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Abstract	
 
The economic crisis in Europe is often articulated as a direct consequence of Lehman 
Brothers’ collapse. Yet it was only in Europe that the real economic crisis was sustained 
in a peculiar, prolonged way. In this comparative study of the EU-27, I examine the 
different manifestations of the crisis with an emphasis on employment, marginalisation 
and inequality.  
Questions	
How to locate the crisis and the people the most affected by it; how can different policy 
responses (stimulation, social investment, active labour market policies) be viewed in 
connection with the crisis? 
Methods	
Using multilevel methods I analyse how individual experiences are linked to and 
explained by national differences. Multiple correspondence analysis is used to model 
subjective experiences. 
Results	
First, there is no correlation between fiscal, financial and welfare-related aspects of the 
crisis. Therefore, the imbalances of the public economy do not straightforwardly justify 
the recent cuts to social protection.  
 
Second, and coincidently, in countries where expenditure on social protection has been 
maintaned, economic difficulties have been less emphatic. Non-social stimulation bears 
no similar benefits.   
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Third, in the so-called post-Fordist, education-intensive economies the subjective 
effects of the crisis are systematically stronger. These effects are the most emphatic 
among the young, indicating vast sustained consequences into adulthood. 
 
However, the attitudes of young adults are straying further. The unemployed young and 
those working in fixed-term contracts relate differently to insecurity, lacking shared, 
generation-wide experiences and representations of conflict. 
 
Conclusions	
Qualitative changes in the conditions of work make the crisis present everywhere in 
Europe, including Protestant countries where the effects of the banking crisis were 
limited. As a possible alternative explanation my thesis then frames the crisis as a crisis 
of ‘post-Fordist’ work, asking whether it is primarily ‘financial’ except as a rhetorical 
construct. I then discuss its broad implications to welfare and inter-generational equity. 
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Introduction	
 
On 1 June 2007, Lucas Papademos was still happily unaware of the coming nightmare 
in Greece. As Vice President of the European Central Bank (ECB), this Greek banker 
began his speech with the following words: 
 
Being in Athens, it seems appropriate to start with a reference to a great thinker who 
established his Lyceum not far from this auditorium: Aristotle once said “We are what 
we repeatedly do. Excellence, then, is not an act, but a habit”. (European Central 
Bank, 2007).  
 
Only two months later, on 9 August 2007, the French bank BNP Paribas had frozen 
the withdrawals from three of its funds due to heavy exposure to the subprime market. 
The ECB, the lender of last resort, infused the market with €94.8 billions of liquidity.  
 
It turned out that this monetary ‘easing’ soon became that ‘habit’ Papademos discussed 
about—a series of ECB-interventions followed at a scale beyond all expectations. And 
even if the first turbulence was subsequently contained, confidence was swept away. 
Like falling domino pieces, a series of bank failures resulted. After the later collapse of 
Lehman Brothers, the US government bailed out two of the largest mortgage-backed 
security holders, Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae. Yet despite the refinancing operations 
by the ECB, the EU conducted no similar centrally organised intervention to bail out 
the banking sector, possibly explaining why the crisis here became so costly (cf.  
Langley, 2008).  
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Before discussing this fare, the above narrative already combines two sets of questions: 
what did cause the crisis and what should governments do about it? The two might 
appear to be essentially the same question, when looking at the crisis from only a 
technical point of view. For example, it is argued that the ‘cognitive interdependencies’ 
behind the ‘CDS’ and the ‘ABX’ devices that made the derivatives market collapse 
(MacKenzie, 2012; also Beunza and Stark, 2012; Bryan et al., 2012; Davies and 
McGoey, 2012)—as if the right response would stem from the elimination of these 
failures. But even from the technical point of view such regulatory interventions as the 
recently introduced Basel III standards1 are somewhat controversial (this is illustrated 
for example by the adoption of counter-cyclical capital buffers based on the 
controversial Hodrick–Prescott filter). This highlights the fact that whatever caused the 
crisis is not inevitably a proper source of a cure. 
 
The connection between the effects and the causes of the crisis is no less ambiguous 
when the crisis is being framed from a broader, non-technical point of view. In 
particular, crisis policies cannot be restricted to the attempts to undo what was caused 
by the ‘misruled’ (Engelen et al., 2012) experts behind the so-called ‘financialisation’ 
process—a process whereby an increasing number of relations and contracts become 
sold as financial assets, in the amount of now over thirty times the global GDP (Ertürk 
et al., 2008; Engelen et al., 2010).  
 
Moreover, it is possible that there is no single crisis to speak of. If economic sociology 
considers the economy as being socially ‘embedded’ (cf. Granovetter, 1985), the 
framings of the crisis are not independent of the social and cultural contexts (Castel, et 
al. 2012). In particular, the fate of the crisis is not economically determined, but there is 
substantial potential for contingency and political freedom. This was proved by Iceland 
where the socialisation of financial losses was refused (e.g., Ragnarsdóttir et al., 2013). 
 
It is then worth rethinking about the crisis conceptually before engaging with its actual, 
empirical contents. This is because identifying the current phenomena as ‘a crisis’ is 
used to structure and control contingency and in order to denounce others’ freedom. 
Originating from the Greek phrase krinô, a crisis indeed refers to the feeling of the need 
 20 
to ‘judge’, ‘cut’ or ‘decide’—a ‘diagnostic of the present’ that does not need to be instant 
but that may emerge over a prolonged period of time (Roitman, 2011: 3; also Gramsci, 
1971: 275–6).  
 
Yet, even if a crisis sustained over time, it also refers to the condensation of time as its 
normative ideal: a moment when decision (about the future) is due (Koselleck, 2006: 
360); a crisis is overshadowed by the ‘compulsion to judge and act under the pressure of 
time’ (Koselleck, 2002: 244). This, in turn, requires belief. It makes any crisis be ‘of 
theological derivation’ (Toscano, 2014: 1025): during a crisis the ‘structure of 
possibility’, time, is still open (cf. Eco, 1984: 112). In particular, the history of the crisis 
is more contingent than in the US, where crises are traditionally overshadowed by 
resolution and reassurance instead.  
 
But it is also possible to make a less subjective, less epochal reading of the crisis. 
Habermas (1973: 1) indeed defines a crisis as an ‘objective force that deprives a subject 
of some part of his normal sovereignty’. He distinguishes between ‘rationality’, 
‘legitimation’ and ‘motivation crises’, all of which can be viewed as currently present in 
Europe. What is sociologically crucial is that the various constructions of the crisis (e.g., 
‘global’, European)—beliefs that something needs to be done—then emerge in support 
of specific interests, which we will discuss in the context of the welfare project.  
 
The crisis can also be viewed as a ‘boundary-object’ drawing together groups, say 
bankers and workers, who would otherwise cease to communicate (Bowker and Star, 
1999). The attributed causes of the crisis then play only an instrumental role in this 
process. And given the ‘significance of political bodies for the economic order’ (Weber, 
1978: 173)—say social policy—the affinities of the crisis are not restricted ‘epistemic 
communities’ and expertise but bear democratic relevance (e.g., Haas, 1992; Dale, 2002; 
Woods, 2005).  
 
The question of causes (were the crisis caused by the few hundred ‘reckless’ bankers like 
some rush to conclude, e.g., Therborn, 2013) is then less interesting than the question 
of how the causes are framed and attributed in order to pursue change. Explanations of 
 21 
the crisis based on bankers’ ‘greed’ are loose: such bankers have always existed. Why 
now, we should instead ask; what makes the current political and technical embeddings 
of banking today so different?  
 
The systemic risks induced in the derivatives markets over the past two decades explain 
the timing only partially, in terms of the ‘formal power’ of money; they ignore the 
question of the ‘substantive’ fluctuations in the credibility of money that are needed to 
explain why the crisis emerged in 2008 and did not generally continue, say, in 2014 
when the size of the derivatives market was even higher (cf. Weber, 1978: 178; also 
Polanyi, 1944). From the latter perspective it is impossible to say whether the financial 
industry ‘caused’ the crisis, or if it only emerged as a reaction to some more pervasive 
changes in the economic infrastructure, including cyclical tendencies (e.g., Massey, 
1988: 83) and changes in the organisation of labour. For example Pothis Lysandrou 
(2011) reflects the increasing global inequalities as an engine driving the crisis. 
Moreover, if the efficient market hypothesis holds sway, the turbulence should be 
viewed as a sign or consequence of the trouble in the real economy, but not directly as 
their cause.  
  
Therefore, there is no single subject of the crisis, and possibly not even a single crisis in 
Europe. Instead of seeking to identify these disparate crises, it is more fruitful to ask 
who exactly bear their consequences: who their subjects are. They are those suffering 
from the employment crisis, from welfare spending cuts and from the deterioration of 
the public economy; they are the ones who are ‘responsible’.  
 
These subjects of ‘the global’ crisis are then local (or localisable) in at least two ways. 
First, there is no ‘global’ subject of deprivation but depression is experienced in actual 
contexts. Second, illustrating the lag in policy responses under the ‘multilayered’ 
government of the EU (Marks et al., 1996), the unemployment-effect became prolonged 
particularly in Europe even if the early unemployment-effect was modest there in 
comparison to the US (Appelbaum, 2011; also Lallement, 2011). The common 
currency-zone has also undermined the elasticity of the labour costs in result of which 
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the spreading of the unemployment crisis has been unequal as illustrated in Figure 1 (cf. 
Rosamond, 2000; Walters, 2004).  
 
 
Figure 1. The effect of the crisis on unemployment. Countries with a higher effect are indicated 
by darker colours (goo.gl/jTRxC2). 
 
Last but not least, the crisis of youth is one of the carrying themes of this study. First, 
youth unemployment rates have now hit over 50 % in Spain and Greece. To assess the 
specificity of this group, most effects and crisis-interactions are expressed separately for 
the youth (18–29 year-olds) in the analysis. Furthermore, youth plays the main role not 
only in the context of the current crisis but also in relation to the changing nature of 
work and wellbeing (cf. Hammer ed, 2003; Bradley and van Hoof eds, 2005)—the 
ninth chapter addresses this by asking whether the crisis of youth can actually emerge as 
a coherent, generational experience (e.g., Edmunds and Turner, 2002).  
 
Youth then also plays another, more methodological role. This is because the changes in 
personal transitions of young adults (e.g., domestic, school to work) can be used as 
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indicators of broader social transitions. In particular, many of the effects like those 
related to unemployment (cf. Verick, 2009), the high number of fixed term contracts 
(Gebel, 2010), but also the ones concerning the so-called ‘post-Fordist’ societies 
specifically (see Chapter 9), are exaggerated among the youth—an age cohort that could 
then be viewed as pivotal to understanding the changing ‘divides’ of society (e.g., Jones, 
2002). Including older adults, on the other hand, allows contextualising the effects 
specific to youth: in addition to comparing the general effect in 2007 and 2012, 
considering the youth-effect adds another dimension to the temporality of the crisis, 
referring to long-term patterns of economic socialisation.  
 
However, I do not attempt to produce a general theory of economic crises: the interest 
lies in the current crisis and in Europe as its institutionally and culturally peculiar 
context. In this sense, the study is idiographic instead of seeking to discover law-like, 
nomothetic truths about the crisis. Yet the current crisis is a particularly fruitful case 
permitting us to speculate on several broader themes including social policy and its 
relevance to the changing dynamics of the global economy.  
 
European	Crisis	
While focusing on the interactions between national and personal experiences, we 
should not disavow the particularly ‘European’ characteristics of the sovereign-debt 
crisis. As the Harvard economists Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff (2009) 
demonstrate, if anything it is the long history of sovereign defaults that encapsulates the 
conflicted ‘habits’ of Europe. Papademos must have known that post-Medievally 
'Greece found itself virtually in continual default' (ibid., xxx), whereas France defaulted 
eight times and Spain six times prior to 1800. Only for a few decades ‘Protestant’ 
prudence has dominated Europe and its sovereign-bond markets. 
 
If ‘history’ then is the ‘true unconscious’, as Émile Durkheim (1977: 11–12) argues, one 
cannot understand the drives behind the debt-crisis outside these peculiar roots of 
European governance. In particular, ‘crisis-thinking’ generally became common in 
eighteenth century Europe. This is the time when ‘political theology’ was altered 
(Koselleck, 2004: 236): the eschatological tone of the fear of ‘Last Judgment’ was 
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replaced by recurring inter-governmental conflict (Foucault, 2009). Framing society in 
terms of a crisis made it possible to think about alternative futures while the role of 
religion at the same time started dissipating (Koselleck, 1988).  
 
Given this long history of conflict, it is not the overall level of debt2 but its increasingly 
diffuse distribution that is worrying. Sovereign-bond rates surged particularly in 
Catholic countries, whereas the near zero rates of the Protestant ‘AAA-countries’ have 
allowed countries like Germany and Finland a financial ‘free ride’ (with even negative 
interest rates). The ‘hair cut’ of Greek bonds in 2012 was viewed as a transfer of capital 
from rich to poor, but given the imbalances in refinancing costs the overall direction of 
financial transfers is the opposite. It is precisely these imbalances that then question the 
elasticity of the European economy as a whole, in result of which the 2015 
unemployment rates are now twice as high in Europe (10 %) as in the US (5 %). Yet, 
especially the German economy seems to have ‘benefited’ from the crisis (or at least 
from the associated imbalances), given how the unemployment rates there fell from 8 % 
to 5 %, contrasting with 2012 rates of Spain (25 %), Greece (24 %), Portugal (16 %), 
Croatia (16 %), Latvia (15 %) and Ireland (15 %).  
 
Also the youth unemployment rates, pivotal to the long-term effects of the crisis have 
become multiple. They were the highest in Greece, Spain, Ireland and Latvia, in all of 
which they are at least twice the adult rates. Also, in all these countries austerity has also 
been driven by debt, either because of excess debt (Catholic) or given the moral 
considerations and fiscal prudence (in Protestant Latvia).  Regardless of whether the 
reasons are economic or moral, ordinary people now pay for losses for the benefit of 
those speculative investors, who actually ‘made’ money out of the crisis. Unlike the real 
economic crisis, the ‘financial’ one is rather like a zero-sum game: one’s win is the other 
one’s loss.  
 
It is not only financial speculators but other governments, like Germany, who actually 
‘profit’ from financial imbalances. By contrast, the ‘crisis-countries’ have relied on 
emergency funding from the IMF and many of them have been under direct control by 
the ‘Troika’ (EC, ECB and IMF). Overall, Europe is overshadowed by the lack of 
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political will to intervene the growing imbalances at the federal level. However, the 
resulting austerity is not restricted to particular contexts but the collapse of aggregate 
demand spreads out rather ‘epidemiologically’ even in countries like Germany and 
Finland, however cheap their debt servicing costs. 
 
Four	Narratives	of	Austerity	
To illustrate the real economic difficulties resulting from this epidemic sprawl of 
austerity, let me briefly discuss austerity programs in the four most critical contexts, 
where the youth unemployment rates were the highest in 2011. Latvia suffered from 
economic collapse early on, with 24 % drop in GDP by 2009. This post-socialist 
country had relied on Swedish banks like Swedbank and SEB; the financial crisis 
resulted in a large withdrawal of their funds overseas. The country, however, decided 
not to devaluate its own currency but honoured its obligations instead in order to be 
awarded with loans by the IMF and the EU: its subjugation to the international rule 
was ‘voluntary’ in this respect.   
 
In result, Latvia slashed its public spending in order to lower the budgetary deficit to 
under 3 % of GDP. Public sector pays were cut by between 30 and 50 %, income tax 
increased from 23 to 26 % and value-added tax hiked from 18 to 21 %. Furthermore, 
more than half of the 56 hospitals in Latvia were closed down. Many other Eastern 
European countries have followed a similar though less exaggerated path (cf. Fóti et al 
2005; Baranowska et al., 2011). Yet over the past couple of years the Latvian economy 
has been growing, although the fall in youth unemployment rates is in part explained by 
high emigration rates.  
  
In contrast, in Ireland the causes of the crisis reflect its emergence as a financial centre a 
few years earlier. The drop in GDP affected it more directly, contrasting with the 
indirect effect of the withdrawal of Swedish capital in Latvia. Subsequently, the IMF 
signed off loans to Ireland amounting to 3.9 billion euro followed by an EU/IMF 
bailout worth 85 billion euro in 2010. In exchange, Ireland trimmed its deficit by 6 
billion euro in 2011. Its public sector pays were cut by at least 5%, which is, however, 
quite modest in comparison to Latvia. Yet when it comes to welfare Ireland has adopted 
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a more inclusive approach to tackle its growing youth unemployment problem. The 
welfare costs have also increased more than in other critical contexts. 
 
Greece is a case in point on its own right. The first austerity package implemented in 
early 2010 consisted of a pay freeze to all government employees, a 10 % cut in bonuses, 
cuts in overtime compensation, the firing of public employees and reduction of public 
work-related travel. The second austerity package, in March 2010, aimed to save 
another €4.8 billion, including a 7 % cut to public and private salaries and additional 
cuts to bonuses and value-added-tax hikes. Not much later, in May 2010, €38 billion 
budget cut was followed as wages, allowances, and pensions were all downsized. The 
fourth package, 'mesoprothesmo', took place in June 2011 accompanied with 24-hour 
strikes and massive protests after the privatisation of government property worth 50 
billion euros. The fifth package consisted of a 22 % cut to the minimum wage previously 
of 750 euro a month, a cut of 150,000 jobs by 2015, pension and holiday bonus cuts, 
health and defence spending cuts, privatisation worth €15 billion and so forth. The sixth 
austerity package was passed in November 2012, including structural reforms, the 
deregulation of professions and of the production of goods, services and energy, as well 
as the creation of a new body to manage state procurement.  
 
The drama of austerity did not end there but two other packages were installed in 2013 
and 2014, including the lay-off of 15 000 public employees, pay freezes, and cuts to 
government expenses like health care. In 2014, the economy was finally picking up as 
the bond rates simultaneously fell. The preliminary hope was short-lived, however, as 
even before the electoral victory of the leftist Syriza coalition, the looming expectations 
of political change made the Troika change its attitude3. A third wave of depression has 
since followed, as the country turned effectively into a cash economy (Figure 2). The 
third bailout in July 2015 led to two additional austerity packages, including tax 
increases, reforms to the pensions system, and the privatisation of €50 billion worth 
public property.  
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Figure 2. Most deposits were withdrawn from Greek banks by July 2015, while the amount of 
cash in circulation increased proportionally (Central Bank of Greece, the ECB, Barclays 
Research). 
 
In Spain, following the example of Greece, the current account crisis is partly related to 
high bond rates that resulted from financial speculation. However, the sovereignty of 
the Spanish government was never questioned as in Greece; its banking system, often 
regarded as ‘too-big-to-bail’, seems to have survived the worst despite the housing 
bubble. Austerity in Spain, similar to Latvia, has then been more ‘voluntary’ including 
an 8 % spending cut in 2010, and later €27 billion cuts including salary freezes and the 
reduction of departmental budgets by 16.9%. Yet, following the recently launched 
quantitative easing program of the ECB, even in Spain the long-term bond yields have 
now fallen under 2 % and the economy is finally recovering. This is sometimes taken as 
a sign to legitimise austerity, but the modest growth could also be attributed to cyclical 
effects and to the altered, monetary policy easing of the ECB exercised in all countries 
but Greece. However, the youth unemployment problem remains enormous.  
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Methods	Used	in	the	Analysis	
As illustrated by the four narratives above, there are any number of ways to address the 
historical coexistence of the production crisis, the public debt crisis and the age of 
austerity. Yet the social political issues are often similar regardless of the causes behind 
fiscal imbalances and tensions. In effect, the salary cuts, the disappearance of both 
public and private jobs, and the particular effect of the crisis on the ‘service economy’, 
are all themes that question the formerly assumed structures of economic socialisation. 
At the same time, they are particularly relevant from the point of view of individuals, 
which makes it necessary to address these phenomena at multiple levels.  
 
To address my research question of how to locate the crisis and how different policy 
responses can be viewed in connection with it, I approach the crisis at different levels by 
using the following methods. First, factorial methods are used to understand differences 
in the national level data, as I will analyse in Chapters 1 and 2. Second, multilevel 
methods (generalised linear mixed modelling) form the methodological core of my study. 
These methods are used to combine national level predictors with individual crisis 
outcomes, and they will be applied in Chapters 5 to 7 and again in Chapter 9. Third, I 
apply multiple correspondence analysis (MCA) in several occasions to model individual 
level data. 
 
These methods are best suited for the following reasons. First, the effects of the crisis 
and the associated policies are relevant from the point of view of ordinary individuals, 
and yet the prevalence of different effects varies across national contexts. To address 
these concerns, I have used data collected at both levels. The multilevel methods allow 
these two levels of analysis to be combined as I discuss more thoroughly in Chapter 4, 
which is the main methodological chapter of this study (for a technical discussion see 
Appendix 8).  
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Table 1. Sets of data and methods used for analysing the crisis at different levels.  
Level Data Methods Year  Position 
National differences: 
Factors of the crisis 
Eurostat, UN, 
etc. 
Correlations,  
Factor analysis 
2007 and 2012 Chapters 1 and 2 
Outcomes of the 
crisis, located at 
multiple levels 
EQLS  
EWCS 
Multilevel analysis 2007/2008 and  
2011/2012 (EQLS) 
2005 and 2010 
(EWCS) 
Chapters 5 to 7, 9 
Individual 
differences:  
Affects of the crisis 
Work-related affects 
EQLS 
EWCS 
MCA 2007/2008 and 
2011/2012 (EQLS) 
2005 and 2010 
(EWCS) 
Chapters 6 and 8 
Epistemological 
representations, 
ethics of debt 
Eurobarometer MCA 2011 and 2012 Chapter 3 
 
In addition, as illustrated in Table 1 above, different sets of data are analysed separately 
with methods appropriate to the particular level of analysis. The national level 
comparison focuses on various themes related to the economy, policy and equality. In 
particular, the factorial methods allow a number of variables to be expressed by only a 
few key dimensions, also demonstrating the extent to which the three themes overlap. 
The results of these analyses—the different ‘factors’ of the national economic crises—
are helpful in forming some tentative hypotheses about the nature of the crisis. They are 
also used as background variables in some of the later multilevel analyses. 
 
By contrast, individual level data consists of various surveys reflecting respondents’ 
socio-economic situations, how they subjectively experience the economy, and their 
specific knowledge about the crisis. Multiple correspondence analysis (MCA) is suitable 
for analysing these sets of data for at least two reasons. First, like with the factorial 
methods, MCA packs up a range of variables into a few key dimensions. This is 
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necessary as many of the subjective aspects of the crisis are quite complex and the 
MCA-constructions give a more reliable picture of the overall crisis experiences. 
Second, unlike the factorial methods, MCA applies to categorical data which is very 
important in social scientific research, as individual experiences cannot be expressed 
numerically. 
 
I will conduct the most important multiple correspondence analysis in Chapter 8, where 
a five-dimensional model reflecting the different ‘affects’ of the crisis is constructed. The 
resulting constructs are in turn analysed by multilevel methods in Chapter 9. I will also 
apply multiple correspondence analysis earlier in Chapters 3 and 6, but these analyses 
are rather peripheral to the main argument, focusing on two additional sets of individual 
level data. Therefore, a more thorough theoretical discussion of multiple 
correspondence analysis is left to Chapter 8 (for a technical discussion, see Appendix 9). 
 
I have divided the analysis so that each chapter focuses principally around a single set of 
data and applies only a single method of analysis (Table 1). In Part I, I will focus on the 
national level differences based on data collected from Eurostat (in addition to two 
Eurobarometer surveys). Part II forms the core of multilevel analysis, focusing on the 
national and group-level differences in connection to more or less objective crisis-
outcomes. These analyses are based on two surveys collected by the Eurofound: 
European Quality of Life Survey (EQLS) and the European Work Conditions Survey 
(EWCS). In Part III, in turn, the focus will again be on the individuals, but this time 
from the point of view of subjective experiences.  
 
Finally, it is worth noting that in some instances the results of either the factorial 
analyses or the MCA are used as part of multilevel analyses. However, these occasions 
are clearly indicated in the text and they are included mainly to evaluate the validity of 
the main argument. In most cases, it is safe to ignore them should the reader find the 
combination of methods difficult to follow. Only the combined analysis in Chapter 9, 
where the different ‘affects’ of the crisis will be analysed by multilevel methods, is 
central to the main argument.  
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An	‘Epidemiological’	Approach	
There is evidence that social expenditure is pressured in all contexts, even if it is unclear 
whether all forms of welfare connect to the crisis similarly. However, the question 
evoked the employment-crisis—the one footed in all these contexts—relates to whether 
work itself any longer shelters and accommodates people as before, that is, whether it 
exists as an inevitable social ‘container’ or as a form of ‘social citizenship’ (Castel, 2003: 
243). It appears that problems associated with work have spread out rather 
‘epidemiologically’ across Europe, even if in country-specific ways.  
 
To conceptualise the relevance of the multilevel approach more philosophically, from a 
post-structuralist perspective, the crisis is not ‘contained’ by national contexts any more 
than by concepts such as work. Even if such ‘actors’ like nation states or work as a 
category are part of its articulation, there is possibly a bidirectional relationship between 
them and particularly between two levels of the crisis: personal experiences both reflect 
and conduct national economic changes. Multilevel methods can be used to identify the 
complex ways in which these two may interact. In particular, the boundaries and 
meanings of national contexts are themselves redrawn during economic conflict (cf. 
Tenbrück, 1994). 
 
This comparative study is then neither purely ‘endogenous’ (based on within country 
processes) or ‘exogenous’ (referring to international logic)—a distinction often used in 
comparative welfare research (Alapuro et al. 1985; Øyen 1990). I also argue that there is 
a certain kinship between post-structuralist ideas and multilevel methods despite the 
fact that the data itself is assumed to be hierarchical in the latter (multilevel methods 
help to articulate such hierarchies as part of the so-called ‘actor-networks’; Law, 1992; 
Latour, 2005).  
 
The ability to cross the boundaries between levels has also made multilevel methods 
pivotal in epidemiological research. Instead of looking for ’endemic’ explanations of the 
crisis, the social epidemiological approach encompasses the idea of treating the crisis itself 
as an assemblage of various phenomena and on various levels—a process involving 
’contamination’,  ’proliferation’ and entrenchment. The crisis is thus assumed to 
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superimpose no single core logic but is mapped out through various ports of entry, thus 
combining various sources of data at different levels. It also refers to two different 
temporal perspectives: the long-term processes that have made the crisis possible and 
those historical discontinuities that interrupted the prevailing modes of action, that is, 
the crisis as an ‘event’. By contrast, explanations based solely on economic causation (cf. 
Davies, 2010) tend to overlook the actual agency of both nation-states and the people. 
 
A reductionist view on agency is typical not only of neoclassical economics but also of 
discourses on economic governance that articulate the crisis as a regulatory failure (e.g., 
Blyth 2002; Dale 2004; Woods, 2005). By contrast, from the sociological perspective 
the ‘economic’ itself is socio-culturally embedded (Emmisson, 1985; Massey, 1988), and so 
are its crises (cf. Castells et al., 2012). Economic sociology thus begins with a paradigm 
different from economics, recognising the variety of agencies and by asking about their 
historical and social origins. It further goes beyond institutions (cf. Foucault, 2009: 
162–164), seeking to understand how institutions themselves gain power and are 
instituted.  
 
Given that I draw on multiple theoretical discourses, sources of data, and at different 
levels, the task is certainly no less difficult for the reader than it has been to the author. 
Few scholars apply paradigms such distinct as multilevel analysis and actor-network 
theory; some might even consider them as incommensurate. The literatures I engage 
also cover a range of fields from neoclassical economics to social policy. Yet I would like 
to believe that these challenges are justifiable by the fact that the crisis itself, by its very 
nature, is diverse, dispersed and even an elusive concept. It spreads out epidemically; it 
affects people at multiple levels and by referring to a variety of actors and institutions. 
Multilevel methods are used to make sense out of this critical, if not ‘chaotic’ epidemic 
bringing disorder into the heart of the European economy.  
 
Traces,	Performances	and	Actor-Networks	
Even if combining and testing a variety of discourses and theoretical ideas, the project is 
at the same time empiricist. The crisis is viewed as an amalgam of social phenomena 
that cross the boundaries between the ’economic’, ’social’ and even the ’psychic’. All of 
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these aspects are addressed by asking both what is common about the crisis but also how 
each context differs.  
 
One of the themes particularly relevant from the ‘material-semiotic’ perspectives of 
sciences studies (Law, 2008) is then the question of what is performed in the crisis—not 
necessarily by ‘the crisis’ itself (which is an incoherent actor) but in the way in which the 
crisis itself is being devised in economic, political and social discourses, technologies and 
assemblages. Previously such approaches inspired by Barry Barnes' sociology have 
evolved mainly in the context of the material-technological embodiments of finance 
(e.g., MacKenzie, 2006), or more philosophically in respect to the cultures of 
genderification for example (Butler, 1993), but rarely in the context of broader 
assemblages that concern economic (cf. Mirowski and Nik-Khan, 2007) or social policy. 
 
Therefore, in addition to material technologies, the crisis encompasses a variety of 
economic, political and social ideas—‘elective affinities’ as Weber used to call them 
(Thomas, 1985). The crisis does not only refer to financialisation and ‘economisation’ 
(Çalişkan and Callon, 2009, 2010), or to their failure. Instead, economic and financial 
actors are part of the network by which the ideas and interests driven in the name of the 
crisis are either embodied or performed. They do so at various levels and in reference to 
different temporal perspectives. Other actors involve ordinary individuals but also the 
public, or rather the various assemblages representing the ‘public’ (e.g., public economy, 
government but also financial markets, national economy, and the more rooted 
embodiments of participatory democracy). 
 
‘Performativity’ is thus a crucial theme whenever we are discussing crises, even if 
Roitman (2011: 2) phrases it with a slightly different wording: that a crisis is ‘a logical 
observation that generates meaning in a self-referential system’. On the other hand, I do 
not wish to restrict the concept only to the domain where economic sociology most 
often applies it—the social studies of finance and its focus on material technologies. 
Instead, in my view, the way in which crisis-discourses are ‘performed’ in society is 
constitutive to themes like policy and power. At the end of this study we arrive at the 
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question of how the ‘public’ is being performed, and whether political change imposed 
by the crisis is counter-performative.  
 
Yet the crisis itself is not a single, identical phenomenon in all countries, but its history 
should be viewed as open; no more does it mean the same thing to different individuals. 
Rather, the very identity of the crisis is an empirical question. In particular, it is crucial 
to understand the subjects of the crisis: whose misery it is that is actually ‘performed’. In 
this direction, I am not only looking at the crisis as a pure ‘performance’ but this study 
also constructs the crisis itself as an embedded object of analysis. In part, I follow the 
more traditional economic sociological literature (e.g., Polanyi, 2001, Granovetter 
1985). ‘Performativity’ is rather an additional theme that is helpful in taking a critical 
distance towards the main narrative of my study, with an emphasis more rooted or 
democratic representations of the crisis (Chapter 3).  
 
Yet the European crisis of debt is particularly illustrative of these ‘constitutive’—or in 
Jane Austin’s vocabulary ‘performative’—aspects of economic crises. Indeed, historically 
such crises seem to be particularly relevant in Europe (cf. Koselleck, 1988). By 
considering individuals as inhabiting not only different countries but Europe as a whole, 
my approach compares with Göran Therborn’s (1995) attempt to understand Europe as 
a continent of conflict—something to metaphorise the ’present’ of the world history as 
such (also Miller and Rose, 2008). The contemporary crisis in Europe can be regarded 
as encapsulating something essential about the global crisis—in an exaggerated and 
prolonged way.  
 
Besides the two, individual and contextual tracings of the crisis, post-structuralism also 
encompasses the ’holistic’4 question about how to map the variety of changes, 
performances and processes together. I do not assume that there should be any single 
answer to the question about the subjects of the crisis, or that there should be any one 
way to translate the crisis into a single ‘actor-network’. Instead, similarly as the historical 
emergence of crisis-thinking in Europe spatialised the question of judgment, it is pivotal 
to understand (and map) the current crisis similarly as a spatial process—even if the 
chosen coordinates are conceptually rather than geographically grounded.  
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Each one of the multilevel models themselves could be viewed as such a mapping, but I 
have approached the problem of cartography also from an alternative, less hierarchical 
perspective. In particular, I follow Pierre Bourdieu’s use of multiple correspondence 
analysis (MCA). His own picture is, however, still rather ’endemic’ in respect to national 
contexts, whereas my combined use of the multilevel and MCA-methodologies is one 
way to take Bourdieu’s insight forward—particularly in the direction of ’transnational’ 
comparisons (Nowicka, 2013; Nukaga, 2013). At the same time, I emphasise the 
relevance of social change and the ‘dynamics of the field’ (Bottero & Crossley, 2011; 
Beer, 2013; Savage & Silva, 2013) instead of considering economic ‘dispositions’ as 
embedded within a stable or static field. This is extremely important when analysing 
crises rather than a status quo. Furthermore, unlike Bourdieu’s (1993: 101) ’objectivating’ 
analysis, the resulting abstractions are subject to methodological discussion (on semiotic 
methods, see Greimas and Courtés, 1979: 108), thus combining quantitative and 
qualitative paradigms at least on the level of groups and contexts.  
 
What is the most peculiar about this ‘cartography’ (e.g., Meyer and Molneux-Hodgson, 
2010) is that it has the power to decentre causal, more or less ‘economic’ narratives about 
the crisis. The focus is thus on national ‘dispositions’ as measured in various affects of the 
social and economic crisis, and on how these dispositions change. This does not target 
to produce a ’systemic’ perspective in the sense of Bourdieu’s ‘fields’ or Wallerstein’s 
(1974) world-system/dependency theory (also Ragin and Walton, 1990), but instead to 
understand how ‘systems’ like those related to welfare are affected and questioned by the 
crisis. 
  
A	Brief	Review	of	Literatures	
The current economic crisis in Europe is a historically peculiar case, and apart from the 
recent special issue of Sociology on the ‘global’ crisis (e.g., Dinerstein et al., 2014), the 
crisis itself bears no extensive sociological literature. Throughout the work, I refer to 
sociological literatures in related themes, whereas in the crisis-context I rely on other 
fields including economics, social policy and social studies of finance. I have here listed 
some of the most important ones.  
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The	‘Global’	Crisis	
Empirical research in the ‘global’ crisis focuses on two distinct perspectives. The first 
one relates to quantitative finance and draws on either economic governance (Engelen 
et al., 2012) or science and technology studies. For example, MacKenzie (2012) 
diagnoses the crisis from the point of view of ABX and CDS devices. Research in these 
directions considers how the ability of the market to produce knowledge was questioned 
as the 'unexpected' emerged (Beunza and Stark, 2012; Bryan et al., 2012; Davies and 
McGoey, 2012). Also Grahame Thompson (2009: 520–521) handles the crisis literature 
from the financial point of view by identifying two dominant meta-narratives of the 
crisis. The first, 'economic' one, frames the crisis as a 'conjunctural rupture' in which 
'multiple overlapping times, arrangements and unstable combinations of circumstances' 
occur. Davies’ (2010) study on different explanations of the crisis falls here. The second, 
more 'critical' voice, adopts an 'ideological' stance on 'neo-liberalism', but seldom 
suffices as an exercise in empirical sociology.  
 
Another section of literature approaches the crisis from the point of view of real 
economic and employment crises, and thus focuses on its ‘public’ more than ‘financial’ 
aspects. As mentioned above, Lysandrou (2011) reflects global inequalities as the engine 
of the crisis. Most research, however, attempts to frame the employment crisis more 
locally (see for example Baranowska et al., 2011, Gebel, 2010; O'Reilly et al., 2011; 
Verick, 2009), or by comparing its contents (Appelbaum, 2011; Lallement, 2011). Local 
subjectivities also played a crucial role in the case of Iceland, where the government 
subsequently refused to cover the losses of foreign speculators (Ragnarsdóttir et al., 
2013). It has further been suggested that the ‘cultures of the crisis’ should be considered 
as variable (Castell et al., 2012). Regarding research on previous economic crises, Glen 
Elder’s (1971) Children of the Great Depression is worth mentioning as a particular 
generational perspective, in addition to Karl Polanyi’s (2001 [1944]) The Great 
Transformation that serves as an ethnographic interpretation of Weber’s ‘substantive’, 
non-formalist understanding about the economy.  
Debt	
From the conceptual point of view, the question of debt is also pivotal to the current 
crisis, even if most discourses on debt frame it in the context of personal rather than 
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sovereign-debt, despite that the latter is increasingly pertinent even to ordinary citizens 
today5. The sociology of money (e.g., Simmel, 2004; Zelizer, 1994) is now partly 
replaced and reconfigured by the emerging field of the sociology (e.g., Roitman, 2006; 
2006; Dwyer, McCloud and Hodson, 2011; from the sovereign-debt perspective 
MacKenzie, 2009) and anthropology (Graeber, 2011; Peebles, 2010) of debt, which is 
viewed as constitutive to the historical emergence of money. In addition to speculative 
philosophical diagnoses (Nietzsche, 2003 [1887]; Lazzarato, 2012), there is then 
empirical literature in both the liberating (Nugent, 1996; Truitt, 2007) and burdensome 
or imprisoning (Howe, 1998, Lowrey, 2006, Peebles, 2010, Taussig, 1987) aspects of 
debt, not to mention the moral considerations behind ‘fiscal disobedience’ (Roitman, 
2006).  
 
Debt is, at the same time, what “makes money ‘social’” (Sarthou-Lajus 1997). And as 
opposed to symmetric exchange, debt is an asymmetric relationship between the creditor 
and the debtor. But that money is debt does not necessarily mean that all kind of debt is 
money. This is why my study experiments on the idea that work and labour more 
generally could be viewed as debt or an existential obligation without a direct, 
personified contract. However, literature on such moral framings and sentiments of 
non-economic ‘debt’ is more fragmentary than the literature on money-debt; let me just 
mention Adam Smith (2004 [1759]), Pierre Bourdieu (1984) but also Georges Bataille’s 
(1985 [1927]) illustrative inquiry The Notion of Expenditure, further discussed by Jean 
Baudrillard (2012 [1976]).  
Employment	
Also, the question of work and particularly the divisions of work have been central to 
sociology since at least Durkheim’s Division of Labour in Society. The reality of work is 
now often depicted in micro-level contexts, including ethnographies in manual work 
(Burawoy, 1979), of doctors who perform surgeries and abortions, of household work 
and of phone sex workers (Hess, 2001). This branch of literature focuses largely on the 
'internal state and the internal labour market’ (Burawoy, 2012: 194); it involves 
anthropological representations of work as a life process and a manifestation (and 
exploitation) of ‘viva activa’—the life of action and speech (e.g., Arendt, 2003 [1958]). 
And grounding on Harry Braverman’s (1975) labour process theory, Michael Burawoy 
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then suggests that this reality of work is ‘two-fold’ in a sense that the expropriation of 
surplus value (and life) makes work ’obscure’ and thus employees must be somehow 
‘secured’ by the employer (by the manufacturing of ‘consent’ he argues).   
 
Other and to us more relevant literature, however, approaches the labour market rather 
than work itself. It focuses on what I refer to as the employment process. Traditionally 
there were two generations of such quantitatively oriented research (Savage, 1997: 305), 
often also called as labour market research: the first based on a hierarchical status 
attainment model (Blau and Duncan, 1967) and the latter approaching job market 
stratification by the so-called ‘class structural’ approaches that no longer assumed any 
intrinsic or linear hierarchy of occupation structures (cf. Erikson and Goldthorpe, 
1992).  
 
But employment is also made understandable by the meanings of its lack. 
Unemployment has indeed been studied extensively in Marienthal: The Sociography of an 
Unemployed Community by Lazarsfeld et al. (1972 [1933]), and later in a series of 
comparative studies on the effect of welfare regimes on unemployment-related 
experiences (Gallie and Paugam ed, 2000). The latter in particular serves as an 
interesting pre-crisis context to contrast my work with. The effects of long-term 
unemployment have also been studied from the point of view of the so-called ‘hysteresis 
effects’ that reflect the difficulties and structural disintegration resulting from prolonged 
unemployment (Hauser et al., 2000: 37; also Blanchard and Summers, 1986) as 
illustrated for example by the economic depression in Finland in the 1990’s (e.g., 
Machin and Manning, 1999). 
 
Two other branches of research focus instead on the changes in the contractual form of 
labour and on the role of the so-called active labour market policies or ALMPs (e.g., 
Boix, 1998; Bonoli, 2010; Vlandas, 2013). Today, available jobs are more often 
temporary or otherwise ‘atypical’ (e.g., Fenton and Dermott, 2006; Schömann et al. 
1998, 139); the labour market is segmented or ‘two-tiered’ (Gash, 2008); and the 
‘entrapment hypothesis’ suggests that people often stick and find it difficult to secure 
permanent jobs after starting in the more ‘precarious’ side of the labour market (Gebel, 
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2010: 641–642). Such a tendency has possibly been furthered by the crisis (Baranowska 
et al., 2011) and/or by official policy recommendations by the EC (Heyes, 2011). 
Studies on the ALMPs also question former welfare research based on the idea of the 
‘decommodification’ of labour—the guarantee of economic means for citizens to opt out 
of work when they consider it necessary’ (e.g., Esping-Andersen, 1990: 23)—and the 
lack of such decommodifying efforts could in part explain the deterioration of the 
contractual form of wage-labour.  
 
In a recent study From Manual Workers to Wage Labourers, French sociologist Robert 
Castel (2003) reflects the changes in the employment process and welfare policy 
historically. What is crucial to his endeavour is that he views work as a ‘right’ rather 
than in terms of exploitation—a disappearing right that then evokes the ‘new social 
question’ (Castel, 2003: 367–444). Given the ’continued deterioration of the conditions 
of wage labour observable since the 1970’s ‘—as often empirically verified by youth 
research (e.g., Bradley and van Hoof, 2005; Evans and Furlong 1997, 17–18; Furlong 
and Cartmel, 2006; Hammer, 2003)—Castel (2003: 3) identifies the reappearance of 
the pre-social state of work and the ‘persistence of traditional tutelages’ that had already 
disappeared (Castel, 2003: 3–5).  
 
Castel (2003: 414) then argues that there is no need to ’draw a distinct hermetic line 
between those who withdraw from the game and those who fall’—the “ ‘ in’s ’ and 
‘ out’s ’ “ of the labour market—but that the unemployed and those in temporary work 
form a group of the ‘supernumeraries’. They are people who suffer from the ‘deficit of 
occupiable places’ at the same time as public welfare is ‘'squeezed to the limit’ (Castel, 
2003: 377).  
 
Their ‘free access to labour’ (Castel, 2003: 3) is undermined simultaneously on two 
fronts. The ’problematic of labour’ associated with the commodification of labour (cf. 
Jessop, 2002; Silver, 2003) could only occur in combination with the ’problematic of 
relief’, that is, the question of decommodification and welfare (Castel, 2003: 4). Without 
the latter the ’right to work’ would not be genuine but only conceal and mystify the 
material and social need to work. Castel then portrays the historical emergence of these 
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two problematics as they span over multiple centuries, at the end of which work 
appeared to shelter people as a form of ‘social citizenship’ as mentioned above. Wage-
labour then evolved as ’a basis for the construction of social rights and duties, 
responsibilities and recognition’, but today the simultaneous ‘subjection and constrains’ 
are increasingly important, narrowing the group to which the institutions of relief apply 
(Castel, 2003: 243, 248–249).  
 
Similarly as Durkheim asked about the divisions of labour, also the types of 
employment are now increasingly divided. These questions are particularly relevant 
during the ’emerging adulthood’ (Tanner and Arnett, 2009) about to enter the job 
market (e.g., Fenton and Dermott, 2006; Lowe and Krahn, 2000; also O’Reilly et al 
2011, 581–582; Scherer, 2005). Even before the crisis, Castel (2003: 377, 408–413) 
anticipated the ‘dual pressures of unemployment and demographic shifts’. Temporary 
workers are argued to be subject not only to insecurity but also stigmatisation (Boyce et 
al., 2007), leading possibly to what Castel calls ‘negative individualism’ that stems ‘from 
the lack of frameworks’. However, as my analysis will demonstrate, negative 
individualism is very differently experienced by the un- and the underemployed, 
questioning the plausibility of the single group of ‘supernumeraries’.  
Inequality		
Inequality is a wide topic originating at least since Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s writings, and 
to some extent all social policy research focuses on inequality. Most emphasis is put on 
‘economic inequality’ (Salverda et al., 2009), and not always in a critical tone as some 
defend the trade-off between economic inequality and efficiency (Welch, 1999), despite 
that this does not explain why many of the more prosperous economies are also quite 
egalitarian (Lindert, 2004). Besides these economising approaches, sociologically there 
are also many other, social and integrative aspects to inequality. Therborn (2013) now 
convincingly argues that differences in income and wellbeing even subject people to an 
actual risk of death.  
 
Yet such differences are recongised as inequalities only as social constructions 
(Therborn, 2013). Traditionally, the constructions have emphasised either the functional 
or conflictual nature of social inequality. In the former direction, I focus particularly on 
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Thomas Piketty’s (2014a) claim that inequality could actually contribute to economic 
stagnation, contrarily to economists’ conventionally held views.  
 
Piketty’s construction of inequality basing on a historical analysis of several centuries is 
particularly relevant in the current context. His account might strike as sometimes 
economistic, focusing on the ‘distribution and redistribution between tax units’ while 
possibly neglecting ‘the important role of social policy’ (Piachaud, 2014: 696). Even so, 
to understand the prospects of social policy in longer economic history, we should not 
ignore that the situation where national growth exceeds the return on equity during the 
twentieth century is historically unique. The wenty first century might bring about a 
decline in growth, and this process could follow and precede the re-emergence of 
growing inequality. As Piketty points out, this is at odds with Kuznets’ conventionally 
accepted theory that higher equality should result as an inevitable consequence of 
economic growth (also Welch, 1999).  
 
Despite these bold and intriguing themes, Piketty’s reception among sociologists is not 
always admiring. It has been argued that Piketty’s use of ‘quantitative’ measures 
overlook the ‘qualitative’ depths of inequality, particularly its temporal and uncertain 
characteristics (Bear, 2014: 639). However, following Pierre Bourdieu’s example, it is 
possible to use quantitative methods for identifying qualitative differences in equality 
and wellbeing.   
 
Indeed, Piketty’s (2014a) account should not only be taken ‘as that of an economist’ and 
the work still covers important themes like the ‘conceptualisation of time and history’ as 
well as that of ‘social classes and privilege’ elaborating a ‘sociology of accumulation’. 
Contrasting with other framings of capitalism, this makes his ‘class analysis’ more fluid 
and opposed to the idea of the economy as a zero-sum game. (Savage, 2014: 590, 600.) 
Despite the ostensible lack of a clear ‘analytical foundation’, Mike Savage (2014: 593) 
praises him particularly for his visualisation of abundant historical data. Furthermore, 
Piketty (2014b: 745–746) himself defines his approach as an ‘exploratory’ one and does 
not make a conclusive argument about the role of inequality in general. Even so, Bear 
 42 
(2014) is quite right in that we should not ignore the ‘changing institutional forms of 
public debt’—a question the crisis has made extremely current.  
Other	literatures	
Finally, my study includes additional branches of literature on themes like the 
transformations of welfare states (e.g., Ellison, 2006; Esping-Andersen, 1990; Myles 
and Quadagno, 2002), financialisation (e.g., Epstein, 2005; Ertürk et al., 2008) and 
economic governance (e.g., Blyth 2002; Haas 1992; Woods 2005)—particularly in the 
EU (Christiansen et al., 2001; Dale, 2004; Marks et al., 1996; Rosamond, 2000; 
Walters, 2004). These literatures are not directly related to the crisis but rather guide 
the methodological choices like the variables used in the analysis.  
 
I also address the affective contents of the economic struggle (e.g., Jahoda, 1992; 1998; 
Kelvin and Jarret, 1985; Warr, 1987; Whelan and McGinnity, 2000), the socialisation 
effects among the youth (De Vreyer et al., 2000) and particularly the psycho-social 
orientation towards social conflict, which refers to the interference of psychological and 
social factors contributing to how an individual perceives or is affected by the crisis. The 
concept then assembles together two perspectives on action, one of which refers to 
personal attitudes, orientations and behaviours, while the other one refers to groups, 
contexts and intersubjective relationships (e.g., DeMause, 2002). These psycho-social 
orientations interestingly parallel David Riesman’s (1950) famous diagnosis The Lonely 
Crowd, which distinguishes between ‘inner-directed’ and ‘other-directed’ orientations as 
sociological ideal types. 
 
To this end, I draw on psychological literature on the internalising/externalising 
reactions to stress, even if I apply them from the point of view of economic and social 
conflict rather than individual developmental trajectories or defence strategies (cf., 
Nezhad et al., 2011; Wilmshurst, 2005). Yet also psychological literature now 
recognises such ‘distal’ moderators as the socio-economic background and social support 
in the emergence of such orientations (e.g., Cramer, 2009; Davidson and Demaray, 
2007).  
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Even if this broad collection of literary sources might appear as eclectic, each approach 
provides a different ‘entry’ to the crisis and is thus important from the post-structuralist 
point of view. In particular, it is possible to use multilevel models to subject a variety of 
discourses to an empirical trial. For example, the notion of inequality is introduced not 
as a way of arguing that inequality should necessarily contribute to the crisis (but see 
Lysandrou, 2011) but in order to understand the types of inequality (e.g., Therborn, 
2013) relevant to data. By combining various blocks of predictors, the multilevel analysis 
is a methodological way for aligning different texts before each other. 
 
Three	Entries	to	Data	
The country-level indicators represent the years 2007 and 2012 and I collected those 
entries individually from sources like Eurostat and the UN. The individual level data is 
based on three surveys, each of which is collected in all EU-countries and with roughly 
similar sample sizes, 1000 respondents per country.  
 
The main set of data—European Quality of Life Survey (EQLS)—is a cross-sectional 
study collected every four years by the European Foundation for the Improvement of 
Living and Working Conditions (Eurofound). The purpose of the data is to ‘examine[] 
both the objective circumstances of European citizens’ and ‘how they feel about those 
circumstances and their lives in general’.  
 
The European Working Conditions Surveys (EWCS) is also collected by Eurofound. It 
focuses on working conditions of both employees and the self-employed across Europe. 
Finally, the third set of data addressing the lay representations of the crisis consists of 
two Eurobarometer surveys (76.1., 2011, 78.1, 2012) collected by the European 
Commission.  
 
As a brief note, the main ethical concerns in survey based research relate to the 
collection of data. These concerns have, in most part, been accounted already by 
Eurofound. One of the most sensitive issues in the data relates to health problems, but 
the data includes only self-assessment variables and no information on actual health 
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problems (e.g., mental or physical). Respondents have also been informed about their 
right to refuse to answer.  
 
Chapter	Outline	
Part	I	
In the first part I will inquire into the different, country-specific aspects of the crisis in 
Europe. Instead of dealing only with separate contexts, the crisis is present everywhere 
but appears in different ways. I will introduce various questions related to actual and 
perceived wellbeing, focusing particularly on the perspective of the state. I will also look 
at which countries may be clustered together based on the perceived effects of the crisis 
and an epistemological analysis.   
 
In the first chapter I will introduce the reader to the idea of studying the crisis both as a 
cross-European phenomenon and as a differential, context-dependent entity. It is 
pivotal to understand the different categorisations of the crisis and whether they gain 
empirical support. It appears that the crisis brought about a bifurcation in the bond 
market that has been detrimental to the economy. However, I will pose particularly the 
question what it is to study the crisis beyond the ‘economic’, that is, by focusing on the 
economy but forgetting about the normative question of efficiency and return.  
 
I will suggest that individual countries have encountered the crisis in three different 
modalities: ‘financial’, ‘fiscal’ and ‘welfare’. I will then discuss several indicators of the 
crisis collected from Eurostat and elsewhere—its quantitative correlates—and contrast 
them with the three modalities of the crisis. Finally, I will address the question of social 
protection and argue that increase in social expenditure stems more likely from health 
care –related costs, even if the crisis has often been used as a frame to justify cuts to 
other kinds of benefits, including compensation for the unemployed. At the same time, 
non-social government expenditure has grown quite systematically in various contexts, 
suggesting that there is ‘room’ to increase public expenditure, whereas the crisis has 
questioned its allocation.  
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The second chapter brings the fiscal, financial and welfare crises in contact with each 
other. In particular, based on the same country-level data, I will construct several 
factorial models to specify national differences. It then appears that the unemployment 
crisis is somewhat independent of the welfare crisis—yet the combination of the two 
axes of the crisis clusters the representatives of different welfare regimes remarkably 
well. The post-Soviet countries are overshadowed by the crisis of emerging welfare, 
whereas those in the North are saturating, but not yet squeezed as are the Southern 
countries associated with a particularly strong, quantitative impact of the crisis.  
 
In the third chapter, I will discuss the lay perspectives and meanings of the crisis as an 
‘object of knowledge’ and as an alternative perspective to the expert discourses 
dominating public discussion. I will emphasise the way the crisis emerges as a 
‘boundary-object’ combining different groups and contexts, considering how expertise 
and awareness themselves are constructed. Basing on Eurobarometer data, technical 
knowledge about the crisis (e.g., knowledge about credit-rating agencies or of EU-wide 
interventions) appears to be somewhat independent of economic and political 
awareness, reflecting the impact of the crisis instead. Economic and political awareness 
in turn shape the perceived futures of the crisis, affecting opinions about its contingency: 
whether or not policy interventions can be used to control the crisis. Such views are also 
associated with specific representations of welfare.  
 
These measures of awareness then indicate that there are actually two overlapping crisis-
representations: the quantitative and the qualitative crises of employment and wellbeing. 
The former cluster is populated by countries standardly associated with the crisis (e.g., 
Greece, Spain and Ireland), whereas the latter category consists of many Protestant 
countries, where unemployment rates have not similarly risen. It is also remarkable that 
different cultural backgrounds (main religion) are further associated with moral 
representations about sovereign-debt and debt-relief: the Protestants are likely to oppose 
financial help and emphasise prudence.  
Part	II	
The second part connects the governmental, nation-state-oriented agencies with 
individual enactments of the crisis. I will focus particularly on economic outcomes, like 
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unemployment and deprivation: what groups and which contexts are particularly 
susceptible to such conditions. The second part then furthers the critique of the 
‘economic’ and, in particular, the ‘financial’ interpretations of the crisis in the context of 
economic and social policy. The combination of national and individual levels allows us 
to understand the crisis as an interaction between micro- and macro-economic frames.  
 
In the fourth chapter I will introduce multilevel methodology, reflecting the kinds of 
sociological problems that have been traditionally addressed by using such methods, but 
I will also contrast them with more recent theoretical frames like the actor-network 
theory, with a specific focus on modelling the crisis based on cross-sectional data. In 
particular, the method allow us to view the crisis as encompassing two temporalities in 
respect to how its different contexts compare: the crisis is on the one hand a pan-
European process that has catalysed pre-crisis differences similarly in all contexts. On the 
other hand, other differences are not sustained but induced only over the past few years. 
These two temporal perspectives reflect how the crisis ‘makes a difference’—once in all 
contexts and once by indicating the contexts where its effects are the most immediate.  
 
The fifth chapter utilises multilevel methods on the EQLS survey in order to 
understand the crisis of employment: how the likelihood of unemployment varies 
between groups and contexts, but also how these differences contrast with those related 
to deprivation. In fact, context-level predictors turn out to better explain differences in 
deprivation, whereas the prevalence of unemployment is more contingent. The 
unemployment crisis is in part associated with the fact that due to the crisis more 
women have entered the labour market; at the same time, those in the low middle-
income quartile have suffered more relative to others. But above all, in comparison with 
the pre-crisis situation, the crisis-effect on both unemployment and deprivation is the 
highest among those with tertiary education—particularly if they are young.  
 
Other than education-related effects, the variation in unemployment rates, however, 
largely mirrors pre-crisis differences (only multiplying them). This suggests that the 
unemployment-crisis reflects more pervasive changes in the employment-process, which 
are catalysed but not created by the crisis. This also explains why crisis-awareness is 
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relatively independent of the perceived ‘impact’ of the crisis, that is, that there are both 
quantitative and qualitative crises of work. Indeed, the multilevel models suggest that 
the Protestant contexts make respondents actually more vulnerable to deprivation-
effects (when controlled for the level of unemployment) due to the lack of substantive 
economic solidarity. Moreover, the crisis is regulated by the distribution of social and 
non-social public expenditure.  
 
The sixth chapter shifts from individual experiences to the social expression of the 
unemployment-crisis by analysing different ‘publics’ of work. Work and employment do 
not exist only to fulfil individual needs but for a variety of social ends, including 
standardisation, control and integration. First, I will consider public work that turns out 
to have defended people against the crisis-related devaluation that characterises private 
work—the ‘public’ then serves as the ‘sender’ to work, which itself targets to benefit 
individual workers. Based on the EWCS, public work has, however, become more 
manual or monotonic and less secure in terms of contracts. This could explain why 
workers in elementary occupations have suffered similarly as other groups in education 
income countries. Creative work also appears to escape from younger cohorts, which 
thus questions for example Florida’s (2002) hypothesis of the emerging importance of 
the ‘creative class’—at least in Europe. 
 
In contrast, the active labour market policies—which will be divided into market- and 
integration-oriented approaches—articulate the ‘public’ as the beneficiary of 
employment. Work then exists to benefit the public rather than an individual worker. 
The effects of such labour market policies on aggregate employment are negligible, 
however. Such policies only seem to support the integration of the higher middle-
income quartile at the expense of low-income households. These policies can also be 
viewed as means to increase employability in order to reduce labour costs. Finally, I will 
discuss what the ‘public’ means to work, framing it both in terms of the national 
product and consider the process of financialisation as an alternative ‘public’ that ‘taxes’ 
contemporary labour but in a way outside democratic control.  
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Part	III	
In the third part I will continue to analyse the EQLS survey but by focusing on the 
questions of subjective wellbeing. Such traditional indicators as happiness do not reflect 
crisis-related changes as well as indicators related to psycho-social orientations: the 
young unemployed have become particularly internalising about the crisis, experiencing 
chronic health limitations twice as often as before. Also, those with tertiary education 
are subject to unhappiness, dissatisfaction and job-related shame; yet they are unlikely of 
‘acting out’ their situations, which in part explains why the problems pertinent to 
education-intensive economies are seldom recognised by those with higher education 
themselves.  
 
Most affected groups are, however, the least prone to engaging politically. Instead, even 
those in the most vulnerable positions have acquired new mortgages, indicating the 
power banks still exercise over the economy. It is also notable that those countries with 
the highest GDP growth during the crisis indicate the most anti-social policies and 
outcomes.  
 
The eight chapter furthers the subjective perspective in more visual ways. I will conduct 
a multiple correspondence analysis on all categorical crisis-outcomes in order to frame 
the aforementioned psycho-social effects of the crisis in more structured ways. Five 
principal manners in which people situate themselves in respect to economic and social 
struggle will be identified. In general, the employed appear to have become more 
economically ‘depressed’, and the nation-states clearly have become less accommodating 
due to the crisis and the pressures on welfare. However, neither depression nor 
marginalisation concerns the unemployed or those working on fixed term contracts on 
average.  
 
Instead, these two groups are affected in opposite ways: the unemployed are more 
deprived but compliant, whereas those working in insecure jobs are more discontent as 
they feel their income insufficient. The latter are also less ‘sympathetic’ or less likely to 
receive such sympathy from others. At the same time, the MCA-construction confirm 
that the young unemployed are particularly prone to long-term socialisation effects. 
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These occur in two directions: if the young generally ‘internalise’ the effects of the crisis, 
more ‘externalising’ tendencies are visible there, where the unemployment rates are 
either the highest (quantitative) or the lowest (qualitative crisis). This also confirms that 
the epistemological constructions of two kinds of crisis-awareness (Eurobarometer) 
resonate with the effects of the crisis on the quality of life (EQLS).  
 
Finally, diagnoses like Piketty’s (2014a) and Therborn’s (2013) suggest that inequality 
tends to increase. However, the two authors do not specify which particular (developed) 
economies are the most prone to such tendencies. By analysing the MCA-constructions 
themselves by multilevel regression, it then appears that while many variables predict 
different kinds of outcomes, there is one tendency that is consistent in all dimensions 
(crisis-related affects): the crisis affects particularly the education-intensive, ‘post-
Fordist’ economies, and these effects are again stronger among the young. In addition, 
the opposite effects of social (positive) and non-social expenditure (negative) are 
confirmed.  
 
However, these macro-level phenomena related to policy and education are not 
generally recognised. I will suggest that the differences in the affective crisis-experiences 
among the un- and the underemployed young prevent them from finding a common 
voice or generational consciousness about the crisis (e.g., Wohl 1979, 5; Hazlett, 1998: 
8–9). Among the most affected countries, only Portugal indicates higher age-related 
mobilisation, whereas Greece demonstrates lower recognition of inter-generational 
conflict than what the multilevel analyses would expect: sustained generational 
consciousness about economic change even in such extreme contexts is uncertain.  
Conclusion	
The final, conclusive chapter addresses the crisis in the context of austerity, drawing on 
the draconian Greek case in order to illustrate the political economy of the crisis. The 
chapter is critical of the underlying trend whereby the public sector and social 
expenditure encounter a growing opposition. The deterioration of public demand, 
which used to overshadow the emergence of the post-industrial welfare states, can then 
be viewed as one of the reasons why the crisis of tertiary education—and of education-
intensive economies in particular—has actually occurred.  
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Part	I	
Twenty-Seven	Crises	of	Welfare	
 
 
What the Euro-crisis is is an intriguing question. It is not only an ‘objective force’ but a 
process whereby the ‘time’ itself is under judgment. It is history overwhelmed by jargon, 
often financial. Few of us then feel competent enough to engage with the technical 
discourses of the crisis. And only a handful of scholars have then asked whether the 
crisis is at all ‘financial’ in its essence (but see Lysandrou, 2011), possibly furthering the 
divide between sociology and economics (Parsons and Smelser, 1956). Finance is a 
powerful rhetorical device (McCloskey, 1986), even if most arguments in the context of 
the crisis are ever-repeated anecdotes with no empirical foundation. Even more 
worryingly, ideas driven by finance also contribute to the crisis.  
 
Beyond its financial superstructure—the events triggered by Lehman Brothers—this 
part overviews the ‘social’, ‘ideological’ and even ‘lethal’ aspects of the crisis: how it 
questions equality if not human ‘dignity’ (cf. Therborn, 2013)—questions too often 
buried under expert discourse (cf. Irwin and Wynne, 1996; Irwin and Michael, 2003). 
At least in Europe, the ‘financial’ (alone) does not explain the prolonged crisis of work. 
Even if some countries are burdened by excess sovereign-debt, others like Finland, 
Germany and the Netherlands benefit from financial imbalances. Yet all the twenty-
seven EU-countries have undergone a recession, an unemployment-crisis, or both. The 
crises are thus nationally embedded: in Finland, for example, the crash in 2009 reflected 
the collapse of the mobile phone manufacturer Nokia. Yet the local crises are united by 
the underlying crisis-rhetoric. This part inquires into this annex by focusing on equality, 
welfare and finance.   
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Figure 3. Public economic crises as combinations of financial (red), fiscal (blue) and welfare-
crises (yellow, goo.gl/CsHpk9).  
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Chapter	1	
The	Crisis	and	its	States	
 
 
What role is played by states, governments and national economies in the context of the 
current crisis? Or perhaps we should ask whether the states do even play any true role. 
Given the technologies that failed, was the crisis determined to have happened to start 
with? Or should we rather think about the crisis as something more contingent; 
something that occurred in different ‘states’, or might not even have occurred at all?  
 
It is true that nation-states and national economies are often framed as ‘actors’ 
associated with the crisis. But the level of agency attributed to these actors is unclear. It 
is often argued that national governments were obliged to react to the crisis in the way 
they did. In the most severe cases, the draconian austerity measures were indeed directly 
driven by the IMF. When anxiety kicks in, there is little faith in public stimulation and 
investment. Social policy in particular is seldom viewed but as a cost, even if most types 
of welfare protection actually play almost no role in the crisis of government 
expenditure.  
 
But despite the fact that crisis-rhetoric makes state-actions look as if they were 
necessary and inevitable, comparative research can still illustrate the level of contingency 
that overshadows them—particularly the question of how to best allocate public 
expenditure between, say, social and non-social expenditure. Does economic 
determinism hold sway or is the role of the ‘states’ more formidable in the enactment of 
the current crisis? Even if this question is ultimately existential, comparative methods 
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can at least contest whether the crisis-outcomes could be determined solely on the basis 
of the most obvious set of the ‘determinants’. They can occur both on national and 
individual levels, and this chapter introduces a set of such moderators on the country-
level to cover as many aspects of the crisis as quantitatively possible  (financial, 
economic, political, welfare, etc.).  
 
In comparison, the tendency to economise the crisis (cf. Çalişkan and Callon’s, 2009, 
2010)—that is, to frame it principally in economic, if not altogether financial terms—
answers the question of national voluntarity in a negative tone. Governmental actors are 
reduced into a reactive role, and moreover they are represented in terms of the 
‘economic’, as if they could merely adapt and adjust to the crisis. Individuals are at the 
same time framed in micro-economic terms as ‘rational’ subjects seeking to maximise 
utility, thus abstaining from any more incandescent forms of agency. In addition, when 
framed as a financialised crisis, it is particularly argued that these economic associations 
do originate from bank failures: that the financial turbulence itself did not originate 
from real economic processes, say, the changes in the employment process, but rather 
that unemployment itself is an invariable result of the market failure—an interpretation 
that actually questions the ‘efficient market hypothesis’ always so dear to mainstream 
economics.  
 
The association of the financial crisis with the real economic process has dominated the 
main discourses of the crisis for two reasons. First, this association has been used to 
emphasise the relevance of the financial question and of interventions like financial 
regulation, deregulation and a variety of other policy responses to broader public. But 
secondly and more importantly, the association between the two aspects of the crisis and 
the supposed causal link between them is used to justify the public bank bailouts, which 
have proved enormously costly.  
 
Empirically, however, the exact mechanisms that connect the ‘financial’ crisis with the  
‘real economic’ process are little explained. Even if these two domains are historically 
coextensive and inherently linked, particularly the question and direction of cause 
remains elusive.  The crisis is sometimes also attributed either to the public or the 
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private economy, either of which could then serve as its origin. But given the complex 
ways in which the domains of the economy intertwine, it is hardly plausible to avoid the 
possibility that the origins traverse both of them in tandem. 
 
In the social studies of finance, by contrast, the ‘economising’ picture is increasingly 
contested by arguing that the crisis has to do with ‘performativity’. By this it is meant 
that the financial tools and machinery (e.g., CDS, ABX) themselves created the 
conditions of their own collapse (e.g., MacKenzie, 2012). Even if true from that 
particular perspective, such discourses still risk depoliticising the crisis by desubjectifying 
national actors as the agency is solely attributed to material-semiotic assemblages of 
micro-level actors and financial devices. The question of policy is virtually absent in 
such discourses (see Mirowski and Nik-Kahn, 2007). In particular, they ignore the 
question of how technical assemblages are empowered, not only in international 
economic governance but also as market-oriented attitudes are performed, for example, 
in social and labour market policy. Sociology has paid little attention to such 
connotations even if the notion of performativity itself did originate also as part of 
policy research (e.g., Butler, 1993). 
 
This is not to claim that the STS-based studies of the crisis would be overtly 
materialistic. Instead, they risk the possibility that the ‘material’ itself—the object of 
economic policy par excellence—becomes inherently depoliticised. Parallel to my 
position, Alberto Toscano (2014: 1027–1028) recently argued that the sociological 
approaches to the ‘new economy’ seem to have ‘minimised, or entirely disavowed, 
capital’s crisis-tendencies’, thus depriving material technologies from macro-actors like 
national economic policy. In other words, the ‘sociology of finance’ is overshadowed by 
a ‘decision to tie one’s account of the economy to the devices, agents and knowledges 
that can be effectively studied’ (Toscano, 2014: 1035–1036).  
 
What is then conceived as an ‘effective’ approach to the ‘empirical’ is rather ‘ascetic’. By 
this Toscano means that the ‘links between the history of racialisation, mortgage 
policies and credit markets in the USA’ (cf. Dymski, 2009) are articulated in a way 
avoiding the macro-level discourses. Similar restrictions overshadow also the micro-
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sociological approaches to social embeddedness (Granovetter, 1985), and there seems to 
be a general tendency to disavow national actors as part of sociological explanations in 
contemporary empirical research.  
 
Of course, it would be similarly unempirical to ignore the role of material assemblages 
and to articulate the crisis only through overarching, ‘epochal’ macro-level tendencies 
like those associated with ‘neoliberalism’ (cf. Thompson, 2009). As a solution, I suggest 
that a multilevel approach combining micro- and macro-level analyses is required in 
order to overcome the restrictions of the ‘depoliticised’ and ‘epochal’ positions.   
 
Moreover, not only financial technologies but also such social technologies as welfare 
transfers and social expenditure should be understood as such ‘devices’ or ‘agents’ 
materialised according to the STS-paradigm—and Çalişkan’s and Callon’s (2009, 2010) 
program on the economisation has indeed been successfully applied in the context of 
private insurance (e.g., Lehtonen and Hoyweghen, 2014). The STS and other 
pragmatic traditions might thus be relevant also in the context of public or social 
insurance, and as a way to understand the performative aspects of social rather than 
private investment.  
 
Beyond	the	‘Economic’	
At the end of this study, I come back to the question of social expenditure as an 
‘investment’ and question the precise boundary separating the two ways in which the 
neoclassical reasoning is applied to private and public economic actors: only the former 
ones are assumed to be ‘rational’, whereas the public economic actors are somewhat 
paradoxically assumed to be ‘irrational’ or, at least, less than efficient (even if they 
actually base their actions on much broader deliberation). This also takes us back to the 
question of the ‘economic’—a discourse necessary for framing expenditure as 
investment. But before this discussion, the three analysis parts instead study the crisis 
beyond the economic: focusing on the effects of social expenditure on the economy 
instead. These effects will then form the basis for contesting neoclassical theory and 
particularly its ignorance of public deliberation.   
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So let us look at things from a rather different angle than usual, and try and forget about 
that abundance of the discourses ‘on the economic’ that prevail the crisis and the 
boundary-work discriminating between public and private domains. Instead, we will be 
focusing on the construction of another set of discourses that are ‘of the economy’ (cf. 
Roitman, 2006: 3, ct. 4). This distinction between the two kinds of discourse has been 
attributed to Foucault, but it also reflects Joseph Schumpter’s (1939: 13) distinction 
between the factors affecting the economy either ‘from within’ or ‘from without the 
economic sphere’, the latter referring to the ‘working of the economic organism itself’. 
On parallel lines, Toscano (2014) argues that sociological imagination has been overtly 
pressured by the habitual naturalisation of economic discourse (e.g., ‘Fordism’, 
‘Keynesianism’, etc.). Instead, given that it is now a conventional position even among 
the economists that the crisis questioned the capacity of the market to regulate the 
efficient allocation of resources, it then appears senseless to approach the crisis from the 
point of view of those very discourses and rhetoric that the crisis has now disproved.  
 
This study then takes it as its fundament that there is no general way of knowing6 what 
the actual links between the real economic and financial crises are. In particular, we 
should undo the dominance of the references to the ‘financial’ as the prevailing discourse 
of the crisis—in this study the ‘financial’ instead materialises in relation to the (real) 
refinancing costs related to sovereign-debt. Therefore, the links between the ‘real 
economic’ crisis and the ‘financial’ issues are subject to empirical analysis; knowledge 
related to them is necessarily situated and embedded (cf. Castel et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, even if I include welfare institutions in addition to economic institutions, 
the socio-cultural differences are still broad, questioning the ‘new institutionalism’ that 
is a major domain of contemporary economics now, and which in turn has sought to 
contest Max Weber’s empirical sociology in particular (e.g., Acemoglu and Robinson, 
2012).  
 
This is not to undermine the importance of the ‘market’, which is recognised as both a 
cognitive and a political technology; I only argue that it is not necessary to economise 
the crisis (or the market). There are certain methodological consequences, which derive 
from the decision of focusing on the ‘economy’ rather than ‘economics’ of the crisis, and 
 59 
they relate particularly to the form of empirical data. Indeed, the crisis of the ‘real 
economy’ is itself a quantitative construction, relying particularly on national statistics 
like GDP and aggregate unemployment.  
 
Instead, my study takes the problem of national actors as its starting point. The national 
economies themselves are statistical constructs, and the idea of modern nation-states was 
historically linked with the emergence of quantitative techniques (see Desrosières, 
1990). Statistical techniques themselves also ‘perform’ the state as a socio-technical 
construct. As far as the crisis concerns national economies, it is adequate to approach 
the crisis itself as a similar statistical construct.  
From	Integrity	to	Bifurcation—Sovereign-Debt	as	‘Cognitive	Technology’	
Based on what I have discussed above, it is one thing for national economies to suffer 
and another thing for governments to be heading at fiscal or financial crises. Sometimes 
they overlap, of course, and Greece now leads both leagues. It also tops the tables for 
both general and youth unemployment. Yet it is Ireland, at least in 2012, that holds the 
cup for the growth in national debt relative to GDP. Furthermore, the biggest increase 
in public deficit goes to Cyprus (9.0 percentage points increase in national deficit) with 
Denmark (8.9 percentage points) just behind, before Spain and Ireland (both 8.2 
percentage points). 
 
Greece, though, ran a large deficit already in 2005 (over 6 % of GDP), much before the 
onset of the ‘global’ crisis. It is in no way inevitable then that the financial crisis should 
be viewed as the dominant frame of the Greek trouble—not even if difficulties of 
accessing foreign capital brought the national problems to daylight, as reflected by its 
extreme long-term bond rates that hit over 30 % in 2012. This has furthered its fiscal 
difficulties both directly and due to austerity measures implemented against its will: the 
larger portion of its national product is used to servicing debt, further depriving the 
economy. The national integrity of the country is being humiliated: both economically 
because of the transfers of funds outside and morally because some other countries 
blame Greece for stealing their money.  
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As mentioned above, it is this intergovernmental conflict that makes the crisis 
particularly ‘European’. Greece is just a single example—despite its rather peculiar 
history and political culture (which the EU actually favours given the recent 
blackmailing of the Syriza-led coalition), many other countries experienced similarly 
extreme financial difficulties, too. Yet others did actually benefit from the situation 
given how countries like Germany have benefited from the historically low rates (much 
lower than in the US, for example) thanks to the sovereign-debt crisis. There is a certain 
demand for Eurozone sovereign-bonds and, as if in a zero-sum game, one’s trouble is 
one’s victory (the average bond yields remained virtually constant through 2010–2013)7. 
 
Unlike what has occurred in the history of any other currency zone, the bond markets 
thus bifurcated in this single-currency zone since the beginning of 2010 (and similar 
tendencies overshadow non-Euro countries8). In addition to standing for a direct 
transfer of funds from poor to rich (through the reallocation of refinancing costs), this 
phenomenon stemming from the ‘multi-layered’ EU-government (Marks et al., 1996) 
in part explains the prolongation of the crisis in Europe. In other words, the real 
economic stagnation could result as a dynamical effect of the imbalances in the bond 
market. Therefore, even if some countries ‘benefit’ from the crisis when it comes to the 
costs of national financing, this does not necessarily mean that any country should 
economically profit from the situation.  
 
Speculating on how the European economy would look like had the bifurcation been 
avoided, low rates would have guaranteed a bigger flood of money to Greece in 
comparison to the present. By mitigating ‘hysteresis’ effect, the stronger economy might 
have enabled it to hike taxes in order to account for the deficit. Given the recent ECB-
interventions, mechanisms like these are currently in play elsewhere in Europe—even 
Portugal’s 10-year bond went down to historically low 1.511 % in March 2015—
whereas Greece was excluded from the program due to governmental reasons.  
 
Like the effects of the crisis, also its causes must then be attributed to multiple levels. 
We can hardly blame Greece alone for the difficulties it has encountered. Yet even 
under the governmental mess in the EU, there is something peculiar about national 
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histories, which explains why some specific contexts have stepped into the eye of the 
sovereign-bond crisis. The crisis refers both to the overall, ‘pervasive’ crisis, and to the 
‘differential’ aspects about it referring to variation between contexts. The bifurcation of 
bond yields combines the two perspectives by referring both to national differences in 
borrowing costs but also to the more pervasive, long-term imbalances in the European 
economy as a whole. Together they have questioned the project of European integration 
(Dale 2004; Walters 2004).  
 
The bifurcation itself is also a certain kind of a ‘device’ or a ‘dispositif’—a cognitive 
technology that classifies the national and public economies according to its own, more or 
less ‘performed’ metrics. The entire crisis may then be viewed as an actor-network 
entangled with this process of constructing and performing the Eurozone as a divided 
whole. In particular, any market combines a variety of ‘crowds’ driven by different 
material resources and affects (e.g., Plummer, 2006; refers to Gabriel Tarde, who 
theorised on ‘crowds’ but also on ‘economic psychology’), and the debt crisis has affected 
the spatial configuration of these crowds. At the same time, as a technology the 
increasing amount of sovereign-debt makes governments increasingly subject to the 
effects of such crowd behaviour. From an STS-perspective, the cognitions about the 
crisis are then not constructed separately either by the market or on the level of the 
states, but instead as they interact.  
 
This does, of course, conflict with the mainstream, rationalist paradigm favoured by 
Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman. But such alternative narratives have gained 
some support in the so-called non-equilibrium economics9. However—and because of 
discourses articulating the market as the ‘truth’ of the economy—cognitive differences 
constructed in the bond-market regulate the different ‘states’ of the economy and guide 
national economies as psycho-social (and political) processes. In particular, as a 
distributional device the bond market articulates Piketty’s (2014a) ‘distributional 
question’ of income on the intergovernmental level.  
Changing	Interchanges	Between	Markets	and	National	Economies	
To summarise, both the sociology of finance and the ‘new economic sociology’ seldom 
refer to national actors in a way that would cross their boundaries (Fetherstone and 
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Venn, 2006: 1), viewing them still rather as ‘containers’ that constrain social action 
(Tenbruck, 1994, 82). Yet as the previous discussion illustrates, they at least do not 
‘contain’ the market but act within it (by issuing sovereign-debt, buying it and other 
securities via central banks, taxing, and regulating labour). Through such interfaces and 
engagements the states ‘regulate’ the market even if, since at least German 
Ordoliberalism, it has been the tendency for the states to ‘contain’ the market rather 
than to regulate it (at least in the legal sense; cf. Albo et al., 2010: 359).  
 
In actuality, the notion of ‘regulation’ (as well as the topological idea of a ‘container’) is 
thus elusive, for in virtually all exchanges with the environment, actors ‘regulate’ it—
more or less intelligibly. Regulation in this sense is bidirectional. Similarly as the EU 
has imbued many legal forms of regulation (standardisation, prevention of 
protectionism, etc.), sovereign-debt has made the states themselves increasingly 
regulated by the market. Yet they still exercise power over the market by redistributing 
income, through public procurement, and by providing services. What ‘neoliberalism’ is 
particularly at odds with is the precise idea of regulating the market in more socially 
responsible manners, that is, by allowing broader publics the access to markets and absorb 
its product. This would in fact allow nation-states to regulate the market not so much as 
containers but as intermediaries between local actors and the ‘global’, financial capital. 
In this sense contemporary anti-welfare rhetoric is largely opposed to pro-market 
policies. 
 
This is not to say that national policies—the ‘states’ of the crisis—should be similarly 
questioned everywhere. If the overall crisis is overshadowed by bifurcation and conflict, 
there are different ways to construct the precise ‘imbalances’ that overshadow national 
and social struggle (similarly as ‘inequalities’ are constructions, see Therborn, 2013). Let 
me elaborate possible imbalances conceptually by suggesting a very broad, overall 
framework before evaluating their pertinence to empirical variation. To this end, there 
seem to be principally three ways in which the crisis has questioned how states interact 
with, intervene and regulate markets: financial, fiscal and welfare.   
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Public	Finance	Crisis	
The public finance or the sovereign-debt crises are perhaps the most visible indicators of 
the way in which the interrelationship between states and markets has been questioned. 
In this thesis I refer to the ‘financial’ aspects of the crisis from the perspective of the 
state and public economies instead of focusing on the general banking crisis or the 
regulatory, legal crisis (e.g., Ertürk et al., 2008; Engelen et al., 2010) resulting in the 
creation of the Basel III -standards10.  
 
There are several reasons for this. First, regulatory interventions might have unintended 
consequences possibly contributing to imbalances and they do not as such address what 
is truly ‘critical’ about the crisis from the national economic perspective. Basel III, for 
example, rewards mortgage lending over corporate loans, and this has infused various 
housing markets with an abundance of capital at the expense of corporate investment. 
Secondly, the ‘financial’ crisis as experienced in the banking sector might have been 
short-lived. This is because the collapse of Lehman Brothers led to government 
interventions on a number of other financial conglomerates, including AIG and 
Goldman Sachs. The state interventions soon made them actually more secure than 
they were before. As a result, the stock market surged only a few months after the 
collapse, since March 2009, and the ‘global’ financial crisis was over.  
 
The crisis was brief also in terms of financial derivatives. As reported by the Bank of 
International Settlements (BIS), the level of speculation on highly technical, non-
regulated 'over-the-counter' derivative markets did amount to $647,762 billions in the 
end of 2011 as opposed to $596,004 billions in the end of 2007. Against this 
background, it is plausible to assume that the sovereign-debt crisis is historically 
separate from the global derivatives crisis, and in my work the ‘financial’ issues and the 
‘public finance crisis’ refer specifically to the latter, emphasising the importance of 
public economic actors.  
 
Of course, to some extent the derivatives crisis resulting in insolvency in the banking 
sector is associated with public financial trouble. Generally, however, it seems to only 
partially explain the crisis: the level of public debt was increasing already before the 
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financial crisis, in a process dating back to Ronald Reagan’s economic program. 
Furthermore, the global crisis does not explain why some countries avoided the banking 
crisis while others did not, and the public finance crisis is therefore more interesting 
from the comparative perspective. In fact, problems in the real economy themselvse 
could have contributed to the emergence of bank failures in Europe.  
 
Finally, the emphasis on public finance crises stresses the importance of public policy 
processes. By centralised policies similar to those adopted in the US the sovereign-debt 
crisis in Europe might have been avoidable, supporting the idea that the link between 
the derivatives and the bond-crisis is conjunctural. It is also possible that the prevailing 
real economic struggle generated fears in the financial sector, which is why the causal 
association between the two should be treated with caution. It is pivotal to analytically 
distinguish between the ‘financial’ and economic perspectives on the crisis. Throught 
this study, I will refer to the financial side of the public economic crisis as the ‘public 
finance crisis’11.  
Fiscal	Crisis	
But nation-states encounter the crisis also as economic actors, who are not just indebted 
but who also coordinate and redistribute purchasing power by various other means 
(collecting taxes, issuing bonds, coordinating social investment and expenditure, bailing 
out banks and by other means of non-social expenditure, including fiscal stimulation). 
By the ‘fiscal crisis’ I refer to the sustained current account deficit, which reflects 
tensions on more endogenous level than the financial struggle (mainly within countries). 
While the ‘fiscal crisis’ is often articulated as a causal consequence of the financial crisis, 
I will treat the relationship between the two as an empirical problem, and when 
comparing fiscal and financial problems in different countries, it is not obvious which 
one of them caused the escalation of the other.  
 
Other than the distribution of government expenditure (social or non-social), which will 
be discussed in depth later, one of the interesting ‘fiscal’ conflicts relates to taxation. It is 
argued that even if higher taxes would initially help reduce fiscal imbalances, they are 
detrimental to economic growth. In other words it is supposed that one euro in the tax-
payer’s pocket would contribute more to growth than either a publicly spent euro or one 
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spent on welfare. Even if studies show that the dynamical effects would be higher in 
some, particularly developing countries, it is questionable in the current situation of the 
EU.  
 
It is notable that at least in the short run fiscal policies like the cuts to public services 
and austerity measures could thus undermine economic growth—particularly because 
well above half of the economic activity in the EU occurs in the public sector. The hope 
that private savings due to tax reductions would be transformed into purchases and 
investments benefiting the national economy is optimistic; if such associations have 
gained empirical support in developing countries, the people there have less 
opportunities for investing, saving and postponing consumption (due to lower living 
standards). Yet discourses favouring tax reductions still dominate Europe, and the 
general tax on income has actually fallen in most countries.  
 
The fiscal crisis is then in part a result of an ideological attitude towards taxation. The 
lowering of tax rates also show that the governments generally have had some room to 
decide about the distribution of funds, and the fiscal crisis is then as much a political 
crisis as it is catalysed by the economic downturn following the global crisis. In 
conclusion, not only the sovereign-debt crisis but also the fiscal crisis appears to 
originate from something else than merely the events culminating in the corpse of 
Lehman Brothers.  
Welfare	crisis	
As mentioned above, the ‘welfare crisis’ in turn is revealing because, unlike the financial 
and fiscal crises of the public economy, it is not necessarily restricted to or even related 
to the unemployment crisis—not at least independently of the financial and fiscal crises 
further amplified by the growing welfare costs. Therefore, the welfare crisis refers to 
high costs that burden the public economies, but in a way controlled for the fiscal and 
financial effects. The welfare crisis is then also an ideological one. In economic terms, 
welfare is now increasingly viewed as a cost and liability, and less as an asset or an 
investment. In result, private insurances (health, pensions) are becoming increasingly 
common as the national governments cut benefits and are less willing to ensure that 
people’s needs are met. And in terms of the economy, the welfare crisis has to do with 
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the distribution of social and non-social government expenditure—a question which is 
increasingly pressing today.  
 
Of course, as an alternative to the ideological explanation it is possible that the welfare 
crisis could stem also from the social problems engendered by the real economic crisis—
the higher demand for unemployment benefits for example. However, when treating 
welfare regime as an ordinal variable (as described in Appendix 2), and which can thus 
be studied based on Spearman correlations, it appears that the welfare crisis is less likely 
to reflect changes on the level of unemployment but differences in the welfare regime 
instead. Notably, in many countries with a surge in unemployment rates, the 
expenditure on social protection has at the same time decreased.  
 
In the second chapter I actually investigate different types of social expenditure in order 
to demonstrate that protection related to unemployment and social exclusion is actually 
quite minor, and the welfare crisis itself originates from something else (e.g., health 
related costs). Anyway, even if it is difficult to say whether institutional differences in 
welfare are causally linked to lower levels of unemployment, it is inevitable that there is 
a correlation between the welfare regime and the depth of the welfare crisis. If Eastern 
regimes are particularly characterised by the fiscal crisis, the Nordic and Continental 
countries are burdened by high welfare costs instead.  
 
The welfare crisis is also associated particularly with ‘resource inequality’ (Therborn, 
2013; Piketty, 2014a), as not all people have similar access to private insurance or 
support. This is not only problematic from the point of view of individual wellbeing, but 
it also risks undermining aggregate demand. In effect, if Piketty (2014a) argues that 
inequality could undermine growth in the national product, the welfare crisis could be 
one of the mechanisms that explain this connection.  
 
Three	Correlates	of	the	Crisis	
To understand the earlier discussed crisis-concepts, at least as they appear from the 
state-perspective, they can be viewed as regulating the complex interchanges between 
the state and the market, and as questioned during the crisis. Let me now elaborate 
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these notions empirically. In particular, the remaining of this chapter investigates these 
associations by introducing a variety of country-level variables and by studying 
correlations between them. When properly chosen, these correlations are then also the 
most visible correlates of the crisis, as they illustrate which particular variables have been 
affected in synchrony. Recall that the approach to the crisis as a single study-case is 
idiographic and the associations and correlations are not expressed in order to generalise 
them though, like in any case-study, they can be used to falsify certain ‘generic’ 
statements about the economy, and to support peculiar positions in social policy.  
 
The investigation in this chapter is also exploratory in a sense that even if causal 
interpretations are possible, the purpose of this chapter is not to make direct policy 
recommendations (in order to intervene the causal factors), but instead to investigate 
the crisis itself in respect to what kind of associations appear to emerge and how they 
cluster together. However, as I aggregate these variables in specific multi-component 
models (Chapter 2), they are then used as country-level predictors in the multilevel 
analysis. As a methodological remark, I considered weighting the variables based on 
population size but decided not to—mainly because we are interested in different 
countries as the specific ‘states’ of the crisis, all of which are equally meaningful to their 
residents despite their size (the likelihood of a given subject occupying a given ‘state’)12. 
 
Credit	Ratings:	A	Crisis	Police	
One of the interesting themes from the perspective of crisis-policy is the role of credit-
rating agencies. These institutions took much of the blame of the sovereign-debt crisis, 
and Eurobarometer has several times asked opinions about how best to regulate credit 
rating agencies. Yet there is little evidence that the agencies should have but reacted to 
changing expectations mirrored by the sovereign-bond market. Therefore, it is 
interesting to look at the credit rating agencies, and contrast them with bond yields in 
order to see what indicators best correlate with the notion of the ‘financial’ modality of 
the crisis.  
 
Indeed, comparing data from 2012, it appears that credit ratings are more likely 
associated with public deficit, which is a ‘fiscal’ indicator. This is interesting because the 
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bond yields generally grade the perceived risk involved with sovereign-debt 
instruments—exactly the same thing as the credit rating agencies claim to evaluate (but 
based on specific principles rather than by an immersed market-process). Furthermore, 
this also shows that the overall level of debt is not the primary marker of financial 
insolvency. Even to a larger extent than the bond-market, credit ratings are likely to 
reflect not only the current direction of the economy, but also fiscal policy. To credit 
ratings in particular the level of liabilities does not matter as much as the political 
atmosphere and will. Credit ratings in other words reflect expectations of current 
account balances more than of growth and the prospects of paying back. But they also, 
possibly, grade countries according to ‘moral’ principles (and the associated technical 
evaluation tools).  
 
In empirical data it then turns out that only half of the variation in credit ratings is 
explained by ‘economic’ factors. Instead, classifying countries based on the main religion 
(Protestant or Anglican, Catholic, Orthodox or other) explains a significant portion of 
the variation that remains unaccounted (Table 2). In particular, all major economies 
with AAA-rating in 2012 are Protestant (Finland, Germany and the Netherlands), 
which reminds me of Max Weber’s thesis of the importance of culture in the 
constructions of the economic action.  
 
Table 2. EU-27 countries ranked by EMU conversion criterion bond rate, 2012 (Eurostat, 
Standards & Poors). 
 
Rank Country
Credit.
Rating,.
2012
EMU.
conversion.
criterion.
bond.yield,.
2012
Public.debt.
%.of.GDP,.
2012
Growth.in.
public.debt,.
2007E2012,.
percentage.
points.
Public.
account.
balance,.
%.of.GDP
GDP.per.
capita,.PPP,.
EUR Currency Main.religion
1 Greece B 22.50 156.90 53.80 E8.60 17.400.€ EUR Orthodox.or.other
2 Portugal BB 10.55 124.80 56.40 E5.50 15.600.€ EUR Catholic
3 Hungary BB 7.89 78.50 12.60 E5.60 9.800.€ HUF Catholic
4 Cyprus B 7.00 79.50 25.80 E5.80 20.500.€ EUR Orthodox.or.other
5 Romania BBB 6.68 37.30 24.60 E3.00 6.600.€ RON Orthodox.or.other
6 Ireland A 6.17 121.70 97.70 E8.00 35.700.€ EUR Catholic
7 Spain BBB 5.85 84.40 48.90 E8.00 22.300.€ EUR Catholic
8 Slovenia A 5.81 53.40 30.70 E3.70 17.200.€ EUR Orthodox.or.other
9 Italy BBB 5.49 122.20 22.50 E3.00 25.485.€ EUR Catholic
10 Poland A 5.00 54.40 10.20 E3.70 9.900.€ PLN Catholic
11 Liethuania A 4.83 39.90 23.20 E3.20 11.000.€ LIT Protestant.or.Anglican
12 Latvia A 4.57 40.90 32.50 E0.80 10.900.€ LVL Protestant.or.Anglican
13 Slovakia A 4.55 52.10 22.30 E4.20 13.200.€ EUR Orthodox.or.other
14 Bulgaria BB 4.50 18.00 1.40 E0.50 5.500.€ PLN Orthodox.or.other
15 Malta BBB 4.13 67.90 5.50 E3.70 16.500.€ EUR Orthodox.or.other
16 Estonia AA 4.00 9.70 9.70 E0.30 13.000.€ EUR Orthodox.or.other
17 Belgium AA 3.00 104.00 17.10 E4.10 34.000.€ EUR Catholic
18 Czech.Republic AA 2.78 45.50 17.70 E4.00 13.699.€ CZK Catholic
19 France AA 2.54 89.20 25.00 E4.90 31.100.€ EUR Catholic
20 Austria AA 2.37 81.70 16.90 E1.50 36.400.€ EUR Protestant.or.Anglican
21 Netherlands AAA 1.93 66.50 23.80 E4.00 35.800.€ EUR Protestant.or.Anglican
22 Finland AAA 1.89 53.00 19.00 E2.10 35.500.€ EUR Protestant.or.Anglican
23 Luxemburg AAA 1.82 21.40 14.20 0.10 80.700.€ EUR Protestant.or.Anglican
24 UK AAA 1.74 85.80 42.20 E8.30 30.200.€ GBP Protestant.or.Anglican
25 Sweden AAA 1.59 36.40 E1.80 E0.90 42.800.€ SEK Protestant.or.Anglican
26 Germany AAA 1.50 79.00 15.50 0.10 32.600.€ EUR Protestant.or.Anglican
27 Denmark AAA 1.40 45.60 18.30 E3.90 43.900.€ DKK Protestant.or.Anglican
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The fact that the credit rating agencies rate also economic culture, not just solvency, 
could either reflect a ‘moralist’ attitude towards culture or religion itself could be linked 
to differences credit-seeking behaviour. Both of the interpretations seem right. On the 
one hand, it is apparent that credit-seeking behaviour in Protestant countries is aversive 
(in addition to lack of solidarity and opposition to debt-relief, see Chapter 3), which 
explains why the bond-rates are lower in Protestant countries. Yet the former 
interpretation is validated in part by the fact that besides differences in bond rates, there 
remains an economically unexplained cultural resonance in credit ratings that is stronger 
than what is economically justifiable. 
 
National	Product	and	Unemployment	
But other than the ‘financial’ crisis related to sovereign-debt, which in part policed 
(though not controlled) by credit rating agencies, there is the question of the real 
economic crisis, which might retain very different correlates. Since the emergence of 
elementary statistical methods and modern accounting, the GDP or ‘national product’ 
soon appeared as the standard indicator of the size and status of the economy. GDP 
growth, by contrast, has been taken as the main aggregate indicator of economic 
wellbeing and prosperity, in addition to which I have analysed the compounded growth 
between 2007 and 201213. Third, I have described the depth of recession by a variable 
measuring its length (until 2012), but all these highly correlate14. Unlike the financial 
indicators, neither welfare institutions nor religion seem to explain these variables (-.01 
and .04), which also suggests that at least to some extent the ‘public finance crisis’ could 
be partly independent of the real economic crisis.  
 
In addition to GDP-related variables, the level of unemployment is another correlate, 
which is one of the most standardly used indicators of economic wellbeing and more 
directly associated with individual experiences. Indeed, as economists and economic 
anthropologists now increasingly suggest, the contribution of wages to the experienced 
quality of life is a relative measure, evolving from peer-comparisons (e.g., Layard et al., 
2010). Therefore, the low level of unemployment could be more directly linked to 
security and fulfilment, even if not without exceptions (see Chapter 8).  
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Figure 4. EU-27 countries based on unemployment rates and the EMU convergence criterion 
long-term bond yields (Eurostat). 
  
As indicated by Table 3 and illustrated in Figure 4, the level of unemployment in 2012 
(.72), and the relative increase between 2007–2012 (.47), are both correlated with high 
bond yields. Rather than the production crisis (GDP), the unemployment crisis then 
seems to be more directly associated with the ‘public finance crisis’. Public finance crisis 
also did follow pre-crisis unemployment rates but to lesser extent (.32), suggesting that 
in part the unemployment rates have been caused by the ‘financial’ difficulties but they 
have also contributed to them. The pre-crisis differences in unemployment rates are also 
very important to other crisis-outcomes, and the crisis has enhanced those differences 
quite invariably.  
 
Finally, also the fiscal deficit is correlated with unemployment (.56), and in fact more 
strongly when controlling for the public finance crisis: this suggests that both of the two 
modalities of the crisis are associated with higher unemployment, and in separate ways.  
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Table 3. EU-27 countries ranked according to unemployment rates, 2012. 
 
Inequality	
The third correlate of the crisis relates to equality, which is particularly important if we 
trust Piketty’s (2014a) argument that inequality is here to stay but, also, that growing 
inequalities could be detrimental to economic growth. Did the crisis then emerge as an 
effect of inequality? The answer obviously depends on how we define inequality, but 
what Therborn (2013) regards as ‘resource inequality’ is perhaps the most relevant in the 
crisis-context. Existential inequalities also occur in relation to qualitative changes in 
work and employment. One of the important questions is then whether growing 
inequality could undermine economic product and result in deeper deprivation (given 
the resulting lack of consumer expenditure for example).  
 
Economic inequality is often operationalised by figures like the GINI-coefficient. As a 
statistical dispersion measure, it reflects the income groups constructed by income 
frequency distribution, that is, the aggregate share of income retained by each income 
group. The higher the coefficient, the less equal the distribution of income. However, at 
least the crisis-context differences in GINI do not appear to be connected to post-crisis 
growth-rates but instead to modify the distribution of the effects of stagnation. 
Evidence only points out that the GINI is associated with the overall level of GDP per 
capita, and thus any effects of inequality on growth appear to reflect longer terms and 
Rank Country
Unempl
oyment0
rate,0
2012
Relative0
increase0
of0
unemplo
yment0
rate,0%
Absolute0
increase0in0
unemploy
ment0rate,0
%0points
At0risk0of0
poverty0or0
social0
exclusion0in0
2012,0%
Change0in0
those0at0
risk0of0
poverty0or0
exclusion,0
%0points,0
2007A2012
Length0of0
recession
GDP0
growth0
2012,0%
GDP0
growth,0
yearly0
average0
2007A2012,0
%
GDP0per0
capita GINI GEP Main0religion
Welfare0
type
1 Spain 24.8 202.44 16.6 27.2 3.9 42 A2.1 A3.49 2203000€ 34 64.62 Catholic Southern
2 Greece 24.5 191.67 16.1 34.6 6.3 54 A6.6 A1.1 1704000€ 33.5 63.29 Orthodox0or0others Southern
3 Portugal 15.8 71.74 6.6 25.3 0.3 48 A3.3 A0.61 1506000€ 34.2 67.88 Catholic Southern
4 Latvia 15 145.9 8.9 36.2 1.1 18 4.8 1.14 1009000€ 35.4 76.18 Protestant0or0Anglican Eastern
5 Ireland 14.7 212.77 10 30 6.9 30 A0.3 A3.4 3507000€ 31.1 75.14 Catholic AngloASaxon
6 Slovakia 14 25 2.8 20.5 A0.8 0 1.6 5.2 1302000€ 25.7 62.82 Orthodox0or0others Eastern
7 Liethuania 13.4 211.63 9.1 32.5 3.8 12 3.8 4.47 1100000€ 32.9 75.51 Protestant0or0Anglican Eastern
8 Bulgaria 12.3 78.26 5.4 49.3 A11.4 6 0.5 5.9 505000€ 35.1 69.6 Orthodox0or0others Eastern
9 Cyprus 11.9 205.13 8 27.1 1.9 27 A2.4 A0.17 2005000€ 29.1 61.49 Orthodox0or0others Southern
10 Hungary 11 48.65 3.6 32.4 3 42 A1.5 A0.4 908000€ 26.8 65.91 Catholic Eastern
11 Italy 10.7 75.41 4.6 29.9 3.9 33 A2.8 A0.29 2504850€ 31.9 59.13 Catholic Southern
12 Poland 10.1 5.21 0.5 26.7 A7.7 0 1.8 4.05 909000€ 31.1 65.03 Catholic Eastern
13 Estonia 10 117.39 5.4 23.4 1.4 15 4.7 1.9 1300000€ 31.9 71.93 Orthodox0or0others Eastern
14 France 9.8 22.5 1.8 19.1 0.1 18 0.3 0.97 3101000€ 30.8 66.87 Catholic Continental
15 Slovenia 8.9 81.63 4 19.6 2.5 30 A2.6 0.11 1702000€ 23.8 71.39 Orthodox0or0others Eastern
16 Sweden 8 31.15 1.9 15.6 1.7 15 A0.3 2.67 4208000€ 24.4 79.57 Protestant0or0Anglican Nordic
17 UK 7.9 49.06 2.6 24.1 1.5 27 0.7 A1.94 3002000€ 33 73.05 Protestant0or0Anglican AngloASaxon
18 Finland 7.7 11.59 0.8 17.2 A0.2 27 A1.4 0.89 3505000€ 25.8 78.47 Protestant0or0Anglican Nordic
19 Denmark 7.6 100 3.8 19 2.2 21 A0.7 0.96 4309000€ 27.8 77.24 Protestant0or0Anglican Nordic
20 Belgium 7.6 1.33 0.1 21.6 0 18 0.1 1.55 3400000€ 26.3 72.41 Catholic Continental
21 Czech0Republic 7 32.08 1.7 15.4 A0.4 24 A0.8 2.68 1306990€ 25.2 60.26 Catholic Eastern
22 Romania 6.8 6.25 0.4 41.7 A4.2 21 0.6 2.23 606000€ 33.2 68.15 Orthodox0or0others Eastern
23 Malta 6.3 A3.08 A0.2 23.1 3.4 6 2.5 3.91 1605000€ 27.4 54.98 Orthodox0or0others Southern
24 Germany 5.4 A36.47 A3.1 19.6 A1 12 0.4 1.95 3206000€ 29 73.99 Protestant0or0Anglican Continental
25 Neatherlands 5.3 47.22 1.7 15 A0.7 27 A1.6 0.53 3508000€ 25.8 75.78 Protestant0or0Anglican Nordic
26 Luxemburg 5.1 21.43 0.9 18.4 2.5 12 A0.2 1.95 8007000€ 27.2 81.47 Protestant0or0Anglican Continental
27 Austria 4.3 A2.27 A0.1 18.5 1.8 21 0.9 2.03 3604000€ 26.3 75.93 Protestant0or0Anglican Continental
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are negligible in the current context. Based on this indicator alone it is then hard to say 
whether GDP growth increases equality or whether inequality is apt to undermine 
growth15.  
 
However, in addition to Therborn’s typologisation that distinguishes between existential 
and resource inequality, there is another relevant measure that combines the two kinds 
of inequality: the gender economic participation (GEP) component of the gender inequality 
index calculated by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). If the 
GINI-coefficient is little correlated with welfare regime or religion, the GEP-
component is a strong correlate of welfare. Comparing the two indices, the GINI-
coefficient is correlated with financial indicators like the bond rate (r = .40) and credit 
rating (r = .45), but not with economic growth, and in result the financial correlates 
remain when controlling for compounded growth (2007–2012). The GEP-component 
seems to be on par with the GINI-coefficient when it comes to bond yields. Moreover, 
when controlling for economic covariates (fiscal deficit and the level of national debt 
relative to GDP), the GEP is actually even more strongly linked to credit ratings than 
the GINI-coefficient, and this correlation is furthered again when controlling for other 
economic correlates (GDP per capita, unemployment rates). The GEP-component 
then depicts something about those ‘moral’ aspects related to credit ratings that are 
independent of economic expectations as codified by bond-prices.  
 
The GEP-component, more than the GINI-coefficient, is therefore an institutionally 
rewarded form of equality, even if this link could be mediated by other variables like 
welfare regime given that the GEP-component serves as a correlate of a higher level of 
protection. Even so, this correlate is also associated with the economic factors regulating 
credit ratings and bond yields, all of which mitigate the effects of the crisis. Therefore, 
regardless of causal attributions, GEP is a relevant marker of the association between 
more egalitarian economies and of less pronounced financial difficulties. But as the high 
level of social protection is in turn one of the most interesting correlates of GEP, let me 
now discuss social protection and the question of its relevance to the crisis.  
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A	Crisis	of	‘the	Social’	
Other than the three crisis-correlates discussed above—one financial, one economic and 
one existential—it is crucial to recognise that there are many other processes, like the 
post-Communist integration in the Eastern regime that are historically coextensive with 
the crisis. This is perhaps the most visible in Bulgaria, where the number of those at risk 
of poverty or social exclusion is still high, 49 % in 2012, but where this figure has, quite 
remarkably, shrank down from the 60 % pre-crisis level. Yet despite the pre-crisis 
distribution, when looking at crisis-related effects on the likelihood of unemployment 
relative to the pre-crisis situation, the unemployment-crisis has occurred quite similarly 
across contexts (roughly doubling the rates almost everywhere).  
 
Therefore, unemployment-rates serve as a fixation point, which allows us to distinguish 
between differences in those crisis-outcomes that reflect long-term change and those 
emerging during the crisis itself—the two temporalities discussed earlier. The latter 
group of effects encompasses differences in how states react and respond to the crisis, 
either actively by specific crisis policies or passively as following policies established 
before the crisis (e.g., existing welfare institutions).  
 
On the more ‘pervasive’ side of economic change, by contrast, one of the most 
important themes when looking at the effects of unemployment is the question of social 
protection, which links national differences with individual experiences (that in turn 
might prove detrimental to consumer-demand and to the macro-economy). Social 
expenditure is a figure that consists of the costs related to health care, disability, 
survivors, family and children, housing and social exclusion, but excluding education-
related costs. The lowest in Latvia and Estonia, expenditure on social protection forms 
about 40 % of total public government expenditure in 2012, whereas in Ireland it 
accounts to nearly 80 % (Figure 5). Even if the relationship looks linear, it does not pass 
through the origin (it is ‘affine’ as mathematicians call it) as over 35 % general 
government expenditure may be coupled with as little as 14 % expenditure on social 
protection (Latvia). In general, non-social expenditure forms 20–30 % of GDP, with 
the notable exception of Ireland (10 %).  
 
 74 
 
Figure 5. Expenditure on social protection and total government expenditure in 2012, % of 
GDP (Eurostat).  
 
Previously the public finance crisis has been associated with overt government 
expenditure. To address such claims, I will next compare the changes in social and non-
social protection to assess the causes behind the rising general government expenditure. 
Indeed, expenditure on social protection has increased 4.2 % relative to GDP between 
2007 and 2012, whereas total government expenditure has increased only 3.7 %. 
Overall, this would appear to suggest that social protection costs should be a significant 
cause of fiscal difficulties, but this is actually not necessarily the case. First, the 
correlation between the two indicators is modest, suggesting that the link between social 
expenditure and fiscal trouble is at best conjunctural and context-dependent. Secondly, 
when looking at differences in the changes in non-social expenditure, it actually explains 
74 % of the variation in the changes in general government expenditure (r = .86). This 
particularly indicates that differences in policy have an effect on general expenditure 
mainly by regulating non-social and often also non-human investment. At the same 
time, as I will discuss in more depth below, it is not obvious whether other forms of 
social expenditure except health care stand behind the fiscal and financial pressures that 
relate to social protection.  
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The question of social protection is of course even more complex, because not all 
expenditure on social protection is calculated as part of government expenditure (e.g., 
employer-paid social insurances). On average, the government contributes 42 % of all 
social expenditure, while employees add a further 36 %, leaving 22 % to individuals and 
other sources. From the economic point of view the difference is somewhat artificial, 
however, but it is politically meaningful (the employer-contributions are often publicly 
regulated transfers comparable to taxes): for example low government share of social 
expenditure is clearly correlated with increase in non-social expenditure, which suggests 
that the allocation of social receipts anyway influences the policy-process. Changes in 
social expenditure on the other hand appear to be more stable and less contingent than 
non-social expenditure, even if their allocation produces contingencies in the latter.  
 
It is then a very difficult question as to whether the economic downturn necessitates 
cuts to social security, and whether individual polarisation is a necessary result of the 
‘financial’ and ‘fiscal’ crises. This is not just an economic problem but also a political 
one. The bottom-line is that social expenditure should not be viewed as the source of 
but only comorbid with financial difficulties, even if it appears so when looking at public 
economies from a static, non-dynamical point of view.  
 
How could we then explain this possible independence of welfare costs from the fiscal 
and financial difficulties? One of the reasons is that if social protection is viewed as an 
investment, social expenditure might actually benefit the economy and, at least in the 
long run, pay itself off (cf. Lindert, 2004, though he supposes that this could also be due 
to pro-growth tax policies). As the second reason, the overall level of expenditure on 
many categories standardly associated with welfare—unemployment benefits, protection 
against exclusion, etc.—form only a tiny share of all social expenditure, whereas health 
care and pensions form the majority. Indeed, expenditure on health services explains the 
growth of social protection over the past few years. Benefits and services to old age, in 
contrast, is one of the main forms of protection particularly in countries where the level 
of social protection is still low (e.g., the Eastern regime).   
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By contrast, transfers to the unemployed account only for 5.5 % of all social protection, 
exclusion 2.2 % and housing 1.1 %. The need to downsize social protection of these 
types reflects political reasons, like the emphasis on individual agency (on active labour 
market policies see Chapter 6), even if the direct economic benefits are contestable. 
What	Precisely	Is	The	Problem?		
It is clear that the protection of the unemployed and otherwise excluded does not form a 
significant portion of governments’ burdens—not even in countries where the 
unemployment crisis is the most emphatic: the protection of the unemployed, the 
excluded and housing (PUEH) now amounts to 16 % of all social protection in Spain, 
10 % in Greece and 11 % in Ireland. In no country, no matter how deep the 
unemployment crisis, do these contributions amount to more than 4 % of total GDP.  
 
Therefore, given that public government expenditure is close to 60 % of GDP in some 
countries, PUEH cannot be truly regarded as the primary reason of the public account 
crises. Not even in countries like Greece and Spain, where the level of social protection 
on the unemployed has increased 50 to 60 % between 2007 and 2012 (simultaneously 
the level of protection per unemployed person has decreased by 47 % in both countries). 
Even if the pre-crisis level per claimant had been maintained, the protection of the 
unemployed and excluded would still amount only to 7 % of GDP—much lower than 
the current levels of public deficit. That 3 % of GDP, however, could make a difference 
if it boosted aggregate demand more than when ‘distributed’ through lower taxes.  
 
Yet, the underlying rationale seems to be the contrary, favouring tax-cuts and non-social 
expenditure and stimulation. The unemployed, therefore, appear to carry the moral 
burden of the debt crisis, while the actual change in the level of social protection comes 
largely from elsewhere. Of all social expenditure, that on health services amounts to the 
largest share; this also explains the growth of social protection over the past few years. 
Benefits and services to old age, in contrast, is one of the main forms of protection in 
the Eastern regime. 
 
In conclusion, even if there is an unemployment crisis in the EU, the financial and fiscal 
crises seem not to be caused by it. Also, the increasing cost of health services (and 
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support to old age in the Eastern regime) plays the main role in the welfare crisis. Let 
me next take a closer look, operationalising these contrary crisis-concepts, asking how 
exactly the welfare systems but also wellbeing and equality as broader, social 
constructions have been pressed during the crisis.  
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Chapter	2	
Three	Routes	to	the	Marginalisation	of	Welfare	
 
 
The previous chapter introduced us to different monetary and financial mechanisms. 
But I also engaged with the intriguing question of inequality that I operationalised with 
a particular emphasis on Thomas Piketty’s (2014a) thesis about the role of economic 
inequality in undermining the prospects of contemporary growth. His economistic 
perspective is then coupled with existential and social political themes following 
Therborn (2013). Such a combined perspective helps us reify the level to which national 
governments have the freedom to control the re-emergence of inequality, and whether 
such control has any relevance to the crisis (economic growth in particular).  
  
Social policy and protection are indeed some of the most pivotal themes about the 
current crisis, and to most people economic growth as such is only an instrumental goal 
unlike democracy and wellbeing. Yet the crisis rhetoric is often overshadowed by 
discussion about the future of the welfare states and social security, as if economic 
growth were an end in itself and in support of which the cuts to social protection are 
being rationalised.  
 
This chapter aims to operationalise these key aspects of the crisis in a way that allows us 
to investigate their associations with each other and, in later parts, also with individual 
crisis-experiences. In this chapter, the focus is on contrasting various equality and social 
policy perspectives with economic ones. What is of particular importance is the question 
of social protection and how it has been undermined by the crisis—this is considered 
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both on the aggregate level but also in specifying changes of social protection by type. 
This broader analysis then helps us understand the specificity of the crisis in respect to 
welfare, and whether we can speak of a single crisis of welfare or should frame national 
crises as qualitatively different instead.  
 
Factoring	the	Crisis	
In the previous chapter I suggested that on the governmental level the crisis emerges in 
three overlapping kinds: financial, fiscal and welfare. Even if the crisis of welfare, and the 
steady rise of the cost of public services and transfers have prevailed at least since the 
1990’s (Palier, ed, 2010), the effect of the current crisis on state income has made this 
long-term process extremely topical. However, it is not necessary that costs related to 
social protection specifically (as opposed to, say, health care) should have much 
relevance, as they form only a tiny share of all welfare expenses. 
 
In some contexts like in Spain and Greece, the soaring unemployment rates result in a 
rapid increase in social expenditure specific to unemployment, even if the benefits per 
claim have radically dropped in countries high on the ‘public finance crisis’ factor16, but 
even there such forms of protection hardly form the main source of public deficit. In 
fact, the social protection per unemployed person has fallen by an astonishing 47 % in 
both countries despite the 50 % to 60 % increase of the overall expenditure on 
unemployment-related costs. To address these concerns, this chapter empirically 
addresses the question of the distribution of welfare protection by type.  
 
At the same time, the discourses undermining the welfare project (cf. Esping-Andersen, 
1990) have been systematised and synchronised during the crisis. It is then important to 
investigate whether the different categories of welfare protection are similarly adjusted.  
 
These considerations are also conceptually relevant. Both as an economic and especially 
as a political crisis, the welfare-crisis materialises the way in which governments but also 
the public are ‘indebted’ to the banking crisis, that is, the bill stemming from bank 
bailouts often falls upon the welfare state.  Austerity programmes and cuts to protection 
might then undermine economic output beyond what is immediately visible, furthering 
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the depriving effect of the bank bailouts and of transfers to financial industry. As the 
different aspects of the economy are deeply intertwined, the political manipulation of 
some domains might result in unforeseen imbalances and ‘externalities’ (as economists 
call them) elsewhere (cf. Callon, 1998).  
 
Of course, in the context of equality and social protection, experimental research is 
impossible (as is the case in most social scientific research). A comparative analysis of 
the associations between different contexts is then necessarily descriptive. Some 
methods, like principal axis factoring (PAF) look for systematic covariances and thus 
make hypotheses about statistical interference even if indirectly. Even then it is 
impossible to say what causes these systematic connections and we cannot conclude 
whether one variable affects the other (direction of cause). However, as the PAF allows 
us to cluster associated variables, it can be used for discriminatory purposes identifying 
what particular variables appear to be causally independent. This also gives a clue of what 
clusters appear to originate causally (or at least systematically) from the crisis—even if 
the direction of cause between any two indicators of the crisis is unknown, the crisis 
itself can thus serve as either a ‘catalyst’ or the ‘origin’ of this link (depending on the 
temporal modality of the effect). Even then, the direction of cause remains open17, but 
the method can at least be used to point out what ‘the economy’ does not explain, and 
where the crisis points at cultural dispositions and expressions of power instead.  
 
Before considering this more ‘systematic’ method, I will start with a determinist (non-
statistical) model called principal component analysis (PCA). It results in a similar 
multicomponent model and the first components are very close to those provided by 
PAF, but which in higher dimensions tends to emphasise individual, deviant contexts 
(outliers) as it maximises the variances of individual variables: for example, the extreme 
growth of support against social exclusion in Liethuania far exceeds that of any other 
country. Both methods also ground on linear associations between scalar variables, and 
they are then more suitable for studying economic indicators, whereas many 
sociologically interesting variables are categorical and require alternative tools (on 
MCA, see Chapter 9). 
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In this chapter, the PAF- and PCA-methods are applied to variables like economic 
growth, length of recession, fiscal deficit and measures of indebtedness, but also figures 
exhibiting the depth, scale and quality of the unemployment crisis. In addition, several 
background variables provide a historically broader contextualisation of the ‘presence’ of 
the crisis: the level of GDP and measures of inequality like the GINI-coefficient and 
the GEP-component. I also contrast these variables with variables indicating the level of 
social expenditure. I am specifically interested in the question of whether statistical 
models could prove that welfare is not only a cost but possibly a higher level of social 
protection could contribute to economic prospects. In the first model I use the broadest 
possible indicator, which is the gross expenditure on social protection. However, the 
overall level of social expenditure does not specify the central role of rising health care 
costs in the current crisis of welfare, which is why the more ‘systematic’ method 
addresses the composition of the welfare crisis based on specific categories of social 
expenditure.  
 
There are also some quite interesting associations between social expenditure and other 
variables including the GEP (projecting on separate axes in both models). Indeed, as 
depicted by Figure 6 below, social protection is a way to balance between family and 
work, and in countries where investment in social expenditure is higher, the labour 
market tends to be more equal between the genders. The Eastern welfare regime is an 
exception though, for women there choose to work not so much as an opportunity but 
in order to make ends meet. However, when asking about the specific aspects of the 
crisis like the rising social expenditure costs, the differences between the old and 
emerging welfare states appear to become less pronounced.  
 
In effect, these broad measures of social expenditure, particularly in association with 
other moderators like the GEP, already suffice to identify different welfare regimes.  In 
effect, quite simple models can be used for identifying the relevance of the economic 
crisis from the point of view of welfare. In particular, when considering welfare type as 
an ordinal variable (for definition see Appendix 4), it appeared to be extremely strongly 
correlated with public expenditure on social protection relative to GDP (0.92). 
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The gross level of social expenditure thus reflects the overall institutional structure of 
welfare, and perhaps more so than any other, more culturally oriented indicators of the 
economy. The main religion, for example, is much less correlated with social 
expenditure than the welfare type. In fact, when controlling the institutional welfare 
regime, the effect of religion on social expenditure is actually reverted suggesting that 
Catholic and Orthodox countries could be more inclined to the idea of social protection 
despite lacking institutional framework. Of course, we should be careful while making 
such conclusions, as they require more thorough analysis and denser time-series data to 
be confirmed in a statistically credible way given the limited number of countries 
included.  
 
Finally, the country-level variables are collected from publicly available sources, most 
often Eurostat. They were then entered into SPSS as a separate table, which in turn was 
later merged with individual level data in order to use the same variables as multilevel 
predictors.   
 
Figure 6. Employment between the genders, expenditure on social protection, % of GDP in 
2012, and change in social expenditure 2007–2012. 
 
Five	Principals	of	the	Crisis:	Recession	and	Social	Protection	
Both factorial methods I use (PCA, PAF) are based on the idea that they reduce the 
total number of variables and present them as few axes as possible (and to avoid the so-
called statistical multicolinearity). The resulting variables are then called the principal 
 83 
‘components’ or ‘axes’: they are independent factors, which exhibit different aspects of 
the original variables, that is, the current crisis. In order to understand the most 
principal aspect of the crisis, I started with a quite narrow set of variables, which 
resulted in a five-component model (Table 4).  
 
It is worth noting that I have used the varimax rotation which maximises the variance of 
each component; they are at the same time rotated so that they are orthogonal to each 
other, that is, the covariance between any pair of components vanish. This allows us to 
use factorial methods in order to distinguish between different aspects of the crisis, and 
also to falsify specific associations.  
 
To illustrate, the first axis combines the unemployment rate (2012, .89), change in the 
unemployment rate (2007 to 2012, .89), youth unemployment rate (2012, .88), EMU 
conversion criterion bond yields (.82), total length of recession (months, 2007–2012, 
.77), the level of fiscal deficit in 2012 (.75) but not so much its change on the level of 
national debt (.71), negatively with the compounded GDP growth (–.70) and 
government credit rating (–.69). Therefore, it combines basically two different 
perspectives of the unemployment-crisis, the pre-crisis levels of unemployment and the 
differences in the relative increase during the crisis (the two will be further distinguished 
in more complex models).  
 
In contrast, the second axis best reflects expenditure on social protection (.89), both 
relative to GDP and in euro per capita. It further encodes life expectancy at birth (.84), 
infant mortality rate (–.71), the gap between female and male life expectancies (–.70), 
and the number of those at risk of poverty or social exclusion (–.69). The indicated 
numbers are Pearson-correlations between the variable and the PCA-component. In  
Table 4, the symbol + stands for a coefficient between .25–.49, ++ for one between .50–
.74, and +++ stands for anything higher. Symbols -, --, and --- are defined respectively 
but for negative coefficients.  
 
In combination, the model explains 76 % of the variation in the set of variables 
indicated in Table 4. But already the first two components—unemployment and social 
 84 
protection (Figure 7)—explain 52 % of this variance, whereas the remaining variables 
(existential equality, realisation of employment insecurity, and a mixed component) 
further refine this picture. The first two alone suffice to demonstrate that the crisis of 
work and wellbeing seem to result in two clusters of countries depending on whether 
the quantitative level of unemployment is high (e.g., Greece, Spain, Portugal, and 
Ireland), or whether the sustainability of work is being questioned in qualitative terms 
instead (e.g., Denmark, Ireland, Finland and Sweden). Many Eastern countries seem to 
be less affected given that their social expenditure was extremely low already before the 
crisis, and given their difficulties related to employment already before, as a result of 
which the current effect on unemployment is less emphatic.  
 
 
Figure 7. Principal components characterising variance in the national encounters of the crisis. 
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Table 4. Five factor model of the presence of the current crisis in the EU. The indicators reflect 
the situation in 2012 unless otherwise specified (PCA-components of eigenvalue above 1.5, 
varimax rotation). 
	
 
Equality	of	Participation		
The previous figure illustrates both quantitative differences in unemployment and 
qualitative aspects related to the ‘problematic of relief’ and welfare. The third axis was 
then identified as the equality of participation and welfare, which best correlates with 
GEP (.84), change in social expenditure during the crisis (.70), women/male 
Unemployment Social.Protection Existential.equality Flexicuration Component.5
Economy
Length.of.recession ++ + – –
GDP.real.growth.2007–2012 ––– +
Employment
Unemployment.rate +++
Increase.in.unemployment.rate.
2007–2012,.%.points +++ –
Relative.increase.in.unemployment.
rate.2007–2012,.% +++ . –
Youth.unemployment.rate +++ –
Female/male.employment.ratio . – ++ – –
Youth/adult.unemployment.ratio +
Increase.of.limited.duration.contracts.
2007–2012,.%.of.labour.force – +++
Financial.situation
Public.debt.engendered.during.the.
crisis +++ +
Credit.Rating –– + ++ +
Fiscal.situation
Fisc.deficit +++ ++ O O
Increase.of.fiscal.deficit,.2007–2012,.%.
of.2012.GDP +++ ++
Income.and.wealth.tax +++ +
Increase.of.tax ++ ++
Government.expenditure
Change.in.expenditure.on.social.
protection ++ +
Expenditure.on.social.protection,.eur.
per.capita ++ +
Expenditure.on.social.protection,.% +++
Compounded.increase.in.expenditure.
on.social.protection.since.2007 ++ ++
Resource.equality
GINI ++ –
Gender.economic.participation +++ –
Gender.pay.gap,.unadjusted ––
Vital.inequality
Life.expectancy +++
Infant.mortality –– ++
Women./.male.life.expectancy –––
Other.socio–economic.conditions
Portion.of.30–34.year.old.with.tertiary.
education ++ ––
At.risk.of.poverty.or.social.exclusion,.%.
of.all.adults + ––
Increase.in.the.portion.of.those.at.risk.
of.poverty,.2007–2012 ++ ++ –
 
 86 
employment ratio (.67), the portion of those with tertiary education (.60). Therefore, it 
addresses the question of equality both in relation to the ‘problematic of labour’ 
(participation) and the ‘problematic of relief’ (protection)—again two themes important 
to Castel’s (2003) sociology of employment further distinguished in larger models. In 
addition, this component suggests that both low and high levels of protection can result 
in more egalitarian employment, either because women are able to work (high 
protection) or because they need to (low protection). Furthermore, the interactions with 
age suggest that the third axis has to do with inter-generational equity, too. 
Interestingly, however, this factor does not seem to correlate with the GINI-coefficient, 
and it thus measures existential rather than economic equality (unlike components 1 and 
2).  
 
These two meanings of equality—economic and existential—are revealing because the 
relationship between welfare and economic participation is non-linear (Figure 8). The 
aforementioned economic explanation of this relationship based on the ability and need 
to work is partial, however: also in the Southern regime people are increasingly 
deprived, and yet this does not similarly materialise in higher female employment. 
There could also be cultural and other factors associated with the emerging of female 
employment, Eastern regime given its socialist background (Cerami, 2006; Fenger, 
2007; Adascalitei, 2012), which explains its difference from Southern and Anglo-Saxon 
regimes. I cannot unfortunately answer this question in more depth given the limited 
data, but the effect of historical background should not be ignored. 
 
Indeed, particularly in the Southern regime, the crisis then appears to have brought 
fourth the squeezing of the prospects of welfare: the ‘Latin rim’ is becoming even more 
‘peripheral’ than it was in the past (Marinakou, 1998). Elsewhere, welfare is either 
emerging or, as Figure 8 illustrates, there are many countries where welfare is now 
saturating and becoming unbearable, even if less immediately than in the Southern and 
Anglo-Saxon regimes.  In effect, the two equality-related components distinguish 
between three kinds of welfare crisis (emerging, squeezed, saturating).  
 
 
 87 
 
Figure 8. Social Protection and Equality of Participation (axes 2 and 3 of 5). 
At the heart of this squeezing there are Spain, Greece, Portugal, and Italy that score 
highest also in unemployment (component 1). In contrast, Latvia, Liethuania, Estonia 
and Bulgaria are clearly situated in the crisis of emerging welfare, where newly 
established social policies are introduced despite the crisis. The situations in Hungary, 
Poland and Slovakia are more mixed, and they could as well be regarded as a group of 
their own. In all the countries listed above, the unemployment rates score above median, 
9.9 %, and long term unemployment rates are 4 % or higher.  
 
What is also remarkable is the fact that in the group of saturating welfare only Ireland 
scores high in unemployment, 14.7 % in 2012. All other countries in this group are 
below the median, and long-term unemployment remains below 3 % (9.1 % in Ireland). 
Hence, the level of welfare protection could be economically sustainable when 
unemployment remains limited, and protection itself could reduce unemployment by its 
indirect effects on the economy. However, political pressures and imbalances might 
prevent further expansion.  
 
The comparison of four extreme contexts, Ireland, Latvia, Spain and Hungary, is very 
illustrative in this respect, both as they demonstrate the economic benefits of social 
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expenditure and as they emphasise the underlying political pressures. Ireland for 
example finances its welfare system with an 8.0 % deficit (2012), and this contrasts 
notably with Latvia’s virtually inexistent 0.8 % deficit. However, by focusing on welfare 
and inclusive social policy, Ireland has still been able to maintain a less troubled position 
than Spain despite the very similar public deficit in the two countries. This is the case 
because Ireland has been able to maintain a higher level of income tax, unlike Spain, 
where the overall tax rate has fallen 20 %. Therefore, despite the fiscal deficit, higher 
expenditure on social protection seems to contribute to economic output, rewarding 
Ireland and helping it maintain the level of social protection. 
 
Hungary and Latvia form another interesting couple to compare given that they both 
exhibit a lower level of protection. Both governments now lean politically towards the 
right. At the same time, Latvia’s inexistent deficit contrasts with Hungary’s 5.6 % 
deficit (2012). Also, in terms of GDP, Latvia managed to make the crisis short lived: 
given its less than 10 % national debt in 2007, it was better able to absorb the crisis by 
public financing than Hungary, where public debt has increased only by 12.6 % of GDP 
(versus 32.5 % in Latvia). Despite its overall drop of 11 % of GDP between 2007 and 
2012, the Latvian economy was growing at 4.8 % rate in 2012, while the Hungarians 
faced another 1.5 % recession. However, the growth is invisible in terms of 
unemployment rates: between 2007 and 2012 unemployment in Latvia grew from 6.1 % 
to 15 % while the same figures in Hungary were 7.4 % and 11 %. Therefore, the 
connection between economic growth and unemployment is far from straightforward—
possibly the opposite (see Chapter 7).  
 
Yet both figures are low in comparison to many other countries. What makes Hungary 
special is that unlike in any other EU-country its expenditure on social protection has 
actually decreased between 2007 and 2012 (–0.9 % of GDP). The next lowest country is 
the UK, where social expenditure increased only by 0.26 %, contrasting with Ireland 
with the highest expansion of welfare expenditure—10.7 % of the national product. 
Hungary is thus interesting particularly because of its extreme political situation for 
which the financial crisis serves as a pretext. The high yields of sovereign debt (7.89 % 
in 2012) derive mainly from the fears over the country’s central bank’s independence. At 
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the same time, the value of their currency HUF has decreased while households retain 
high levels of foreign currency debt making their situation even worse. These 
developments have followed the landslide victory of the rightist parties in 2010, 
resulting in a new ‘basic law’ that ties up the hands of future governments as well18.  
 
Flexicurisation	and	Desecurisation		
The fourth axis, in contrast, relates to the effects of the crisis in the labour market, and 
particularly on the question of whether the number of the employees with limited 
duration contracts has increased (–.62). It furthermore tracks changes in the level of 
fiscal deficit (.66), suggesting that in countries which have opted to avoid deficit, the 
share of fixed term contracts has increased. The precise reason why such a connection 
exists (also in the higher dimensional model) cannot be deduced from the considered 
variables alone, even if we could speculate on the role of public sector employment.  
 
Even so, it is notable that Spain and Greece greatly differ on this axis in particular: in 
Greece, those on fixed term contracts have lost jobs, whereas in Spain the share of such 
contracts is increasing. This is why I have labelled the axis as cuts to flexicurised work force 
(component 4), which measures the difference between the increase in insecurity, and 
the realisation of insecurity, which does actually result in a definitive drop in income.  
 
In particular, Figure 9 allows us to contrast the ‘flexicurising’ tendencies (cf. Bradley and 
van Hoof, 2005; Plug and du Bois-Reymond, 2005) with the ‘desecurisation’ of those 
formerly in temporary jobs, and whose risks have been realised. In other words, there 
are increasing numbers of temporary workers in Greece, Ireland, Portuga, Latvia and 
Italy, whereas growing unemployment has reduced their numbers in Spain, Cyprus, 
Lithuania, the UK and Sweden. Of course, inside national contexts these two processes 
may occur simultaneously. 
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Figure 9. Unemployment and underemployment (and desecurisiation). 
In the light of the above figures, Latvia and Lithuania differ from other Protestant 
countries, still illustrating the weight of post-Communist transition. However, it is 
possible that the cultural backgrounds have made these two Baltic countries particularly 
vulnerable in financial terms given the combination of low institutional social security 
and their ‘Protestant’, aversive relationship to debt. Estonia, where the Eastern 
Orthodox Church is more dominant, serves as an interesting context to contrast even if 
it has a similar population size and shares the Soviet background with other Balts.  
 
Also, the Catholic countries differ depending on welfare regime, even if generally the 
financial difficulties have been more emphatic in this less ‘ascetic’ cultural environment. 
However, even if it is true that the most sever crises (Spain, Portugal) or bank failures 
(Ireland, Belgium) have occurred in Catholic countries, this only applies to Western 
Europe. Instead, in post-Communist countries like Poland and the Czech Republic, the 
Catholic tradition seems to result in a shielding effect. This is why religion and welfare 
regime should always be studied in tandem.  
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The fifth and last component is more ambiguous: it measures both equalities and 
inequalities at the same time. For example it correlates negatively with the gender pay 
gap (–.71) but positively with the infant mortality rate (.59) and with the portion of 
those at risk of poverty or social exclusion (.45). It thus combines a mixture of resource 
and vital equality. It is, however, slightly negative on the female/male employment ratio, 
the  gender economic participation index and the GINI-coefficient, suggesting that the 
equality of pays could stand for lower female unemployment. The latter connection is 
actually confirmed by the multilevel analysis in the third part. Similar ambiguity 
overshadows the connection between the pay gap and the number of those at risk of 
poverty and social exclusion, but these correlations bear no inevitable relationship with 
the crisis19.  
 
Furthermore, even if the model itself lacks data on more nuanced differences in 
employment (e.g., by gender), there are interesting connotations between components 
1, 2, and 4 with the distribution of unemployment between both gender and age. 
Component 1 correlates with the change in men’s share of both adult (.53) and youth 
unemployment (.40) suggesting that it is men who have lost more jobs due to the crisis. 
The flexicurisation-component, however, largely undid this effect among the younger 
jobseekers (.32), suggesting that in those labour markets that have become more harsh 
on the ‘flexible’, often younger workers, women face even more serious risks. In higher age 
cohorts, where permanent employment is still the norm, there was no similar 
connection. 
 
Therefore, the gender specific effects of the crisis are mixed, and tend to depend not 
only on context but express interesting interactions with age. In some countries with a 
high number of flexicurised employees in the public sector, the cuts to state expenditure 
could then have unexpected, gender-specific effects. This is particularly so as the public 
sector jobs are often related to caregiving, and pronouncedly gender specific. In fact,  
similar concerns are then reported in the paper by ILO European Commission (Public 
Sector Adjustment in Europe, 2012). On the other hand, cuts to public sector jobs could 
span over a longer period, and particularly in countries with a large social services sector 
(reflected by component 2), males again seem to be prone to losing jobs (.39). 
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What	Happens	to	Welfare?	
The model is very illustrative in a variety of themes, particularly as it emphasises the 
importance of distinguishing between the unemployment- and welfare-crises. However, 
these axes are still give quite a coarse picture, and to a large extent they cannot specify 
between pre- and post-crisis effects on social protection and unemployment. In 
particular, the model fails to identify whether the crisis catalyses or creates differences in 
them. Furthermore, the fifth axis appears to correlate with equality and inequality –
measures simultaneously, not to mention the second axis that both depicts the benefits 
of social protection in, say, vital inequality, but at the same time associates social 
protection with the ‘fiscal’ difficulties engendered by high social security costs.  
 
Therefore, the model also leaves us short in regard to where exactly different welfare 
states and regimes are heading. The first component distinguishes between five 
countries that stand above others (Greece, Spain, Ireland, Latvia and Hungary) but it is 
notable that processes like ‘desecurisation’ simultaneously characterise a very different 
set of countries (e.g., Denmark and Sweden). The model in particular omits the 
differences in these two contrary processes.  
 
In order to extend the model to resonate with the future prospects of welfare protection, 
there are at least two possible options to follow. First, one could ask to what extent the 
government directly controls the redistribution of resources either directly or indirectly 
(e.g., social criteria in public procurement). This would, however, lead to country-
specific considerations and it would be difficult to contextualise such processes and to 
understand how they are relevant to the economy as a whole. Alternatively, it is still 
possible to rely on macro-level data but analyse social protection both by occasion and 
type.  
 
I followed the second route, constructing another model that incorporates variables 
representing the typology of social expenditure categories used by Eurostat. They 
indicate that an increase in welfare cost is particularly associated with the health care—
the protection of the unemployed and those at risk of social exclusion is very minor in 
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this respect. Luckily, however, it also appears that variation in the pre- and post-crisis 
unemployment effects appear to project on different dimensions. Given that this 
discrimination occurs solely when introducing category-specific social security variables, 
either social security contributes to employment and prosperity, or otherwise there is a 
systematic connection between changes in the level of unemployment and changes in 
the level of social protection.  
 
The larger model also includes variables reflecting the level of protection per 
unemployed and of socially excluded per claimant. This is to distinguish between 
changes related to the number of claimants and those that reflect changes in the 
emphasis on social policy. I also modelled different sources of social expenditure—
government, employer (insurance), and private—but they appear to be relatively 
independent of the economic and welfare crises (despite the slight correlation between 
the growth of non-social expenditure and lower share of government contributions, 
which merely confirms the link between lower government share of social receipts and 
the ‘room’ for higher non-social expenditure).  
 
The model further encodes more nuanced data on distribution of unemployment 
between genders and those with higher education. In particular, education-groups are 
differently affected depending on whether the unemployment-crisis is overshadowed by 
high pre-crisis levels of unemployment or is more current. Also, those with higher 
education were more protected in countries with high pre-crisis level of social 
expenditure. This suggests that social expenditure might result in economic externalities 
that are particularly important to the so-called ‘post-Fordist’, education-intensive 
economies. The model also confirms that the post-crisis (but not the pre-crisis) effect 
on unemployment is stronger where the number of those with tertiary education is high.  
 
As one last remark, the broader model encompasses two variables related to welfare cost 
increase: the difference in expenditure between 2007 and 2012, and the compounded 
expenditure 2007–2012 in comparison to the 2007 level. Comparing these two with the 
model suggests that virtually in all the countries with high welfare costs, the crisis did 
induce a burst in welfare cost early after the crisis. However, some countries have later 
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come to tighten their welfare policy, while others have not. This also explains why the 
level of social cost seems to have contributed to total government expenditure at the 
beginning of the crisis, but not necessarily afterwards.  
 
Given how the crisis is overshadowed by the rhetoric calling for welfare reduction, it is 
interesting that the PCA-model now suggests that non-social expenditure—including 
fiscal stimulation in the Keynesian sense—has been much less promising than social 
expenditure in defending economies (especially when excluding health care, which has 
no similar stimulating effects than, say, inclusion measures). But regardless of this 
stimulating effect of social protection on economic absorption, public debt (and deficit) 
is still often viewed as if stemming primarily from social costs; this rhetoric could then 
further contribute to the crisis. Therefore, the level of expenditure alone does tell little 
about how countries and the people are being defended, but it is rather the institutional 
framework and the composition of the different categories of social protection that 
make the difference. This is visible in Figure 10, where it appears that different regimes 
form separate clusters when measured against the unemployment crisis and pre-crisis 
level of protection.  
 
 
Figure 10. Unemployment and the pre-crisis level of social protection. 
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The first two components of the PCA, again, reflect most variance of the model. Quite 
remarkably the welfare regimes can be identified as clearly identifiable clusters in this 
figure. In other words, given that they emerge solely from the data it appears that they 
do, indeed, make a difference in the folding of the crisis. Furthermore, the financial 
crisis (materialised by unemployment) and the welfare crisis are associated in a way 
modified by the welfare regime, even if we do not know the exact direction of cause, if 
any, between them.  
 
Crisis	and	Welfare:	The	Question	of	Causes		
The relevance of welfare regime to the link between social expenditure and 
unemployment is notable, particularly as it suggests that the connection is quite 
systematic, regardless of whether they stem from the institutional, geographic or cultural 
differences. To address other, also ‘systematic’, links between different aspects of the 
crisis, I constructed a further model that results in nine different axes. The model is 
indeed based on PAF, and the constructed axes then refer to covariances between rather 
than the variances of individual variables.  
 
There are close links between the 9-factor model and the previously discussed 14-
component model. They do not always agree, however, mainly because the PAF is a 
statistical model and I thus needed to delimit the number of modelled variables to 
match with the low number of contexts. Therefore, I actually compared two 9-axis 
models with the same variables but that were based on both PAF and PCA. The PCA 
then seemed to exaggerate the negative connection between the gender pay gap and the 
relative increase in female unemployment. Also, despite what the previous PCA-model 
anticipated, that lower wages to women do not systematically help women avoid the risk 
of unemployment. As another important difference, the PAF model is powerful enough 
to recognise where particularly those occupying insecure, fixed term jobs should be more 
vulnerable to unemployment.   
 
The PAF-model can then be used to identify which connections can be viewed as 
systematic and based on various economic and causal mechanisms20. Furthermore, the 
PAF is a statistical model, and each variable is extracted by the model only to a certain 
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extent (measured between 0 and 1, estimation based on maximum likelihood). This 
reflects the level of contingency of a given variable in respect to the model. However, 
after compensating for these statistical discrepancies, there are only three variables whose 
extraction dropped significantly when compared to the descriptive, 14-component 
model: the GINI (extraction .49), the effect of the crisis on youth in particular (.53), 
and the cuts to the level of unemployment benefits (.64). These are variables that are the 
least likely to being systematically connected to the crisis, that is, they bear no causal 
relationship with differences in the crisis-outcomes. Similarly, in regard to pre-crisis 
unemployment it is possible that some of the correlations are (non-systematically) 
explained by differences in how unemployment-rates are being calculated, and therefore 
the ‘systematic’ picture provided by the PAF can be considered as more valid.  
 
But there are also several variables, whose extraction increased under the PAF-paradigm 
(despite taking into account statistical variation). These are then the variables that are 
perhaps the most ‘economically’ based, illustrating that fact that PAF is more suitable 
for extracting underlying, latent connections. Among these, there is the level of fiscal 
deficit in 2012 (extraction 1.00), GDP real growth 2007 to 2012 (but not the overall 
level), government credit rating, pre-crisis level of national debt (but not increase in debt), 
and slightly the change in unemployment. The model indicates that these variables in 
particular should be causally linked to the current economic crisis. In fact, this suggests 
that the PAF-model in general is a more systematic description of the ‘economic’ crisis, 
whereas the political crisis of welfare seems to resonate less with this structure and that 
requires more ‘endemic’ interpretation instead.  
 
Three	Regimes	of	Ill-Being	
The first factors in the PAF then reflect precisely those three modalities of the crisis 
that I conceptualised in the first chapter: the financial (PAF1), fiscal (PAF2), and welfare 
crisis (PAF3). The last one refers particularly to the overall level of welfare cost. The 
fiscal crisis thus emerges as its own, largely independent factor, which is not directly 
connected to the public finance crisis (e.g., high bond rates and problems of access to 
capital) alone. The existence of these three factors also empirically confirms the 
conceptual elaboration. Methodologically this is notable given the fact that the latter 
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emerged independently of the statistical analysis (Table 5), but which were then 
visualised and used in later analyses based on the latter.  
 
Figure 11. The public finance crisis -factor; darker colours stand for higher difficulties in public 
financing (goo.gl/JVXr0J).  
To summarise, the public finance crisis, as measured by factor 1 (Figure 11), best 
aggregates EMU conversion criterion bond yields and government credit rating. Increase 
in unemployment rates measures on this axis (.60), but also on the second factor 
standing for the fiscal crisis (.50). This factor also the best explains the depth of 
recession measured by the GDP real growth between 2007 and 2012 (.77)—much 
better than the fiscal crisis (.31), whereas both variables reflect the length of recession 
(.54 and .51) similarly and have thus both contributed to depression but to a different 
extent.  
 
By contrast, the increase in national debt has to do with the public finance crisis (.47), 
but even more so with the fiscal crisis (.70). This second factor (Figure 12) then depicts 
differences in the pre-crisis level of fiscal deficit (.89), but it is also highly associated with 
the increase in fiscal deficit (.60) and only little correlated with financial burdens (.28). 
Both factors contribute slightly more to male rather than female unemployment. 
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Figure 12. Fiscal difficulties encountered by public economies (goo.gl/P5UMU1). 
What makes the PAF-model pivotal is also the fact that unlike in the case of the PCA-
model, there is then no single component either to the pre- or post-crisis 
unemployment rates. Instead, the pre- and post-crisis rates project differently over the 
three crisis-factors in the PAF. Therefore, unemployment hardly forms a solid basis for 
illustrating the most systematic aspects about the crisis, even if it is then the most tangible 
outcome contributed to by a variety of factors. Also the variables measuring the depth of 
recession—the GDP growth, the length of recession (months) and the unemployment 
rates—are now distributed along these three axes in addition to factor 5 measuring the 
pre-crisis burden of government expenditure.  
 
The cross-model correlations between the PAF and the PCA models also reveal that 
the public finance crisis is associated with lower non-social expenditure, whereas the 
fiscal crisis stands behind cuts to unemployment benefits and thus contributes to 
inequality (despite fiscal stimulation). The comparison also suggests that women have 
suffered relatively more in countries with low pre-crisis problems and where 
employment insecurity is higher, particularly among the young. This in fact suggests a 
double effect on young women who are both more prone to doing non-standard work 
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and to the risk of having no job at all—a phenomenon depicted by the axis referring 
particularly to young women, but which can also be called employment insecurity. 
Whether that increase in temporary contracts could undermine the existing gender-
contract is discussed thoroughly elsewhere (Gash and McGinnity, 2008).  
 
If the annex of the financial and fiscal factors relates to the crisis on the side of 
production instead of consumption, factors 3 and 4 reflect the crisis from the point of 
view of welfare, and thus also absorption. The welfare crisis factor is particularly 
associated with high pre-crisis burdens of both debt and welfare, suggesting that any 
additional problems of access to borrowed capital or government revenue could 
undermine the capacities to maintain systematic support for welfare: in such countries 
welfare is subject to saturation if not squeezing (Figure 13).  
 
Yet the welfare crisis was only slightly associated with the length of recession (.35) but 
not at all with its depth. This suggests that despite the association of the welfare crisis 
and recession, higher level of protection also mitigates their consequences. Instead, the 
welfare crisis factor most emphatically reflects the pre-crisis level of public debt (.89) in 
addition to the high level of pre-crisis protection (.76). Even so, the welfare crisis itself 
seems to bear almost no effect on bond yields (.26), suggesting that the pre-crisis level 
of welfare might out the effects of higher government expenditure by contributing to 
higher growth prospects, possibly paying itself back: in the PAF-model at least, welfare 
expenditure has actually contributed to real economic growth (.19) and shortened 
recession (-.36).   
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Figure 13. The burden of welfare transfers to the public economy (goo.gl/VCK9LX). 
In conclusion, it seems that the welfare crisis is somewhat independent of the 
financial/fiscal crises despite its political connotations. For example, countries like the 
UK and Ireland suffer from fiscal difficulties despite more modest level of welfare 
protection when compared with other Western European countries. Finland and 
Germany are overshadowed by high welfare related costs even though neither one of 
them has encountered problems related to public finances (quite the contrary), and 
Germany is actually experiencing fiscal surplus. Greece and Spain both suffer from high 
welfare-related costs but Spain is still overshadowed by fiscal difficulties whereas in 
Greece the difficulties are now dominated by public financing.  
 
Therefore, neither one of these three modalities of the crisis seem to have caused any 
other—at least not on the level of the EU as a whole. The three kinds of a crisis can 
coexist in various ways as Figure 3 in the beginning of this part illustrates (it is a sum of 
the three maps above, see also Figure 14). Yet such comorbid crises may deepen each 
other, furthering the unemployment crisis which is the most exaggerated in Greece and 
Spain (see Figure 1 in Introduction). In particular, even if welfare expenditure could 
actually benefit the economy, the high welfare costs during the crisis are not politically 
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inconsequential (this precisely makes the crisis ‘critical’). Therefore, the crisis could have 
been further deepened by the erratic cuts to welfare in addition to allowing the inflation 
of other forms of state expenditure.  
 
 
Figure 14. Overlapping economic and welfare crises (PAF). 
 
The	Marginal	Man	and	the	Marginalisation	of	Welfare	States	
The level of welfare expenditure and the different aspects of the unemployment crisis 
suggest that the emerging, saturating and squeezed crises of welfare reflect different 
institutional frameworks that in turn moderated the way in which the current economic 
crisis plays itself out. The factors 1, 2 and 3—financial, fiscal and welfare—then stand 
for the three routes to the marginalisation of welfare itself: a discourse and an institution 
that itself was once determined to eliminate marginalisation.  
 
In particular, the imminence of the need to adjust social protection is possibly more 
rhetorical than material construct. Indeed, the nine-factor model demonstrates that 
much of the post-crisis increase in welfare is explained by factors other than the three 
crisis-related factors. Instead, the exploding social expenditure mainly reflects the rising 
health care costs (.79), which have decreased only in Greece where austerity is most 
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dominant. By contrast, a notable increase in the cost of all unemployment-related 
benefits burdens significantly only Spain, even if many other countries have decided to 
cover health-related costs at the expense of the marginalised.  
 
 
Figure 15. Main factors of the economic crisis: the financial and the fiscal (PAF). 
But other than health care costs, how exactly do the financial and fiscal factors 
undermine the protection of those in margins? At least in countries high on the public 
finance crisis but lower on the fiscal crisis (upper-left corner, Figure 15), unemployment 
benefits have been cut more: considering Greece, Latvia, Liethuania, Spain, Cyprus and 
Hungary, in all of them average protection per unemployed has been cut down by more 
than 40 %; Ireland is the next country in a row, reducing the level of protection by 25 % 
per claimant.  
 
It then appears that the very idea of welfare, and particularly the idea of the 
‘decommodification’ of labour (Esping-Andersen, 1990) as a universal form of relief is 
becoming marginalised as a result of the financial crisis—even when unemployment-
benefits themselves seem to have negligible effect on the overall costs of welfare. Robert 
Ezra Park wrote in 1926 that a ‘marginal man is one whom fate has condemned to live 
in two societies and in two, not merely different but antagonistic cultures’. Even if the 
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discourse first referred to ethnic minorities, similar antagonisms also overshadow the 
experiences of other forms of social exclusion and the poor and rich worlds again falling 
apart.  
 
The welfare project originally emereged in order to question this marginalisation on two 
fronts. First, following policies proposed by scholars like H. Marshall as well as Sir 
William Beveridge21, Western countries approached close to full employment. The 
number of the unemployed was reduced—there was no longer a strict distinction 
between the worlds of success and misery, as the welfare states fought against the world 
of ‘commodified’ labour. Besides modernisation and strict national boundaries, the 
emergence of the welfare state thus greatly enhanced the accommodation of the 
marginalised. In other words, as Beveridge fought his ‘giant evils’—squalor, ignorance, 
want, idleness, and disease—the question of marginality changed, and was largely 
dispelled: poverty no longer existed in the ‘margins’ but was now addressed as part of 
mainstream experiences (cf. Dean, 1991).  
 
The roots of this process date back to Otto von Bismark’s Germany in the 1870’s, when 
the ‘social state’ (Sozialstaat), later theorised by Italians (stato sociale), was first 
pronounced: this followed by the introduction of sickness insurance law in 1883, 
accident insurance law in 1884 and old age and disability insurance law in 1889. 
However, the insurances did not always cover all universally, and already Thomas 
Malthus (1766–1834)—an English economist and demographer known both for his 
population growth estimates—opposed to social insurance as an adequate way to fight 
poverty. He argued that these ‘root and branch’ measures would only make marginality 
part of the economic order instead of mitigating them. 
 
The success of social democratic policies in the twentieth century could be interpreted 
differently. Yet today we might again be able to say that welfare itself finds itself a 
refugee in the world of economic investment. It is viewed as an expense and subject to 
austerity, which can only result in further marginalisation and disinvestment of human 
skill, wellbeing and capital. The crisis then has brought Malthusian tones back. Social 
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expenditure is now, again, viewed as part of the world of misery, and national actors try 
to stay away from it.  
 
This deterioration of welfare, my factorial model suggests, is catalysed but not caused by 
the financial crisis. The increasing tendency to ‘reform’ the welfare states (e.g., Palier, 
ed, 2010) has evolved in the Nordic countries at least since the 1990’s (Kvist, 1999) as 
active labour market discourses now articulate decommodification as a source of idling. 
In effect, unlike what Karl Polanyi notes in Great Transformations, ’the figure of the 
pauper’ is no longer ‘almost forgotten since’, but again dominates a discussion ‘the 
imprint of which is as powerful as that of the most spectacular events’—say the current 
economic crisis. Even the unemployed have to be active, maintaining their 
employability and demonstrate this to society (as illustrated by a recent paper published 
by the ILO: Brewer, 2013; also see Chapter 6). The crisis is then but a good chance to 
question the sustainability of welfare costs, not only now but for years to come.  
 
The conflict between the two worlds of Malthus and Polanyi now anticipates the 
performative question: to what extent is welfare marginalised as an effect of precisely 
those discourses that articulate it on the side of misery rather than success? And, more 
materially, do not the welfare cuts contribute to inequality and stagnation, thus 
furthering the fiscal imbalances and the deprivation of public resources?  
The problem is even more complex at the global level, of course, as many of the ‘poor’, 
developing economies (but not all) are becoming richer while the poor in rich countries 
become more deprived. But before preceeding with the multilevel anlaysis combining 
the national and individual levels, the next chapter investigates the role of wellbeing and 
solidarity in individual crisis-representations in order to understand how such 
connotations and performances are themselves socio-culturally embedded. 
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Table 5. Nine axes of the crisis produced by PAF, explain 87 % of total variation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	 	
Factor	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
		
	
Public	
financing	
crisis	 Fiscal	crisis	
Welfare	
crisis	
Welfare	
expansion	 Participation	 Youth	crisis	
Anti-poverty	
policy	
Young	
women's	
crisis	
Gender	
pay	gap	
	
Economy	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	GDP	real	growth,	compounded	
change	end	of	2007–end	of	2012	
	
–––	 –	
	 	 	
+	
	 	 	 	Combined	length	of	recession	
periods	2007–2012,	months	
	
++	 ++	 +	 –	
	 	 	 	 	 	GDP	per	capita,	2012	
	
–	
	
+	
	
+++	 –	 –	
	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Unemployment	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Unemployment	rate,	2007	
	 	 	 	 	
–	 +++	
	
–	
	 	Increase	of	the	percentage	of	the	
unemployed	of	working	age	
population	
	
+++	 ++	
	 	 	
–	
	
––	
	 	Reduction	of	the	percentage	of	
those	with	limited	duration	
contract,	%	points,	2007–2012	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
––––	
	 	Change	in	the	proportion	of	youth	
among	all	unemployed	
	 	 	 	 	 	
+++	
	 	 	 	Change	in	women's	portion	of	all	
unemployed	2007-2012,	%	
	 	
–	 ––	
	 	
+	
	
++	
	 	
Unemployment	change	ratio:	
teritary/lower	educational	groups	
	 	 	
–	
	
––	 ++	 –	
	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Government	account	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Fiscal	deficit,	2007	
	 	
++++	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Increase	in	fiscal	deficit	
	
+	 +++	
	 	 	
+	 +	
	 	 	EMU	convergence	criterion	bond	
yield,	2012	
	
+++	 +	 +	
	
+	
	 	 	 	 	Government	credit	rating	
	
––	
	 	 	
+++	
	 	 	 	 	Public	debt	to	GDP,	2007	
	 	 	
++++	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	Increase	of	national	debt	relative	
to	GDP,	2007–2012	
	
++	 +++	
	
+	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Pubilc	expenditure	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Expenditure	on	social	protection	
2012,	%	of	GDP	
	 	 	
–––	
	
+	
	 	 	 	 	Change	in	expenditure	on	social	
protection	2007–2012,	%	of	2012	
GDP	
	 	 	 	
++++	 +	
	 	 	 	 	Increase	in	non-social	
expenditure,	%	of	2012	GDP	
	
––––	
	 	 	
+	
	 	 	 	 	Goverment	contributions,	%	of	all	
social	expenditure	
	 	 	 	 	 	
–	 ––	
	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Welfare	protection	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Increase	in	social	protection	on	
health	2007–2012,	%	of	GDP	
	 	 	
–	 ++++	
	 	 	 	 	 	Cuts	to	protection	per	
unemployed,	2007–2012	
	 	
–––	
	
–	
	 	 	 	 	 	Increase	of	protection	against	
social	exclusion,	per	claim	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
++++	
	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Equality	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Gender	economic	participation	
index,	2012	
	 	 	 	 	
++++	
	 	 	 	 	GINI-coefficient,	2012	
	
++	
	
–	
	 	 	 	
–	
	 	Gender	pay	gap	in	unadjusted	
form,	2012	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
++++	
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Chapter	3	
It	Could	Be	a	Performed	One	
 
 
At least if Edmund Husserl’s (1965 [1935]) diagnosis of the Crisis of European Man is 
right, the current crisis touches something historically more abiding than just the past 
few years of debt-expansion. Among other things, the past few centuries of European 
economic government have been crowded by financial defaults (Reinhart and Rogoff, 
2009). Since at least the eighteenth century a peculiar kind of ‘crisis-thinking’ has 
overshadowed European ‘political theology’ characterised by recurring crises and 
conflicts (Koselleck, 1988). The current crisis, in turn, is thus both a shared crisis and 
yet manifests differently across contexts. It is then sociologically intriguing to ask how 
these particular crises relate to the idea of Europe, on the one hand, but also how views 
about economic governance and expertise relate to actual crisis-representations and the 
perceived depth of the crisis on the other.  
 
In the light of these concerns, it is crucial to ask how the current crisis is itself  
‘constructed as an object of knowledge’ (Roitman 2011, 2). Crisis-thinking entails a 
certain representation of what exactly is in a crisis. In the fifth chapter I criticised 
certain expert-driven perspectives that tend to economise the crisis and desubjectify 
national actors and welfare. Yet, our knowledge about the connection between 
financialisation, the financial crisis and the trouble of the real economy is limited. Even 
the question of the extent to which the crisis is contingent or controllable is open, and 
seems to also divide the lay people, not just the experts.  
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In result, the ways of ‘knowing’ the crisis both as a technical affair and as a question of 
moral judgment have broad implications to policy. In particular, it has long been 
recognised that economics is, among other things, dominated by certain ‘rhetoric’ (e.g., 
McCloskey, 1986; 2000), which is powerful as as it speaks to the people, coordinates 
their behaviour and ‘performs’ certain techniques of economic cognition.  
Precisely because there is no ‘right’ answer to many questions about the economy (e.g., 
the moral duty to pay debt, the level of contingency of the economy, and the proper 
measures to regulate the financial markets) they are politically laden issues and thus 
important to the broader public. This chapter thus endorses an epistemological position 
that emphasises the relevance of the ‘public understanding’ of knowledge—both because 
of the democratic goals (cf., Rosanvallon, 2008) but also as a way to guarantee more 
efficient outcomes (cf. Irwin and Wynne, eds, 1996).  
 
As a brief introduction to the discourses of ‘public understanding of science’, the 
sociology of knowledge was previously dominated by the study of science itself as a 
‘community’ (Hagström, 1965). After the constructionist turn (e.g., Berger and 
Luckman, 1991), this became gradually replaced by the sociology of scientific knowledge 
(SSK) as an object of social construction (e.g., Bloor, 1991, Goldman, 1999). This in 
some way marked a reversal that brought sociology back to Durkheim’s elaboration of 
‘categories’ and ‘representations’. In particular, the discourse of scientific knowledge 
itself (Gilbert and Mulkay, 1984) was no longer viewed as independent of the social 
contexts22.  
 
It has been argued that the sociology of science and later the SSK emerged from the 
need for sociology itself to develop a sense of itself as a ‘science’ (Bourdieu, 1975; 1988). 
This occurred simultaneously with quite different developments in the philosophy of 
science that originated from Popper’s positive philosophy (e.g., Lakatos, 1976; Kitcher, 
1995), and which became favoured among the philosophers of economics and other 
quantitative sciences instead (Hands, 2001; on the ‘economy’ of scientific inquiry itself, 
see also Peirce, 1969 [1879]). Sometimes referred to as the ‘economics of scientific 
knowledge’ the paradigm holds a more progressive view of science, and thus it is closer to 
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what earlier sociologists discussed in the context of scientific ‘growth’ (e.g., Ben-David, 
1991).  
 
This paradigm is perhaps the most distinctly opposed to the developments of the SSK 
and what later became known as science and technology studies—particularly the ANT 
that I have used, even if loosely, as a broader theoretical framework. In this direction, 
the focus on scientific communities became decentred by a more distributive way of 
knowledge, referring either to ‘practices’ (Lave and Wenger, 1991; Knorr-Cetina, 1999) 
or to an entire ‘network’ of individuals and communities who would hardly possess any 
shared practices or ‘beliefs’ (cf. Haas, 1992). What coordinates actions across such 
dispersed networks is something like a ‘boundary-object’ (Bowker and Star, 1999): the 
crisis coordinates practices in various communities, and those actions are brought in 
contact with each other in the way that they all deal with the crisis even if they do not 
share a common understanding about it.  
 
The idea of a boundary-object thus assumes that no single community dominates the 
production of knowledge. The crisis-constructions are then objects that various groups 
engage with, including the communities of ‘non-experts’. Yet few ANT-based social 
studies of finance have explicitly investigated the constructions of the national, 
European and global crises from the lay-perspective, focusing on financial experts 
instead (cf. MacKenzie, 2004; 2006; Muniesa et al 2007)—not despite the fact that the 
dominance of public debt makes democratic representations and the way in which 
people make ‘sovereignty’ intelligible (cf. Bartelson, 1995: 53) extremely timely. Also, it 
is obvious that the rhetoric about the crisis and expert-constructions ‘perform’ the way 
in which the public relates to debt.  
 
‘Knowledges’	About	the	Crisis—A	Quantitative	Comparison	
Both the SSK and the public understanding discourses have traditionally applied 
qualitative methods, whereas my interest lies in comparing the crisis-constructions 
between contexts, and quantitative methods serve as a way to experiment the extent to 
which these epistemic representations are associated with various economic axes of the 
crisis (e.g., PCA and PAF). To this end, there are two relevant sets of Eurobarometer 
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data collected in 2011 and 2012 (76.1 and 78.1). They assess technical knowledge of 
several crisis-related issues (e.g., rating agencies, Eurobonds, the role of the ECB etc.) 
and also ask opinions about suitable policy-responses to the crisis. The emphasis lies on 
group- and context-averages, and it is not the aim to represent individual knowledges 
similarly as in the standard approaches to the sociology of knowledge. 
 
Methodologically, I have applied multiple correspondence analysis (MCA) that is 
discussed in more depth in Chapter 8, where I apply the method in the context of the 
main data. The analysis in this chapter is instead somewhat more peripheral and only 
attempts to illustrate how different contexts are positioned in respect to crisis-
awareness—not so much their actual impact on wellbeing. Here it suffices to say that 
the MCA-method is very similar to principal component analysis, but it applies to 
categorical, discrete data. This is pivotal because the answers I study are most often 
likert-scale variables (subjectively rated scales from, say, 1 to 5). This also enables 
considering blank responses as individual response categories—a crucial thing from the 
epistemological point of view as it is relevant to understand not only the representations 
of knowledge but also to represent lack of it. In La Distinction Pierre Bourdieu (1984) in 
fact similarly uses non-responses and omissions as part of his social distinction analysis.  
 
The resulting axes are in contrast ‘scalar’ (continuous) ones: they are calculated from 
individual response categories based on the so-called !2-metrics, and range from 
negative to positive numbers. The procedure itself is reasonably complex (see Appendix 
9) and the resulting axes are ‘latent’ factors whose meanings are identified 
retrospectively. Following Bourdieu’s example, they are interpreted by looking at how 
different groups based on certain answer-categories average on each one of the included 
axes. The identification of the axes, as explicated in Appendix 6, is based on several 
graphical plots currently available online (goo.gl/x3uYe4).  
	
Contingency	or	Control:	Economic	and	Expert	Epistemologies	
Crisis-related knowledges were analysed based on Eurobarometer 76.1 (2011) and 78.1 
(2012) data sets collected in all EU-countries. Starting with the former one, there were 
25 different variables that all were incorporated as part of a single MCA-model. This 
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resulted in five axes, which give quite a consistent picture based on their high 
Cronbach’s alpha-coefficients (.657–.863). The survey is important for the lay-
epistemology considerations because it directly asks about awareness related to credit 
rating agencies and the bond markets (particularly about the Eurobonds, which are 
proposed bonds issued by the Eurozone as a whole and with shared responsibility). One 
of the interesting themes in this regard is the question of debt-sharing and particularly 
how the respondent articulates the benefits of debt-relief (if any). For example, whether 
forgiving some of the debt of the most troubled economies would contribute to overall 
economic growth in the Eurozone or whether debt-relief should be promoted in the 
mere interest of solidarity. Such representations of debt are contrasted with respondents’ 
awareness about technical issues like the role of credit rating agencies and central banks. 
They are also compared to expectations about the European and national economic 
growth.  
 
I then identified the MCA-axes depicting differences in crisis-representations by 
plotting individual response categories. I also plotted countries and different groups 
(age, income, etc.) separately on the different axes. Using these maps the five axes were 
identified as (1) expertise, (2) solidarity, (3) technical knowledge, (4) assertiveness, and 
(5) impact. Each one of them may be viewed as independent of the others. However, 
many interesting themes like the question of moral obligation to pay debt and the 
different modes of crisis-awareness actually emerge as combinations of multiple axes (the 
diagonals in the following figures).  
 
The first important theme that emerges relates to the question of economic expectations: 
whether the respondent believes that the outcomes of the crisis could be controlled or 
whether they are contingent instead. This question of control is an old theme in 
economic sociology, and it relates to the emergence of institutions and identities (cf. 
White, 2008). Interestingly, this axis is independent of the so-called expertise-axis, that 
is, the lay-epistemology approach confirms that the question of the future is open and, 
therefore, independent of the interpretation of the current economic situation in the 
country. Yet the combination of low expertise and high belief in control results in a 
rather subordinate position that advocates institutional resolution.  
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Figure 16. Expertise and contingency: two diagonals of the MCA-analysis on crisis-
representations.  
 
In contrast, the outcomes of the crisis are identified as contingent by those who disagree 
with debt sharing, assume the crisis to last for long, or who have either lost their own 
jobs or whose relatives have become unemployed. Those who believe in contingency 
tend to leave the question about the national crisis-impact blank. In contrast, the crisis 
is identified as more controllable by those who agree with debt sharing or assume 
financial help to be in the national economic interest. They are less certain about the 
direct consequences of the crisis. At the same time, however, they believe that the crisis 
itself is about to end, at least given that proper political measures are taken. But if 
control without awareness results in an affirmative relationship with institutional 
resolutions, the combination of expertise and control is, instead, overshadowed by 
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acknowledgment (horizontal axis). In contrast, both expertise and control lead into an 
opposition towards institutional framings (vertical axis).  
 
In terms of demographic, socio-economic and occupation groups, there are few 
differences in the contingency-diagonal: only the groups less aware of crisis-related 
themes tend to advocate and believe in institutional resolutions. Notably the young prefer 
more institutionally oriented approaches and emphasise control. By contrast, older 
respondents tend to feel less ‘expert’ about the crisis, and they are more ignorant and 
feel contingent about its outcomes. Individually felt expertise is highest among the 
general managers—not professionals—and the modelled forms of expertise indicate a 
peculiar relationship with power (not just technical representations about the crisis). 
Expertise identified by the model thus indicates a certain kind of relationship with 
power, not just technical representations about the crisis. In respect to national contexts, 
particularly the respondents from Ireland, the UK, Spain, and Portugal regard the help 
of the EU-institutions as pivotal to crisis-resolutions.  
 
The	Moral	Dimension	
In addition to the question of the current and future prospects of the European 
economy (the assumed level of contingency), the data is also revealing as to moral 
questions related to the debt-crisis. Previously, such moral connotations of debt have 
been empirically studied in qualitative research (e.g., Roitman, 2006), but the 
quantitative analysis allows us to compare macro-level contexts. As to public debt, the 
question also relates to Castel’s (2003) discussion about the ‘problematic of relief’: unlike 
in the case of private debt, it is particularly the public welfare rather than individual 
wellbeing that is at stake in the sovereign-debt crisis.  
 
The reasons that the respondents believe to justify debt-relief are particularly illustrative.  
Solidarity as a non-instrumental goal is mentioned mostly by those occupying 
elementary or manual jobs but also by supervisors (who differ from the ‘professionals’ in 
this regard). Therefore, it is not the case that poverty or disadvantage would necessarily 
result in discord; rather, the lack of solidarity appears to characterise those in the highest 
and, in many ways, also the most expert positions. However, if the professionals favour 
 113 
direct debt-relief least, the general managers are instead more pragmatic as they assume 
debt-relief to benefit the overall prospects of the economy.  
 
But country-level differences are perhaps the most interesting ones, not the least 
because of their resonances with Max Weber’s (2001) thesis about the Protestant Ethics 
and the Spirit of Capitalism. Still today, Protestant countries are particularly opposed to 
debt-relief with the notable exception of Denmark. The Eurobonds in contrast are 
favoured in Cyprus but also in countries like Greece, Spain, Ireland, Hungary and 
Denmark. The housing market collapsed in all these countries and it is possible that 
those suffering from difficulties related to household debt might become more 
sympathetic towards debt-relief also on the national level. In the opposite camp there is 
for example Finland, where the moral obligation to repay is the most emphatically 
stressed.  
 
Impact	and	Awareness:	Quantity	and	Quality	
Unlike economic ‘futures’ represented by respondents, the moral obligation -diagonal is 
independent of the epistemic axes23, but also of the level of perceived impact. The latter is 
indeed an important variable and despite the many ways in which the economic impact 
of the crisis can be represented (personal, national, European), there is some coherence 
between them. Interestingly, the impact factors that combine them also appear to 
correlate quite consistently with another diagonal that relates to economic but not 
technical expertise. In other words, it is a different thing to ‘know’ the crisis in the sense 
of economic expectations rather than technically, and only the former kind of 
knowledge is associated with high impact.  
 
Therefore, countries low on economic ignorance are the ones, where both the impact 
and awareness are high—the so-called quantitative crisis countries. As another diagonal 
there is one axis that relates to those who believe that the crisis is going to last, yet 
according to whom there should be no inter-governmental help or solidarity24. Lack of 
solidarity also illustrates the absence of crisis-awareness. At the opposite end, on the 
same diagonal (Figure 18), we encounter another mode of awareness, which is typical in 
those countries in which the perceived impact of the crisis is low but where there are 
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qualitative changes to the organisation of work: the so-called qualitative crisis cluster. 
Experiences of uncertainty are not necessarily visible in terms of economic indicators 
alone (cf. Bear, 2014), but they relate to the changing structures of employment. 
 
Figure 17. Crisis-awareness: qualitative (blue) and quantitative (red) crises of work and 
wellbeing (goo.gl/RH2Vez). 
 
Crisis-awareness, at least when measured in connection to the European crisis, is now 
situated between these two ends of the crisis (red and blue colours in Figure 17). The 
former, quantitative one, is particularly associated with economic awareness, whereas 
the qualitative crisis of work exhibits more political orientations. Both of these two 
forms of awareness seem to be independent of economic expertise; they also do not 
resonate with the confidence in the future prospects of the economy. Negative 
experiences of the personal economy are strongly associated with the ‘lasting crisis, no 
help’ axis, whereas crisis-awareness refers to broader and shared experiences and 
solidarity. 
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Figure 18. Two modes of awareness—qualitative and quantitative crises of wellbeing. 
But the impact of the crisis is also related to national awareness. In particular, it appears 
that where the impact of the crisis is significant but not overt, there is the greatest 
contrast between the emphasis on national or EU-wide resolutions, that is, unlike in the 
countries intervened by the Troika, in others there is still some level of political ‘excess’ 
that allows people to choose their level of attribution to the crisis. Finally, regarding the 
PAF-predictors the fiscal crisis (PAF2) is associated with higher hopes for relief, but not 
the public finance crisis factor (PAF1: -.051). This suggests that the attitudes towards 
debt relief seem to be independent of the national debt-situation and reflect the national 
ethos instead.  
 
Crisis	Awareness:	an	Independent	Concept?	
The question that remains is whether crisis-awareness, which I opposed to both 
economic and political modes of ignorance, is as such an independent, crisis-related 
construct. Or should crisis-awareness be, instead, regarded as part of broader 
acknowledgment about EU-related issues? This question can be assessed in the context 
of the latter Eurobarometer data (78.1), which similarly asks about specific crisis-related 
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opinions but with less emphasis on detailed aspects about the crisis and more about its 
impact and about the EU. Featuring such themes as one’s personal economic situation 
and perceptions about the EU, the data can actually help to justify the construction of 
crisis-awareness as an independent mode of expertise.  
 
Indeed, the cross-correlations between the MCA-models based on the two data sets 
suggest that crisis-awareness is positively correlated with acknowledgment about EU-
related matters (.58) and with awareness of the economic situation (.46), but little less 
with the certainty about the personal situation (.34). However, the fact that only about 
20 to 33 % of the variation in the neglectfulness about the crisis is explained away by the 
EU-related variables suggests that there is something peculiar about crisis-awareness that is 
irreducible to broader institutional framings.  
 
Knowledge related to the EU is, therefore, partially distinct from that related to the 
crisis, even when the crisis-awareness -axis is itself constructed basing on 
Eurobarometer-questions specific to the EU-context25. The independence of the crisis-
awareness from representations of its quantitative impact is further supported by the fact 
that the assertiveness in crisis-representations (extreme answers, either high or low) is 
independent of the assertiveness related to future expectations about the economy. In 
particular, the general crisis-awareness and technical knowledge emerge as independent 
components that are, furthermore, both unrelated to the perceived impact of the crisis. 
However, the analyses demonstrate that personal certainty about the economic position 
plays an important role in the construction of personal well-being and hope.  
 
Answering the question of what it is to ‘know the crisis’ then involves three 
components: knowledge about personal prospects, about the basic nature and 
organisation of the EU in order to understand the specificity of the crisis in the EU, and 
technical awareness about crisis-related issues like the bank or transaction taxes, rating 
agencies etc. These are all relevant as they contribute to the feelings of confidence and 
expertise, which in turn are important in the development of the ‘democratic’ 
representations of the correct crisis-policies. 
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What	About	the	EU?	
Furthermore, one of the interesting questions is also the role of the crisis in the process 
of European integration. It is as such interesting that crisis-awareness tends to be 
independent of EU-related opinions although it is true that countries overshadowed by 
quantitative impact tend to be more optimistic about the EU. In contrast, the 
qualitative crisis cluster (in addition to Bulgaria) is associated with pessimism, which is 
however, a less systematic association.  
 
On the other hand, ‘optimism’ about the prospect of the EU as exhibited in Greece, 
Cyprus and the UK is coupled with much lower involvement with the EU. Instead, 
another set of crisis-countries, like Latvia, Sweden and possibly Spain, indicate a more 
affirmative relationship with the EU. Also, particularly in post-socialist Europe there 
are high expectations about the EU, even though the respondents are generally more 
modest there while assessing the EU. It is thus clear that the question of the EU divides 
national cultures and thus moderates the crisis-representations if not the crisis itself.  
Knowing	Thy	Crisis,	Knowing	Wellbeing	
But is knowing the crisis then at all relevant to its actual outcomes? Is it performed by the 
construction of its knowledges? This can never be answered for certain. However, 
basing on above comparisons it appears that crisis-awareness (.19), economic difficulties 
(.21) and the strong role attributed to the EU (.23) are all associated with the higher 
likelihood to the dominance of a social democratic cabinet.  
 
By contrast, in the countries where people acknowledge the impact of the crisis but still 
oppose inter-governmental relief and help, there appears to be change towards the right 
in the cabinet (-.134***), whereas ‘expert’ attitudes by the lay people are associated with 
a contrary shift towards the left (.150***).  Therefore, knowledge and awareness do 
appear to make a difference at least politically, even if we cannot yet deduce the 
direction of cause.  
 
Inequality also makes perceptions about the economy more contingent and increases the 
likelihood of a submissive attitude towards institutional resolution. Social expenditure, 
by contrast, is associated with higher crisis-awareness, faith in economic control and 
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solidarity (non-social contributions have no similar connection). Higher GDP also 
predicts higher experience of control. Extreme bond rates in turn are associated with 
less ignorance—both technical (-.45) and economic (-.29)—but not acknowledgement. 
 
As illustrated by the table below, it then appears that awareness and expertise about the 
crisis are particularly associated with welfare crisis  (PAF3), but not with the financial 
and fiscal crisis –axes, which instead result in higher perceived impact. In result, the 
picture indicating the quantitative and qualitative ends of the crisis should also be taken 
as an indication that it is wellbeing in particular that is questioned at both extremes. 
Therefore, it appears that the constructions of the crisis-awareness do indeed genuinely 
contribute to the crisis of welfare. Even if fiscal and financial representations of the 
crisis then modulate its impact (particularly the GEP appears to defend against 
quantitative impact), the question of welfare prevails everywhere but in the emerging 
regime. Moreover, it again appears that moral connotations of debt are independent of 
the crisis-representations. Instead, they mirror the effect of culture that, unlike welfare, 
is not itself a direct element of the crisis (even if there is a slight indication that the 
unemployment-crisis itself could mitigate the most disciplined views towards debt).    
 
Table 6. Correlation table of the epistemological constructions and the most relevant 
components and axes describing the crisis-impact. 
 
 
 
Considering the strong role played by social expenditure in the construction of crisis-
awareness, and the little relevance of the fiscal and financial crises to this awareness, it 
appears that the question of wellbeing is indeed at the heart of the crisis. The feeling of 
the crisis is, after all, little related to the quantitative impact of the crisis but to the social 
political tension that, like Koselleck and Roitman define it, makes the crisis as much 
political and moral as it is economic.  
Awareness Impact
Moral0
obligation
Quantitative0
crisis
Qualitative0
crisis
Crisis0subject0
to0control Expertise
Technical0
ignorance
PAF Financial0crisis ?0.05 0.21 ?0.07 0.11 %0.19 0.01 ?0.09 %0.22
Fiscal0crisis 0.00 0.19 ?0.10 0.14 ?0.14 0.08 ?0.09 %0.22
Welfare0crisis 0.22 ?0.08 ?0.05 0.10 0.21 0.15 0.16 0.02
Welfare0cost0hike 0.00 ?0.01 ?0.03 0.00 0.01 0.07 ?0.08 0.00
Economic0participation 0.19 %0.22 0.09 ?0.02 0.29 0.17 0.10 0.22
PCA Unemployment0crisis ?0.03 %0.29 %0.13 0.18 %0.23 0.03 ?0.08 %0.33
Unemployment0before0the0crisis 0.01 ?0.02 0.02 ?0.01 0.02 ?0.02 0.04 0.05
Social0protection0before0the0crisis 0.26 ?0.10 ?0.04 0.11 0.26 0.23 0.14 0.03
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Therefore, the debt crisis illustrates a moral dilemma, which is visible particularly in the 
context of debt-relief—something favoured by the Catholic and the Orthodox but 
fiercely opposed by the Protestants (except Denmark), who suffer from a qualitative 
crisis instead. As to the question of what it is to ‘know’ the crisis (and sovereign-debt), 
technical knowledge plays an insignificant role. As suggested above, we could say that 
there are two overlapping but spatially different crises in Europe. One of them is 
dominated by the moral dilemma whereas the other refers to more material changes in 
the conditions of living undermined by its economic impact. Nevertheless, despite their 
differences, in both cases ‘knowing’ the crisis has much to do with wellbeing, which 
then appears to be a common denominator integrating various representations. 
 
But it also appears that another kind of awareness—possibly one framing the crisis in 
terms of broader social conflicts and oppositions like the ones related to age and social 
change in the context of employment—could bring about a peculiar sort of realism. 
Portugal, for example, illustrates strong awareness based on aforementioned indicators. 
The third part will discuss the subject, brining about the idea that there are generational 
movements in play. In effect, ‘awareness’ does not necessarily mean exaggeration on any 
particular axis on crisis-representations—control, expertise or moral superiority—but 
awareness could be indicated by a kind of modesty as well. In particular, the local truth 
about the crisis can be very different from the representations of its global or even 
European existence. 
 
Old,	Young	and	the	Coming	Crises	of	European	Welfare	
While crisis(-awareness) is generally related to welfare, there is no single, all-
encompassing way to compose what exactly the problem of welfare is. The crisis calls for 
judgment, like Koselleck and others argued, but what precisely is being evaluated varies 
from one context to another. Perhaps the best picture of crisis-awareness is then 
provided by what it is not: based on our analysis of the lay-epistemologies, there are 
basically three manifestations of ignorance: technical, economic and political. Even if the 
manifestation of these three types of recognition vary depending on the ‘impact’ of the 
crisis, the level of crisis-awareness itself appears to be irreducible to the deterioration of 
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actual conditions. In fact, the differences in impact largely reflect the pre-crisis differences 
in unemployment (e.g., differences in pre-crisis unemployment, PCA3).  
 
These differences in the perceived impact then little resonate with consciousness about 
the imminence of the European problem: even in Germany, where unemployment rates 
have fallen from 8 % to 5 % between 2007 and 2012, there are many qualitative changes 
to employment and welfare. Of course, in the German case the declining rates reflect 
changes in classification: today there are 5.2 million people relying on benefits, while 
only 3.4 million are considered jobless, and these changes are part of the German crisis 
of work. There are particularly the so-called ‘One-euro jobs’ created as part of the Hartz 
reforms: jobs for young adults, which only compensate their expenses, spanning from 
1.0 to 2.5 euro an hour (in addition to unemployment benefits).  
 
It is then not surprising that Germany stands quite high on the youth crisis factor 
(PAF6), even if its economy prospers more than in decades, and in part due to its free 
access to capital thanks to cheap loans guaranteed by the turmoil in Southern Europe. 
Therefore, when looking at the situation across the EU, all countries seem to be part of 
the crisis even if the problems of unemployment were more stressed in some countries 
rather than in others. German Bundesbanks are amongst the biggest creditors of 
Greece; now Germany is taking the lead in reforming social support and labour market 
policies.  
  
As one of the leading themes, the reforms ‘performed’ as part of crisis-thinking affect 
the old and the young differently. The effects of social change manifest particularly in 
the latter group, both because they still know what they used to be expecting about their 
adult lives, and what is now happening in a changed situation. On the other hand, 
youth refers not only to a specific phase of life but also to a certain generation of ideas. 
In this respect, the idea of the welfare state—which is now questioned particularly from 
the youth-perspective—is both old and young.  
 
The idea of the welfare state is young because it needs to be renewed from time to time, 
not only because of political will but because of the economic balance of payments and 
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transfers. This system of transfers is complex, and the exchanges between younger and 
older cohorts in terms of both money and work (services) are pivotal to the maintenance 
of inter-generational balance. In addition to economic reasons, this balance may be 
questioned given the demographic shifts in the population structure, and because the 
politically created system of transfers is not necessarily elastic enough to resonate with 
these shifts: some cohorts are promised too much at the expense of others.  
 
Of course, such economic reasoning about the sustainability of welfare is speculative, 
and it is possible that fewer people are required to care for us in the future. We should 
not undermine what innovation brings us even if this would be contrary to the current 
trend. However, these speculations are inherent to European crisis-thinking. On the 
other hand, welfare protection is what has made the European economies distinctive, 
and it is uncertain whether without such ‘social states’ at the age of austerity Europe can 
maintain freedom and innovation that once made its economies prosper.  
 
The problems of welfare should thus matter for all of us, independent of age. Welfare is 
about maintaining the delicate balance between the production and absorption, and in 
real economic terms the old age benefits and the increasing demand for care-related 
work could actually be the salvation of the European economy—on the condition that 
the transfers are politically adjusted so that the demand and supply of work may actually 
meet.  
 
Perhaps then it is not so much the balance between work and need but between work 
and the system of transfers allocating work that is undermined by the crisis. The crisis 
could also have been created by such imbalances. Indeed, it is after all possible that, 
despite all the rhetoric, the collapse of Lehman Brothers might have been peripheral to 
the crisis of welfare. Of course, the financial turbulence and the resulting flight of 
financial capital away from welfare states and in support of banking might have 
furthered (and performed) the imbalances between the need for care and the system of 
transfers, and displaced the exchanges between the old and young. Should bank bailouts 
have been avoided, no one knows what would have happened. This is a speculative 
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hypothesis except in Iceland, of course, but at least it shows that the fate of the economy 
should be viewed as politically contingent.  
 
Performative	Contradiction	
But what actually happened is that the Troika took over politics in many countries, and 
demanded broad cuts to social protection. Regardless of the sanity of these measures, 
they create and ‘perform’ the current crisis of wellbeing. For example, unemployment-
benefits have fallen by 47 % in both Greece and Spain, even if the need for them is 
higher than ever. The tightening policy results in a vicious circle, which undermines 
aggregate demand: we can only conclude that aforementioned cuts are made in an 
attempt to ‘encourage’ the jobless to work. This could be called a ‘performative 
contradiction’: it is aimless to promote employability by measures that at the same time 
deteriorate the conditions of employment.   
 
From the point of view of fiscal difficulties social protection is inconsequential given 
that only 4 % of the GDP is spent on unemployment, exclusion and housing, which is 
little in comparison to 73.9 % (Greece) or 62.5 % (Spain) spent on all welfare 
contributions. The overall amount of public expenditure relative to GDP (including 
pensions) runs from 43 % in Bulgaria to 80 % in France. The burden of welfare comes 
from elsewhere.  
 
At the same time, given how prominent role public expenditure then plays in the 
dynamics of the European economy, any cuts to welfare policy or other government 
expenses might undermine the prospects of economic growth (despite the political 
tendency to favour the ‘private’ economy in Europe). Austerity imposes a direct, 
negative effect on the foundations of the way we live. It is hardly plausible to then say 
that only the ‘public finance crisis’ questioned the organisation of welfare. Even if the 
rising welfare costs are associated with national fiscal and financial problems, welfare 
itself in most social political sense (unemployment, exclusion, etc.) is impossible to 
blame. Instead, the financial, fiscal and health care crises serve as a pretext to changes in 
other contexts of public expenditure—changes that could be difficult to pursue without 
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the underlying crisis-rhetoric. Let us now take a closer look at the foundations of this 
pretext.  
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Part	II	
Work,	Policy,	and	Expenditure	
 
 
Cross-national comparisons indicate broad differences in how the crisis plays out, 
benefiting some countries at the expense of others. Yet the crisis brought welfare into 
question in virtually all the EU-countries, all while employment was undermined both 
in quality and quantity. The crisis is a period during which these changes are at least 
actively pursued if not materially performed. A crisis calls for a decision rather than an 
answer—‘Never let a good crisis go to waste’ Churchill once said, and many have joined 
the fray (cf. Mirowski, 2014).  
 
But how exactly does the ‘new social question’ perform itself now? Who are those who 
suffer? Using multilevel analysis, I address this distributional and epidemiological 
question from two perspectives: employment and labour market policy. Both themes 
illustrate the central role of the ‘public’ in the folding of the crisis: lagging social 
investment but also the often overt non-social expenditure have undermined the 
prospects of growth. At the same time, labour market policies that are unable to 
promote employment still address the ‘publics’ of work politically and ideologically. 
 
People then increasingly ‘long for’ work—at least metaphorically the welfare costs rise 
because people are unable to fund their own lives: if nothing else, the debt-crisis and the 
growing dominance of quantitative finance have revealed our existential ‘debt’ to work. 
In response to this deficit, the question of welfare and public expenditure today relates 
to how we could best secure our needs—and ‘refinance’ our existential debt but in a way 
that still maintains our obligation to work and to be active. 	  
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Chapter	4	
Subjects	in	Contexts—On	Multilevel	Methods	
 
 
The aim of this chapter is to introduce the main concepts of multilevel methodology. I 
will start with the history of multilevel methods and discuss their relevance to sociology. 
I will then address decisions about how I used the models and on what variables; what 
alternative models I introduced; and how I contrast the results with the findings from 
the previous part.  
Brief	History	of	Multilevel	Modelling		
Multilevel methods are now applied in various fields ranging from education to 
epidemiology. They are particularly pertinent to sociology, which has traditionally 
addressed both individual agency and the social contexts that regulate and structure 
their actions. Using quantitative methods of his time, Émile Durkheim (2002 [1897])  
sought to assess how those contexts—different countries and cultures—would affect an 
individual’s behaviour even as extreme as committing a suicide. To achieve this, he tried 
to demonstrate that variation in suicide rates was a genuine, structural effect of national 
contexts. 
 
Durkheim’s account did not then so much ‘deduce‘ the existence of ‘social facts’, but it 
was abductive instead: the ‘social’, he believed, would be the simplest way to explain 
otherwise unaccounted variation. As anticipated already in the Rules of the Sociological 
Method, Durkheim (1982 [1895]) argues that there is no direct statistical way to 
represent the effect of contexts but that ‘the social’ instead stands for what is residual to 
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other, more specific modes of scientific explanation. Illustrating rather post-Kantian, 
‘relational’ thinking (e.g., Rose, 1985), sociology would take other disciplines and their 
modes of causation as its objects, focusing particularly on the emergence of ‘categories’ 
(Durkheim, 2001 [1912]).   
 
Today it can of course be questioned whether a strict opposition between sociology and 
other disciplines, say economics, as Parsons and Smelser (1956, 7) discuss, is still useful: 
even ‘economic’ modes of explanation are currently regarded as deeply embedded within 
social contexts (e.g., Granovetter, 1985). As mentioned above, there is also a growing 
literature on the so-called ‘boundary work’ between academic disciplines (e.g., Bowker 
and Star 1999). In addition, the question of the ‘social’ (or context) is now addressed in 
many other fields, including epidemiology, which looks for the subject-independent, 
contextual effects of the spreading of diseases. This contrasts with the ‘endemic’, within-
subject figure cultivated by classical medicine, and which perhaps comes closer even to 
Durkheim’s own operationalisation of social structures (as materialised by individuals). 
Epidemiology is often superior to sociology in quantitative methodology, but it lacks in 
conceptual and theoretical depth and in qualitative understanding of contexts.  
 
Multilevel methods indeed originated in social sciences before their adoption in medical 
science. In fact, a critique of the then dominant individualism surfaced in American 
sociology already in the 1940’s, as traditional methods like linear and logistic regression 
were regarded as unsuitable for understanding the specific role of context. Population 
based studies like those inspired by Malthus (1993 [1789]) required an update. Various 
scholars then pointed out in the 1960’s that the estimation of regression coefficients 
only at the individual level ignored group-specific variances. Blau (1960) proposed that 
there are so-called ‘structural effects’ which individually collected variables could not 
explain. Lazarsfeld (1959) and Lazarsfeld and Menzel (1961) simultaneously adopted 
the notion of ‘contextual propositions’ by which they referred to the interactions 
between levels.  
 
As introduced first in educational science, plausible methods to answer these questions 
were developed a decade later, as school-to-school comparisons sought to address the 
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school-specific effects of learning results. The effects specific to a single school were 
associated with ‘tactic’ or social learning. The first approaches to structural or contextual 
effects were, however, based on methods that were later heavily criticised (e.g., Hauser, 
1970). Pooling ‘structural’ or ‘contextual’ data together with otherwise individual 
entries—say considering the GDP as a property of an individual—would lead into an 
atomistic fallacy. Some of the difficulties were overcome by clustering and the calculation 
of robust errors, but there was no suitable way of addressing interactions between the 
levels. Any effects would remain ‘fixed’, and the variance components could not be 
estimated. Alternatively, the aggregation of individual data as contextual properties 
would lead into an ecological error (Diez Roux, 2003: 100), losing the variation between 
individuals in turn.  
 
There are now several approaches seeking to avoid both of these two mistakes, and the 
choice of methods depends on the specific research interest. The identification of the 
existence of such ‘contextual propositions’ already suffices to most epidemiological 
research instead of seeking to explain them using context-level predictors. For 
population-average estimates, the generalised estimating equations –method (GEE) is 
regarded as being among the most efficient ones (Frank et al., 1998).  
 
Sociology, by contrast, is driven by the urge to conceptualise and explain such contextual 
effects. The generalised linear mixed models (GLMM) are then more pertinent to 
sociological modes of reasoning. Even if the GLMM is less precise in terms of group 
averages—especially when considering uncommon phenomena—the model estimates 
fixed and random effects (Goldstein, 1995; Hox, 2002; Raudenbush ja Bryk, 2002). 
Modelling the wave-effect—the difference between 2007/2008 and 2011/2012 
responses—is particularly useful as it allows us to distinguish between the two 
modalities of the crisis. In particular, as the year of response interacts with all the other 
model-predictors, any one of the other effects is represented in two different 
temporalities: either reflecting pre-crisis differences (the effect itself) or the differences 
incurred during the crisis (its wave-interaction).  
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The GEE- and the GLMM-methods also differ in respect to how they behave in the 
case of model assumptions or systematically missing data26. In the most obvious cases, I 
included missing data as their own binary predictors (e.g., income, education, 
occupation) so as to allow the model to specify their relationship with crisis-outcomes. 
 
Why	Multiple	Levels?	
But why should we address the crisis on multiple levels? Why not just focus on 
individual struggle; what do such experiences have to do with national phenomena? 
National considerations are important precisely because the crisis refers to a historical 
and an epochal period, even if its real outcomes are then materialised or experienced by 
actual individuals. To understand the connections between these levels is precisely the 
reason to work on multiple levels. In fact, individuals do not only bear the consequences 
of macro-economical change but individual level processes could also have contributed 
to the crisis at the national level.  
 
Epidemiology that applies similar methods in medical science is similarly interested in 
the spreading and prevalence of diseases as they are regulated at the level of context. It is 
thus assumed that in addition to the ‘endemic’, within subject reasons, the variation of 
diseases pertains also to ‘epidemic’, contextual reasons. From this point of view, my study 
attempts to bridge the ‘endemic’ picture of individual crises to the epidemic spreading of 
unemployment, deprivation and psycho-social affects. But as discussed above, sociology 
brings forth another set of questions: how to regulate variances in order to understand 
interactions between levels? The GLMM leads us to the classical sociological problem 
of agency and structure—a question that epidemiology seldom asks.  
 
This approach further helps to specify the role of ‘nation-states’, these ‘imagined 
communities’ (Anderson, 2006) but that can now be realistically operationalised as 
higher level contexts. This does not mean to essentialise their meaning, as if the 
economy would be wholly contained by them (cf. Fetherstone and Venn 2006, 1), but 
rather the method allows us to view individual struggles as they cross the often diffuse 
nation-state boundaries (Tenbruck 1994, 82). Of course, the model itself distinguishes 
between levels hierarchically, but as we interpret them we should avoid attributing social 
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‘structures’ for example to contexts and ‘agency’ to individuals. Rather, the assembly 
between agency and structure is itself a process (something Giddens refers to as 
‘structuration’ or Bourdieu as ‘habitus’) and both agency and structure emerge at both 
levels.  
Short	Introduction	to	Genearlised	Linear	Mixed	Models	
Let me now briefly describe GLMMs. They form one of the two main methods 
introduced in the 1980’s in response to aforementioned concerns, extending the 
standard regression methods used in a variety of human sciences. The generalised version 
also applies to categorical outcomes—most often dichotomic ones like unemployment, 
thus extending classical sociological uses of logistic regression to multilevel data. The 
idea is that each variable is associated with a likelihood or link function27—not the direct 
value of the variable. Linear methods are then used to estimate these transformed values 
(Wedderburn, 1974). Multilevel models just extend these link-function estimates so 
that variance components are estimated at various levels.  
 
There are two kinds of variables used in the model: predictors and outcomes. In Table 16, 
the former refer to rows whereas the latter correspond to columns. The former ones are 
used to represent the two levels, whereas the outcomes are always determined at the 
lowest level. In my case, in addition to the conditions related to employment and 
deprivation, I have chosen subjective assessment-variables as other ‘outcomes’, whereas 
such demographic variables like the number of children, occupation, gender and age are 
taken as ‘predictors’: they explain differences in crisis-experiences but are not explained 
by them.  
 
Many of the outcome-variables are assumed to be normally distributed, in which case 
the link-function is actually the identity. Most outcomes are binary, however, and the 
link-function is then assumed to be logarithmic. To explain this, a binary variable takes 
only two values, 0 or 1. Either a respondent is or is not unemployed. The likelihood 
function could then be the (group-related) probability of unemployment, or in logistic 
regression it is the natural logarithm of the odds ratio28. In particular, in social scientific 
research it is often assumed that the odds of a certain condition increase proportionally 
to linear predictors (e.g., Heck, Thomas and Lynn, 2013). For example, there is roughly 
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a fixed crisis-effect on unemployment, as the odds of unemployment are multiplied by 
about 1.6 (=e.481) for most countries.  
 
The estimated likelihood becomes more specific the more we know about a group of 
respondents: sex, age, education, etc. It can also be specified by country-level predictors, 
like GDP growth, bond rates or welfare regime. The odds-level is then assumed to 
wholly determine the likelihood of unemployment for a given group. 
 
What makes the GLMMs different from the traditional GLMs is precisely that 
predictors occur on two (or more) levels—there are then also more levels to estimate 
variances on. A coefficient measuring the extent to which any single predictor (like age-
group) increases the odds-logarithm of a certain outcome-variable is referred to as a 
fixed effect, whereas the extent to which this coefficient itself varies between contexts is 
called the random effect (Appendix 5).  
 
There are many similarities between multilevel and classical models, and I will leave the 
more thorough discussion of them to the literature (e.g., Kaplan et al. 2004). But as in 
all statistical research, it is impossible to discover a model that best describes reality; 
rather, we look for a model in light of which the likelihood of the observed results is the 
highest. Statistical inference always subscribes to this kind of reverse reasoning, 
‘abduction’, because there are no natural probabilities but they are only constructed as 
part of specific models.  
 
Model	Development:	Towards	the	Two	Temporalities	of	the	Crisis	
The first analysis chapter focuses on employment and deprivation, which are the most 
obvious variables to model. Deprivation is broadly understood, including the social 
exclusion index and also subjective assessments of economic affordability. The third part 
analyses subjective aspirations that could bear longer-term effects on social and 
economic change. In addition to personal satisfaction scores, I model several variables 
related to both trust and the acknowledgment of social tensions.  
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Because the main interest is in the crisis-related changes in the employment process, all 
the models excluded people older than 65. Some variables like unemployment, 
deprivation and some trust/tension-related ones were modelled separately for the 18 to 
29 year-olds in order to specify youth-related interactions more deeply—several models 
were developed specifically for those looking for work.  
 
All the multilevel models were developed by adding variables in blocks of only a few 
predictors at a time. This was particularly useful, because it enabled me to assess the 
extent to which interclass variances (contingency) are explained away by any single block 
of variables. For example, we can ask how much of the variance of the effects of the 
crisis, say, on young adults is explained by the effect of welfare institutions. For each 
outcome I thus developed about 15 different models.  
 
Calculating models using data from 50–60 000 respondents, including tens of explained 
variables and hundreds of fixed predictors, and estimating several random effects takes a 
considerable amount of processing time. Despite using several computers day and night, 
each one of which used several processor cores by virtualising parallel SPSS installations, 
it took months to produce the analyses. Many interesting variables had to be left out for 
economical reasons. Also, the number of contexts delimits the applicable number of 
context-predictors—only a few, most important effects were estimated as random-
effects: the intercept, wave, age and gender.  
 
The specific research interest lies in understanding the intercept and the wave-effects in 
association with other variables, that is, by reflecting them in two temporal modalities. 
Youth also plays a central role in understanding the long-term effects of social change. 
These three variance-components (intercept, wave, youth) were assumed to be 
independent (variance component model).  
 
To explicate these effects, both sets of data modelled by GLMMs included two 
comparable years of response: 2007/2008 and 2011/2012 for the European Quality of 
Life Survey (EQLS), and 2005 and 2010 for th European Work Conditions Survey 
(EWCS), and they are specified by the variable called ‘wave’. The models were then 
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developed in a way that refers to the ‘crisis’ in two different meanings. First, the 
outcomes themselves are chosen in a way that ensure their significance to the crisis (e.g., 
unemployment), and by specifying the year of response (wave) as an effect allows us to 
estimate the extent to which the responses in the two occasions differ (and how that 
difference made by the crisis is regulated by other predictors). 
 
Each of the other predictors—e.g., age, occupation, GDP growth or welfare regime—
may then affect the outcome separately from the wave-effect, that is, in a crisis-
independent way, or through its interaction with wave, regulating the crisis as a historical 
event (youth-interactions were sometimes also included and could be interpreted 
similarly as regulating long-term change induced by the crisis). By looking at interclass 
variances we may then ask whether specific predictors like the GDP growth regulate 
and delimit the contingency of the crisis. Do the predictors at different levels (and their 
interactions with the wave) regulate the crisis-effects, or do they, instead, only reflect 
differences in the pre-crisis situation?  
 
Indeed, in logistic models the overall wave-effect can be viewed as an effect that 
multiplies pre-crisis differences in a way independent of other effects. In contrast, the 
wave-interactions of the other predictors refer to the way in which the differences 
incurred by the crisis are actually regulated and channelled through specific predictors, 
instead of assuming the crisis-related change to be entirely contingent. Considering the 
intercept and the wave-effects both as random allows us to understand how different 
blocks of predictors reduce the level of contingency otherwise associated with these two 
perspectives on the crisis.  
 
Of course, the ‘crisis’ is then represented as a difference between only two points in 
time, and besides the limited data there are many other reasons justifying this choice29.  
Most importantly, there are both methodological and theoretical choices involved in 
representing the crisis as such a wave-effect and a set of interactions. First, theoretically, 
the crisis is not explained but rather it is itself something that ‘explains’ or embodies 
changes that other factors cannot explain. Second, methodologically, the wave-effect is 
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treated as one of the level 1 –predictors rather than as its own level (as in some 
longitudinal research designs).  
 
It is often indeed the case with longitudinal data that occasions are nested first within 
individuals and then within contexts. In that case, however, the change itself between the 
occasions itself is not treated as a meaningful effect, but the model only addresses 
changes to the extent that they are explained by other variables. Even if I could have 
similarly nested individuals within occasions within countries, in this case the context–
variables would have been entered separately for the two occasions, and this would have 
prevented the possibility of interpreting the crisis itself in two temporalities30. I did test 
such models but they did not appear to produce anything meaningful.  
 
Actor-Networks	and	Multilevel	Methodology:	Some	Theoretical	Perspectives	
As a brief theoretical background, I assumed that the crisis itself cannot be modelled 
only from a causal perspective. Based on literature, a crisis is instead viewed as a 
moment demanding judgment and a decision, thereby questioning any pre-existing 
‘logic’ or system of causation (Roitman, 2011). The causes, but also the decisions, are 
‘embedded’ in the same sense that economic sociology now assumes markets to be 
‘embedded’ (e.g., Granovetter, 1985). In other words, it is pivotal to study the different 
cultures of the crisis (Castells et al., 2012).  
 
From the point of view of such multiple cultures and changing logics of economic 
causation, the crisis as a whole can be viewed as a ‘singular’, non-causal phenomenon. In 
this role its consequences are then represented by the wave-effect while the interactions 
of wave-effect stand for its context- and group-specific ‘embeddings’. The ‘singular’ 
aspects are also reflected empirically by the fact that the ‘unexplained’ interclass-variance 
of the wave-effect remains high. Unlike in most multilevel studies, this is not necessarily 
alerting but it also allows us to assess what cannot be explained about the crisis based on 
economics, policy and culture. The method then represents the crisis as an amalgam of 
mutually independent, local crises. It is used to track down how exactly these local 
differences are regulated and coexist, either multiplying pre-crisis differences or by 
inducing new differences in a regular (interactions) or contingent (random effect) way.   
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Illustrating this distinction from the point of view of Sartre’s (2003: 1) existential 
phenomenology that defines a phenomenon as the ‘totality of its effects’, the ‘singular’ 
or contingent view refers to that precise distance of the model from the empirical 
totality31. And as discussed above, the model in turn materialises in two temporally 
distinct ways: as (1) catalysing pre-crisis differences and (2) by inducing new ones but in 
a regular way (e.g., policy/choices). The former refers to what is common about the 
crisis in all contexts. For example, it can be said that differences in pre-crisis 
unemployment rates determine the post-crisis differences, even if the overall 
(multiplication/catalysing) effect is contingent. The latter, in turn, measures the level to 
which contingency allows itself to be framed in context-dependent ways, that is, to what 
extent cultural backgrounds or political decisions can modulate its outcomes. For 
example, the differences on the level of adopted policies (e.g., social/non-social 
expenditure, tax-increases, ALMPs) indicate that the crisis is about ‘judging’, ‘deciding’ 
and ‘cutting’, something other than mere contingency (cf. Roitman, 2011).  
 
Of course, no method can grasp these two aspects in ‘totality’: the collection and 
interpretation of data always requires theoretical choices, which I have sought to justify 
in the previous part. But as related to the financial, fiscal and welfare-crises, I hope they 
still reach something essential about the crisis. At least regression-methods allow us to 
distinguish precisely between the two kinds of effects: direct effects and the interactions 
with the crisis-effect, or perhaps we could say the structural features and different forms 
of agency using traditional sociological vocabulary.  
 
One of the theoretical questions that remain then is the role of actor-network theory 
(ANT) in relation to multilevel methods—something I briefly mentioned in the 
introduction. Perhaps what we can claim to be distinctive about the theory is that it 
does not assume a strong hierarchy between action and networks (like the agency–
structure-dualism does). Actor-networks are all open to experience (Greek. empeiria), 
and often the two roles are also interchangeable: every effect may be conceived as an 
agent (interaction-effect) but also as a structural constraint to others (direct effect). Yet 
even if the central idea behind ANT is to avoid any pre-empirical theoretical 
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hierarchies, I believe that the temporal hierarchy that distinguishes between the two 
kinds of effects can still subsist on ANT: the theorists would never oppose the 
assumption that we should be able to separate between a single place in time and the 
direction that we are heading at. This is, in fact, what actors and networks are all about, 
and the crisis can play itself out in any one of these two roles.  
 
Given that views based on actor-network theory—the ‘financial sociology’ or, as 
sometimes referred to, the ‘new’ new economic sociology—have rearticulated 
Granovetter’s (1985) thesis about economic embeddedness, one of my methodological 
goals is to illustrate that we can utilise quantitative methods to approach these notions, 
which most often are instead subject to qualitative scrutiny. Perhaps we should relook 
into the roots like Durkheim’s cross-national comparisons. At the same time, I argue 
that it is possible to frame the ‘actors’ in the network from the point of view of a broader 
set of discourses—not only those related to the ‘material’, ‘technical’ and ‘expert’-
oriented technologies of finance.  
 
Indeed, besides the discourses conventionally associated with ANT, let me briefly 
mention why I think a connection between multilevel methods and ANT could be 
fruitful. First, the actor-network theory is very flexible on the question of scale, and 
multilevel methods combine actors at various levels. In my case, both of the two kinds 
of temporality of the crisis can be attributed at both levels (individuals and contexts). 
Second, even if regression models generally assume a causal hierarchy between 
predictors and outcomes, an explorative and an experimental use of methods allows us to 
use the same effects both as predictors and outcomes (e.g., unemployment). They are 
then used to trace a network of associations rather than a directed, causal tree.  
 
As a reservation, however, multilevel models still assume a hierarchy over scales. This is 
not necessarily a problem, however, but rather the art of the method itself. In particular, 
any hierarchies between levels pertain to data: accessing or entering actor-networks seem 
to entail some decisions and distinctions to be made, and it is an empirical problem to 
see how they resonate with reality, that is, the ‘actor-networks’ like the crisis. Every 
method, even ethnography, requires some sites and ways to enter reality. In my case, we 
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could as well treat the two-level data itself as an intellectual ‘topos’ (cf. Hammersley and 
Atkinson, 2007: 200) through which the crisis is being entered.  
Grouped	Individuals—Description	of	Level	1	Predictors	
Let me briefly describe the choice of level 1 variables. Both the EQLS and EWCS data 
sets combine a range of variables that were similarly collected both before and during 
the crisis (all others were excluded from the analysis). The variables were also recoded 
before using them in the models. Categorical predictors were split into binary 
variables—e.g., one for each income quartile, and one for missing values—whereas 
continuous predictors were standardised (normalised and centred) so as to make effects 
comparable.  
 
Scarcity was followed when choosing the variables in order to ensure the convergence of 
the models and in order to make the processing of the model feasible. Many more 
variables were tested, however, especially when modelling unemployment. This model-
outcome was considered the most pivotal to the epidemiology of the unemployment-
crisis. The same set of predictors (except for a few added employment-related 
predictors) was then used to model other outcomes, as well, in order to keep the group-
averages comparable. 
 
As for both the EQLS and the EWCS, the first block of variables consists of 
demographic variables related to age and gender. The importance of the 18 to 29 year-
olds as well as the 30 to 35 year-olds was justified by empirical evidence: the 
unemployment-statistics in particular. While people in later youth saw higher 
unemployment-rates prior to the crisis, they came closer to older adults in 2011. This 
group has thus been better able to adapt to the changing conditions.  
 
Education- and income-variables are those available in data. Those with secondary 
education and the low middle-income-group were chosen as the reference categories, 
because they are assumed to represent typical respondents, and also because the crisis is 
assumed to be more relevant to the lower income quartiles. I also had several job related 
variables (which applied to non-employment outcomes): those with fixed term 
contracts, those holding two jobs simultaneously, the unemployed and those who had 
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never had a paid job. The reference category then consists of those employed with long-
term contracts but with only one job, but also of those pursuing studies, for example, 
and who thus did not report themselves as being employed, etc. Even if the reference 
category then possibly contains multiple groups, the main focus is not in modelling the 
employed as such but the experiences of the unemployed and the employees on fixed 
term contracts instead. When comparing the intercept and the youth-predictors we 
must remember that in part these effects reflect the age-dependent prevalence between 
employment and education. Yet given that employment is the normative position to 
older adults, similarly as the young typically are still studying, therefore these groups 
represented by the intercept as well as the youth-effect are quite meaningful.  
 
The recoding of occupation –related variables deserves a brief note. In both data-sets 
(EQLS and EWCS) the current, or when not applicable, the previous occupation was 
coded into one of the three categories: (1) managerial, professional and high skilled (2) 
services, sales and clerical support, and (3) elementary or other (and one further category 
for those with missing occupation information). The group (1) was chosen as the 
reference category as I was interested in specifying the effects on the latter two groups. 
The  sales and travel workers are particularly interesting as they seem to be affected the 
most but given the small size of this group, they were categorised together with other 
workers in services and clerical support. The resulting combination is also peculiar as it 
is evenly distributed across income quartiles.  
 
Compositional effects stemming from the correlations between multiple predictors, like 
occupation and gender or age, are of course worth considering. Yet at least the young 
are generally quite equally represented in many groupings, including income groups in 
which they are only slightly underrepresented in the two highest quartiles. In education, 
the young are less likely to having completed only primary education but also tertiary 
education is less common as many of them are still studying. However, neither one of 
these connections is strong enough to skew the picture significantly, that is, the youth-
effect does not reflect differences in income to any relevant degree.  
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Gender is another interesting theme, and it seems that those working in services, 
clerical support and sales are twice as likely to be women than men. Therefore, given the 
high contribution of the crisis to this group specifically, the reported gender-effect is 
slightly conservative as for many women we need to consider the occupation-specific 
effect as well. However, the occupation-independent models can be compared to 
address these effects and generally they are modest—this suggests that it is possible that 
women working in sales, services and support could have been more secure than men in 
the same occupation group. I tested such complex interactions in the case of 
unemployment and it appears that those women with tertiary education in this group 
are more affected. As regards household income and the level of education, the 
differences between genders are modest.  
 
In addition, I modelled several social support variables, accommodation types, those 
reporting health issues, all of which will be discussed in the next chapter. Finally, the 
number of children was used as a level 1 predictor, which is particularly revealing from 
the gender-perspective. For the general population the variable is mean-centered (at 
around 1.4) to make it meaningful both as a contributing and a defending predictor 
depending on whether the standardised number of children is positive or negative. 
However, because young adults have generally fewer children, we have to subtract 1.4 
times the interaction between children- and youth-effects to see how the crisis affects 
those young adults who have no children. For models covering young adults alone (with 
the average of .4 children) I used the non-centred variable instead. 
 
In the EWCS there is no data for education, social support, or the number of children. 
Instead, I included the organisation size, sector (public, private, NGO or other) 
variables and also those standing for the ‘new employers’ (under 24 months in the post), 
supervisors, part time workers and those working in shifts –variables. As I was 
interested in the public sector in particular, I included its interactions with many other 
variables at both levels.  
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Modelling	Nations	
The country-level variables consist of both categorical (welfare regime, religion) and 
continuous data (like many of the variables used in the previous part, including the 
principal factors and components themselves). While the principal factors and 
components are already standardised (mean = 0, variance = 1), also other continuous 
level 2 –variables were standardised. Otherwise, the scale of coefficients for, say, the 
GDP per capita would be very different than for the tax rate on income and wealth. 
Now the coefficients do not refer to actual numbers but to the relative position of any 
single context in respect to the average (measured in standard deviations). Furthermore, 
the standardisation makes the intercept more meaningful, as it then represents the 
scores with average scalar predictors.  
 
As the first block of context-predictors, I modelled the financial crisis based on the 
GDP growth, bond rates, level of national debt and change in tax on income and 
wealth—variables that reflect the financial and fiscal situation of a context. Another 
block of variables instead refers to the more pervasive structures of the economy. First, it 
consists of the absolute GDP per capita, an important figure, which in Adam Smith’s 
wake we could call the ‘wealth’ of a given ‘nation’—at least a rudimentary measure of the 
overall level of economic development. The block further consists of variables measuring 
the openness of the economy, old age dependency ratio and the portion of 30 to 34 
year-olds with tertiary education. Similar variables tend to be used in various other 
labour market studies (e.g., Bonoli, 2010; Vlandas, 2011, 2013). The policy and equality 
–block in contrast measures the effect of the cabinet composition (and its change), of 
the GINI, life expectancy and life expectancy gap: equality variables are inspired by 
Therborn’s (2013) work and also allow us to assess Piketty’s (2014a) hypothesis about 
the negative effects of inequality to economic wellbeing.  
 
Keeping the recent debates about the relevance of culture to the economy in mind (cf. 
Acemogly and Robinson, 2012), I included two additional blocks that reflect the welfare 
regime (recoded into three categories) and the largest religious community in the 
country. The latter is particularly justified by Weber’s thesis about the relevance of 
religious figures to the construction of economic culture. 
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The notion of the welfare regime itself is broadly defined. Following Gallie and Paugam 
(2000: 4), it refers ’to a system of public regulation that is concerned to assure the 
protection of individuals and to maintain social cohesion by intervening, through both 
legal measures and the distribution of resources, in the economic, domestic and 
community spheres’. As regards the operationalisation of welfare-regimes, I follow the 
classification used by the European Social Survey (ESS).  
 
Of course, there are other models of classification, like the one by Gøsta Esping-
Anderssen’s (1990) Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Gallie and Paugam (2000) 
themselves divide welfare-regimes into ‘universalistic’, ‘employment-oriented’, 
‘minimal/liberalistic’ and the ‘sub-optimal’ ones. These regimes do not, however, 
straightforwardly reflect regional or geographic differences, which are important from 
the point of view of the crisis. Therefore, when looking at the presence of the crisis in 
terms of things like credit ratings, employment rates and bond yields, the regional 
classification seems more pertinent. This classification also includes the emerging 
welfare states still undergoing the process of post-Soviet transition. 
 
Yet, for the purposes of the multilevel analysis, I recoded the regional categories down 
to three. The crisis has, for example, treated many Nordic and Continental countries 
quite similarly, and based on the underling similarities between the two groups 
encompassing a mixture of universal and earnings based protection, I classified Nordic 
and Continental countries together. In fact, according to a study, the Nordic and 
French models result in very similar outcomes when controlling for demographic 
differences (Kangas and Ritakallio, 1998).  
 
Based on the types of provision and the focus on marginal groups, I also classified 
Anglo-Saxon and Southern regimes together, even if the development of welfare 
models in these two regimes are historically different. The Anglo-Saxon model has 
often been viewed as being ‘marginal’ in respect to transfers, even if this Beveridge-
report based model is among the first ones in Europe. In contrast, the institutional 
arrangement in the Southern regime is more ‘peripheral’ (e.g., Marinakou, 1998), 
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sometimes characterised as the ‘latin rim’ (Leibfried, 1992), though it is now more 
conventional to define the regime geographically (Ferrera, 1996; Rhodes, 1997; Guillen 
and Mataganis, 2000). It is also worth noting that the Southern regime focuses on the 
family whereas the Anglo-Saxon models are more individually based. Yet in many 
respects both the Anglo-Saxon and Southern models differ significantly from the 
Nordic and Continental ones. They are also clearly different from the still emerging 
Eastern regime. Due to the need to reduce the number of predictors it was then 
necessary to consider these two regimes together.  
 
These somewhat unorthodox classifications of welfare seem justifiable, however, given 
the fact that the very reason of using the welfare-predictor in the first place has been to 
compare its explanative power with that of religion. To this end, the re-classified 
welfare-predictor is, at its worst, less sensitive to the effects of welfare institutions. Also, 
aspects like the ‘universality’ in protective institutions is already tracked by other 
variables with which it is closely correlated: the sum of social expenditure (other than 
health costs or pensions). Likewise, the life expectancy –rate—another robust correlate 
of the health care system—is controlled for. As used in the analysis, the welfare-
predictors thus reflect institutional differences that relate to allocation and equality 
rather than the overall level of protection.  
 
I chose the Protestant religion and the Nordic or Continental welfare models as the 
reference categories. Even if they are not usually associated with the toughest effects of 
the crisis, it is important to note that the wave-effect is often quite negative for these 
countries as well. Furthermore, it is interesting to compare the coefficients for Southern 
and Eastern countries both for general outcomes and the youth-specific interactions, 
while the Nordic, Continental and Protestant countries provide the baseline. The 
differences are not always significant, which suggests that many (but not all) aspects of 
the crisis are pan-European.   
Alternative	Models	
There are several modelled outcomes, some of which were considered to concern the 
entire working age population, whilst others only the young. Furthermore, a few of the 
specific models addressing the MCA-constructions are introduced in Chapter 8. To all 
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of these outcomes except the MCA-constructs, I further developed combined models, 
where the level 2 -predictors were replaced by the PAF- and PCA-models, or with 
certain active labour market policy (ALMP) –based predictors32. There is some 
confirmatory overlapping between these models, too, because the total level of active 
labour market policy (ALMPs) correlates with the economic participation -axis in the 
PAF-model. The PAF model was further equipped with one PCA-component 
measuring the increase of non-social expenditure; the aim was to test the relevance of 
the predictors across as many models as feasible.  
 
In these alternative context-level models, the number of level 1 –predictors was reduced 
(including only demographic and socio-economic blocks), however, in order to 
guarantee convergence and to save processing time. Other predictors were confirmed to 
have little effect on the level 2 –effects reported for these alternative models.  
 
Given that factorial and particularly the PAF-models provide an economic, ‘systematic’ 
picture of national differences, it was quite revealing then to compare the interclass 
variances between the reference model and the models with alternative predictors—the 
latter indicate the level to which the crisis-outcomes are ‘economically’ based. 
Furthermore, the PCA-factors were also considered as they interact with the young (or 
female in the youth specific models), allowing me to study the extent to which 
systematic differences specific to youth and gender occur.  
What	Can	Interclass	Variances	Teach	Us?		
As a final methodological remark, let me briefly introduce the true ‘art’ of multilevel 
analysis. In other words, why is the use of random variances instead of only fixed effects 
crucial? The answer could be that—on the level of context—the random effects can be 
used to specify the contribution of entire blocks of variables, not just individual effects. 
They do not tell about the direction of such effects but about the extent to which cross-
country variances are controlled for. For example, it may be said that the notion of 
welfare-regime explains this or that percentage of level 2 variation without specifying 
the exact regime, or in which direction that effect is being materialised. Therefore, 
interclass variances can reveal important, conceptual associations even if their exact 
mechanisms remained undisclosed. At the same time, the remaining interclass variance 
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of the wave-effect illustrates the level of contingency in the way that the crisis ‘makes a 
difference’ (between contexts).  
 
Exemplifying these discussions briefly, modelling unemployment results in a positive 
wave-effect. This means that the rates for the reference group were higher in 2011/2012 
than in 2007/2008. If that does not sound novel, the power of the model lies precisely in 
the associated random effects. Without any context-predictors, the interclass variance is 
.116**, which is statistically significant. This suggests that the unemployment-effect—
the multiplication of odds due to the crisis—differs across contexts. However, after 
adding only the predictors for the financial and economic standing of the country, the 
number is reduced to .087, which is not significant. Any significant contingencies are 
thus possibly overcome by these two sets of predictors (we cannot falsify the contrary). In 
other words, at least we cannot verify that the crisis-effect on the likelihood of 
unemployment should significantly differ from one country to another—this suggests 
that the unemployment-crisis itself is a coherent, cross-European phenomenon, and has 
mainly exaggerated differences existing already before.  
 
Furthermore, we can use interclass variances to compare the goodness of fit of the PAF, 
PCA and ALMPs models. For example, when studying the general level of 
unemployment (in the group of 18 to 64 year-olds), the 14-component model (PCA) 
drops the interclass variation of the intercept down by 55 % and of the wave-effect by 
44 %. The PAF-model, in contrast, reduces the two random components by 19 % and 
by 69 % respectively (even if I could use only some of the factors to ensure convergence). 
This means that the ‘systemic’ or economising PCA-model better predicts the overall 
level of unemployment, but not the crisis-related variance, which refers to the crisis in 
terms of agency rather than as a pre-existing network of relationships. Consistent 
findings are discovered in the case of long-term unemployment further emphasising the 
validity of such models.  
 
Given that the PCA-model was also used to introduce cross-level interactions related to 
youth or gender, differences in youth-effects were very well explained by PCA-
interactions on unemployment and especially on long-term unemployment. The fitness 
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was notably lower in the case of fixed term effects—broader changes in employment 
that have less to do with the ‘economic’ aspects of the crisis. For example, cuts to 
unemployment benefits have reduced the level of unemployment, but only among older 
adults, whereas the young are subject to simultaneous rise in unemployment and decline 
in income.  
 
Considering ALMPs, in contrast, when further regulated by financial and economic 
level 2 –predictors, ALMPs provide a much more coherent image of the wave-effect on 
unemployment than other models, reducing the random component associated with the 
crisis by 65 %. However, unlike the factorial models, it is possible to argue that ALMPs 
have little predictive value, even in the case of employment-outcomes. First, the 
reduction of interclass variance does not similarly apply to long-term rates, which is 
crucial because reducing long-term unemployment is the specific goal of many of such 
policies. Second, individual effects themselves seem modest. It is then likely that 
ALMPs rather modulate the general atmosphere towards unemployment, and we 
should rather ask whether the level of unemployment could explain differences in labour 
market policy rather than on the contrary, as we will further discuss in the sixth chapter.  
 
Random vairances are not the only way to assess the fitness of the model, however. 
Instead, each model is associated with the so-called information criterion value (-2 log 
likelihood). It is used to compare two models with the same subjects and outcome. The 
number itself is not meaningful but the difference between the criteria of the two 
models is assumed to follow χ2-distribution. However, I have not reported all of the 
values but only those of the final models, even if changes in the information criterion 
guided my decision on which blocks of the level 2 variables should be included in any 
particular model. Most importantly, I have used the numbers to determine in which 
cases we could use both welfare and religion -predictors together, and when it should be 
necessary to restrict to considering only one of the two blocks. Random parameters are, 
however, reported to all valid models, and most often they agree with information 
criterion tests (lower variances usually imply a better model). 
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Chapter	5	
Longing	for	Work—An	Impact	and	a	Catalyst	
 
 
Work is demanding—not only as one does work (labour) but also as people need to 
work (employment), most often to cover their expenses, that is, to earn their livelihood. 
Besides, there are various social aspects to work, including its integrative functions. 
Before discussing these broader implications of employment in more detail, in this 
chapter I will focus on the effects of the crisis on employment itself and on its associated 
implications to economic wellbeing—mainly deprivation and social exclusion.  
 
As I reviewed in the introduction, there is now extensive literature on labour, like 
Braverman’s (1975) work on the ‘labour process’ from which an entire field of research 
followed. Most ethnographies of work fall into this category, investigating the ‘reality’ of 
work from the insider-perspective, ranging from shop floor to phone sex workers or 
from strawberry to doctors performing surgeries and abortions (Hess, 2001). Much less 
has been written about employment and, in particular, what it means to the ‘outsiders’ 
who do not have a (permanent) place to go and where they could manufacture their 
‘consent’. This includes the unemployed (but see Gallie and Paugam, ed, 2000) but also 
those working in ‘precarious’, insecure jobs. Their experiences are often addressed 
mainly from quantitative perspectives (Schömann et al. 1998, Fenton and Dermott, 
2006; Gash, 2008; Gebel, 2010: 641–642; Heyes, 2011).  
 
Like there is no single definition of work, there is no ‘natural’ form of employment 
either. Instead, the construction of wage-labour itself was a long historical process, 
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emerging particularly as the standard of ‘social citizenship’; Castel (2003: 114) indeed 
provides a rare historical syntheses focusing on the emergence of ‘free’, contractual 
wage-labour as intertwined with the discourses of welfare or ‘relief’. Both employment 
and relief, then, have been questioned during the current economic crisis, especially 
among the young.  
 
This is not to say that most people would be excluded from the labour market altogether 
as mere ‘outsiders’. Only in Cyprus, Portugal and the Netherlands the likelihood of 
never having had a paid job has significantly increased, suggesting that the young there 
have particular difficulties in securing jobs, and could become permanently excluded. 
But also elsewhere ‘outsider’-experiences are increasingly common, and even the 
employed now experience marginalisation particularly as they occupy the so-called 
‘atypical’, often fixed term jobs (cf. Heyes, 2011).  
 
It is now the carrying idea to approach the nature and meaning of employment by 
studying the distribution and effects of unemployment. First, the lack of work allows us 
to metaphorise employment in terms of debt: if being short of money is what makes 
money ‘social’ (e.g., Sarthou–Lajus, 1997), similarly when there is structural lack of jobs 
the need to work becomes truly tangible—not only to an individual but on the level of 
society as a whole. In this context, as an exception among a few, there is the classical 
‘sociography’ by Lazarsfeld et al. (1972 [1933]) on the particularly harsh effect of 
prolonged unemployment on reduced opportunities and aspiration, a state of apathy and 
timelessness that, in the particular Austrian context in the 1930’s, did result in a 
breakdown in the personality structure in the studied group.  
 
My approach is something slightly different, however. Instead of studying such effects 
of unemployment at length—without a comparative approach, it would be impossible to 
link such experiences with the current economic crisis in particular (and distinguish 
between contextual and temporal effects)—my interest lies in understanding the precise 
interactions between context and individual matters, particularly as they relate to 
unemployment and its various outcomes (e.g., deprivation, exclusion, satisfaction, 
health).  
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My focus is not restricted to the macro-level account, though, but I further consider 
group-related representations of for example ‘social-psychological’ issues similar to those 
encountered by Jahoda (1992, 1998)—one of the authors of the aforementioned 
‘sociography’ Marienthal. This takes us closer to a set of studies edited by Gallie and 
Paugam (2000) that focus on macro-level comparisons of the effect of welfare regimes 
on the distribution and experiences of unemployment. As they study more perpetual 
and pervasive processes, this work serves as an interesting point of contrast in respect to 
my own inquiry, focusing instead on the temporal gradient associated specifically with 
the crisis.  
 
However, similarly as in Lazarsfeld’s et al. (1972) work, the economic crisis as a temporal 
context emphasises and exaggerates the meanings of employment—or of the lack of it. 
This means to say that our ‘need’ to work (debt) is not constant over time. Exaggerating 
this need, the debt crisis then allows us to access the longing for work from a structural 
perspective: to understand what it means that a payment is due not only individually but 
for society as a whole. This ‘bill’ that metaphorises contemporary unemployment also 
propagates shared experiences and feelings of sympathy. Therefore, the crisis serves as a 
peculiar framework for analysing the societal representations of the need to work and, in 
effect, the meanings of employment as interactions between the individual and society.  
 
At the same time, approaching work in the context of the debt-crisis helps framing 
employment in terms of power—and particularly such concepts as ‘capital’, finance and 
fiscal policy—which are often invisible in micro-sociological approaches to different 
practices of work. The labour market is regulated by something other than the mere 
allocation of skills, knowledge and actions. In the next chapter it in fact turns out that 
labour market policy often results in a less than efficient allocation of ‘human capital’. It 
is also crucial to see whether the crisis reshapes labour market policy, for previously it 
has been argued that even the Left is still likely to focus on the ‘insiders’ and the 
protection of employment rights—not the unemployed or the peripheral, insecure 
employment (Rueda, 2007).  
 
 149 
Who	Are	Those	Who	Suffer?	
This chapter seeks to understand both employment and deprivation as intertwined 
phenomena. In particular, it is my aim to understand who particularly have been subject 
to economic difficulties during the crisis. The next part addresses this question in terms 
of subjective and perceived wellbeing, whereas the focus in this chapter is in ‘objective’ 
employment-related outcomes as well as on both structured and unstructured 
assessments on the economic situation33.  
 
The reason to consider deprivation-related effects alongside employment is that 
unemployment and other employment -related variables (used as predictors in the 
deprivation models) are strongly correlated with the depriving tendencies of the crisis. 
In order to determine the actual effect on deprivation for any given group, I must then 
also account for the effect on unemployment and its implications to economic 
prosperity. However, it is noteworthy that employment-related variables reduce the 
interclass variances in deprivation-related outcomes only slightly. This confirms that 
context-dependent differences in the overall level of deprivation cannot be explained 
away by for example the differences in the unemployment-effect of the crisis—the 
model actually controls for such differences, and the reported main-effects are those 
applicable to respondents who are not unemployed or ‘underemployed’ (on temporary 
contracts).  
 
Considering the efficiency of context-level models in general, it is interesting that the 
differences in the effects of the crisis on the number of fixed term contracts (72 %) or 
those working simultaneously in two jobs (57 %) are much less contingent after 
controlling for multilevel predictors than are unemployment, long-term unemployment 
and employment. This is so even if the pre-crisis rates in the latter variables are more 
regular (40 %–80 %). Deprivation-related variables in contrast are less regular in terms 
of pre-crisis rates, whereas the contingency of the crisis-effect in this case is explained 
largely away (60 %–90 %). Particularly the policy, equality and welfare-related predictors 
thus explain the effects of the crisis on employment-controlled deprivation.  
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Therefore, even if the unemployment-effects of the crisis have been irregular, the other 
deprivation-related effects are generally predictable at least on the national scale. After 
controlling for employment-related effects, we can at least then locate where the subjects 
are, even if we do not know who they are. For example, besides the fact that the overall 
wave-effect on unemployment is non-significant—reflecting the reference group of 
Nordic and Continental countries (NC) with Protestant culture—the unemployment-
crisis is particularly harsh in the Eastern regime (EAS), especially among the young. In 
Southern and Anglo-Saxon regimes (SAS) the effect on long-term unemployment rates 
is instead high, though still less so than in EAS.  
 
Underemployment and fixed term contracts have instead become more common in the 
reference countries (NC), whereas in SAS and particularly EAS those in ‘atypical’ jobs 
have been likely to encountering difficulties in securing new contracts. In EAS and 
SAS, in contrast, many times more people now work in two jobs simultaneously—a 
phenomenon that instead has disappeared in NC. Given the change in the composition 
of these groups of workers, having two jobs no longer supports the perceived ability to 
make ends meet (-.355*).  
 
Deprivation and social exclusion on the other hand have become more common 
everywhere, but especially in SAS. All the contexts also illustrate that the employed find 
(or perceive) it more difficult to make ends meet. However, even if people in EAS are 
even less likely to make ends meet, they are still able to afford to pay for their daily 
meals better than before the crisis, especially among the young. This is contrary to other 
regimes, where people have become deprived also in terms of food.  
 
But let me first start from group-related effects: who are the most likely to suffer; whose 
crisis the crisis has actually become? After this I will discuss the context-level effects, 
starting with indicators related to the financial and fiscal crisis, then the structure of the 
economy (e.g., size and demography), policy and equality. I will then move on to the 
question of welfare with the different regimes are analysed as they interact with 
unemployment and demographic variables among others. Finally, I will address the 
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alternative models that bridge the multilevel analyses on employment and deprivation 
with the two factorial models developed in the previous part.  
Educated,	Indebted	and	Welfare	Youth	
Let us first look at unemployment as a function of demographic variables and income.  
Starting with respondents 18 to 29 year-olds, the odds of unemployment were higher 
than in the older working age population already before the crisis (.394*), but especially 
afterwards (.370*). This means that in comparison to the reference group, young adults 
in a similar position were about 48 % more likely to be unemployed in 2007. The crisis 
contributed a further 45 % to this picture, and in 2011 the odd of encountering 
unemployment is 116 % higher for those who are young but otherwise similar to the 
reference group34. This is in addition to the general wave-effect, which also applies to 
older adults, and which already has increased the odds by at least 60 % and even more in 
EAS or in Catholic and Orthodox contexts. Whatever the base rate, therefore, the 
young are affected both because of the general multiplication of unemployment-rates, 
but also because the multiplicative effect specific to the young (which in EAS is even 
furthered by the 3-way interaction of young × wave × EAS: .393*). When looking at the 
outcomes of the crisis in any specific groups, these various effects need to be combined 
in order to understand the overall effect.  
 
The young have generally thus become even more affected throughout Europe than the 
older adults, and in this sense we can talk about a youth unemployment crisis. A specific 
age-effect is also invisible among 30 to 34 year-olds. However, the proper specification 
of the reference group is crucial: no youth-specific effect applies to those with just 
primary education. On the other hand, the young are specifically affected among those with 
higher education.  
 
In contrast, it is evident that there is one very peculiar group of young adults that, for 
reasons that I will discuss below in more detail, are affected at least on the group-level. 
Indeed, those young adults with mortgage loans seem to have become more vulnerable to 
unemployment during the crisis. This could at least in part be explained by a 
compositional effect: the young who have mortgages might find it more difficult to 
change accommodation patterns in result of unemployment in comparison to those 
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paying rent for example. Instead of these young adults being more vulnerable to 
unemployment as such, they might just be more vulnerable than tenants to the risk of 
economic liabilities being sustained despite encountering unemployment. To those 
formerly living as tenants, in turn, it is possible that some of the effects are accounted 
for by the changes in the composition of social support variables as they look for 
alternative ways to arrange accommodation.  
 
In this respect, it is interesting to contrast the young with the group of people in later 
youth (30–34 year-olds); they neither exhibit a similar wave-specific effect nor 
mortgage-related interaction. Instead, in this age-cohort insecure employment has 
become much more common among the mortgage-holders. This suggests that among 
the 30 to 34 year-olds housing debt presses people to adopt employment-positions even 
if they are atypical or insecure (and often demanding less skills). On the other hand, 
even among the young the employment-rates do not resonate with mortgages, and it is 
possible that the high unemployment-effect among them does not reflect the lack of 
work as much as their need to claim for unemployment benefits.  
 
As a further youth-specific interaction worth mentioning, health limitations have made 
young adults much more vulnerable to the crisis. Of course, it is also possible that the 
crisis has increased the prevalence of health limitations. However, it is notable that only 
the young, and not the older adults, suffer from health related effects, which further 
contribute to unemployment and at the same time reduce employment. Among the 
young, health limitations are also associated with higher likelihood of working 
simultaneously in two jobs, while again the older adults score the opposite. 
 
In terms of deprivation, however, the young are not affected any more than what is 
expectable based on the general unemployment-effect on deprivation. This general 
effect is constant through the crisis and also independent of age (.760***): that is, 
unemployment similarly deprives people regardless of age or the year of response. In 
contrast, the young adults who have remained in work have possibly been better off than 
older respondents in terms of deprivation and social exclusion. There is a specific group 
of young adults subject to marginalisation, however: in result of the crisis, the number of 
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those young adults who have had no household income over a period of 12 months has 
doubled. Also, employment insecurity (fixed term contracts) has made the young (more 
than older adults) susceptible to deprivation. 
 
Furthermore, all these deprivation-related effects (after controlling for unemployment) 
are welfare-independent except for those young people who cannot afford a proper meal 
at least every second day: the share of these young people (but not older respondents) 
has increased more in NC than in SAS or EAS. This suggests that the most material 
forms of deprivation have affected youth there, where the crisis is more ‘qualitative’: 
polarisation in these regimes is higher, possibly because of the lack of non-
institutionalised frames of support and recognition.  
Women	Take	the	Jobs	
Overall, the crisis appears to be dominated by male-unemployment: there has been less 
pressure on female employment during the crisis (.241***), and the likelihood of female 
unemployment has decreased especially in long-term unemployment (-.534*). 
Therefore, the long-term hysteresis effects stemming from the crisis are particularly likely 
among male-respondents, less so among women.  
 
Also, the elevated financial and economic pressures and the risk of deprivation have 
driven women to partake in the labour market increasingly. They also take care of the 
household and children less often than before. Therefore, employment-rates have 
significantly improved among women (.241***), indicating a 27 % increase in the odds 
of employment. In fact, the female-specific post-crisis odds are possibly further elevated 
in SAS (.142) and EAS (.267), which makes the gender-contrast in the crisis-outcomes 
even more emphatic there. Depending on the welfare regime, about 15 to 35 % of 
women, who used to stay at home, have now started to work. In result, there could be as 
high as 5 to 12 % increase in the demand for jobs, that is, the number of people who are 
either employed or expecting to become so. Yet given the structural problems of the 
economy, it is unlikely there to be more available jobs. This further exaggerates the 
unemployment-crisis among men who now have to compete with a larger group of 
women. 
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This shift to female-employment has also affected the way in which families look after 
their offspring. Indeed, if women with children were less likely to work before (.324***), 
more than third of this effect has been mitigated during the crisis (.120***). Also, in the 
post-crisis situation children then appear as a defensive factor against female-
unemployment (-.199**), and long-term unemployment rates have not increased for 
mothers like they have for fathers.  
 
In terms of deprivation and social exclusion, however, women differ little from men 
(after controlling for employment), even though they are more likely to perceive their 
ability to ‘make ends meet’, and thus indicate a slightly stronger subjective reaction to the 
crisis. On the other hand, women still evaluate their personal financial capacities higher, 
although they also put more emphasis on the effect of the crisis. This can be seen from 
the fact that those women who are unemployed are still twice as likely to report 
themselves as being able to make ends meet than men are (.754***). One explanation is 
that the unemployed women might be likely to receive different economic support. The 
discrepancy could also reflect subjective differences. It is, in fact, quite likely that 
unemployed women are less prone to being able to afford proper meals at least every 
other day, unlike unemployed men.   
 
At	the	Heart	of	Struggle:	the	Lower	Middle-Income	Quartile	
The effect of income on unemployment is more difficult to interpret, because many of 
the modelled outcomes have actually a backward-effect on income itself. For example, 
respondents from low-income households are almost three times as often unemployed 
as the reference group (lower middle-income), and we do not know whether this is 
because unemployment has deprived these households or because lower income itself 
makes people more vulnerable to the shortage of work.  
 
Nevertheless, supposing that unemployment has a relatively stable effect on household-
income through the crisis—an interpretation which appears to be confirmed by 
deprivation-related models—it is still possible to make tentative suggestions based on 
the wave-effects: the effects of unemployment on income are already visible in the 1-
way effects, and the crisis-interactions should reflect how the effect of income on 
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unemployment changes. This interpretation is further supported with the fact that the 
crisis-interactions of income bear no further interaction with unemployment. 
 
Based on these assumptions, it appears that the higher middle-income group is less 
vulnerable (-.357*) in comparison to the lower middle-income and low-income (-.085) 
groups. The lower middle-income group in particular has, however, suffered in terms of 
employment when compared with other income groups. The long-term unemployment 
rates similarly show a stronger effect in the lower middle-income group. It is then 
possible that the lower long-term effect in the low-income group could be explained by 
both their being already more prone to marginalisation before the crisis and the low 
income (e.g., cuts to benefits) serving as an increasing incentive to work for those who 
did not do so before.  
 
The market cannot respond to this elevated demand for work, however. This is visible 
from the fact that working in two jobs simultaneously is now less likely in lower-income 
quartiles, whereas before the crisis it was more common. The crisis-effect is positive 
though for those with just primary education, but this again does not apply to young 
adults, suggesting that even low-skilled jobs might not be as easily available for them as 
for the others. Other indicators, like ALMPs as I will later discuss, also support the idea 
that the higher middle-income groups are still likely to acquit the few available, often 
fixed-term jobs. The crisis has made the higher middle-income quartile overly 
represented among insecure workers.  
 
As we would expect, deprivation-related variables greatly differ according to the income 
quartile. But most crisis-interactions are virtually independent of income on a variety of 
measures. Therefore, the differences in unemployment-effects being controlled, the 
deprivation index in all the income quartiles has risen modestly (.194), though not 
significantly, the ability to make ends meet has shrivelled (-.848***), and the 
respondents are less likely to find available funds for proper meals. Of course, the higher 
likelihood of unemployment makes the lower quartiles more prone to deprivation, 
which correlates with unemployment by all measures35. But it is crucial that otherwise 
 156 
also higher income quartiles should have become more deprived (relative to where they 
were before). 
  
Crisis	of	Higher	Education	
Education is another interesting socio-economic background variable in addition to 
income. Before the crisis, tertiary education was one of the most significant defensive 
factors against unemployment (-.506*), unlike either primary or secondary education. 
After the crisis, they are almost equal to other education groups as to the risk of 
unemployment (.399*) generally but further .425* for long-term unemployment). Among 
those with only primary education, in contrast, unemployment used to be highlighted 
among the young while now it is not. Therefore, even if the tertiary education group has 
only become closer to those with lower educational backgrounds, this shift indicates that 
at least relative to the previous position the crisis is the most tangible in the higher 
educational group. Difficulties that used to be largely non-existent are as relevant to 
them today as they are to any other group.  
 
A similar shift is visible in terms of deprivation even after controlling for 
unemployment: the highly trained have become significantly more deprived during the 
crisis (.202***) and they more rarely make ends meet (-.243***). Of course, given their 
higher pre-crisis affordability (.613***) they are still less deprived than other education 
groups, but again they clearly approach the others, suggesting that tertiary education has 
lost much of its distinctive capacity.  
 
Also, even if those with tertiary education themselves are not likely to believe that they 
would be ‘left out of society’, the struggle is visible for example in terms of health-
related difficulties that the crisis has increased among the highly educated, particularly if 
they are young. Therefore, taking a note of the fact that the long-term unemployment 
rates themselves have risen so dramatically among the young (.805***)—indicating 
prolonged struggle and possible hysteresis—it is obvious that all the young even with 
high educational attainment are susceptible to a range of negative socialisation effects.  
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Furthermore, there is evidence that also the young with at most primary education 
suffer: today they are more likely of having no work history at all than in the past. But 
this group no longer dominates the statistics. In 2011, therefore, the level of education 
no longer plays a significant role in youth unemployment rates in general, and in this 
respect the relative loss of the highly educated has been the most emphatic.  
 
Conditions	of	Life,	Conditions	of	the	Crisis	
Unemployment itself is a peculiar life condition, and in addition to the fact that the 
number of such experiences has increased through the crisis, I am also interested in the 
qualitative changes in the experiences of unemployment, even if it seems that the crisis 
has no effect on unemployment-related deprivation. In fact, the experiences of 
deprivation among the unemployed are regulated by social context, and it appears that 
the overall pre-crisis effect (.760***) is mitigated in SAS (-.272***) and even more so in 
EAS (-.469***). Similarly, SAS (-.167*) and EAS (-.253***) mitigate the effects of 
unemployment on social exclusion (.408***) and again without any crisis-interaction. 
These cross-level interactions of unemployment-related deprivation have thus been 
invariable through the crisis—not just the overall effect. This brings further support to 
the idea that the economic experiences of unemployment as such have not been altered 
during the crisis—they are only more common. 
 
Marginalisation	of	Service	Work?	
But for those who work, occupation is also an important predictor of the level of 
deprivation. In fact, the average effect of the crisis on deprivation is slightly 
underestimated by aforementioned coefficients, because it describes the situation of the 
reference-group: managerial, professional and high-skilled manual workers, who then 
serve as the point of comparison but also have themselves become more deprived. 
 
By contrast, indeed, those working in sales, services and support have suffered 
significantly more from the unemployment-crisis (.337***) and especially of long-term 
unemployment (.419***). Similarly, the crisis-effect on both deprivation (.148**) and 
social exclusion (.062**) are higher for those working in services, sales and clerical 
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support, whereas those in elementary occupations are more deprived (.220***) but not 
that much more marginalised. Yet, elementary workers are now more prone to 
subjectively evaluating lower ability to make ends meet (-.348**). Similarly also the high 
skilled employees assess their economic position lower (-.243***) despite the fact that 
many of the effects of the crisis have been the most emphatic to those in services, sales 
and support, and who are thus the least likely of expressing crisis-awareness. 
 
This is so despite the fact that also fixed term contracts have become less common 
among the service-related occupation groups (-.214***), suggesting that the higher 
employment insecurity prior to the crisis (.445***) has now been realised in the loss of 
such jobs. They have also been subject to the declining number of available new jobs. By 
contrast, many more fixed term jobs have opened up for those in elementary 
occupations now (1.078***), while they were absent before (-1.322***). Again, similarly 
as different education groups have converged in terms of unemployment and 
deprivation, employment insecurity now characterises different occupation groups more 
evenly.  
 
Therefore, particularly those unemployed who used to work in the service sector have 
experienced the most notable increase in deprivation and marginalisation. At the same 
time, elementary workers are experiencing heightened employment insecurity. However, 
the implications of ‘precarity’ are otherwise broad, including the notable crisis-specific 
effect undermining the ability to make ends meet (-.419).  
 
Failed,	Reverted	or	Postponed	Transitions:	A	Norm	Among	the	Educated	
Social support, particularly in relation to accommodation, is another pivotal theme that 
I have sought to understand by using multilevel methods. Following the methodology 
of the European Social Survey, ‘social support’ is defined in terms of shared housing. 
The living with a partner –variable for example clearly contributes to employment, while 
reducing both unemployment and employment-controlled deprivation at the same time: 
these effects are virtually independent of the crisis. The partner-related effect indicates 
that it is not only general social support that benefits respondents, but the partner-
related effects need to be added to the general effects on the reference group which 
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already consists of those who live together with someone but not with parents or 
partners. 
 
Nevertheless, perhaps the most important form of social support to the young is that 
provided by parents; it has been suggested that economic trouble could postpone or even 
reverse the processes of domestic transition (cf. Furlong and Cartmel, 2006). However, 
it turns out that there is little support for such effects, except in the lower income-
quartiles where the benefits of prolonged transition to the young themselves are, 
however, economically negligible. Instead, even if many people have sought shared 
accommodation, those who for one reason or another have continued to live alone are 
troubled by the crisis.  
 
Unemployment in contrast was more common both among those living with a parent 
(.360*) and those living alone (.396**) prior to the crisis, whereas those living with 
someone else and particularly with a partner were more secure. Either parental social 
support indeed relates to socio-economically vulnerable positions, or otherwise people 
genuinely seek help from their parents as a consequence of unemployment.  
 
To evaluate these possibilities, I included two relevant interactions in the model. The 
low-income respondents living with parents were no more likely of being unemployed, 
whereas among those with tertiary education the association between parental social 
support was notably higher (.809*)—even if this association has been largely undone 
during the crisis (–.572*). This suggests that at least prior to the crisis the 
unemployment-effect of parental support did not follow from socio-economic 
difficulties; it is also notable that the general association between unemployment and 
living with a parent is not related to whether respondents pay for their part of the 
housing costs.  
 
In this respect, the living with a parent -variable can indeed be deemed as a social 
support variable, not primarily an economic one. Indeed, despite its association with 
unemployment, in the pre-crisis situation parental support also contributed to higher 
employment rates (.287***). Also, when looking at younger respondents, their long-term 
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unemployment rates were markedly lower among those living with a parent (-.965t), and 
a similar defensive effect was visible in terms of deprivation (-.261***) and social 
exclusion (-.092*).  
 
Against this rather complex picture of the role of parents as a form of support, it is 
interesting to contrast the post-crisis effects to see whether parental support has received 
any new meanings. Among the younger cohorts, the defensive effect against long-term 
unemployment has become possibly even stronger, and parental support has similarly 
defended against deprivation and social exclusion (but not more than before the crisis). 
In general, however, the association between economic struggle like unemployment and 
parental support has become rather obscure during the crisis. Also, there is no crisis-
related interaction in terms of deprivation or exclusion despite a weak effect on perceived 
income (reflecting attitudes). Similarly, prior to the crisis young adults living with 
parents were associated with higher likelihood of living without any household income 
(1.376***), but in the post-crisis situation parental support is no longer associated with 
such socio-economic extremes (-1.804***). 
 
In effect, it at least appears that no broad effects on domestic transition have occurred, 
and there is no evidence supporting the reverse transition hypothesis. But it is likely that 
transition periods could be prolonged at least among those young adults, who have a 
tertiary education degree. Also, the young living with parents appear to be closer to the 
average in socio-economic terms today. This ‘equalisation’ applies particularly to those 
with tertiary education, again, because the strong association between unemployment 
and parental support has significantly weakened, and because the highly educated are no 
longer overly represented in terms of inability to afford food (-.641*).  
The	Lonely	Crowds	Up	In	the	North	
Also the reference group is influenced by social support, given that they do not live 
alone. In Nordic and Continental countries the men who live alone, instead, were more 
likely to be unemployed (.396***, also long-term, .558**) or in insecure, fixed positions 
(.642***). In addition, they were more deprived (.308*) or marginalised (.066*), at least 
before the crisis. Women are not similarly affected by whether they live alone or not: 
they are more deprived like men are, but not more often unemployed, and actually less 
 161 
likely to be socially excluded (-.90**). Regardless of gender, however, it is notable that 
the unemployment-effect of loneliness is still very much higher among the low-income 
group (.475***; long-term unemployment: .467**; employment-effect: -1.165***), 
whereas the high-income earners are even more likely to work (.564***) when living 
alone. Therefore, it is likely that the unemployment-crisis results in a particularly strong 
vicious circle among the low-income single person households, especially in NC, as these 
men have both lower resources to begin with and are encountering unemployment at 
increased rates.  
 
Of course, young adults do not necessarily experience living alone similarly as the old, as 
it is more ‘normal’ or typical of members in this age-cohort anyway; however, 
independently of context, the young have approached older adults in terms of the 
depriving effects of living alone. The young, for example, are even more likely now 
(.462*) than before (.580**) to be unable to afford to have proper meals every second 
day. These associations also demonstrate that it is not likely that the lonely would seek 
living arrangements of other kind, possibly moving together in order to get more social 
and economic support: if anyone, it is those in less vulnerable positions that are able to 
change housing patterns to make life more manageable.  
 
Those living alone are often subject to paying rent or mortgage. Starting with older 
respondents, tenancy is associated with much higher unemployment and long-term 
rates, whereas during the crisis paying either rent or mortgage has reduced the 
likelihood of employment. This again indicates that those responsible for paying in full 
for their housing are not likely to move away even after encountering the unemployment 
crisis—at least until they become unemployed for longer periods. Both forms of 
responsibility thus make respondents vulnerable to deprivation and exclusion in often 
extreme ways. Where SAS and EAS appear to defend people against the harmful effects 
of living alone, in these contexts the crisis-effect of mortgage holding on deprivation is, 
however, well above the reference (SAS: .266***, EAS: .203*) in addition to the possibly 
higher indebtedness among the unemployed (SAS: .209, EAS: 262). Considering the 
interactions between living alone and mortgage, the connection with unemployment is 
even higher.  
 162 
 
Focusing now on the young, it appears that the tenants are slightly more flexible in 
changing accommodation, which defends against deprivation even if this does not 
usually mean a reverse-transition back to one’s family home. Indeed, among the young 
who still pay rent or have started to do so, the crisis has brought lower unemployment 
rates. It then appears that the young unemployed are likely to give up their rented 
apartments. Similar transitions do not occur in the case of mortgaged single person 
homes, however. Therefore, the unemployment rates are now exaggerated among the 
young mortgage holders: it is probably more difficult to sell a home rather than to 
vacate a rented apartment, especially in a declining housing market. 
 
Combining these effects, it is then likely that unemployment and living alone as a 
combined condition makes it extremely difficult for an individual to bear the 
consequences of the crisis—this particularly concerns the low-income single-person 
households where unemployment is now much more common. If tertiary education is a 
form of ‘cultural capital’ that, however, makes one vulnerable to the crisis, the lack of 
social support is then a form of ‘social’ capital similarly associated with rather emphatic 
effects of the crisis. Combining these conditions with possible homeownership makes 
the risk of unemployment extreme (.767** + .183 + .571). But also others, not 
necessarily indebted, pay a drastic price for the crisis: in the unemployment-specific 
model it appears that the health-related effects fall upon those living alone in particular 
(1.295**), and especially so if they are young (1.270*).  
  
Crisis	by	Context	
We have now identified two separate features that put individuals particularly at risk: 
the ways of being (education) and those of living (alone, mortgage). At the same time, 
the crisis brings new population-groups to the labour market to compete for fewer 
available jobs: mainly women and those from higher income quartiles. The service 
economy is at the same time becoming more marginal. Most of these reported effects 
are statistically significant, suggesting that even if they might be context-dependent, the 
direction of the effects is relatively consistent across contexts. Yet there are interesting 
differences: for example the mortgage-effect on deprivation is higher in EAS/SAS, but 
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it is counterbalanced by lower unemployment-effect on deprivation in the very same 
contexts. At the same time, there is a growing group of older, marginalised men who 
live alone in NC and are particularly affected by the crisis.  
 
It is obvious that qualitative differences in how the crisis is experienced across contexts 
exist. Yet given that there are 27 countries and 15 to 19 context-predictors makes the 
interpretation sometimes difficult; there is some overlapping in the models and in most 
difficult cases the number of variables has been reduced. However, it was crucial to 
cover the most important aspects about the crisis—the financial and fiscal issues, 
economic growth and structure, policy, equality, welfare and culture. All of them are 
needed: policy and equality for example account for most variation in the employment-
controlled deprivation- and marginalisation-effects. In order to make the modelling of 
different outcomes compatible, it was then necessary to use the same context-predictors 
in all models. In particular, as I briefly mentioned before, the multilevel analysis is 
especially used for exploring predictors so as best to say what the crisis is about instead of 
treating them as causal predictors that could be directly manipulated to control the 
outcomes.  
 
For a more explanative purpose, I included two factorial models (PCA and PAF) as 
other sets of context-predictors, and particularly given their capacity to predict the 
unemployment-crisis36, explaining about 80 % of the context-variation.  Furthermore, 
given the particular overlapping between welfare and religion –variables, all the models 
were tested with both of these separately and then by combining them. I then used 
statistical tests to choose the fittest one of the three as the reference model (for a 
particular outcome); I also made several efforts to guarantee that the interclass variances 
would decrease, while adding blocks of context-predictors in. This was done in order to 
demonstrate that any contingencies imbued by a given variable would be evened out 
when looking at the context-picture as a whole.  
 
‘Impact’	and	Impact:	Qualitative	and	Quantitative	Faces	of	the	‘Financial’	
With these preliminaries in mind, the obvious first question is what role the ‘public 
finance crisis’—expressed by higher refinancing cost of national debt for example—plays 
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in regulating the crisis-outcomes. In a respective block of variables, I combined bond 
rates, the overall level of national debt with GDP growth indicators as well as the tax 
base in order to regulate for the fiscal and economic associations of the financial crisis. 
Unfortunately, themes like fiscal deficit were too contingent to be properly addressed by 
the models. Nevertheless, the growth-variable itself turned out to be quite peculiar: 
GDP growth was associated with higher pre-crisis unemployment but also 
employment-controlled deprivation and social exclusion. The effect was even twice as 
strong for the young as for older adults. This indeed suggests that growth-rates alone do 
not defend ordinary citizens against the crisis, but rather that growth itself appears to be 
associated with qualitative, age-related changes like higher pre- (.342*) and post-crisis 
effect on long-term youth unemployment (.443*) as well as with aggravated deprivation.  
 
Therefore, even if countries high in terms of the public finance crisis (bond yields) form 
the most visible face of the crisis, similar or even stronger changes are visible in 
economies that appear to have grown instead. In this respect, even if the ‘public finance 
crisis’ has occurred in countries where pre-crisis unemployment rates were extreme 
(1.227***)—thus suggesting that the unemployment crisis preceded the financial one 
and not the other way round—the crisis itself appears to have affected quite a different 
set of countries.  
 
This justifies the division into the ‘qualitative’ and ‘quantitative’ faces of the crisis, which 
I already suggested in the first part, as it appeared that crisis-awareness prevails also in 
countries where the ‘impact’ of the crisis is less emphatic (in Eurobarometer opinion 
survey). The multilevel model now provides a coherent interpretation of this 
independence of ‘awareness’ and ‘impact’. Namely, the differences in the ‘impact’-
component seem to be associated with pre-crisis differences, and are thus unrelated to the 
differences in the crisis-awareness, even if the overall effect were catalysed by the current 
crisis. The crisis, in other words, has not created the differences, even if it exaggerates 
them and makes the differences more tangible. It might be correct to blame the 
financial crisis for the vast unemployment-problems in SAS and EAS, but that is not 
the proper way to address the differences between SAS and NC in this respect.  
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Indeed, differences in financial variables tell quite a different story from those related to 
employment: even if national debt and bond rates are associated with post-crisis 
deprivation and exclusion -effects, they are unrelated to unemployment-rates. In other 
words, precrisis rates have been similarly multiplied also there, where public finance has 
not run into problems. High national debt has also mitigated the post-crisis pressures 
on long-term unemployment (-.357**). Of course, given the resulting real economic 
imbalances, the extreme public finance crisis is associated with deprivation like the 
difficulties of affording to pay for daily meals, but again it seems that the differences in 
national debt, which is an important predictor of the differences in bond-yields as well, 
the unemployment- and deprivation-related differences did exist, by and large, already 
in 2007, causing the financial difficulties rather than being explained by them. Crisis-
awareness has then resulted in part from this quantitative impact whose direction of 
cause is the opposite to what is most often assumed. Awareness is also canalised through 
another route which relates to changes in the labour market and socio-economic 
differences in countries with particularly little pre-crisis impact, but where the current 
economic crisis is thus used as a means of promoting certain policy programmes.  
Structure	of	the	Economy	
Economic growth little resonates with the overall structure of the economy, and 
therefore it was investigated by another block of variables. There are two measures of 
the external structure, that is, of how an economy compares to others: first, the level of 
national product (GDP per capita PPP) measures the overall level of development. It is 
also independent of the quantitative impact of the crisis, even if higher GDP did predict 
lower pre-crisis unemployment-rates, it has not affected the crisis-effect on 
unemployment.  
 
As another, external measure, I modelled the effects of the openness of the economy: the 
total sum of exports and imports as a portion of GDP. The effects of openness happen 
to differ between low- and high-income countries. In the latter, openness mitigated the 
crisis-effects on both short- and long-term unemployment, but exaggerated them in 
low-income countries. In open high-GDP and closed low-GDP countries long-term 
unemployment is also more prevalent. This indicates that marginalisation under the 
influence of such combinations is perhaps a more difficult problem than unemployment 
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in general. More open economies have also been subject to stronger deprivation-effects 
resulting from the crisis. In general, countries that largely rely on international trade 
have been likely to experience either unemployment effect (low income) or deprivation 
effect (high income).  
 
The other two variables reflect the internal structure of the economy in turn. First, the 
old age dependency ratio, which is also important from the point of view of ‘inter-
generational equity’ (Quadagno, 1989), that is, the equality of provision and cost of 
welfare between age-cohorts, has actually contributed to reduced unemployment during 
the crisis (-.216*), but also simultaneously to lower employment rates (-.212***) in high 
GDP countries (-.416***). Therefore, the prevalence of old-age related problems may 
affect the general dynamics of the economy negatively, even if reducing unemployment. 
Also, even if the crisis has resulted in a slight marginalisation-effect, where the old-age 
dependency ratio is high, it has still had a negative effect on deprivation and contributed 
to equality.  
 
Another, perhaps the most important internal indicator is the share of people with tertiary 
education (among the 30 to 34 year-olds in 2012). It predicts both higher pre-crisis 
deprivation and increase in post-crisis deprivation (.105***), particularly among the 
young (.188***). This variable will be discussed in more length in the third part, given its 
associations with a variety of psycho-social effects of the crisis. It also predicts higher 
pre-crisis unemployment, and such higher rates have remained stable through the crisis 
(but without added crisis-effect). Furthermore, high prevalence of tertiary education has 
made the young subject to fixed term employment (.308**).  
 
Between	Equality	and	Policy	
Beyond economic representations of the crisis, and in addition to welfare and religion  
-predictors, I modelled the effect of several (standardized) scalar predictors concerning 
equality, policy and public expenditure. In previous research, social policy has been 
identified being connected to different levels of poverty among the unemployed but also 
as a way to reduce negative ‘hysteresis’-effects resulting from prolonged unemployment 
(Hauser et al., 2000: 37; also Blanchard and Summers, 1986): I thus expected the 
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policy-variables to regulate the effects of unemployment, while seeking to understand 
the role of different types of inequality. The policy and equality –variables were analysed 
as a single block, as they gather together various aspects of well-being, which, if studied 
separately, could lead to contingencies. 
 
Equality	
One of the reasons justifying the inclusion of equality –variables is Therborn’s (2013) 
recent thesis about the Killing Fields of Inequality. Representing economic inequality, the 
GINI-coefficient is associated with higher crisis-related general (.345**) and long-term 
unemployment-effects (.628***), deprivation (.095*) and the inability to make ends meet 
(-.248**). These effects were compared to the so-called ‘vital inequality’ measures—life 
expectancy and the life expectancy gap (between genders). Unfortunately, given the 
association of both variables with high welfare costs, these two variables often appeared 
to contribute in the same direction, and were thus associated with deprivation and 
possibly higher long-term unemployment rates, even if they contributed to lower 
unemployment among the youth.  
 
However, the interaction between women and the life-expectancy gap—a gender 
inequality measure—is easier to articulate in the context of Therborn’s thesis, and it 
indeed appears that the realisation of employment insecurity and higher deprivation-
effects among women are more likely when gender-differences are high37. In addition, 
Therborn further gains support from the alternative PCA-models, which included the 
gender gap –variable measuring economic and existential inequality; interestingly, the 
pay gap then did appear to reduce unemployment rates among women (lower salaries 
increases female job demand), but also with lower youth-unemployment –effect, and 
notably higher general deprivation. 
 
Policy	
Reflecting the articulation and resolution of economic and social differences on shorter 
time-scales, two variables control for the effect of cabinet composition. First, the overall 
composition is measured by the Schmidt-index (at the end of 2012), where 1 stands for 
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the hegemony of right-wing and centre parties, while 5 stands for social democratic and 
other leftist parties. Another variable depicting the change on this index over 2007 to 
2012 was included to track political reactions during the crisis. Given that the overall 
policy-effect is thus controlled for such reactions, the former reflects the effects of policy 
itself rather than the effects of political reactions which might mirror many other factors 
associated with dissatisfaction in national policy. 
 
In the context of the current crisis, it indeed appears that there are no visible 
employment-outcomes related to policy. In terms of deprivation and exclusion, two 
effects are visible but contrary: a leftist cabinet as such results in lower deprivation and 
social exclusion (-.225t), and higher ability to make ends meet (.162*). On the other 
hand, leftist governments seem to have emerged as reactions to contrary effects on these 
variables, following increases in deprivation and exclusion38. Therefore, if equality –
variables generally appear to be too broad in terms of their time-scale and interpretation, 
the policy-variables might be too narrow, even if they have more pertinent effect on 
subjective experiences of the crisis, including happiness and satisfaction: the Left seems 
to have contributed to happiness and also to institutional trust but reflects higher 
personal dissatisfaction.  
 
Expenditure	
Variables related to public expenditure instead act on the intermediate level, reflecting the 
long-term trends related to equality and welfare, yet in a way regulated by the short-
term policy-process. It is notable that the measures above are then controlled for the 
level of social expenditure (other than health or pensions), tax on income (which together 
with debt-related variables reflects the overall level of public expenditure), and on 
changes in non-social government expenditure. The latter variable is taken as an indicator 
of what is generally conceived by fiscal stimulation and Keynesian economic policy, 
which seeks to directly contribute to production instead of stimulating the economy by 
the means of public transfers.  
 
In relation to public expenditure, I first decided to consider the variable reflecting 
changes in the overall tax-rate along with social and non-social expenditure. The 
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variable is a sum total of tax on income and wealth, calculated in a standardised way 
(Eurostat). However, we must beware of the fact that if some forms of income are taxed 
higher than others, reduction in low-rate income could inflate the value as a 
compositional effect, and this could happen for example in the case of capital gains 
during the crisis. These effects would for the most part be covered by other variables, 
however (e.g., GDP-growth).  
 
Nevertheless, the gross rate of tax can at least be used to verify that higher taxes do not 
necessarily mean economic stagnation or unemployment, as economists sometimes believe, 
and that they still appear to have mitigated deprivation (-.275***) and social exclusion (-
.079**) rather than contributing to them. In particular, it is not necessary that the lower 
taxes should automatically contribute to the dynamics of the economy by stimulating 
aggregate demand—not at least any more than the alternative use of the money as social 
expenditure would do.  
 
The distribution of public expenditure between social and non-social categories is then 
particularly interesting. More specifically, contrasting two spending categories helps us 
avoid the standard rhetoric about the restrictions in available resources and about the 
necessity of spending cuts: the question is about where the money is cut from, and how 
that very decision contributes to the crisis. These same categories are compared in later 
chapters too in order to understand their effects on subjective outcomes, while now I 
will be focusing on unemployment and deprivation.  
 
Social expenditure, to start with, is associated with a notable increase in long-term 
unemployment rates (.844***), indicating that it not only reflects the political 
atmosphere but the number of the people in need. What is important, however, is that 
despite these compositional effects—and in the opposite direction—the pre-crisis 
association between social expenditure and lower deprivation (-.790***) and social 
exclusion indices (-.466*) have remained valid through the crisis. Social support has, 
genuinely, defended people from the worst.  
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Non-social expenditure, by contrast, also predicts higher long-term rates (.233*). But 
unlike social expenditure, it is associated with higher pre-crisis deprivation rates and 
post-crisis difficulties in making ends meet. It has also contributed to social exclusion, 
even if it has slightly mitigated employment-controlled deprivation. Non-social 
expenditure was also included in alternative models based on the PCA- and PAF-
predictors stemming from the previous part.  
 
Also according to these models, non-social expenditure has resulted in higher long-term 
unemployment rates (.182* / .405**), and being unable to answer the needs of social 
inclusion. The PAF-models indicate consistent contribution to deprivation (.085t), 
social exclusion (.115**), food-related deprivation (.267*) and the inability to make ends 
meet (-.223*). Among the young, it is associated with a higher number of temporary 
jobs (.140**), and further contributes to deprivation (.113***). The fact that non-social 
expenditure is higher in countries that have avoided the public finance crisis (PAF1) 
crisis, and should thus be associated with a defensive compositional effect on 
deprivation (Table 5), supports the interpretation that the negative effects of non-social 
expenditure could be of causal nature. 
 
Indeed, most of these effects are contrary to those related to social inclusion measures- 
and cuts to unemployment-benefits -components, both of which suggest that social 
expenditure is helpful in lowering deprivation but also in tackling youth unemployment, 
particularly long-term.  Social expenditure is often disavowed given its association with 
long-term unemployment, but its contrary effect on youth unemployment indicates that 
the fear of respective socialisation effects is preliminary, and social expenditure seems to 
better address such issues of inter-generational equity that non-social expenditure 
cannot handle.  
 
Of course, one could then argue that the different effects of these social and non-social 
categories of ‘voluntary’ government expenditure should reflect pre-crisis differences 
that in turn shape the policy-process. They would not be controllable then in which case 
their manipulation would turn out to lead into inefficient results.  
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Whatever the case, at least we can say that the pre-crisis differences are extremely 
interesting from the point of view of other outcomes related to subjective assessments. 
Namely, non-social expenditure predicts lower pre-crisis long-term unemployment (-
.421***), and is thus related to lower levels of ‘hysteresis’-effects and other economically 
depressive tendencies. Any indications of the detrimental effects of non-social 
expenditure, when measured against the affects of the crisis and its broader (psycho-
social) representations, are then even more powerful given these lower long-term rates to 
begin with. Regardless of the extent to which political decisions could have altered the 
unemployment-crisis, I will demonstrate how they make a difference to an individual’s 
wellbeing. Furthermore, the youth-specific effect that favours social expenditure is 
notable, and cannot be explained away by referring to the pre-crisis differences 
predicted by these variables.  
 
The	Questions	of	Culture	and	Welfare	
The one last question that remains for this chapter is the role welfare and culture in the 
crisis. Above, in association with themes like unemployment and deprivation, the 
interactions considered not only youth and gender but also accommodation. Those 
living alone, for example, appeared to suffer particularly in Nordic and Continental 
regimes, whereas people in EAS are characterised by pre-crisis deprivation, and their 
experiences about it, but security and welfare are rather in the process of emerging there.  
 
Of course, the most material differences between welfare regimes are already accounted 
for by variables reflecting economic structure, policy, equality and expenditure, not to 
mention cultural differences. The latter are controlled particularly by religion-related 
variables, which should, at least in part, control for cultural differences insofar as they 
are unrelated to the precise institutional setting of welfare. These are then necessarily 
infused with any institutional attempts to frame welfare (already because those 
institutions themselves shape the historical perspective from within which they are 
interpreted and understood). Information-criterion-based tests were then used to 
determine whether cultural and institutional aspects of welfare properly support each 
other. When the two blocks could not be combined, I usually reported the effects of the 
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other in gray ink in order to allow the reader to understand their effects even if the 
predictions were then not comparable39. 
 
To summarise the results, even if the low number of contexts reduces the number of 
applicable variables, and despite the fact that the typologies related to welfare and 
religion are somewhat overlapping, I applied both of them (when the multilevel models 
allowed) in order to explore the effects of economic culture and the institutional frames 
of welfare. This now also brings the question of welfare in contact with Weber’s 
culturally oriented hypothesis about the economy. To this end, it was pivotal to reduce 
the number of categories to three in both variables. As these variables cannot be 
manipulated, the problem of causal attributions is also less urgent.  
 
Based on the differences between the institutional and cultural effects of wellbeing, it 
then appears that Catholic culture plays a strong role in economic solidarity and contributes 
to non-governmental forms of protection. Catholic (1.395***) and possibly Orthodox 
(.572) countries are on the other hand associated with ‘flexicurising’ tendencies, even if 
in this respect they also better shield people from deprivation (-.179**, -.272**) and it is 
possible that similar flexicurisation processes already occurred in Protestant countries 
earlier. Yet there is an intergenerational polarisation also involved, as the insecure young 
adults are not similarly defended. Catholic women are also more likely to be 
unemployed (and less employed), but there is little crisis-related effect in this regard.  
 
In Protestant countries, by contrast, the crisis appears to have contributed to deprivation 
more than what is expected based on other variables, even if this does not occur in terms 
of inability to pay for meals. This indicates that besides higher GDP growth and non-
social expenditure, the harmful effects pertinent to the ‘qualitative crisis’ countries could 
also originate from the Protestant cultural backgrounds.  
 
But besides the effects of welfare- and religion-based typologies interesting as such, we 
should answer the question what is the exact role played by the welfare crisis. Does 
welfare matter more materially, despite the particular regime or culture? This question 
was in turn addressed as part of the PCA- and PAF-models.  
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The PAF-model, which has a more ‘systematic’ predictive value and incorporates 
‘economic’ associations in particular, associates particularly the public finance crisis (but 
not the fiscal one) with unemployment (.408***, long-term .462***). The welfare-crisis—
either measured by the current cost or expansion during the crisis—is instead associated 
with slightly lower unemployment (-.140**, long-term -.165*). In terms of deprivation, 
however, not only the financial but also the fiscal crisis contributes to deprivation—
unlike the welfare crisis whose negative consequences are balanced out by its benefits. 
Yet, in addition to the public finance crisis, also the welfare crisis does contribute to 
social exclusion.  
 
In contrast, in the PCA-model it appears that welfare cost hike is associated with higher 
adult- but neutral youth-deprivation-crisis-interaction, and from the point of view of 
inter-generational equity and economic socialisation processes the cost-hike itself is not 
a problem (except due to the fiscal/financial difficulties that result). On the other hand, 
the pre-crisis level of welfare is associated with a notable increase in the number of 
young working simultaneously in two jobs, which suggests that as a result of the welfare 
crisis, the responsibility of taking care of youth (cf. Stiegler, 2010) now increasingly falls 
upon the young themselves. Again, social inclusion measures that have been questioned 
by the welfare crisis, but which have still been applied extensively in some contexts (e.g., 
Ireland), are associated with both lower unemployment- and deprivation-rates upon 
youth. Finally, as one more interesting phenomenon worth mentioning is the fact that 
in countries where economic participation is high (e.g., GEP), the number of those who 
have had a paid job is naturally much higher (PCA5: .298***; PAF5: .238*), but there is 
then evidence that unemployment rates are also generally higher because of the way 
participation contributes to the demand for more jobs.  
 
In conclusion, it appears that the policy-process deciding between social and non-social 
expenditure regulates the different outcomes of the crisis. But there are other, more 
direct and less politically laden predictors of the crisis-impact. They largely reflect 
differences that existed already before the crisis like the pre-crisis unemployment rates 
(PCA3), that in the case of the PCA-model explain well the differences in 
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unemployment and deprivation outcomes, or by the fiscal and financial problems that 
follow (rather than explain) the unemployment crisis. Here it is notable that the public 
finance crisis tracks differences in the crisis-related unemployment-effect, and the fiscal 
crisis regulates differences in deprivation. These effects are uncontrollable, however, in a 
sense that any rapid changes in long-term processes are unlikely. Yet the dominance of 
such effects often conceals the relevance of those crisis-specific, temporally more 
immediate decisions that can be altered now—namely the choice between social and 
non-social expenditure.  
 
Finally, the more systematic model (PAF) illustrates another pivotal difference: the 
effects of the welfare-crisis are particularly related to youth. Youth-related negative 
effects are also illustrated by the effects of non-social expenditure. And it is here, in the 
context of younger members of society, that the long-term effects of the welfare-crisis 
find reinforcement in the current emphasis on material, non-social policy. These 
measures are further applied, where welfare is being simultaneously criticised. Even so, 
given that I have now discussed unemployment from the point of view of the individual, 
let me next turn towards the question of what employment means to society.  
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Chapter	6	
Employment	and	its	Publics—From	Economics	to	Politics	
 
 
Employment is a material condition. Short of employment: both deprivation and social 
exclusion occur. This has remained consistent through the crisis—there is no wave-
effect for either one of these indices. But other than that, employment is also a social 
condition and, in that respect, subject to political constructions. The importance of the 
emergence of ‘wage-labour’ as a defining category of social citizenship has been long 
recognised, at least since Marx’s writings, and the entire project of welfare states 
emerged from the social democratic attempts to promote employment and to make 
wage-labour a livable social position. Also many others, including Adam Smith, wrote 
about work in the context of propriety and duty. As briefly reviewed in the introduction, 
Castel (2003) perhaps best portrays the history of the two intertwined problematics: 
what it is to live (relief) and to work (labour).   
 
The previous analysis verifies that both problematics—subsistence and permission to 
work—have indeed become more problematic during the crisis, not always similarly but 
still somehow in all the EU-countries. But we are also interested in how the crisis 
shapes what these problematics consist of, that is, whether the crisis has made a 
qualitative difference to their contents. According to the typology between the 
quantitative and qualitative crises, these changes should be particularly visible in 
Germany, Finland, the Netherlands, Sweden, Austria and Luxembourg. And they are. 
The European Working Conditions Survey (EWCS) indicates that in 2010 discrimination 
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at work was highest in Sweden, Luxembourg, Finland, Ireland, Denmark and Austria. 
But the quality of work could also be undermined in the context of employment- rather 
than only work-relationships, that is, the organisation of wage-labour and not only its 
contents. Germany has, for example, introduced virtually non-paid jobs to those short 
of work. As a result, self-doubt among employees is particularly common in the Czech, 
Lithuania, Denmark and Germany. 
 
Some of these rather pervasive tendencies might be condensed or catalysed by the crisis; 
similarly I considered the changes in the articulation of the ‘problematic of relief’ in the 
first part. Yet it is in terms of the public policy, and in particular the introduction of 
active labour market policies (ALMPs) since the 1990’s, that the two sides of the wage-
labour-assemblage—work and employment—appear to intertwine. Of course, welfare 
and labour-related policies are often promoted by referring to worker’s rights and 
wellbeing from an individual perspective; however, it is clear that employment (and 
unemployment) are phenomena benefiting the ‘public’ (i.e., the public economy but also 
the civil society) also in the governmental sense: work is both a way of regulating the 
people but it also produces income and tax (while unemployment produces cheaper 
labour prices). Promoting employment is therefore in the ‘public’ interest—yet its 
‘publics’ or audiences refer to a variety of actors (individuals, governments, markets).  
 
On the other hand, it has been suggested that also unemployment—Engels’ ‘reserve army 
of labour’ and an aggregate resource to keep labour costs down—is beneficial to the 
market. In particular, later discourses have referred to the commodification of labour (e.g., 
Jessop 2002; Silver, 2003) in the contexts of the regulation of labour costs and -
conditions. The aim of the welfare policy then was not only to reduce unemployment, 
but, instead, to free the unemployed from deprivation and the (unrealised) need to work: 
from their ‘commodification’ or instrumentalisation as a reserve army. As Esping-
Andersen (1990, 23) neatly describes it, in ‘[d]ecommodifying welfare states […] 
citizens can freely, and without potential loss of job, income, or general welfare, opt out 
of work when they consider it necessary’. It thus ‘refers to the degree to which 
individuals, or families, can uphold a socially acceptable standard of living 
independently of market participation’ (ibid., 37).   
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This question is inherently political. Esping-Andersen (1990: 129) provides convincing 
evidence of the strong connection between the ‘decommodification index’ and cabinet 
composition between 1949 and 1980, demonstrating that such policies were particularly 
appealing to the Left. Critiques, usually from the Right, called this social democratic 
politics of relief as ‘politics against markets’ (Bradley et al., 2003), fearing that 
decommodification would lead to market exit or ‘substitut[e] political determinations 
about distribution for market determination’ (Huo et al., 2008: 17).  
 
Yet this controversy itself was never imminent during the emergence of institutionalised 
welfare, as the inflationary period of the 1970’s was characterised by almost full 
employment. The decommodifying policies did not cause as much opposition given that 
the problems of ‘capital’ were attributed elsewhere (to low unemployment instead). And, 
in fact, the decommodification-process might have actually been a problem to the Right 
not because of reducing ‘employability’ but, contrarily to what the Right fears, because 
such policies could have contributed to full employment (which would then be deemed 
as undesirable from the point of view of the rising labour costs). Even so, the positive 
effects of social expenditure on employment were hardly recognised as being that 
important then, which is why the critique of decommodification emerged mainly from 
the micro-economic perspective. Respectively, the idea that social expenditure should 
play a central role in tackling the current unemployment crisis remains unconventional 
and unacknowledged.   
 
Yet the situation has now reverted. Somewhat ambiguously, it is deflation instead that is 
feared by many, even though at the same time the degradation of welfare and public 
austerity target to increase the size of the ‘reserve army’, keeping both labour costs and 
purchasing power down. Against this background, even if the ALMPs did not reduce 
unemployment that much, they might be useful to the Right as they promote 
employability and, therefore, keep the ‘reserve army’ active and on duty. 
 
The question of labour (and relief) today is as much a governmental problem as it has 
ever been (e.g., Miller and Rose, 2008); it is not just about party politics but it relates 
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particularly to how life itself is being ‘policed’ (e.g., Foucault, 2009). The ALMPs are 
particularly associated with what Giddens (1991) has discussed in the context of the 
ethical shift towards ‘entrepreneurialism’ as a basis of everyday life. Therefore, in 
addition to the effects of policy discussed already in the previous chapter, the precise 
composition of ALMPs in respect to various crisis-outcomes illustrates the kind of 
governmental ideas or climate overshadow the crisis—even if we could not peremptorily 
establish any causal connections.  
 
But the public sector plays an important role also in the economic, not just governmental 
sense. In many EU-countries, indeed, the public sector employs a large part of the 
working population. Furthermore, combining public expenditure and the state-
regulated social insurance transfers like pensions, whose total amount now varies 
between 43% of GDP in Bulgaria to 80 % in France, the public sector plays a crucial 
role also by providing consumers with more purchasing power. As a result, regardless of 
how untenable the growth of public employment is deemed from the point of view of 
global competition, it is clear that the austerity programs in countries like Greece, 
Spain, Ireland and Latvia are prone to inducing broad stagnation.  
 
Pressures	on	Public	Work:	Elementary	Workers	Pay	the	Price	
Public sector employment forms a large portion of all workers in virtually all developed 
economies. But unlike the recessions in 1981, 1990 and 2001, after all of which the 
share of public employment grew for at least the next 30 months and smoothened out 
the employment crisis, the current one is different, being characterised by the steady 
reduction of public employment over at least three consecutive years. Contrary to the 
trend that began in the US, the reduction in public jobs was not counterbalanced by an 
equal increase in private employment. 
 
Yet ‘public’ sector employment itself is first and foremost a construction, which relies on 
and is performed by accounting practices above all, that is, by how it is being paid for 
(cf. Power and Miller, 2013). Of course, in the case of public bookkeeping, there are 
differences in that decisions are accountable to the democratic ‘public’ rather than a 
group of owners, and also the marginal cost of labour is lower to the public given that it 
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is the public economy itself that is the beneficiary of taxation. But even if regulated by a 
democratic process, the attributed differences in economic ‘rationality’ between private 
and public actors are often quite loosely defined. In fact, from the point of view of for 
example Habermas’ theory of deliberative democracy and communicative rationality, it 
is the latter that should be considered as having better prospects for rational decision-
making and efficiency.  
 
Nevertheless, it is obvious that, even though also private economic agents (e.g., 
individuals, firms) have suffered, there has been a notorious shift to question the 
sustainability of public work in particular. Therefore, before addressing what work 
means to the ‘public’ from the point of view of labour market policy, I will start by 
comparing the conditions of public and private work during the crisis: first, in what 
contexts the discrepancy between public and private work is the most visible? Second, is 
the deterioration of public employment visible ‘internally’ in work, that is, in terms of 
what one does rather than referring only to the form of employment? 
 
The EWCS was analysed similarly as the EQLS-data, now comparing 2005 and 2010 
while addressing the crisis as the difference between the two. The available individual 
level variables naturally differ, but also the cross-level interactions were chosen with an 
emphasis on public work. I also briefly summarise the most important findings based on 
the so-called multiple correspondence analysis (MCA) by which I analysed a broader 
range of variables (see Appendix 9).  
 
In general, there were few differences between private and public work in terms of job-
satisfaction, even though it appears that the conditions internal to public work have 
been less pressed by the crisis. However, in the context of cabinet composition, the 
leftist and social democratic cabinets seem to have emerged as a reaction to worsening 
conditions in both but especially in the public sector. In terms of the number of sick-
leave days, the young are affected but not as much as older adults, except in Catholic 
countries, where sick-leave days are common also among the young. Again, however, 
the effect is mitigated among the public sector workers. Also, when we look at whether 
workers have ‘time to have a job done’, it appears that work has generally been 
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disintensified across Europe, especially among the young. This, on the other hand, 
applies mainly only to those with either secondary or tertiary education—the highly 
skilled, often ‘post-Fordist’ jobs. Moreover, the young in Catholic countries form an 
exception, with possibly more intense experiences of work.  
 
Therefore, in terms of the labour process, mainly only the young in Catholic countries 
stand out with more sick-leave days and more intense experiences of work—regardless 
of the sector. However, when we specify the level of education, differences also by sector 
appear to stand out. Indeed, in relation to employment security and fixed term 
contracts, temporary work has become increasingly prevalent among elementary workers, 
particularly among young employees with no secondary or tertiary education, and 
especially women. This is interesting because still in 2005, temporary contracts appeared 
to characterise only high skilled jobs, and few elementary workers were on such 
contracts.  
 
Now, it is noteworthy that employment insecurity among the young low skilled workers 
seems to have emerged particularly in the public sector (PAF8  × public sect. × wave: 
.138*). There is certain ambiguity regarding their assessments about their own 
employment situations then: elementary public sector workers were both more certain 
about career prospects (.402***) but more fearful about their current jobs (.418**). In 
other words, they expect security while experiencing insecurity at the same time. No similar 
effects are visible in the case of service or high skilled work in the public sector. 
Furthermore, in terms of overtime, evening or weekend-work elementary public work 
seems to have become intensified. Generally, this intensification is visible specifically in 
the public sector in countries high on the fiscal crisis -axis (PAF2: .158**), where welfare 
costs have hiked (PAF4: .070*), or where fiscal stimulation is characterised by non-social 
expenditure (.286*).  
 
There is, therefore, a clear indication that fiscal issues but also the ideological emphasis 
on non-social stimulation are particularly concerning for the low-skilled jobs in the 
public sector, even if for example the pressures reflected by welfare cost hike are related 
to rising health care costs, and have less to do with elementary jobs in particular. 
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Elementary workers are those who pay the price to pressures on public welfare, and they 
do not as such benefit either from non-social expenditure, which rather tends to 
intensify their work while distributing resources to those with higher qualifications.  
 
Finally, as one peculiar form of discrimination I also modelled the reported first hand 
experiences ‘linked to race, ethnic background or colour’. Other discrimination-variables 
were aggregated together in the MCA-analysis (below), but ethnic discrimination is 
interesting as it combines two specific issues: crisis-incurred tensions between social 
groups but also the changing ethnic composition of employment. Indeed, general 
discrimination (e.g., age, sex, orientation) occurs more likely in the private sector, 
whereas ethnic discrimination has come to dominate public work, again particularly 
among those without higher education.  
 
Public	and	Private:	What	Is	the	Difference?	
Let us now take a closer look at subjective assessments regarding job-satisfaction, career 
prospects and security. Such assessments are not as such commensurable across different 
points in time, because people tend to adjust their expectations given the underlying 
economic circumstances. Only in EAS there is a clear drop in satisfaction among all 
workers (-1.387***), which suggests that similar adjustments to economically depriving 
conditions might have existed already prior to the crisis. In other regimes, those who 
have remained in work tend to feel more satisfied. On the other hand, particularly the 
younger respondents with no higher education appear to feel much less positive about 
their conditions of work (-1.476). Therefore, from the perspective of the ‘labour process’ 
internal to work(place)—whether private or public—there is a tendency for the market 
to become more polarised based on educational attainment. 
 
But there are interesting contradictions also between age groups. The young are more 
hopeful as they grade their career prospects higher even if the unemployment crisis—
and also long-term unemployment—is much more common among them. Similarly 
public sector workers in countries with high welfare costs (and fiscal pressures) are likely 
to be less fearful about losing their jobs, despite increased austerity. In fact, these 
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contexts only exaggerate a more general phenomenon that public sector workers 
consider their career prospects higher than private ones.  
 
One explanation to this striking result could be that respondents in the public sector 
have remained at work despite austerity. If they have seen others lose their jobs, this 
could have enhanced their confidence in their own capacity and prospects. Moreover, in 
2010, when the data was collected, the most staggering effects of public austerity were 
yet to come, at least elsewhere than in EAS. Also, even if the general measures in SAS 
do not reflect heightened insecurity, already in 2010 it was visible in SAS that public 
work was becoming less secure at least relatively, when compared with other sectors.  
 
But it is also possible that the question of career prospects could mirror broader themes 
related to insecurity, not just those reflecting current employment. It is then crucial that 
on the level of subjective perceptions, the public sector should still appear to be a safer 
and more defensive environment to those who remain at work, even if not in all contexts, 
like the Orthodox Eastern countries and Greece, where the perceived risk of losing 
one’s job is particularly high (1.432***), especially for women and possibly more so in 
the public sector there.  On the other hand, across all regimes where the young have 
specifically suffered, insecurity among public sector workers is heightened (PAF6: 
.086*).  
 
Five	Qualities	of	Work	
To summarise a broader range of assessments related to the conditions of work, MCA 
in the context of the EWCS resulted in five relevant axes of inertia: self-assurance, 
social support from co-workers, supervisors and the organisation, monotonous/manual 
work, assertiveness, and discrimination (for original plots used in the identification, see 
goo.gl/kI5jBh). First, assertiveness relates particularly to the strength of attributions the 
respondent makes (i.e. the tendency to exaggerate both positive and negative answers). 
Self-assurance in contrast is opposed to blank responses, illustrating some sort of 
ambiguity regarding the personal situation at work. The other three axes were easier to 
identify and more helpful in distinguishing changes between private and public work.  
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Supporting my previous conclusions, it then appears that public jobs—for those who 
have managed to stay in—have defended employees from a variety of unfortunate effects. 
For example, in the private sector those with only primary education conceive 
themselves as being much more discriminated in 2010 than before, but this does not 
apply to the public sector (except in terms of ethnic discrimination). Also, even if work 
has become intensified and also more insecure, particularly among the elementary public 
workers, they still find their jobs more rewarding in 2010 than before. In highly skilled 
work (professional, managerial, etc.) the case is the contrary: in the private sector they 
find their jobs more rewarding, but not in the public sector. What is common to all 
education groups in public work, however, is that they receive more social support, and  
work has become less manual but creative instead, also making them perceive their tasks 
as being more rewarding. In the private sector, in contrast, the quality of jobs has 
decreased.  
 
Devaluation	of	Private	Work	
The self-assurance dimension was perhaps the easiest to understand: together with 
work-related social support it results in the so-called valuation-diagonal, which 
measures how high the respondent evaluates the value of work—either in her own eyes 
or as perceived by others. Based on the MCA-analysis, higher valuation appears to 
characterise public sector work: there is a simultaneous shift towards self-doubt and 
social disrespect in virtually none of the countries.  
 
In contrast, such devaluation characterises private work increasingly in Portugal, 
Greece, Romania, Poland, Hungary, the UK, Ireland, Slovakia, Poland, Estonia, the 
Netherlands and Sweden. This discrepancy between the private and public work is 
confirmed by multilevel analysis: private sector work has become particularly devalued (-
.183**), whereas public work is not devalued at a statistically significant level. It is clear 
that the crisis has hit employees in virtually all welfare regimes—at least on the level of 
subjective assessments—but in none of these contexts have public sector employees 
suffered in the same way. After accounting to other predictors, however, public work is 
not more valued than before the crisis but appears to be assessed the same way. 
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Indeed, I investigated then the five qualities of work as the outcomes of separate 
multilevel analyses in order to examine whether some of the above findings could be 
explained by specific context-predictors. For the subject-specific model, I reduced the 
number of predictors to general demographic, education- and occupation-related 
variables. Also, I only modelled the variables against the PAF-model that is the most 
‘economically’ oriented, and these axes were then made to interact with public sector 
work. The results confirm and summarise what I already discussed. As a result of the 
crisis, the public sector is associated with higher valuation (.116), social support (.174**) 
and with less discrimination (-.248**) except in specific cases: welfare cost expansion and 
public finance crisis predict self-doubt. In addition, the public finance crisis, ‘young 
women’s crisis’ (PAF8) and non-social expenditure are all associated with lower social 
support (and valuation) among public workers. Together, the financial crisis is then one 
of the most important predictors of the devaluation of private work in particular. 
 
Crises	Specific	to	Public	Work:	The	Case	of	Discrimination	
In terms of the ability to be creative at work, and especially the extent to which work is 
valued, differences between the private and public sectors are vast. They seem to be 
growing, but the discrepancies still actually indicate broader, more pervasive changes 
rather than being specific to the current crisis. Yet it is not at all obvious that the public 
and private sector should differ. Indeed, on other two axes related to discrimination and 
assertiveness, there are very narrow differences between public and private workers in any 
context and in any single year of response. These are then qualities that as such are not 
sector-specific.  
 
In contexts where a more radical departure between private and public work has 
occurred—mainly in Spain and Ireland—it is then plausible to take it as an indicator 
that the crisis has caused specific trouble in the public sector. This claim is supported by 
the fact that prior to the crisis (2005) even those contexts, where the qualities associated 
with public and private work now move further away from each other, used to score 
similarly. By contrast, in Portugal discrimination was dominated by the public sector 
even before the crisis, and the relative position of the two sectors has remained the same 
through the crisis. There, we can say, the crisis of public work occurred earlier than in 
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other contexts. In Greece, in turn, still in 2010 at least, it is those working in non-public 
jobs that were more affected, making them much less assertive, even if this situation 
might have reverted now.  
 
It is also possible to use the social support -axis as a discriminatory measure, when 
looking at entire national contexts. Divergences have occurred in Greece, Romania, 
Portugal, France, Spain, Ireland and Austria, where the economic crisis is most likely 
associated with a specific crisis of public work.  
 
The	Young	and	Monotonous	Work:	Where	Is	the	‘Creative	Class’?	
Finally, one peculiar phenomenon drew my attention in the context of work conditions. 
Both the valuation of work (social support and self-assurance) but also the level of how 
monotonous (and non-creative) work is appears to be higher among younger cohorts. 
Therefore, it appears that work in the private sector used to be more valued among the 
young (.110***) and is increasingly so (.105***) even if, at the same time, it has become 
increasingly monotonous and manual (.14***, 105**). Similar effects are not visible in the 
context of public work. Therefore, despite all the clamour about The Rise of the Creative 
Class (Florida, 2002) praising innovation and creativity as the foundations of the new 
economy, in the EU it appears that creativity at best characterises public work. But even 
in the public sector social and personal valuation of work is higher in the case of 
monotonous labour. Therefore, not even the public sector appears to encompass a broad 
‘creative class’, and not the least because the relevance of public work is diminishing.  
 
Of course, we cannot draw a direct link between creativity and the devaluation of the 
contents of work. When comparing other groups than the young, like women, they 
work in less rewarding jobs but are at the same time less likely to receive social support 
and feel valued. Even so, it is inevitable that the crisis of work can cause further 
divisions among the youth. The distinction between private and public work is just one, 
illustrative example of the difficulty of formulating a unified perspective on the crisis—a 
perspective that is then particularly unlikely of becoming formulated by young adults 
themselves. Unfortunately, apart from what was discussed in the first part, questions 
related to generational awareness, social mobility and counter-democratic ‘grass-root’ 
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representations of the crisis (e.g., Rosanvallon, 2008) would require more nuanced data. 
Given the high discrepancy between private and public sectors, Spain, Ireland and 
Portugal would be some contexts to begin with.  
 
In effect, public work is overshadowed by both creativity and discrimination, themes 
that lack in private employment, which has become increasingly dull. But even if the 
number of jobs stagnates in both sectors, the history of the public economy and work 
are still open. The analysis shows that the question of wellbeing is also about policy and 
rhetoric, not only about the economy. Therefore, let me next discuss work from the 
point of view of active labour market policies. This opens up the question of what the 
‘public’ means to employment (and not only labour).  
 
Two	Faces	of	Labour	Market	Policy	
Governments that represent the public are not just providers but also ‘receivers’ of work 
and employment, with the economic, integrative and also ‘bio-political’ effects usually 
associated with employment. In particular, the public economy is still largely founded 
on the taxation of wage-labour (and of wage-consumers). These issues were not as 
relevant before, when the emergence of welfare states were characterised by almost full 
employment at least in Western Europe. As I mentioned above, there was more 
ideological room for the ‘decommodification’ of labour. But at the time Esping-
Andersen (1990) formulated this project, the active labour market policies—the more 
‘entrepreneurial’ approaches to wage-labour—were already underway. Instead of 
defining employment and unemployment as structural constraints, the emphasis was put 
on the jobseekers themselves. 
 
There are various ways to approach these goals, though. Standard classifications, 
including Eurostat divide the ALMPs into a number of categories: (1) training, (2) 
incentives, (3) supported employment and rehabilitation, (4) direct job creation, and (5) 
start ups. All of them target at the activity of potential employees, but in two 
fundamentally different ways. First, activity itself as a target of such measures results in 
an increased supply of labour power. Second, by increasing the demand for labour 
power it is possible to make more people actively engage themselves or participate.  
 187 
 
Expressing this difference more conceptually, the market-oriented approaches, like 
incentives and rehabilitation, attempt to increase activity as a means to promote 
employment—either by increasing employability (individual level) or aggregate 
employment (context) and generally to increase the competitiveness of individuals. In 
contrast, integration-oriented approaches like direct job creation and training emphasise 
the integrative advantages that derive from activity and work as such. They target at 
individual wellbeing rather than employability. This category also includes measures 
seeking to enhance the labour market participation and integration of specific groups 
(long-term unemployed, disabled, etc.) instead of targeting at the unemployed 
population as a whole. The market-oriented approaches can then be argued to aim at 
increasing the supply of labour power, whereas integration-based approaches emphasise 
the demand-side.  
 
A simple principal component analysis on the five ALMP-categories on the level of the 
EU-27 countries supports this distinction: the main component relates to the overall 
level of ALMPs, whereas the second component distinguishes between the market- and 
integration-oriented approaches. Also, when modelling changes in the ALMPs by type, 
changes in market- and integration-oriented policies emerged as separate components, 
which are then also used as context-predictors in the ALMP-related multilevel models.  
Equal findings are also supported by previous labour market research that often uses 
denser time-series data thus enhancing the empirical validity of this crucial distinction 
(e.g., Boix, 1998; Vlandas, 2013).  
 
Similarly as the ‘decommodification’ of labour was associated with cabinet composition 
(Esping-Anderssen, 1990), research also confirms that the overall type of ALMPs is 
associated with party politics. In particular, the social democratic or leftist governments 
are negatively correlated with market-oriented approaches (e.g., employment incentives 
and rehabilitation), but higher on money spent on public employment services instead. 
In particular, the left-leaning governments ‘will not want to spend more on employment 
incentives and rehabilitation because this may be neither beneficial for workers nor for 
the unemployed’ (Bonoli, 2010: 12). 
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In terms of an integration-oriented approach, research is more discordant about the 
effect of cabinet composition. Still in 1998, Boix argued that the Left would cease to 
emphasise the supply side in their politics (direct job creation) but sought to pursue 
social protection and improvements to worker’s rights instead. Today, in contrast, 
Vlandas (2013: 12) claims that employing people as a way to protect them—instead of 
freeing them from the market (decommodification)—is increasingly important to leftist 
cabinets as well. Therefore, unlike in the 1990’s, Bonoli (2010: 441) claims that today 
‘pro-market employment orientation’ also characterises the Left, even if not necessarily 
in the sense of market-oriented emphasis on employability but by providing jobs with 
more integrative goals in mind.  
 
There are also other ways to conceptually distinguish between different categories: 
Bonoli (2010: 441) argues that job-related vocational training and upskilling strongly 
contribute to ‘human capital’, but which in my distinction translates to the integrative 
tendencies associated with policies aiming at increasing labour power demand. In 
addition to political differences there are regional differences, which characterise the 
overall level of ALMPs. Vlandas (2013: 10) for example suggests that Anglo-Saxon and 
Southern regimes reflect a ‘minimalist labour market policy’.  
 
ALMPs:	A	Failed	Attempt?	
Before discussing the models treating the main components of ALMPs as context-
predictors for various crisis-outcomes, let me summarise the correlations between the 
five types of ALMPs and the PAF-axes of the crisis. It turns out that the financial and 
fiscal crises have not been associated with either one of the two main components of the 
ALMPs. Instead, the public finance crisis seems to be associated with higher emphasis 
on entrepreneurial policies (support to start ups). The welfare crisis in contrast has been 
characterised by integrative policies, whereas countries high on participation, government 
contributions and non-social expenditure are associated with market-oriented policies.  
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Table 7. Active labour market policies and the PAF-model of the crisis. 
 
 
In the multilevel models I instead used the main components that related to the overall 
level of ALMPs, their orientation or increase in respect to any single orientation; I also 
considered these effects as regulated by the overall level of GDP. As the first, crucial 
finding, the data indicates that ALMPs have not contributed to aggregate employment 
during the crisis. Instead, the total level of such policies is associated with higher 
unemployment rates resulting from the crisis (.651***). These effects are even more 
exaggerated in the context of long-term unemployment rates (1.022***), even if market 
oriented approaches possibly lower this effect on long-term rates (-.399). And the 
mitigating effect of market-oriented ALMPs on long-term rates could actually reflect 
the compositional effect stemming from the fact that participation and government 
contributions associated with incentives and rehabilitation tend to reduce long-term 
rates.  
 
It is, of course, one question to discover associations between the crisis and ALMPs and 
another to make causal attributions about them. However, even if the crisis itself could 
be viewed as a cause for changes in the composition of ALMPs, it would be plausible to 
assume that changes in ALMPs would also be affected by differences in the pre-crisis 
levels (of unemployment for example). The introduction of higher incentives is indeed 
associated with lower pre-crisis rates, but given the direction of this effect it rather 
supports the finding that market-oriented ALMPs have no positive effect on 
employment. Yet the fact that incentives provide little support is not surprising, given 
for example the fact that also those who have housing loans and are personally 
indebted—and who should have a high incentive to work regardless of labour market 
policy—have struggled to secure employment. The advocates of the market-oriented 
policies often confuse between two modalities of action: the need to work (incentive) 
and the actual ability to work (market) do not always agree. 
financial'crisis fiscal'crisis welfare'crisis participation
government'
expenditure
increase'in'
non5social'
expenditure female'crisis gender'pay'gap
incentives'/'rehab. X' X X
job'creation – X
training X
start'ups X X
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In contrast, the increase in the creation of public jobs seems not to be connected to pre-
crisis differences in unemployment—at least in high GDP-contexts. This suggests that 
the contributions of such policies to be genuine, or at least there is no reason to believe 
that the actual, causal effect should be the opposite. Indeed, in high GDP -contexts 
where ALMPs are generally more maturely applied, crisis-related unemployment has at 
best increased the level of market-oriented policies, which again do not recognisably 
contribute to aggregate employment.  
 
In effect, it is plausible to conclude that ALMPs have in no way mitigated the 
unemployment crisis, but they seem to have contributed to it instead. Even if ALMPs 
could have contributed also to higher employment in some groups, these effects would 
be undermined by higher unemployment rates elsewhere. If we consider the supply and 
demand sides of the labour market as independent from each other, it is natural to 
assume that incentives and rehabilitation as such do not create jobs (but they force 
actors compete for existing jobs in less than efficient ways).  
 
But it is very interesting that also the public creation of jobs has not been able to 
mitigate the effects of the unemployment crisis at the macro-level. Instead, increase in 
integrative policies has contributed to higher unemployment (.330***) and long-term 
rates (.618*). It is, of course, possible that such measures have been adopted particularly 
where the unemployment-crisis is most exaggerated. However, also the pre-crisis 
composition of ALMPs and unemployment-rates indicate that they at least seem to 
have no positive effect on aggregate employment.  
 
Distributing	Unemployment:	In	Defence	of	the	Higher	Middle	Class	
If ALMPs mirror the idea of the ‘public’ (or the government) as a ‘receiver’ (or an 
audience) of higher employment, this relates less to the quantitative and economic 
impact of such policies but to the fact that they rather shape the general atmosphere 
towards work. ALMPs can also affect the distribution of available jobs. Furthermore, 
ALMPs seem to genuinely contribute to more ‘flexicurised’, insecure forms of 
employment. This effect is consistently associated with integration-oriented policies in 
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particular. Similarly as public employment is still perceived as being more ‘defensive’ 
despite the apparent insecurity associated with such jobs, also the jobs created through 
ALMPs appear to be short-term and temporary, thus undermining the long-term 
integration effects of such policies. Furthermore, the total level of ALMPs seems to 
contribute to the so-called ‘two-tiered’ division of the labour market (Gash, 2008).  
 
In relation to the distribution of jobs, there are two important findings. First, when we 
look at the effect of ALMPs on job-satisfaction, there is a clear drop resulting from 
market-oriented approaches. This suggests that people are pursued to take jobs that they 
are less satisfied with, possibly undermining their competences. The focus on 
employability could therefore make the labour market itself less efficient, misallocating 
available resources, but without contributing to aggregate employment (or by reducing 
it). Given how ALMPs contribute to employment insecurity, ALMPs in general thus 
seem to be associated with the fragmentation of careers that then become increasingly 
‘precarious’ (see Fenton and Dermott, 2006), and they make the labour market generally 
more inefficient.  
 
Another crucial finding relates to the distributional effect associated with ALMPs. First, 
by making more jobs available to those who have been unemployed for over 12 months, 
it is possible that even without increasing aggregate employment ALMPs can still 
mitigate long-term ‘hysteresis effects’ associated with prolonged unemployment (cf. 
Blanchard and Summers, 1986; also De Vreyer et al., 2000), at least if the risen levels of 
overall unemployment turn out to be short-lived.  
 
But perhaps even more interestingly from the distributional perspective the effect of 
ALMPs on the prevalence of unemployment based on household-income. Indeed, for 
the higher middle-income quartile, ALMPs bear a clear, reductive effect on 
unemployment rates during the crisis—both for incentives (-.203*) and public job 
creation (-.298*). In effect, the positive effects of ALMPs seem to defend the higher 
middle class at the cost of lower income households. This is because the lower income 
quartiles seem to have higher economic incentives to work despite labour market policy. 
This result with striking consequences finds further evidence from the fact that ALMPs 
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are associated with a higher number of fixed term contracts and, again, the higher 
middle-income quartile is overly represented among those who have acquired a fixed-
term contract during the crisis.   
 
It is in no way surprising then that the ALMPs are often created, promoted and 
supported by people who associate employment with values related to 
‘entrepreneurialism’, self-actualisation and individual rewards. These typically 
characterise high-skilled, creative jobs but not ‘manual’ work, which, however, is now 
relatively more common at least in the public sector. In this sense, we can say that the 
higher middle class is the primary public or audience of labour market policy—if not of 
employment as such. In their own part, these associations and distributive effects also 
explain why the so-called ‘post-Fordist’ economies, where the problems are 
preliminarily associated with high-skilled work, result in lower subsistence and 
satisfaction also among the low-skilled inhabitants (see Chapter 9).  
In	What	Sense	is	Employment	One	of	the	‘Publics’	of	Finance?	
Considering the fact that governments have put so much emphasis on labour market 
policy, debt-laden fiscal stimulation (though not social investment) and if public work 
being much more time-intensive, valued and more efficient today than before, the 
interesting question is why these effects are not realised in terms of the aggregate 
product and employment? Castel (2003: 394) already asked this question few years in 
advance: why do the labour market policies, so ‘numerous, diverse and insistent’, have as 
little effect as they have? And should not financial and fiscal imbalances, that is, 
overinvestment of public resources rather contribute to economic growth (at least 
initially)? If there are so many ‘publics’ of employment today, why are the employees 
constantly less satisfied (and more deprived)?  
 
There is no straightforward answer to this difficult question. This in part stems from 
the fact that the question itself seems to entail several unwarranted assumptions. For 
example, ALMPs are often treated as economic policies, whereas their macro-economic 
effects might be limited to distributional effects instead of contributing to aggregate 
employment. Second, it is assumed that the discursive construction of the employee-
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image provided by ALMPs should automatically enhance participation, engagement 
and activity, not to mention trust and satisfaction.  
 
But the mistakes are restricted neither to the peculiar discursive constructions nor the 
unwarranted confusion that misleadingly articulates macro-economic outcomes 
(aggregate employment) based on micro-economic effects (employability). Even more 
importantly, the emphasis on fiscal and financial policy (on the cost of social policy) 
confuses ‘financial’ growth and ‘real economic’ growth that operate on categorically 
distinct regimes. In particular, this confusion becomes apparent if people find it 
unexpectable that the crisis-related public injection of financial money—the growth of 
sovereign-debt but also the quantitative easing programs by the ECB40—is not visible in 
terms of aggregate employment or national product.  
 
In effect, questions about the economy are often found difficult only because of the 
underlying assumptions about the far from inevitable connections behind the economy. 
People often assume a material connection between the financial and the real economies 
instead of treating their precise connection itself as an empirical problem. Nothing 
indicates that the current real economic issues should have resulted in characteristically 
‘financial’ problems. Instead, the level of financial obligations has increased and the 
process of financialisation (see Epstein, 2005; Ertürk et al., 2008; Engelen et al., 2011) 
continued both in the private and public sectors. Despite the initial collapse of the 
CDS-markets, even during the global crisis the amount of technical, non-regulated 
'over-the-counter' derivative markets did increase to $647,762 billions (2011) from 
$596,004 (2007) as reported by the Bank of International Settlements (BIS).  
 
Therefore, (also the European) economies have grown in terms of financial obligations 
and liability, but not in terms of real economic product. This financial expansion could 
then bear all sorts of real economic consequences, including the vast number of people 
paid by the financial industry, but they do not necessarily stimulate aggregate demand. 
One could say that instead of being ‘repaid’ by work, liabilities related to the wellbeing 
of financial engineers are now subject to ‘refinancing’ instead, as Lisa Adkins’ (2014) 
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recently characterised changes in the debt-economy and the ‘speculative’ nature of its 
futures. Economic product is not created by finance but distributed by it.  
 
Perhaps it is then easier to illustrate this discrepancy between the two regimes of 
growth, the two publics of expansion, in terms of two uses of money: as a unit of value 
(signifier) and as purchasing power or a means of exchange (signified). Financial money 
and growth generally refer to the differentiation of those units of value, which now 
proliferate through the establishment of financial derivatives, whereas real economic 
growth refers to the proliferation of purchasing power instead. Yet the proliferation of 
financial obligations is now articulated as a source of real economic deficit; the ‘public 
economy’ is increasingly represented as a liability rather than as an investment. This 
rhetorical connection, in turn, could have actually devastating consequences to the ‘real 
economy’.  
 
Therefore, it appears that public employment is made ‘liable’ by those pursuing financial 
growth—at least indirectly in the way that the need for financial wellbeing now 
outweighs the emphasis on public wellbeing. The idea that the State and the public 
economy should be liable to markets rather than control them was first introduced by 
the German ‘ordoliberalists’ Walter Eucken and Franz Böhm in the 1930’s (Foucault, 
2008, 2009). The subsequent discourses later rationalised the adoption of the 
neoclassical frame of micro-economics as the normative goal of the so-called ‘neo-
liberal’ state policy (cf. Gane, 2012). It was, in other words, argued that economic 
agents (including governmental agencies) should maximise their input based on micro-
economic principles. This can now be viewed as a source of this confusion between the 
two regimes of growth and the false identification of the two correlated modes of 
wellbeing (economic and social). As a result, the private economic crisis has induced a 
public economic crisis of equal extent—not only due to ‘material’ reasons but as a result 
of policy. This, in turn, could have negative implications also to private economic 
growth given how the crisis has undermined social expenditure and, in turn, the 
transformation of the ‘financial’ money into public ‘purchasing power’, that is, by 
translating ‘financial’ difficulties into real economic ones.    
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National	and	Financial	Growth:	Two	Publics	of	Employment	in	the	21st	Century	
Thomas Piketty’s (2014a) portrayal of the tendency of increasing inequality but also of 
the failure of public investment to absorb national growth is very illustrative of this 
aforementioned dilemma about the connections between public debt and the various 
‘publics’ of financial expansion. Instead of accepting Kuznets’ predictions about the 
positive effect of economic growth on equality, Piketty (2014a: 336–337) argues that the 
new century might well bring about inequality-driven stagnation.  
 
Indeed, as Piketty argues, Kuznets’ findings reflect the peculiar period of ‘historically 
unprecedented’ growth (1913–1945, 1950–2012), which followed from the 
‘hyperconcentration of wealth’ in the nineteenth century but also of the historical 
‘concatenation of circumstances’ like the ‘wartime destruction’ and ‘progressive tax 
policies’ that explain why an increasing amount of money was then used as purchasing 
power instead of focusing on its financial derivatives (ibid., 356). Kuznets thus knew 
(though he denied this fact later) that the twentieth century compression of incomes 
stemmed largely from the Great Depression and World War II. A year later, in 1954, 
he, however, suggested equality to be more materially connected with economic growth: 
that promoting the latter would automatically mitigate inequalities. As Piketty 
describes, the ‘distributional question’ since disappeared from economics.  
 
The compression of incomes created an era of almost full employment. Nonetheless, 
Piketty argues that it would be unfeasible to assume this tendency to continue, or global 
growth-rates to continuously exceed 1 %. In fact, global growth has historically been 
closer to 0.1 to 0.2 %. If lower rates now reappear, it is obvious that maintaining current 
levels of public economic investment might be impossible. Either way, such 
assumptions forget that the public sector did play a central role in the twentieth century 
growth and, therefore, public austerity could in fact cause low growth rates rather than 
follow them. In particular, the deterioration of the public economy results in what 
Piketty (2014a: 16, 25) refers to as a ‘fundamental force of divergence’: it is not 
necessary that growth should be distributed always more evenly. Yet if the process is 
driven by policy, the actual future of the economy is open to alternative interventions, 
and thus contingent. 
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In particular, if the neo-liberal discourses now argue that public investment grounds on 
‘irrational’ allocation of money, they omit the fact that the very idea of wasting or 
disposing is inherent to the dynamics of consumption and expenditure (Bataille, 1985). 
We only need to recognise the fact that private (but not public) money is referred to as 
‘disposable income’, and this illustrates that the ‘public’ and ‘private’ economies are 
constructed quite differently in contemporary economic discourses. Growing 
inequalities today could thus reflect the fact that the absorption (or ‘anti-production’) of 
economic product has become overtly narrow. The public sector itself is becoming the 
‘forced destroyer of [its] own creativity’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983: 236).  
 
At the same time, it is as if financialisation took over the ‘public’ or ‘national product’, 
which no longer serves as the ultimate goal of economic activity. Like the public used to 
do, the financial sector provides work and, in this sense, ‘taxes’ the public (the financial 
industry now absorbs about 8 % of national product). However, as another ‘public’ of 
employment, the financial sector undermines equality and welfare, and little cares about 
full employment.  
 
The situation of the ‘public’ (and also national) economy is further undermined by the 
fact that as a result of financialisation and global tax-planning, a growing share of 
capital finds itself as a refugee sheltered in ‘tax-havens’, out of the reach of state-
interventions and thus escaping the hands of the ‘public’ in democratic sense. This could 
further undermine public economic and national growth by contributing to the 
imbalances between production and trade (Piketty, 2014a: 15). In effect, the ‘public 
economy’ is undermined not only on the discursive level or through its democratic 
representations (undermining social policy) but also materially, because an increasing 
amount of money circulates outside public control.  
 
In the light of available data, there is, however, no indication that inequality as such 
(e.g., GINI) should result in a more extensive unemployment crisis. Instead, the 
changes appear to be long-term, though it is notable that the GINI is associated with 
the increase in long-term unemployment during the crisis. Economic literature usually 
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associates long-term unemployment with detrimental hysteresis effects that could 
undermine economic growth in the long run (e.g., Blanchard and Summers, 1986). 
However, it is clear that the crisis has affected the way in which employment and its 
‘publics’ are being constructed—as illustrated for example by ALMPs. Also, the data 
indicates that these changes do not seem to have any positive effect on growth in the 
long run.  
 
At the same time, it is obvious that the question of the ‘public’ (even in the context of 
employment) is increasingly sporadic, even an ‘empty’ concept—regardless of the fact 
that the neoliberalist ‘thought collective’ has possibly attempted to promote the share of 
private services for example by shifting the focus to private insurances. Of course, the 
public economy still plays a central role in the absorption of the so-called ‘post-Fordist’ 
work and in supporting the service economy: it dominates education and health care in 
particular. But it is no longer the idea of the democratic public that drives these servces, 
at least to previous extent, but the public sector is rather viewed as a service provider 
among others, gradually loosing its significance.  
 
This chapter has illustrated this process in several contexts: the inability of private work 
to adopt the role and values associated with public work; the inefficient allocation of 
jobs due to labour market policy; and given the indifference towards national economic 
growth among the advocates of ‘financial’ growth stemming from very different 
representations of money and value. These effects, in turn, explain why what Piketty 
(2014a) calls the ‘class warfare’ might not actually benefit anyone from the point of view 
of ‘national product’. Yet the process still continues precisely because ‘financial growth’ 
has now emerged as an alternative ‘public’ to employment (and a form of taxation, 
which is not, however, based on the egalitarian principle of democracy).  
 
Sociologically it is crucial that the crisis has also resulted in various other discrepancies, 
not just economic ones. In particular, differences characterised as ‘vital’ and ‘existential’ 
inequalities emerge, and while they ‘bear heavily upon resource inequality’ (Therborn, 
2013; see also Ferriera and Gignoux, 2008), they are not reducible to them. Let me next 
‘construct’ the ‘differences’ induced by the crisis as new sources of ‘psycho-social’ 
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inequality, represented in the context of various ‘affects’ related to economic deprivation 
and struggle. Like Therborn argues, inequality as such is not a ‘natural kind’; it is a 
social construction instead. Critical sociology and social policy partake in these 
constructions—in my case, I will frame the crisis as a psycho-social crisis with broad 
implications for individual and national wellbeing.  
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Part	III	
Changing	Geographies	of	Wellbeing	
 
 
In the previous part it turned out that despite the generally diffuse epidemiology of the 
crisis, there is still a certain ‘logic’ to it. It relates to the role of public expenditure, and 
particularly to its distribution between social and non-social expenditure. Regardless of 
public overinvestment associated with the financial and fiscal difficulties, it is rather the 
allocation of public spending and austerity that matter.  
 
This part now addresses the effects from the point of view of life quality. In addition to 
thematic contextualisations like religion and welfare, multiple correspondence analysis 
allows us to visualise and locate actual experiences according to subjective outcomes. In 
particular, I apply Pierre Bourdieu’s techniques to construct and identify the affects of 
economic struggle. A comparative cartography exposes the changes in affects between 
2007 and 2012, illustrating how the geographies of wellbeing appear to change.  
 
Some of the changes are context dependent, but others—perhaps the most crucial 
ones—grow consistently in all contexts. For example, the un- and the underemployed 
young adults relate to insecurity very differently, but in a way consistent in all contexts. 
In addition, there is a consistent increase in adverse or negative affects where the 
number of people with tertiary education is highest. I then discuss the possibility of 
framing the current struggle alternatively as a crisis of higher education and ‘post-
Fordist’ wellbeing.  
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Chapter	7	
Experiencing	the	Crisis—the	Personal,	Political,	and	the	Social		
 
 
The previous part looked into the crisis from the point of view of employment and 
deprivation—two material or economic indicators of the crisis. This chapter employs 
similar multilevel-methods in order to understand how contingencies and change are 
subjectively and, in particular, non-economically perceived. I consider how people 
personally interpret economic life and, reflecting changes in the group- and context-
averages, how precisely the economic crisis plays out in their lives.  This includes life 
satisfaction, the feelings of being left outside but also assessment about trust in 
institutions or governments, and the recognition of various tensions.  
 
There are two principal questions that are addressed by data consisting of such variables. 
First, comparing the situations based on employment status allows us to better 
understand the meanings of the need to work and, in particular, what the lack of work 
means in the era of ‘recommodification’ of labour; when the ‘problematic of relief’, as 
Castel (2003) argues, is replaced by ‘the new social question’. If people are ‘indebted’ to 
work at least in the existential sense, this chapter will help to understand the meanings 
associated with such obligations as well as how these meanings change.  
 
Second, the aggregate differences in subjective assessments allow us to better 
understand how individuals, in addition to governments, are subject to the sovereign-
debt crisis. Even if the discourses of debt, at least when it comes to individuals, tend to 
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consider only private borrowing (e.g., Roitman, 2006; Graeber, 2011), the ‘public’ debt 
is also important to individuals. This is both because it affects the dynamics of the 
economy and because the ‘will of the people’ becomes undermined. If the debt-
relationship is often characterised as asymmetry between a debtor and a creditor (cf. 
Sarthou-Lajus, 1997), I look into the matter by asking what this means from the point 
of view of wellbeing and, in particular, the welfare states no longer free to accommodate 
people’s ‘will’.  
 
Rather than talking about the crisis of debt itself—for the global debt now amounts to 
40 % higher than prior to the crisis—the debt crisis is more about the debtors. It is not 
about unavailable cash or absent capital. Far from it; most economists even think that it 
would be economically non-viable should the amount of debt generally decrease. 
Instead, the debt crisis is about the overt infusion of debt and about the subjectivation of 
‘sovereignty’ under the logics of ‘repayment’ and ‘refinancing’ (Adkins, 2014); it is, 
above all, about the uneven distribution of debt (and credit).  
 
The consequences of our ‘debt’ to the sovereigns become visible, when there is no work 
to offer and as the public guarantees of wellbeing disappear. If capital is in crisis, its ‘bad 
faith’—as Bourdieu (1990: 42) lends Sartre’s (2003: 580) Being and Nothingness—does 
not exactly mean the fear about the end of ‘capitalist realism’ (cf. Fischer, 2009). 
Instead, the failure to cultivate real economic growth, employment and wellbeing seem 
to be part of that reality. Economic government is an inevitable part of this equation, as 
in July 2015, for example, the ECB used its regulatory power over the material and 
technical networks of money as a way to orchestrate the ‘bank run’ in Greece—the result 
we all know. But Hegel once said that as long as there is at least one slave, no one is 
free. From this point of view, the question of wellbeing concerns all of us. 
The	Many	Sides	of	Wellbeing	
Let me thus begin by applying multilevel models in order to address the effect of the 
crisis on individual wellbeing. Happiness and life satisfaction, for example, are inevitable 
indicators of wellbeing, and they combine positive and negative assessments. But there 
are also separate indicators for either desirable or aversive outcomes. These include 
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health, the feelings of being left out of society and negative assessments of work, but in 
the context of available data also mortgage holding or political engagement.  
 
It has been known for long that the effects of economic prosperity on wellbeing are 
indirect; instead, they are mediated by social recognition and subjective comparisons, 
which stand behind experiences of distress and inferiority (Runciman, 1966; Merton 
and Rossi, 1957; Crosby, 1976). More recently, it has been suggested that abundance 
and meaningfulness are more or less independent of material living conditions 
(Arthaud-Day and Near, 2005, Diener and Biswas-Diener 2002). Wellbeing is 
therefore a difficult topic to study, as it combines a variety of economic and non-
economic affairs. Before studying the crisis in respect to emergent classifications in the 
next chapter, it is necessary to try and model the crisis using available indicators.  
 
Happiness	
Let me begin with happiness, which is one of the most acknowledged indicators of 
wellbeing, for it has been the goal of good government to promote ‘general happiness’ 
since at least Aristotle and increasingly so after Paine (1996 [1791]: 164), Malthus and 
others. There are also biological correlates of happiness in the brain chemistry 
(Davidson et al., 2000), even if they tell little about the meaning of happiness or about 
the embeddedness of neurophysiological functions in society. Furthermore, self-
assessment evaluations of happiness are available in data. Despite being an 
‘introspective’ measure, it has been suggested that such indicators form a sufficiently 
coherent enough expressions for happiness to warrant cross-national comparisons 
(Easternlin, 1974). At least from a comparative, ‘phenomenological’ perspective (that is, 
without making any argument about the meaning of happiness in terms of its social 
ontology), differences in happiness assessments across contexts can be considered as 
intriguing social phenomena.  
 
Yet we need to beware that happiness is not the most distinctive measure of any of the 
different aspects of wellbeing. Also, happiness research is often driven by utilitarian 
assumptions even if it does dispute some economistic beliefs: for example, it appears 
that while poverty can cause unhappiness, the marginal increase in happiness as a 
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function of income refracts (Scitovsky, 1976)—a phenomenon confirmed by my 
empirical analysis. There has also been a tendency for happiness ratings to decrease 
during the past few decades despite economic growth. Furthermore, contradicting with 
economists’ fear of deflation, happiness has been associated with low inflation (Frey and 
Stutzer, 2002).  
 
In the EQLS data it indeed appears that interclass variation in happiness scores 
becomes much more reduced by policy- and inequality-predictors instead of financial 
and economic predictors alone. In fact, the latter two blocks explain differences in the 
crisis-effects on happiness extremely well (the interclass variance of the wave-effect 
.000). Recalling that the reference category consists of Protestant countries in Nordic 
and Continental regimes; the crisis-effect on happiness there is actually negligible. 
Instead, happiness has been reduced in the Eastern (EAS, -.669***) and the Southern and 
Anglo-Saxon regimes (SAS, –.511**). By contrast, the Catholic (.573***) and Orthodox 
(.342***) cultures have undone some of these welfare-related effects. Looking at young 
respondents specifically, it appears that they are more positive in EAS and SAS.   
 
Focusing now on specific groups, happiness has increased among those with higher 
education (.090*) more than among those with secondary education at most. However, 
in countries, where the portion of highly trained population is high, happiness scores 
have fallen significantly; the connection is particularly strong in high GDP countries. I 
will come back to this issue later while discussing the specific effects of the crisis in 
‘post-Fordist’ societies. 
 
To consider other within-country groupings, it is notable that the income–happiness-
relationship is little altered by the crisis (but instead the crisis may exaggerate pre-crisis 
differences). Only the lower middle-income quartile fell. This suggests that even if 
happiness-assessments vary as a function of economic wellbeing in general, the crisis-
interactions with happiness are typically non-economic (but relate to policy, welfare, etc.). 
This is confirmed also by the fact that employment-status does not appear to contribute 
to the crisis-effects on happiness-assessments for those who have remained in the same 
occupational position.  
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Of course, it is clear that transitions in employment-status due to the crisis (those who 
have become unemployed) result in extremely adverse effects on happiness (-.890***). 
But it means that, similarly as in the case of deprivation, the crisis itself has not made 
the experience of unemployment any more adverse than it felt before. Furthermore, 
employment insecurity (temporary contracts) seems to have a significant effect on 
happiness only among female respondents. On the level of subjective assessments it thus 
appears that women are more likely to bear adverse consequences of insecurity.  
 
Given that the crisis-effects on happiness seem to vary according to non-economic 
predictors, it is understandable that the PCA-predictors focusing on economic and 
institutional conditions did not give a particularly fit description of this effect. The most 
notable findings are that a wide basis of economic participation increases happiness, 
whereas a high gender pay-gap, cuts to unemployment benefits, and the prevalence of 
the crisis among the male population decreases happiness. Among the young, by 
contrast, welfare crisis has made the crisis-effect on happiness negative; so has increase in 
non-social expenditure, whereas social inclusion measures have particularly benefited 
the young.  
 
On the country-level, on the other hand, there are several economic predictors 
(openness, old age dependency) to unhappiness—even if they do not reduce interclass 
variation particularly well. Instead, contextual variation in the crisis-effect is better 
explained by policy-variables, including centre-right cabinet or non-social expenditure. In 
contrast, leftist or social democratic governments are helpless in countries where they 
have emerged in reaction to previously centre-right cabinets. Also economic inequality 
(GINI) greatly reduces happiness, particularly during the crisis. Furthermore, because 
the GDP growth during the crisis is associated with lower happiness assessments (-
.281***), happiness ratings on average have fallen also in some Protestant and 
Continental countries, like Austria and Germany, whereas in many countries, where the 
economic crisis is more imminent (but not in Spain and Portugal for example), the 
experiences of happiness are supported by alternative contributors (e.g., Greece, the 
UK).  
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However, the connections between happiness and other features of the crisis are not 
often straightforward, and happiness is found to be a difficult concept for social sciences 
to operationalise. For example, in the typology of crisis-affects emerging in the next 
chapter both extremely low and high happiness ratings characterise disdain or lack of 
sympathy—this is so even if in terms of economic wellbeing happiness clearly grows 
through the income spectrum (Figure 19). It is therefore necessary to note that the 
analyses above are based on group-averages in happiness scores. For the credit of the 
alternative methods applied in the next chapter, the multilevel models can miss some 
non-linear connections, for example that both low and high happiness are associated 
with inner-directed orientations towards conflict.  
 
 
 
Figure 19. Happiness as a function of economic wellbeing and sympathy (for methodological 
discussion see the next chapter). 
 
Personal	Satisfaction	
Personal satisfaction is another assessment-variable and it is easier to interpret from the 
economic point of view (particularly by the PCA-predictors).  It is not similarly an 
‘introspective’ measure like happiness is, but, instead, a sum-variable constructed on the 
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basis of principal component analysis on various satisfaction-related questions. 
Interestingly, when modelling against the PCA-model, it gave very similar profiles as 
the happiness-assessment, showing a negative effect of the welfare crisis and increase in 
non-social expenditure while demonstrating positive response to participation. This 
suggests that personal satisfaction scores then grasp (only) the ‘economic’ aspects of the 
crisis-effect on happiness. Personal satisfaction is also one of the crisis-outcomes whose 
differences between groups are best predicted by level 2 –variables (80 %).  
 
The non-economic effects of the crisis on satisfaction are often opposite to those on 
happiness. In EAS (.829***) and SAS (.491***) satisfaction increased, and quite 
remarkably so. This suggests that there is a tendency for them to comply with what the 
crisis brings forward.  
 
Yet, looking at most of the within-country groupings, personal satisfaction scores 
appeared to have remained stable through the crisis. However, unlike in the case of 
happiness, satisfaction scores fell significantly among the unemployed (-.452**) and those 
who did not report any present or previous occupation (-.612***)41. This is remarkable 
because the effects of unemployment on satisfaction have been long known (Whelan 
and McGinnity, 2000), but it now appears that the crisis itself has strengthened this 
link between unemployment and dissatisfaction. In other words, it is even more 
dissatisfying to be unemployed now than it was a few years ago—a drop invisible in 
terms of happiness.  
 
I was actually expecting something contrary: that the commonness of unemployment 
would actually mitigate the negative effects on subjective wellbeing. There are two 
possible ways to explain this. Either it could be that some other modalities of wellbeing 
have still increased among the unemployed but that satisfaction does not depict such 
changes adequately. In this case, the unemployed might also have become more critical, 
thus reporting lower satisfaction scores that indicate their distance or dissociation from 
their own situations. Alternatively, it is possible that lower satisfaction scores could tell 
about an actual decrease in wellbeing.  
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In the next chapter we will encounter some positive evidence of the former 
interpretation—there are kinds of wellbeing (like sympathy) that the unemployment 
crisis contributes to. However, it appears that in the most material respects of wellbeing, 
the latter interpretation could also be valid. In particular, the decline in satisfaction 
should not be taken as an indicator of a critical attitude. Instead, those who are the most 
critical and aware of social tensions might actually feel more satisfied with the given 
circumstances: in the countries with the highest bond yields only the general public, but 
not the unemployed, have become dissatisfied. 
 
Considering other level 1 –predictors, education has little effect whereas household 
income alters satisfaction-effects like happiness does: the lower middle-income group 
has fallen in relation to others. But looking at the unemployed specifically, the effects 
are somewhat different. For example, satisfaction in this group increases as a function of 
the number of children for those who are unemployed (.161**; cf. gen. popul. .036*), 
and despite the obvious financial pressures of the need to take care of them.  
 
In addition, the unemployed in the higher middle-income quartile (contrasting with the 
general experiences in this quartile) indicates a peculiar drop in satisfaction. This could 
be possibly because unemployment is anyway more uncommon in this group, which 
increases the unexpectedness of the situation; financial obligations could also be more 
burdensome in this group than in the highest income quartile (in which the rare cases of 
unemployment relate to health limitations). Looking at other outcomes, the 
unemployed in the higher middle-income quartile also felt being left out of society 
(.607) much more than in any other quartile, their share of mortgages having fallen (-
.465) and also their trusting the government diminished (-.537). The negative effects of 
unemployment during the crisis in this income quartile are wide—however, none of 
these three effects are statistically significant due to the small size of this group. 
 
Satisfaction also shows interesting level 2 –patterns and it did decrease—not only in 
countries with high bond yields (-.182*, characterising the ‘quantitative’ crisis) but also in 
countries with higher GDP growth (-.167*, the ‘qualitative’ crisis). This further 
supports the idea that satisfaction and wellbeing are not necessarily the only indicators 
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of material growth and income. At the same time, higher level of national debt was 
associated with higher post-crisis satisfaction on average (.222*), suggesting that debt as 
such is not harmful at least in the current economic context. Old age benefits form 
another source of financial obligation that undermines satisfaction.  
 
Focusing on the unemployed and policy, it is interesting that leftist governments should 
be associated with lower post-crisis satisfaction. More importantly, however, the effect 
of leftist government is mitigated by social expenditure (other than health or pensions) 
which contributes to personal satisfaction (.318**) and particularly so among the 
unemployed (.588***). Therefore, given that leftist governments generally favour social 
expenditure, we need to take this combined effect into account when evaluating the 
consequences of the crisis related to parliamentary politics. Conversely, cuts to social 
security undermine satisfaction more than the unemployment-crisis as such. At the 
same time, reflecting the adverse effects of individual economic load and risk, it is 
crucial that personal satisfaction and happiness scores both fell as a result of more 
emphasis on incentive and rehabilitation –related ALMPs.  
Health:	An	Alternative	Entry	to	Wellbeing	
To understand the question of wellbeing beyond happiness and satisfaction, 
Subramanian et al. (2005) recently demonstrated that self-assessed health, at least in the 
US, correlates with income and education at a level comparable to happiness-
assessments. Health-assessments can then serve as an alternative entry to wellbeing.  
 
In the case of EQLS, there were two different variables that I then considered. One is a 
binary variable asking whether one is ‘limited in [one’s] daily activities by [a] physical or 
mental health problem, illness or disability’, whereas the other one is a dimensional self-
assessment score (1 to 10). However, only the binary variable associated with negative 
health does indicate significant crisis-related changes, whereas the self-assessment score 
is only related to pre-crisis differences, and does not resonate with the crisis. Health is 
then not used as a similar, dimensional measure ranging from negative to positive end, 
but instead as a categorical variable focusing on negative effects. 
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Health-limitations indeed grew in all welfare regimes except in the emerging regime 
(Eastern, often Orthodox countries), where such limitations appear to be mitigated if 
not reduced due to post-Soviet transition. Also, when contrasting younger respondents 
with the general population, it is notable that both SAS and EAS appeared to defend 
them, whereas in Nordic and Continental countries health-related effects are even 
stronger among the youth.  
 
Supplementing happiness and satisfaction, the health-issues-variable thus appears to 
depict another important aspect of the crisis. It is particularly associated with the 
quantitative impact of the crisis, whereas economic growth clearly mitigates health-
problems even if not unhappiness or dissatisfaction. Also, national debt and high old 
age dependency ratio are connected to diminished crisis-effects on health. Not the 
qualitative aspects of the crisis any more than demographic tendencies contribute to 
health-limitations in the general population. One of the reasons for this could be that 
health also reflects the institutional organisation of welfare. Poor health then derives 
from the welfare cost hike -axis in the PCA-based multilevel model. Only at extremes 
like in the contexts of Greek austerity the downsizing of health-care results in an age-
independent decrease in health.  
 
However, the health-limitations variable is still a good indicator of the crisis among the 
youth, and focusing on youth largely allows us to ignore the demographic changes 
related to the aging population for example. Among young adults, indeed, it is notable 
that the crisis-effect of unemployment on health is specific to this age group (.555***). 
These effects are further exaggerated among those who live alone and thus lack 
accommodation-related social support. A similar age-discrepancy is also confirmed by 
the unemployed-specific models.  
 
Even if the data does not allow us to specify whether the health-limitations encountered 
by the young unemployed are mental or physical, there is a widespread convention that 
unemployment brings psychological problems in addition to economic ones (Kelvin and 
Jarrett, 1985). Warr (1987) suggests that the negative effect of unemployment on 
psychological well-being could reflect the unpleasant or threatening actions associated 
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with unemployment—not just the psychological and material loss that unemployment 
results in. Interestingly, however, those unemployed young adults who have only 
primary education report fewer health limitations (-1.266**). This suggests that the 
health-related issues encountered by young unemployed specifically relate to the 
education-centred dynamics of the economy. Unemployment might lead them to 
experience ‘loss’ as being related to the desired self-image: Jahoda (1992, 1998) indeed 
argues that work is crucial for forming favourable self-images.  
 
Considering health-limitations in the context of the highly skilled group more 
generally, health-limitations pop-up in all the countries specifically in the highly 
educated group. Supposing that happiness and satisfaction scores do not similarly vary 
between educational groups but are based on the prevalence of higher education in the 
entire context, health limitations indicate that the highly skilled respondents are more 
likely to suffer though not in the way that could reduce the overall satisfaction-
awareness much (unlike for the lower middle-income quartile). Second, health-
limitations indicate that also the lower income quartile has suffered, even if their 
satisfaction-scores do not similarly resonate with the crisis. There are thus latent crisis-
effects invisible in general satisfaction-scores but only those who show clinical 
symptoms make them visible.  
 
But why focus on such negative effects in particular? As discussed above, at least in the 
case of multilevel analysis the problem with happiness and satisfaction scores relates to 
the fact that the method addresses group averages; negative effects of the crisis could be 
evened out by positive ones and remain invisible in the analysis. Literature in personality 
psychology is increasingly confident that positive and negative emotionality are 
orthonormal to each other—they should not be viewed as opposites but as independent 
of each other (e.g., McAdams, 2009). As a measure specific to negative feelings, the 
health limitations –indicator tracks crisis-related difficulties pertinent to some 
respondents with  tertiary education (.277***), and particularly among the youth 
(.232***), even if in terms of satisfaction and happiness the crisis leaves the group 
(average) intact or positively affected.  
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Through	Debt	and	Politics	to	Marginalisation	
Supposing the health-limitations variable depicts the debt crisis as it affects the subjects 
negatively, I asked what available variables could similarly illustrate more positive, 
engaging points of subjectification that, however, should be independent of 
‘introspective’ assessments like happiness. I came up with two candidates: those who 
have acquired mortgage debt and those participating politically. Housing debt indicates 
certain engagement with the debt-crisis, and the changes in the prevalence of mortgages 
are illustrative at least at the level of group-aggregates. In particular, it is plausible to 
assume that those willing to take a new mortgage are not particularly negatively 
affected. Also political participation can be viewed as a  ‘positive’ mode of engagement. 
By this I do not mean agreeableness towards others or good feelings about the crisis, but 
instead the fact that those who do participate that way maintain a positive attitude 
towards their own agency and affluence during the crisis.   
 
Interestingly, the prevalence of mortgages in the reference group has increased during 
the crisis (1.777***). This is even more so in Catholic countries (.665*) and about equally 
so in SAS. In these regions people have thus become more indebted also in their private 
lives. To them, the sovereign-debt crisis has not emerged exactly as a manifestation of  
poverty but it has rather inspired and invited them to partake in the debt-economy.  
 
This might sound quite surprising given how one would assume that economic struggle 
or the stumbling housing market would make home buyers more aversive. One 
explanation, however, could be the recently introduced BASEL III -standards that 
reward banks for mortgage lending, and such lending is also catalysed by the fact that 
banks have looked for alternative places to park their money after the crash in corporate 
loans. Therefore, there has been an ample supply of money for home-buyers—possibly 
more so where the crisis has otherwise been harsh.  
 
Most remarkably this tendency now overshadows the experiences of an increasing 
number of unemployed people (1.400t in the unemployed-specific model), although this 
mainly applies to the Nordic and Continental regimes, not SAS. Mortgages have 
become more prevalent particularly among non-educated unemployed young adults. 
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Young adults with little education also tend to trust government as if somehow 
daydreaming for better times. But any further conclusions are difficult to make given 
the limited data on this group.  
 
In EAS, in contrast, there is no change in the prevalence of home ownership, so the 
debt crisis does not engage the subjects in a similar, ‘positive’ way. No similar financial 
sector exists there, and in the Baltics the Swedish lenders withdrew a big part of their 
funds explaining the depression in the mortgage market there. This supports the idea 
that the supply of money indeed has had a significant impact on the level of housing 
debt. Furthermore, in high-income countries where the housing market is already more 
saturated and where banks have not been as pressed lending to home-buyers (as an 
alternative to corporate loans), no similar effect is visible.  
 
In effect, the crisis has generally contributed to increased housing debt, even among the 
unemployed (except in EAS). Yet, the fact that also many home owners have become 
unemployed suggests that we should not undermine the interaction-effects of housing-
debt and unemployment. Housing-debt is a burden particularly for those who live 
alone. And many of those struggling with a home loan find their jobs quite unsatisfying, 
if they even have a job, and this makes them less happy and less positive about their 
situations. They are then more likely to feel like being left out of society, and they do 
appear to express feelings like disdain and solitude. However, even if housing debt as 
such could prove burdensome, I treat mortgages as indicators of positive engagement 
(this particularly refers to the increase in the number of mortgages in any given group).  
 
Political participation—defined by whether the respondent has attended a meeting of a 
trade union, a political party or political action group over the past 12 months—is 
perhaps easier to justify as a marker of positive engagement: even if expressing negative 
feelings, it reflects positive esteem and belief in agency. It is also quite regular given that 
the context-predictors explain about 74 % of the interclass variance. Political 
engagement is also a marker of economic involvement: high economic participation and 
particularly gender economic participation (GEP) rates predict higher rates of political 
participation especially among young adults and particularly as a result of the crisis.   
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Yet, unlike the involvement in mortgages, political engagement is not similarly a 
function of available liquidity; political engagement has thus been expedited in both 
EAS and SAS (not just the latter). Also, in all the regimes the GDP growth contributes 
to political engagement but not the involvement in the housing market, and social 
expenditure behaves similarly. This suggests that political engagement results as a 
function of available resources, whereas engagement through debt reflects available 
liquidity and credit instead. The importance of economic wellbeing for political 
participation is also visible in group-related differences. Both the unemployed, who lack 
suitable resources, and the young with only primary education seem to be less involved. 
In conclusion, the lack of wealth does not prevent economic engagement but does so to 
political engagement, which in part could explain why the crisis as such does not 
necessarily evoke widespread political representations.   
Marginalisation	and	Affect	
In comparison to happiness and satisfaction, the statistics above demonstrate the 
relevance of less introspective measures that still characterise the subjectivities associated 
with the crisis. This in part stems from the fact that these markers resonate with 
positive and negative engagements separately. However, there are many other, more 
introspective assessments that similarly distinguish between positive or negative aspects. 
These include markers like whether the respondent feels being left out of society, and 
whether or not one is looked down because of the current job.  
  
Starting with the latter indicator, it is meaningful only to employed people. Yet it is 
extremely illustrative of how and in which contexts also the employed have become 
susceptible to crisis. In particular, it appears that marginalisation also characterises the 
employed. Looking at employment-related marginalisation then by occupation groups, 
higher rates are reported in the group of services, sales and clerical support work, which the 
previous part identified as being economically most affected. Job-related shame also 
characterises the low-skilled group, particularly the young.  
 
Context-level differences are, however, more revealing from the point of view of how 
the crisis has catalysed changes in the employment process. Even if in high-income
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countries job-related shame is less likely, in the ‘post-Fordist’, education-intensive 
economies such feelings are more common—possibly because people have had to take 
on jobs below their training. By contrast, higher taxes and high social expenditure 
reduce such negative feelings, whereas non-social expenditure—the more ‘Keynesian’ 
approach to fiscal stimulation—again increases job-related shame. As another policy 
measure, the incentives-based ALMPs have also contributed to job-related shame 
(unlike job-creation), which further supports my previous claim that such ALMPs could 
result in inefficient allocation of labour.  
 
Incentives-based ALMPs have also contributed to another measure of marginalisation:  
the feeling of being left out of society. In fact, this effect grasps context-level differences 
in exclusion incredibly well. In the reference model, such feelings have occurred 
particularly in EAS; this is interestingly the opposite to how job-related shame is more 
intimate in other regimes. This measure is, at the same time, a consistent indicator of 
marginalisation as experienced by the unemployed: the large pre-crisis effect (.932**) 
remained essentially unaffected during the crisis. But, in general, it is remarkable that 
the ‘left out of society’–variable characterises the higher income half possibly more than 
the lower one (though only among the employed).  
 
The low marginalisation-effects in the lower income half of the employed population 
could in part be explained by how the social support –variables regulate the feeling of 
being left outside more than any other block of level 1 variables (their predictive effect is 
even stronger among the unemployed)—in other words low-income earners might 
appear to experience marginalisation for reasons other than mere income. Living with a 
partner for example increases such feelings. Nevertheless, given how economic pressure 
contributes to an inefficient allocation of work, exclusion typically results from the 
combination of living alone and housing debt, or the obligation to take care of one’s 
parents. 
 
The feeling of being left out is therefore not exactly a measure of isolation or 
detachment, but it rather indicates the lack of broader recognition of responsibilities and 
social needs. In contrast, employment insecurity is not a proper predictor of the feeling 
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of exclusion, even if temporary young workers are associated with health limitations and 
the lower prevalence of home ownership: they are affected in a way different from 
marginalisation.  
 
On the country-level, there is a similar story as with job-related shame: economic 
growth (-.382**), national debt (-.627***, -1.350*** × GDP) and social expenditure (-
.713***) make people less likely to feel left out, whereas this form of self-reported 
marginalisation increases as a function of higher old age dependency ratio (.401***), 
non-social expenditure (.604***) and GINI (.534***), as well as a reactionary change 
towards leftist policy (indicating previous uneasiness). If higher life expectancy gap in 
turn diminishes such feelings, it could be because the gender gap being wide men tend 
to externalise, seeking other sources of engagement even if this puts their lives at risk.  
 
Furthermore, I will address negative and positive affectivity, which are additional axes 
produced by the same principal component analysis used to define the personal 
satisfaction score. In comparison to the above, quite disparate indicators of the crisis, 
these variables come closer to the notions cultivated in personality psychology. For this 
reason they are also quite stable, often argued to reflect developmental or even genetic 
differences in temperament. This is also visible by the fact that neither one of these two 
outcomes is significantly moderated by level 1 –predictors. On the context-level it also 
appears that differences do not relate to one side of affectivity in particular but instead 
to both: for example high social expenditure suppresses both negative and positive 
affectivity.  
 
However, it is notable that even if most of the considered effects hardly discriminate 
between the two measures, the interclass variances differ. The economic and equality 
predictors of the standard model better describe the variation in positive affectivity. 
Negative affectivity in contrast might have more to do with policy rather than 
economics: its variation is better described by the ALMPs-based model instead 
(increase in incentives and rehabilitation in particular have contributed to negative 
affectivity during the crisis), whereas positive affectivity remains contingent to the 
ALMPs-model.  
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In addition, there is one remarkable indication that the contents of economic controversy 
shape different reactions to affectivity: negative affectivity increases due to the public 
finance crisis axis (PAF1: .129*), whereas positive affectivity decreases because of higher 
fiscal crisis scores instead (PAF2: -.072***). Notoriously, a similar contrast is visible in 
terms of employment: in addition to positive affectivity, employment declines for fiscal 
crisis (-.160***), whereas unemployment and negative affectivity both increase for public 
finance crisis (.383***). Affects (and employment) thus project differently along the two 
axes, and it appears that economics and politics regulate the crisis in ‘psycho-socially’ 
different ways. This is so even if the effects of these changes in affectivity appear to be 
similar in terms of economic subsistence (both negative affectivity and lack of positive 
affectivity make people deprived).  
 
To conclude, it appears that crisis-related effects on subjective assessments and in 
various negative attitudes are modest but also often quite consistent. They are, however, 
much more contingent in respect to the considered level 2 –predictors than the positive 
feelings and feelings of sufficiency, which characterise the most ‘economic’ aspects about 
the crisis instead. Indeed, these variables are important to the so-called ‘economic 
affects’ as constructed in the next chapter, whereas in the case of negative attitudes we 
are likely to discover something else: internalisation (health-issues), inner-directedness 
(unhappiness), marginalisation and withdrawal. The latter two reflect the feelings of 
exclusion, but in two different ways: what we operationalise as marginalisation depicts 
experiences of both high-income quartiles and those in more vulnerable social positions. 
  
Trust	and	Tensions:	From	the	Individual	to	the	Social	
Above, I have discussed a variety of rather different indicators of how people are 
subjected to the debt-crisis in a relevant way, and reflecting life as an individual (e.g., 
happiness, satisfaction, health but also political participation, housing debt as well as the 
feelings of exclusion). These have been categorised based on whether they reflect 
‘positive’ or ‘negative’ engagements. But the ‘left out of society’ –variable indicates not 
only negative engagement but something more pervasive: the absence of involvement. In 
the context of the crisis this means that the feeling of being left outside not only stands 
 218 
for the negative experiences of individual withdrawal but that marginalisation also 
indicates social detachment—a distinction that will be confirmed by the MCA-analysis 
in the next chapter. 
 
There are also a few variables that depict positive engagements on the level of social 
representations, not just based on individual actions. In particular, the construction of 
crisis-thinking is articualted from two different perspectives: trust in the institutional 
system and in the national government and the recognition of tensions (namely social, 
age-related and ethnic)42. Two of the variables—institutional trust and social tensions—
are sum variables (normally distributed), whereas the others are (recoded as) binary ones 
studied by logistic regression. Level 2 –predictors reduce the interclass contingency of 
the sum-variables, whereas the three binary variables are of specific interest. In relation 
to institutional trust, half of the variation is explained by financial indicators, and 
economic, policy and equality -variables reduce the original variation down to 20 %. 
Social tensions, in contrast,  mirror differences in the welfare regime, thus complementing 
the picture from another point of view.  
Illusion	and	Ignorance	
Starting with institutional trust and the specific trust in government –variables, they 
appear similarly distributed, even if the differences in the latter are more pronounced. In 
both cases, there is a strong slide in SAS (-1.018***, -1.817***) and in the Eastern 
contexts (-1.496***, -3.466***), even if Catholic culture counteracts these tendencies 
(.761***, 2.256***). They also agree in terms of GDP, GDP growth, and bond yields. In 
particular, in countries high in GDP the reported trust was so high before the crisis 
(.620***, 1.001***) that it has been impossible to keep up with the same level (-.325***, -
.786***); a similar reduction of high pre-crisis trust is visible in terms of equality-
predictors.  
 
Previously, I identified the countries with a high number of people with tertiary 
education—the ‘post-Fordist economies’—as susceptible to unhappiness, dissatisfaction 
and job-related shame. Furthermore, those with tertiary education themselves have 
more health problems (general: .232***, unemployed: .144), have seen taken fewer 
mortgages or sold homes (general: -.237***; unemployed: -.979***).   
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However, respondents in the countries where their number is high are more trusting.  
Reflecting similar disunity regarding perceptions, young adults with high education seem 
to be more satisfied (general: .118; unemployed: .197), they are less likely to feel being 
left out of society (general: -.175; unemployed: -.633), and they are more likely to trust 
in the government (general: .144; unemployed: .144)—quite peculiar findings given 
how young adults generally suffer in the countries, where the share of higher education 
is large.  
 
Similar discrepancies seem to result also from differences in the level of social 
expenditure, which contributes to employment and engagement (with the crisis), while 
mitigating marginalisation and withdrawal. In such countries, however, general trust 
still appears to be abated (–.723***). What best explains differences in general and 
governmental trust-variables on the individual level is unemployment: those lacking a 
job are distrusting specifically towards the government. Certain forms of social 
expenditure like unemployment benefits can in part mitigate this effect. But the 
unemployment-related political distrust is also mitigated by high bond yields: the public 
finance crisis is generally perceived as justifying the inability of the government to tackle 
unemployment.  
 
General trust and the trust in the government also differ among the young but in 
different directions than how the unemployed feel: the young are more likely to trust in 
the government but they score like older adults in terms of institutional trust. 
Governmental trust is further heightened among those young adults who lack a job and 
live with their parent—this is important because it previously appeared that parents as 
providers of social support have not defended this group from deprivation and other 
material effects of the crisis. However, parents’ low-income status reverts this effect, 
resulting in an extremely low trust in the government (-1.483**) and high likelihood of 
the feeling of detachment (.961*). In effect, suspended or reverted domestic transitions 
of some sort could occur as a reaction to the crisis in this group, but again it does not 
defend them from economically harmful effects (given the low income of such parents). 
Also, it is notorious that the young unemployed do not indicate opposition towards the 
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government unlike their older peers. This undermines their capacity to translate their 
difficulties into any pervasive political movement (also see Chapter 9).  
 
Acting	Out		
Sometimes, but not always, trust could then emerge as a phenomenon opposite to social 
tensions. For example, those responsible for paying either rent or mortgage used to be 
less likely of trusting in the government but they are now more trusting—this also 
applies to the unemployed-specific population. At the same time, they are much less 
likely of recognising age-related (or ethnic) tensions (-1.268**). Of course, in part this is 
explained by the composition-effect: those encountering the most exaggerated 
consequences of the crisis have likely moved out or at least not adopted new mortgages. 
Anyway, given also the vast drop in the recognition of tensions, the data at least shows 
that there is no clear movement against governments and towards the representations of 
social conflict among those paying for their own housing. 
 
However in other cases, like among the youth, it is possible that the higher trust is 
coupled with higher or unaltered tensions. In the general working age population, the 
slight decrease in trust is coupled with simultaneous fall in social tensions—particularly 
those related to age (-.500**).  On the other hand, in comparison to other tensions, 
those related to age are low among the youth—an interesting finding given the 
heightened effect of the crisis on youth, but that then indicates no more political than 
general social arousal. Instead, it is the unemployed who are more likely of ‘acting out’ 
the crisis, even if less so among the young. This is so regardless of whether they trust in 
the government or not. Such externalising versus recognising patterns of conflict are 
higher also for those living alone. In effect, the lack of social support could be one of the 
sources of crisis-related social conflict.  
 
Level 2 –models are not entirely comparable between different outcomes: for example 
the ethnic tension-models did not converge when including both welfare and religion-
predictors simultaneously. However, it generally appears that age-related tensions 
(.691**) and in part social tensions have increased in SAS (.168; and in Catholic, .306*), 
whereas all tension-variables have decreased in EAS. On the other hand, high GINI 
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countries indicate lower tensions, possibly because people are more accustomed to 
inequality.  
 
Similar patterns could explain the lack of tensions in EAS. However, there is 
polarisation between younger and older cohorts there, even if this is invisible on the 
level of general social tensions. In particular, the increase in ethnic tension (.305*) and 
age-related tensions tell about the particularly unsettling position of young adults in 
EAS. Furthermore, they fail to articulate their vulnerabilities by positioning themselves 
in economic terms—for example in respect to the worker–employer or the poor–rich -
relationships. It does then appear that the economic crisis is still overshadowed by 
experiences of the post-Soviet transition even, and especially, among the young (e.g., 
Fóti et al 2005; Baranowska et al., 2011).  
 
If age-related tensions, at least in part, indicate recognition of inter-generational conflict, 
ethnic tensions can in contrast be taken as signs of projective and ‘externalising’ ways for 
‘acting out’ the crisis—especially so given that the level of immigration in most Eastern 
countries is low. Similar externalising reactions are exaggerated in countries with high 
bond yields (.303***) if the GDP is at the same time high (1.142***). The recognition of 
age-related tensions in contrast results from high GDP growth but also from centre-
right government or low life expectancy rates. This indicates that respondents in the  
‘qualitative’ crisis-cluster might be more concerned about age-related issues even if 
unemployment itself is still more modest there among the youth.  
 
Social tensions are also important from the point of view of policy and particularly 
ALMPs. It appears that generally ALMPs tend to alleviate social (-.302*) and age-
related tensions (-.528***); increase in public job creation further reduces such tensions 
during the crisis (-.265***, -.500***)—it is at least a symbolic even if macro-economically 
ineffective way for governments to address the unemployment crisis. The general effect 
of ALMPs is, however, undone in the case of incentives and rehabilitation. In contrast, 
the individualising and responsibilising policies are likely to be associated with 
conflicts—either by causing them or by reflecting the general atmosphere that makes 
individual-focused policies more likely.  
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The	Unemployed:	Internalising	and	Externalising	Patterns	of	Conflict	
Let me now consider conflicts and tension as they specifically occur among the 
unemployed. I also emphasise age-related differences in this group. Even if the young in 
EAS ‘act out’ in ‘externalising’ ways as indicated by ethnic projections, youth 
unemployment in general is associated with more ‘internalising’ patterns—resulting for 
example in health limitations (which among the youth is often mental or 
psychosomatic). Tertiary education further increases the likelihood of such internalising 
reactions—those young adults previously in highly skilled jobs but now jobless at the 
same time experience more likely the feeling of being left out and withdrawal.  
 
On the context-level, externalisation and ethnic tensions characterise unemployment 
only in the Nordic and Continental countries, but not in SAS and EAS. The youth-
specific effects are, however, positive in SAS and EAS indicating that the crisis affects 
the socialisation processes in this direction. The public finance crisis (bond yields) 
further induces externalising reactions among the unemployed43, explaining for example 
the success of the far-right nationalist Golden Dawn party in Greece. But similarly as it 
is important to consider positive and negative affectivity as separate variables, also the 
internalising, externalising, and affirmative engagements are complementary and can 
coexist in any single group. Reactions to unemployment are often opposite among the 
younger and the older groups however.  
 
Again, the ‘post-Fordist’ contexts with a high share of those with tertiary education 
point at the same direction: in these countries the competition for skilled jobs is high 
and the unemployed have generally become more aware of ethnic tensions (1.993***; 
general model .167*)—and even more so among the young (1.127***; general model 
.227***). This is the case even if ethnic minorities and migrants the most often represent 
lower educational backgrounds and are unlikely to compete with the skilled labour force. 
That in turn supports my interpretation that in the context of the unemployment crisis 
the increase in ethnic tensions reflects projective behaviours resulting in 
misidentification of the economic struggle.  
 
 223 
Has	Growth	Become	Anti-Social?	
Even if the crisis has increased unemployment and deprivation in general (the odds of 
unemployment have nearly doubled in almost all the contexts) there are various ways in 
which people react to this situation: from the psycho-social perspective we can talk 
about externalising or internalising patterns of conflict, and both affects are involved in 
what I previously called negative affectivity. On the positive side, it is possible that the 
crisis also results in more constructive and affirmative approaches to social recognition. 
But as illustrated by political participation, these positive engagements, however, appear 
to require substantial economic resources—both material means and hope that are more 
likely available in high GDP contexts or where expenditure on social protection is high.  
 
However, economic resources alone do not explain why some people rather than others 
take an agentive role in the crisis. For example, those with tertiary education are likely 
to have better access to various forms of economic and cultural ‘capital’, but their 
experiences of the crisis are still overshadowed by health limitations and other 
‘internalising’ experiences instead of experiences evoking widespread political 
engagement. Even so, in countries where the highly trained young form a majority—
where a ‘critical’ mass of education-related issues are encountered—externalising 
representations are also present. In contrast inner orientations are typical and apply also 
to those with at most primary education or those representing lower middle-income 
quartiles. Therefore, it is particularly among the more educated that more collective 
representations of conflict tend to arise. 
 
Looking at the group with tertiary education more closely, the people in this group can 
be seen as being clearly more deprived in EAS and SAS. In SAS there is little or slight 
increase in more endorsing and acknowledging social representations about the crisis, 
whereas EAS is much more dispersed44. But most remarkably, it is particularly in the 
Nordic and Continental regimes that the highly trained young have become much less 
affirmative and more indifferent and externalising—again this indicates the experiences 
of the ‘qualitative’ crisis cluster even if the members of this group are not as materially 
deprived as the others. Externalisation and ethnic tensions also characterise those in 
insecure, fixed term jobs, or more generally the young, employed people in Slovenia, 
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Bulgaria, Greece, Cyprus, Portugal and Ireland. The question of externalising 
representations is therefore a good indicator of the tensions between youth and adult 
employment.  
 
However, perhaps the most remarkable conclusion of this chapter relates to the 
somewhat counterintuitive effect of the GDP growth on both trust- and tension-
variables: more prosperous economies are overshadowed by distrusts and tensions. This 
parallels the deprivation-related effects (fifth chapter), which are twice as strong among 
the youth. And there are many other examples: even if GDP growth has slightly 
contributed to employment and lower unemployment, as discussed in the previous 
chapter, it has simultaneously contributed to general deprivation and social exclusion. 
Employment and national income, therefore, do not as such save from the experiences 
of economic deprivation.  
 
These findings suggest that the quality of growth during the crisis has been somewhat 
counter- or even anti-social: in the countries where the economies have managed to 
grow it has actually undermined trust and contributed to generational and ethnic 
tensions. Also the length of recession –variable, another indicator of stagnation, 
illustrates similar results. Growth during the crisis, if it exists, is characteristically non-
social, and the benefits of social expenditure both to well-being and employment are 
seldom realised. Non-social government expenditure itself appears to contribute to 
deprivation and social exclusion but it also has a negative effect on satisfaction, 
employment-integrity, inclusion and so fort.  
 
Therefore, the direction of the economy is clear: contrary to Kuznets’ assumption, 
economic growth does not seem to reduce polarisation and social tensions. By contrast, 
in the countries where growth stalls, stagnation could result in integrative experiences 
and the feelings of communality, again contributing to trust and mitigating tensions (at 
least elsewhere than in EAS or where the bond rates are extreme). This discrepancy of 
the effects of different types of expenditure also highlights the need to assess whether 
the supply side labour market policy makes fiscal stimulation efficient, and whether 
governments should emphasise social rather than material investment. 
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Chapter	8	
In	the	Midst	of	Affect—The	Un-	and	the	Underemployed	Young	 	
 
 
The past three chapters have been empirically focused, even if I have drawn on a broad 
range of literatures on work, employment and welfare. Above all, these literatures have 
guided the choice of variables, whereas the main emphasis has been on testing their 
applicability and the role of, say, public expenditure, inequality, and the changing nature 
of employment in framing a variety of crisis-outcomes (e.g., perceived and reported 
distress, deprivation, and unemployment).  However, the use of multilevel methodology 
itself has been governed by several more theoretical questions and discussions, which the 
previous analysis has implicitly assumed. They relate particularly to the question of 
economic causation—a theme I have sought to address critically in the context of available 
data.  
 
Multilevel models are often articulated in terms of causes (predictors) and consequences 
(outcomes). Utilising such notions in the context of economic deprivation makes my 
work partake not only in economic sociology but also in econometrics (loosely defined), 
which often applies similar regression models as means of a ‘quantitative analysis of 
actual economic phenomena based on the concurrent development of theory and 
observation, related by appropriate methods of inference’ (Samuelson et al., 1954: 142). 
In this regard, I use the methods rather to criticise and falsify certain assumptions about 
economic inference that lack clear empirical support. These include statements about, 
for example, the positive contribution of economic growth on perceived and experienced 
equality and well-being. These associations were largely based on Kuznets’ controversial 
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and historically restricted evidence (Piketty, 2014a), or about the micro-economic 
assumption about the ‘rationality’ of economic agency. As a constricting paradigm, such 
theories of action could actually undermine more voluntary and contingent perspectives 
on agency.  
 
A viable sociology must instead frame economic agency as an empirical, embodied 
concept rather than explaining behaviour based on any given representation of action. 
As mentioned earlier, following Schumpeter’s distinction sociology has then 
traditionally leaned towards discourses ‘of the economy’ rather than those focusing ‘on 
the economic’ which concerns efficiency instead (see Roitman 2006: 3 ct. 4). At the 
same time, sociology questions whether the principle of causation can be similarly 
extracted from the principles of natural science as in economic sciences (see Hands, 
2001). Of course, causal inferences are applied particularly in quantitative social 
mobility research (Savage, 1997), and in the context of the current crisis there are three 
principal causally oriented questions (O’Reilly et al., 2011: 581–582): (1) the specificity 
of the crisis in relation to other downturns, (2) the causal mechanism that leads to the 
crisis and (3) the long-term implications.  
 
The previous part considered at least the latter two questions from the point of view of 
welfare and state expenditure, though in general, of course, a comparative as such is not 
suitable for causal argumentation stricto sensu: it can never exhaustively confirm causal 
inferences as they depend on ‘other things equal’ (ceteris paribus) arguments. In real life, 
it is not possible to control for or manipulate social and economic predictors between 
nation-states as free variables (cf. Kincaid, 1996; also Bourdieu, 2004). Other than using 
empirical evidence to falsify certain causal beliefs—as I have done in the previous part—
comparative sociology must then either rely on other, conceptual grounds, or it can 
focus on processes that do not project causation to the object of study.  
 
But now it is time to turn into the first question: how to locate the crisis in a way that 
makes it specific in comparison with others; what is its ‘essence’? Already in the previous 
part I argued for a ‘phenomenological’ approach to the crisis: to consider it as the 
‘totality of its effects’ rather than seeking to pin down and identify its exact causes. As I 
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explained in Chapter 4, I have then considered a whole network of models, often 
interchanging between outcomes and predictors. Causal connections still play a role in 
the analysis, but these links are not used to explain the crisis itself but rather the way in 
which it evolved and as it is was spoken through those links. At the same time, the crisis 
refers to how various modes of causation change or are eluded. 
 
This chapter thus frames the problem alternatively, examining broader representations 
of economic and social wellbeing. I will first discuss the theoretical background behind 
the sociological applications of multiple correspondence analysis, focusing on Bourdieu’s 
work in particular. I will then operationalise these methods in the context of the crisis. 
Finally, I will discuss the relevance of the results from the point of view of the economic 
socialisation of youth.   
From	Cumulative	to	Circular	Structures	of	Causation	
What makes the ‘logics’ of the crisis, that is, any attempt to econometrically identify its 
true causes and consequences, particularly elusive? The answer relates to the hierarchy 
between causes and consequences, that is, to the attempts to control the way in which 
the past defines the present—as actions turn into reactions. But it is not clear that the 
‘causal’ frames through which the crisis itself is spoken should be cumulative or 
hierarchical. The very idea that the economy is ‘performed’ by certain discourses and 
techniques subscribes to the idea of circular causation. Similarly, for example Pierre 
Bourdieu (1988) describes the different structures of ‘capital’ instead as they emerge in 
and through themselves, referring to circular or auto-affirmative processes that validate 
their own existence. Social capital, for example, provides people with access to resources 
(but also obligations) that in turn can be used in the formation of further networks. 
Needless to say how Marx’s definition of ‘capital’ as a process based on monetary 
exchange is similarly circular (M → C → M). 
 
Cycle theories (of the economy) illustrate these circular phenomena at a historically 
broader scale. Despite the real business cycle theory, cyclical approaches to the economy 
are, however, somewhat unconventional and lack general acceptance. Richard Meegan 
(1988, 163) suggests that it is possible to think that Britain, for example, would 
currently live through the era coloured by neo-Fordism or flexible specialisation—this 
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would be another long cycle following the four grand cycles defined by the industrial 
revolution, the rise of continental industry, the Imperialist expansion and the post-war 
boom. Economists do not ignore these processes as such but contest the regularity of 
such cyclic oscillations: whether some form of periodicity adequately predicts historically 
occurring cycles or whether they are just random. Economic historians and generational 
theorists have instead suggested longer cycles lasting for about 60 (Kondratieff) or 90 
years (Strauss and Howe).  Even if any of these theories held true, in the context of the 
current crisis it is, however, unclear whether different national contexts should exhibit 
synchronous or parallel cycles.  
 
This is why I put little emphasis on the, as such, interesting question about the 
relevance of the current crisis to cyclical theories and generational change. Instead, it is 
pivotal to understand that the rhythms and crises are part of social life—on both 
individual and national scales (cf. Durkheim, 2001). First, from the Marxist perspective 
it could be said that there are ‘cyclical imbalances in the supply of and demand for 
capital equipment in production’, as Marshall (1987, 19) echoes Jay Forrester45. Other 
classics like Simmel (2004: 504) view cyclicality from the life-world-perspective: ‘change 
in monetary circumstances brings about a change in the pace of life’. Or, like the 
Philosophy of Money suggests, ‘life's contents advance and recede’ in ways ‘strengthening 
or weakening of the periodicity of life' (Simmel 2004, 491). Following Massey (1988), 
in turn, sociology can benefit by representing the cycles of both production and the life-
world at a geographical level (also Marshall, 1987).  
 
Bourdieu’s theory of ‘capital’ is one attempt to frame such processes in a way addressing 
individuals. In other words, by defining the structures of ‘capital’ as being inherently 
circular, Bourdieu seeks to resolve the conflict between structure and agency—the past 
and the present—which could also be phrased as the ‘space of experience’ and the 
‘horizon of expectations’ separated during crises (Koselleck, 2004: 275). This problem is 
similar to that of historians, who cannot 'add up to what actually happened’ but can only 
‘recognise retrospectively the web of references into which the acting humans have been 
spun’ (Hoffmann, 2010: 230).  
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Aggregating	Affects		
Multiple correspondence analysis then provides one way to tackle this endless circularity 
of action, something fixed enough for locating action and also crises. It is one way to 
frame the ‘dialectic’ problem in a way that is still historically relevant, something 
reasonable but in a way avoiding the pitfalls of the materially determinist reading typical 
of economics. It allows us to frame how the past shapes the present but in a way 
sufficiently contingent to permit individual choice and freedom.  
 
The answer to the dilemma thus draws in part from methodology. Yet, what is also 
crucial is my decision to focus on individual experiences and affects even when they are 
used as a basis for aggregating the effects of the crisis at the collective level as well. In 
psychology, indeed, it is now assumed that the action-perception networks are 
themselves circular so that there is no straightforward hierarchy between the two.  
 
Therefore, this ‘dialectic’ problem of action is not just a social one but it is hardwired on 
the level of our material existence. In psychology these wirings have often been 
approached by the cognitivist paradigm: that the syntheses between perception 
(occipital and parietal lobes) and action (controlled primarily by the frontal lobe) should 
be viewed as ‘cognitions’. But psychology is now giving away to a more emotionally 
oriented perspective (Brosch et al., 2013). These so-called ‘emotions’ not only 
accumulate the dilemma of action-perception networks in neuronal circuits instead of 
being localised in any single part of the brain (these ‘circuits’ in turn stand out as 
material correlates of for example language or senso-motoric action-mirror networks: 
see Pulvermüller and Fadiga, 2010; Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia, 2010); they affect those 
circuits and make them meaningful.  
 
Philosophy, in turn, refers to affect rather than emotions in shaping the dilemma 
between actions and perceptions. Affects can reflect faith and confidence, which are 
definitive to our ‘power to act’ according to Blaise Pascal and William James, but also 
discontent, doubt and indifference that imply more reactive or adverse orientations. Any 
affect thus involves at least two things. It refers to action, which from an existential 
point of view is an intentional, ‘free’ project expressed in practices or ‘strategies explicitly 
 230 
oriented by reference to end’—a project able to effect its own purpose. Against this 
background, Pierre Bourdieu (1990: 42) credits Sartre for an ‘ultra-consistent 
formulation’ of action, that is, an ‘antecedent-less confrontation between the subject and 
the world’. In particular, this means that affect does not manifest deterministically, as 
directly implied by the world within which action is immersed. At the same time, 
however, action is only possible ‘by reference to the anticipated reactions of other 
agents’, which brings Bourdieu closer to Max Weber’s action as a manifestation of social 
intention. 
 
We could then say that the problem is all about how those material correlates of the 
action-perception-dilemma become assembled in society. Any single structure of 
capital, like Bourdieu's structural constructivism defines them, might not avoid the risk 
of economisation. But the art of social distinction, in Bourdieu’s case, emerges from the 
amalgam of the structures of capital. Bourdieu (1986: 241) defines ‘capital’ as 
‘accumulated labour’ not as something purely ‘objective’ or ‘subjective’, but instead by 
referring to a variety of ‘fields’ and ‘microcosms’ including the meta-categories of the 
‘economic’, ‘cultural’ and ‘social’. Echoing also some systems-theoretical perspectives, 
each form of capital justifies itself and encodes its own telos. Yet action becomes 
meaningful precisely as people habituate and are able to strategically alternate between 
various ends. 
 
To us, in turn, it is the variety of emotions that the crisis brings together, yet still 
guiding their ‘motions’ differently. They are not similarly ‘exchanged’ as in the case of 
Bourdieu’s forms of capital. Instead, rather than focusing on individual intentions, we 
are interested in the crisis itself as a contingent, open process during which a variety of 
ends are combined. The crisis itself results from practices with a variety of ends—e.g., 
deprivation, disdain, but also sympathy—and they are identified by methods 
comparable to those Bourdieu used. These ends are ‘free’ in a sense that they are not 
implied by the erroneous techniques of quantitative finance but historically contingent.  
 
Following the revival of interest towards more emotionally based views on action, I have 
then labelled these alternative embeddings of action-perception networks relevant to the 
 231 
crisis as its affects. Affectivity also quite well captures the fact that the reciprocity 
between means and ends, reactions and intentions, is itself mobile. This is the case 
particularly during crises, when affects are redrawn if not rephrased. Even if not 
considering the crisis itself as a (singular) actor, the crisis stands for the way in which 
agents are moved—affects put them in ‘bad faith’ (reactive) but they are also being used 
by them (active).  
 
It is crucial to my approach that each modality of affect (e.g., accommodation and 
marginalisation) can serve in both of the two roles. For example, quantitative finance 
actively produced the crisis from the governmental perspective, but finance could also be 
viewed as a superstructure reacting to more rooted framings of the economy. There are 
then two ends to each affect. They are illustrated by the two labels situated at the 
opposite ends of any single axis. Both of these ends can be articulated as active (and 
reactive) processes.  
 
Mapping	Out	the	Crisis	
But how to best map the affects and bridge the individual and society in a way relevant 
to how the crisis-outcomes aggregate in different groups and contexts? This is not only 
an epistemological problem, but concerns more fundamental questions about social 
ontology: how should we contextualise economic struggle in order to best describe social 
mobility and change during the crisis? How should we perceive the crisis outcomes, and 
how are these transformed into actual sources of action?  
 
To answer these questions, I use multiple correspondence analysis (MCA), which was 
already applied in the context of the Eurobarometer data in Chapter 3 and again in 
framing the five qualities of work in Chapter 6. Pierre Bourdieu (e.g., 1984, 1988) is 
one of the first scholars who brought the method to sociology in order to identify and 
aggregate structures of ‘capital’ or social ‘distinctions’ and particularly as a way to 
combine ‘objective structures’ of capital with more subjectively oriented, ‘incorporated 
structures of the habitus’ (Savage and Silva, 2013: 113). In effect, Bourdieu 
conceptualises the axes identified by multiple correspondence analysis based on his 
‘structural constructionist’ viewpoint; the structures of ‘capital’ are referred to as 
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embodying self-referential and yet cumulative processes of accumulation that foster 
their own conditions of existence similarly as the MCA aggregates the axes of maximal 
‘inertia’ (Appendix 9).  
 
Even if we are interested in the structures of the crisis rather than of those directly 
linked to more stable environments of capital, these axes bear actual and real power in 
society as Bourdieu (1986) argues; the accumulation of labour can be considered as a 
process of ‘transubstantiation’, that is, as inertia becomes recognised in social structure 
and interactions. The method itself, however, only depicts the distribution of such 
powers, whereas their identification and interpretation is a sociological challenge. 
 
Against this background, I have been asked how exactly I have operationalised the 
different affects like sympathy or disdain—what precisely they come down to. There is 
no straightforward answer, however. MCA-axes are methodological, ‘synthetic’ 
constructs that are emergent from data in a sense that they combine hundreds of 
response categories and the axes of inertia are identified only in retrospect. We could 
thus say that the axes themselves are phenomena to be explained; they do not as such 
explain anything but help identify differences and similarities in respect to both the 
structure and dynamics of the ‘field’.   
 
Yet the MCA-method itself is also about classifying such modes of recognition and 
about linearising formatively non-linear data (thus ‘resolving’ the circular, dialectical 
processes). The methodology, indeed, constructs a link between the circular or curved 
ontology behind ‘capital’ (or affect) with what is cumulative and thus may be considered 
in terms of accumulation (or effect in the case of a crisis). The method is, at one and the 
same time, a way to abstract historical contingencies and a way to identify patterns 
structuring these contingencies as ideal types. If Bourdieu has been blamed for 
economising the picture, it reflects the fact that the Cartesian scalar fields provided by 
the MCA-method constitute the way in which fields and contingency are allowed to 
become pictured. Characterised as ‘battlefields’ like Bourdieu (1993: 148-150) himself 
describes, they assume a stable set of ‘latent, potential forces which play upon any 
particle which may venture into it’.  
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There are three implications to be drawn about this point. First, to Bourdieu’s credit, by 
referring to the field as a ‘battlefield’ especially in the contexts of ‘cultural’ and ‘social 
capital’, he recognised the negative and normative aspects better than many other 
theorists of ‘social capital’ (e.g., Putnam, 2001). Of course, when it comes to ‘economic 
capital’ Bourdieu (1986) roughly equates it with money and himself fails to grasp the 
negative aspects of indebtedness, even if in this respect his recent work on Social 
Structures of the Economy is more insightful (Bourdieu, 2005).  
 
Second, the field metaphor might turn out to be restrictive both conceptually and 
methodologically. Bourdieu (2004: 116) characterises the field as if providing a ’God 
view’ or as a ’view from nowhere and everywhere’. Such a perspective is not only 
epistemologically ‘overarching’ (cf. Boltanski, 2012), but he hardly compares the 
emergence of fields across spatially or temporally different sites (see also Savage and 
Silva, 2013). It has thus been suggested that similar methods could be applied cross- or 
‘transnational’ comparisons (Nowicka, 2013; Nukaga, 2013), following Bourdieu’s 
(2005: 223) own recognition of the need to transgress  ‘from the national to the 
international field’.  
 
Third, the use of multiple correspondence analysis could also be applied to study social 
change—the ‘dynamics of the field’—instead of assuming the so-called ‘dispositions’ to 
be static (Bottero and Crossley, 2011; Beer, 2013). From this point of view, Bourdieu’s 
own fields are not only isolated but flat constructions. Without a more dynamic 
perspective, a field depicts no force of gravity or gradient to avow for social cohesion 
(Hage, 2011).  In other words, each position in the field could reflect the ‘accumulation’ 
of work (capital) only as a stable, dimensionless process. In contrast, by depicting these 
positions as temporal vectors rather than as field-invariances, it becomes possible to 
identify contrary and reverted processes and transitions.  
 
MCA could then serve as a viable approach to the so-called ‘cultural diffusion models’ 
in economic sociology, that is, to view change, temporality and mobility in a more 
heterogenic fashion than what Bourdieu’s original use allows (see Trigg et al., 2008). 
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Drawing from a physical analogue on field dynamics, Bourdieu himself applies the 
‘field’ metaphor in the sense of a scalar field, dominated by Cartesian representation. I, 
instead, approach the crisis as a vector field, representing it rather as a dynamical system, 
while seeking to grasp what is emergent from or even in excess of scalar representations.  
 
Given these concerns, I depict different groups and contexts at two points of time, 
2007/2008 and 2011/2012, and then draw vectors between them to indicate the crisis as 
a flow field rather than as a scalar field. I also compared them across countries to account 
for the ‘transnational’ aspects of habitus (Nowicka, 2013; Nukaga, 2013). I have no 
knowledge of whether MCA has been applied in combination with the flow field 
paradigm previously. To make the findings compatible with the classification used in 
the multilevel models, in all the graphics the blue arrows represent Nordic and 
Continental countries, the yellow arrows Southern and Anglo-Saxon countries, and the 
red arrows stand for Eastern countries. In most cases the vectors related to young adults 
were drawn with darker colour than those representing the older adults. This is to make 
it easier to distinguish between the two groups.  
 
 
Constructing	the	Axes—A	Methodological	Note	
In the context of other data (EWCS, Eurobarometer), as I have illustrated before, I 
used MCA on several different blocks of variables in order to produce analyses with the 
most coherent and comprehensible axes of inertia. In this chapter, in contrast, the idea 
is to consider all previously discussed (categorical) crisis-outcomes in the EQLS data. 
Based on all 18 to 64 year-olds respondents, the first five axes stood out based on the 
discrimination measures (a figure indicating whether respondents on any given variable 
are best discriminated by what particular MCA-axis). Based on conceptual and semiotic 
considerations, I have reported the plots for three different planes (dimensions 1 × 2, 1 × 
3 and 4 × 5). The construction variables as well as the resulting axes of inertia are listed 
in Appendix 5.  
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The constructs themselves remain abstract, of course, until they are retrospectively 
interpreted. As the next section illustrates, I applied plots similarly as Bourdieu did, 
mapping out all of the variables used in the construction of MCA-axes (Figures 20 to 
22). In fact, the construction-variables do not specify the year of response, so the axes 
are assumed to reflect economic and social struggle in general—the crisis is instead 
articulated precisely as a flow-field along these axes. Furthermore, SPSS enables 
plotting also variables not used in the construction itself, and I further included other 
variables like age, gender, occupation, education, happiness index etc. Sometimes they 
were helpful in identifying the results and refining the picture of the crisis (e.g., poor 
health and low happiness in identifying the difference between internalising and inner 
directed orientations).  
 
In contrast to Bourdieu’s practical use of the method, my MCA-analysis is based on a 
combination of objective (e.g., unemployment, deprivation) and subjective (e.g., 
recognition of age-related tensions, feelings of exclusion) indicators of the crisis. In 
addition, I do not restrict myself only to the first two or three axes, and I also use 
semiotic insight to problematise the identification of the axes and to better understand 
both positive and negative forms of affect (e.g., sufficiency and deprivation as two 
different reflections of what Bourdieu takes as ‘economic’ qualities and thus equals). 
Even if MCA-axes themselves are abstract, mathematical constructs, the identification 
task is a qualitative exercise at least on the level of groups and contexts.  
 
In specific plots, the country-identifier was recoded by age in order to compare young 
and older adults with each other on a country-wise basis. I also plotted predictors from 
level 1 and 2 separately in order to illustrate the affects at multiple levels46. However, it 
is crucial that these separate plots for level 1 and 2 variables do not account for 
interactions within or between the levels; in particular, without multilevel methods it is 
impossible to identify which effects are compositional and which relate to the essence or 
the property of the group itself (see the next chapter). The resulting 40 plots are all 
currently available online47. 
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Five	Modalities	of	Struggle	
To make tentative assumptions about the identity of the axes, I then looked at the 
construction variables on the five MCA-axes (Figures 20 to 22). It is notable that the 
social exclusion index, unlike the deprivation index, decreases not only along the first 
but also the second axis. It is also worth noting that the axes themselves are based on 
variables that do not specify the year of response: the resulting axes can thus be used to 
specify how exactly any group or context travels or is being ‘affected’ during the crisis.  
 
In addition, virtually all variables in the EQLS data were correlated with the resulting 
five axes (see below for the most important ones). This was helpful in verifying the 
interpretation of the axes. It took particular effort to (1) identify the second axis 
(sympathy), (2) the exact distinction between axes one and three, and (3) the precise 
configuration of the affects projected on axes four and five.  
 
 
Table 8. Correlation table of the MCA-axes with several relevant variables (**: p<.01, N = 48 
486). 
 
  
Affordability Sympathy Sufficiency Withdrawal Externalisation
Positive;affectivity;(factor) .206** .080** .121** E.012** !.132**
Negative;affectivity;(factor) !.580** !.450** .073** E.096** !.122**
Personal;satisfaction;(factor) .368** .143** .115** .021** E.046**
;I;feel;left;out;of;society !.568** !.363** .152** .021** E.068**
Life;has;become;so;complicated;today;that;I;
almost;can’t;find;my;way E.523** E.288** E.094** E.028** E.039**
Satisfied;with;the;present;standards;of;living .552** .156** .230** .003 .042**
Financial;situation;in;comparison;to;most;
people .479** .020** .148** E.050** .021**
Afford;necessary;expenses .374** .058** !.021** E.080** 0.008
Afford;other;expenses .503** .074** .427** E.058** .073**
Optimism;about;the;national;economy;(factor) .160** .009 .151** .040** E.020**
Social;tension;awareness;(factor) E.131** E.170** E.002 !.417** .300**
Institutional;trust;(factor) .332** .120** .303** E.024** .092**
Trust;government .300** .138** .298** .056** .052**
How;many;hours;per;week;would;you;prefer;
to;work;at;present? .069** E.127** E.049** E.105** !.278**
 237 Figure 20. MCA construction variables on axes one and two (economic and social 
marginalisation, goo.gl/xpkfpN). 
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Figure 21. MCA construction variables on axes one and three (economic affects, 
goo.gl/FGB3g9). 
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  Figure 22. MCA construction variables on axes four and five (orientation and engagement, 
goo.gl/vg0Jz6). 
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Economic	Affects:	Deprivation	and	Deficiency	
Let me start with axes one (affordability/deprivation) and three (sufficiency/deficiency), 
both of which refer to economic wellbeing but in different ways48. The affordability-axis 
is identified especially by the ‘afford necessary expenses’ variable, whereas the 
sufficiency-axis correlates with the ‘afford other expenses’ variable (Table 7).  
 
In regard to these two modalities of economic wellbeing, both characterise positive 
affectivity but only the latter one is neutral on negative feelings. The positive and negative 
feelings here refer to two factorial components construed basing on multiple variables 
related to personal life situation –assessments. As discussed in the previous chapter, the 
distinction is backed with standard psychological literature, which has broadly 
confirmed the foundational role of such a distinction in grasping differences related to 
emotion, temperament and personality.  
 
It is now extremely interesting that only deprivation results in negative feelings but not 
economic deficiency, which only seems to mark the lack of positive affect. Therefore, 
after affording ‘necessary’ goods at a certain level, higher income no longer helps 
suppressing negative feelings. Conversely, when the most immediate economic needs 
are met, the lack of sufficient income for additional spending does not appear to 
contribute to negative feelings—people feel worse only if necessary goods are 
unaffordable. Furthermore, the third axis is independent of how people perceive their 
financial situation in comparison to others. The third axis also correlates less with 
personal satisfaction, which increases more as a function of sympathy instead. By 
contrast, both subsistence-related axes, affordability and sufficiency, have notable 
correlations with institutional trust and trust in government (all between .30–.33), as 
well as on optimism about the national economy.  
 
It is often difficult to address phenomena, where an apparently single concept (e.g., 
economic wellbeing) splits into two contrary perspectives. I then applied Algirdas Julien 
Griemas’ and Joseph Courtés’ (1979) semiotic square as a diagrammatic illustration of 
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contrary and contradicting modalities associated with any single concept (e.g., economic 
wellbeing or accommodation). The opposite ends of a given diagonal can be viewed as 
‘contradictory’ modalities, whereas those situated next to each other are ‘contraries’. For 
example, in the case of economic affects, prosperity contradicts with depression but is 
only contrary to compliance.  
 
 
Figure 23. Semiotic square illustrating the two meanings of economic wellbeing (MCA-axes 1 
and 3). 
 
It is remarkable that the unemployed score low on affordability but still high on 
sufficiency: they are compliant about declining income. This means that the decreasing 
income due to unemployment is received in mixed ways: people have difficulties in 
affording necessary expenses but do not find it worrying that they cannot afford non-
mandatory needs. In particular, the unemployed do not generally feel particularly 
‘depressed’ about declining income—even if the unemployed are significantly deprived, 
they appear to generally adjust to this situation, and increasingly so in 2011, making 
good use of the little they still have. 
Sympathy,	Marginalisation	and	Solitude	
Whether positive or negative, feelings about the crisis are, however, not always 
experienced in isolation. Sympathy or ‘fellow-feeling’ (Greek. syn pathos)49 is represented 
by the second axis and it was perhaps the most difficult axis to interpret. Sympathy does 
not refer to how sympathetic respondents are towards others but rather to how 
sympathetically they perceive their own situations are treated.  
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Similarly as the unemployed feel more ‘sufficient’ despite deprivation, their experiences 
are also treated more sympathetically than those of many other groups. Lack of 
sympathy is also what distinguishes social exclusion from mere deprivation, which is 
neutral on the second axis: disdain or the lack of sympathy stand for the ‘social’, non-
economic effects of marginalisation. Conceptually, the marginalisation-indicator is then 
a crucial discriminatory measure that helps to identify the communal feelings associated 
with the sympathy-axis. 
 
Given the fact that the unemployed now score high on sympathy, it is notorious that in 
addition to affordability, also the second axis should defend against social exclusion (-
.36). Sympathy also defends against negative feelings (-.45), makes life more satisfying 
(.14) and less complicated (-.29), and mitigates the effect of social tensions (-.17). 
Unemployment then is not always as negative an experience as what the associated 
economic difficulties would suggest. I consider this combination of low economic 
wellbeing but still sympathising, shared experiences as acceptance of the economic life 
situation. The opposite end, solitude, characterises feelings associated with insecurity in 
employment-relationships, as illustrated by those on fixed term contracts who are 
overshadowed by affects opposite to acceptance (discontent).  
 
The interpretation of the corner opposite to marginalisation, ‘homelessness’, was 
somewhat more demanding—not only sociologically but philosophically as well. 
Heidegger, for example, discussed homelessness of thought as a phenomenological 
experience while addressing the experiences in post-war Germany. According to him, 
mortal beings always have to first learn to live and accommodate themselves, which he 
finds all the more difficult in modern, ‘technologically’ laden societies. Even if the 
technological determinism of Heidegger’s civilisation critique did not necessarily prove 
right—as welfare technologies were invented to better accommodate people instead—
his thinking is again increasingly pertinent today as financial technology overshadows the 
rhetoric against welfare expansion and accommodation, making welfare states 
themselves marginalised or ‘homeless’.  
 
 243 
In effect, unemployment does not generally make respondents more ‘marginalised’ or 
less ‘accommodated’, which is a rather separate phenomenon and turns out to reflect 
social change and the deterioration of welfare broadly—also among the employed. I 
instead started from this notion of homelessness and found accommodation to be a 
concept that best describes the opposite of marginalisation. Accommodation refers to 
both what one can afford and sympathise, feel sure about and which replaces negative 
affects with positive ones—something with little tension and a high level of (social) 
security. It is also illustrative that both tenants and mortgage holders are now lower on 
accommodation, suggesting that a home that is not fully owned no longer shelters 
respondents against ‘mental’ homelessness.  
 
 
Figure 24. Economic and social aspects of marginalisation (MCA-axes 1 and 2). 
  
Of course, we could have started the identification of the square (Figure 24) very 
differently. Namely, another option would have been to name the second axis as 
security. However, as far as we are concerned about economic and social security, they, 
too, refer to the process of being recognised (and ‘felt’) by others, and who can then 
ensure that life is still acceptable and has not become too complicated. In this respect, 
the sympathy-axis also refers to non-economic aspects of security, which likewise fall 
short for those working in fixed term contracts. Permanent jobs, by contrast, secure 
employees not only financially, but also by providing stable social and organisational 
frames to perceive life. The axis could also be framed as communality, but this would 
not similarly cover the negative feelings associated with acceptance and it would be 
difficult to distinguish communality from accommodation (sympathy plus affordability). 
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In contrast, disdain refers not so much to lack of community but to that very 
community that makes one feel homeless, an outsider.  
 
Orientation	and	Conflict	
The fourth and fifth axes of inertia do not have a similarly direct relationship with 
economic or social wellbeing—affordability, sympathy or sufficiency. Instead, they 
relate to the recognition of social conflict as well as to the orientation towards such 
conflict50. In this respect, the latter axis helps reifying the internalising and externalising 
reactions to the crisis. The former one (recognition) also helps us discriminate, when 
people withdraw from social conflict—sometimes when they are extremely unhappy. 
Both axes are, therefore, correlated with affirmativity towards economic struggle: 
internalisation measures the extent to which a respondent is willing to take actions to 
overcome the crisis (e.g., working longer hours), whereas recognition assumes a more 
discursive or representational approach to affirmativity.  
 
Starting with the externalising/internalising-problematic, the fourth axis supports the 
analysis from the previous chapter. In particular, it helps specifying the meaning of 
economic struggle in respect to psychiatric discourses on stress reactions—the so-called 
‘defence mechanisms’ that regulate how mental disorders are encountered most often in 
young adulthood (e.g., Wilmshurst 2005; Nezhad et al. 2011). Rotating this axis in the 
direction of the fifth one yields something more neutral in respect to social conflict, 
characterising inner- and other-directed orientations instead.  
 
Affects related to the orientation towards the crisis are particularly important from the 
point of view of socialisation effects, especially in the case of young adults. Indeed, it 
appears that while generally the crisis shifts adult populations only in the directions of 
recognition/withdrawal, it makes youth move also in terms of externalising/internalising 
reactions. Young adults are particularly affected in their orientations both because of 
their still developing self-concept (Jahoda, 1992, 1998) and because they are only 
entering the job-market (De Vreyer et al., 2000), which makes them more vulnerable to 
unpleasant and often (subjectively) threatening situations (Warr, 1987).  
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It is an established case in psychological development theory that national differences 
exist in regard to such processes, and therefore it is not too far-fetched to apply these 
developmental contexts also when seeking to understand social change.  
First, it is possible that socio-economic and family oriented trajectories intertwine as 
complex, dynamical systems, and the internalising/externalising behaviours are 
moderated, for example, by socio-economic backgrounds (Cramer, 2009). Second, the 
effect of social support on psychological disorders has also been demonstrated in the 
context of school bullying, suggesting that social support and secondary patterns play an 
important role even in the most individual, psychopathological manifestations of affect 
(Davidson and Demaray 2007).  
 
Theories related to psycho-social orientation are also not limited to psychology. George 
Herbert Mead, for example, distinguishes between inner (I) and other-directed self 
(me), which is considered one of the foundational theories of socialisation. As another 
example, the phrases ‘inner’ and ‘other’ directedness are employed by David Riesman’s 
(1950) famous diagnosis Lonely Crowd. The work diagnoses a change in the personality 
types on a broader scale, focusing particularly on the other-directed attitudes emerging 
among the American college students.   
 
The flow field -construction provided by the MCA-analysis is quite illustrative as it 
reflects differences in orientation, not only in respect to socio-economic and national 
groupings, but also as the crisis unfolds in a way of interacting with such differences. 
The effects on young adults are crucial as they are about to enter the labour market (e.g., 
Fenton and Dermott, 2006; Lowe and Krahn, 2000; also O’Reilly et al., 2011: 581–582; 
Scherer, 2005) and thus re-evaluate their aspirations towards education, work, family 
and leisure (McDonald et al., 2011). This is prone to imbuing a cohort-specific imprint 
on the current patterns of secondary socialisation. In particular, difficulties in the entry 
to the labour market tend to produce permanent disadvantages to those seeking to 
ignite their careers (De Vreyer et al., 2000).  
 
Others argue that problems of employment alone do not induce a notable effect on 
other values and orientations even among the young (Jehoel-Gijsbers and Groot, 1989; 
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Tanner, Krahn and Hartnagel, 1995), but it is still assumed that the ‘emerging 
adulthood’ (Tanner and Arnett, 2009) is pivotal to secondary socialisation, including 
economic accommodation. From a developmental perspective, it seems plausible to 
assume that the internalising/externalising-orientations are closely related to long-term 
socialisation effects acting both on actual career-expectations and by altering the 
developing perceptions of the self. 
 
To understand the meanings of this axis in personal life, the inner-directed orientations 
are associated with unhappiness, whereas other-directed orientations are indifferent to 
or conservative about their assessments on happiness. Deprivation results first in 
internalising patterns but at extreme levels it is associated with withdrawal instead. On 
the other hand, financial obligations due to accommodation (rent / mortgage) make 
people generally more other-directed and responsive to recognising social conflict. The 
internalisation-/externalisation-axis also helps us identify the difference between the 
type of social conflict: ethnic tensions lean towards the externalising end as opposed to 
age-related tensions.  
 
Another diagonal characterises affirmativity vis-a-vis indifference towards social 
struggle. Indifference, which is a combination of externalisation and withdrawal, is 
associated with the lack of recognition of social or ethnic conflict, and thus inheres a 
somewhat uncritical attitude. It, however, does not always result in such internalising 
problems as health related issues. Correlating indifference with PCA-axes on the 
country-level resulted in an association between indifference and the qualitative crisis of 
work, whereas the quantitative crisis is independent of the level of indifference.  
 
Similarly, the ‘internalising’ orientations are affirmative but still inner-directed, 
suggesting that internalising respondents fail to make such other-directed attributions 
that would be required in order to recognise the crisis as principally a social conflict. The 
internalising misrecognition then results in chronic physical and mental health 
limitations. Furthermore, in those contexts where inner-directedness and withdrawal 
generally prevail, the Eurobarometer-based crisis-awareness component is low; they are 
the countries where both the qualitative and quantitative crises of work are absent. 
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Figure 25. Orientation and recognition of social conflict (MCA-axes 4 and 5). 
 
The MCA-model now produces two axes that are both closely related to the ‘left out of 
society’ and ‘looked down because of job’ –variables: marginalisation and withdrawal. 
The multilevel analysis in the previous chapter already suggested the fact that these 
variables depict experiences of two rather separate groups of respondents. First, there are 
those from the higher income half, who anyway feel like being left out, or who 
otherwise have social support but are, for example, responsible for taking care of their 
parents or have other notable obligations. Their experiences of the crisis are 
characterised by deficiency and deprivation (the marginalisation-diagonal in the MCA-
model), which is a form of negative engagement and also highly correlated with negative 
affectivity. In particular, they do not withdraw from conflict but instead they perceive 
themselves as being economically or socially ‘homeless’ given their underlying 
circumstances.  
 
In contrast, there is another group of outsiders marked by withdrawal. This is perhaps 
even a more radical form of exclusion—also exhibiting the lack of voice and not only 
homelessness. Instead of marking negative engagement, which can well occur in tandem 
with positive engagement (e.g., political participation), the withdrawal-axis is better 
framed as absence of engagement. In other words, it is possible that ‘marginalisation’ and 
‘recognition’ occur in tandem: they are contrary modalities in the sense of Greimas and 
Courtés (1979), whereas ‘withdrawal’ and ‘recongition’ contradict each other. 
Interestingly, negative effects and economic marginalisation are typical in countries like 
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Cyprus, Greece and Hungary, whereas particularly after the crisis withdrawal, 
detachment and absence characterise young adults in Denmark, Germany and Austria. 
Latvians have become marginalised in both meanings of social detachment; Bulgarians, 
who used to score high on both axes, are now proceeding in the direction of social 
inclusion instead. 
 
Affected	By	the	Crisis	
Thus far we have made only a few comments on crisis-related changes, while generally 
the affects have been defined as time-independent manifestations of struggle. Yet, 
precisely because these affects are time-invariant, we can use them as a meaningful way 
to address how the relevant groups change through the crisis. This is done on a country-
wise basis: given how the group-effects differ by context, it would be meaningless to 
aggregate the crisis-effect in general. Instead, we are specifically interested in how 
different contexts shape the way in which, say, the unemployed are being affected. 
Sometimes contexts greatly shape these processes, while in other cases—quite 
intriguingly—changes prove out to exist separately in all the contexts.  
 
One of the cases that can be established despite context includes the separation between 
the unemployed and the ‘underemployed’ young. This suggests that such effects are not 
random or accidental, but instead they depict more systematic and stable tendencies—
they are pan-European features of the crisis and emergent in context-invariant ways. 
Given that these country-dependent positions of the two groups are calculated entirely 
separately, it is unlikely that it would be by mere accident that the direction of move is 
virtually the same in all of them. Furthermore, given the specific interest on youth, the 
contexts are plotted separately for younger and older respondents.  
 
I have included two peculiar maps of the un- and the underemployed below. These two 
maps summarise the themes that we already encountered in the previous chapter: the 
varying effects of the crisis on wellbeing, the socialisation processes, and the general 
awareness of conflict, in addition to the question of the quality of growth. Let me now 
briefly review the most notable connections and group-related differences illustrated by 
them.  
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Shift	to	Depression	
Starting with economic wellbeing, country-related differences of the general population 
averages are situated along the prosperity–depression-axis51. Also the crisis-effects occur 
on this diagonal, making the effect of the crisis on the overall population generally 
depressive. When looking at the context-predictors to understand where the shift to 
depression is at its strongest, we discover that it is the fiscal crisis but not the financial 
one that is to blame. The only notable exception is the most impoverished part of the 
Eastern regime. However, the effect is significant also in more prosperous contexts.  
 
Therefore, differences between compliance and discontent are only relevant to specific 
employment-groups, but not to the general population, in which the effects are evened 
out. The situation is largely similar in the case of all employed respondents. This suggests 
that the depressive tendency cannot be explained by the unemployment-crisis alone. In 
fact, in virtually all the occupation groups people have become economically more 
depressed except in the group of managers, who have become more prosperous in 
relation to others. As regards the other predictors, bad health is more closely associated 
with depression than either strong unhappiness or extreme deprivation. Interestingly, the 
low-skilled workers have not become similarly depressed as their highly trained peers. 
Discontent is also common in EAS, where it characterises older adults in Bulgaria, 
Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia, creating a further divide between the young and the 
old. 
 
However, the most interesting findings relate to Figures 26 to 28 below. This bears two 
important consequences. First, the effect of the crisis is reasonably uniform across the 
contexts, similarly separating the un- and underemployed young. Apart from a few 
Protestant countries as well as Romania, Bulgaria and Lithuania, in all the others the 
employees on fixed term contracts52 have become more discontent, that is, their perceived 
affordability has increased but insufficiently: this distinguishes them from the depressive 
tendency of those in permanent jobs. In conclusion, those who experience employment 
insecurity are characterised by a certain form of mental ‘homelessness’—insecurity creates 
the feeling of insufficiency. Given that fixed term contracts are particularly common 
among the young (Heyes, 2011), this tendency can bear long-term implications. 
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Figure 26. The young and old before and after the crisis along the two axes of 
marginalisation (goo.gl/arry1L). 
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Figure 27. The unemployed by country on the two axes of marginalisation (goo.gl/u5t2ax). 
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Figure 28. Employees on fixed term contracts on the two axes of marginalisation (goo.gl/bLfxCS). 
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On the other hand, it is notable and somewhat unexpected that the unemployed53 have 
not become more ‘depressed’ about the economy, except the young in the qualitative 
crisis countries including the Netherlands, Sweden and Denmark. Instead, in almost all 
the other contexts, they have become either more compliant, or in a few cases slightly 
more discontent (the young in Austria, Germany, Lithuania and Ireland, or the older 
unemployed in Germany, the Netherlands).  
 
The unemployed and the ‘underemployed’ thus differ in terms of economic affects. This 
is so even in Cyprus, where the compliance of the unemployed is extreme—only among 
the German young the pathways of the two groups are equal, and the relationship is 
reverted in Austria, though not for the low-skilled population. The separation between 
the insecure and unemployed young in virtually all the contexts can then undermine the 
general recognition and awareness of economic change of the specific difficulties 
encountered by youth, which then hardly results in shared, generation-wide experiences.  
 
Feeling	Together	About	the	Crisis	
It is then crucial to understand how this separation between the two employment-
related groups occurs in terms of the other, non-economic affects: sympathy and ‘fellow-
feeling’ in particular. Does mental ‘homelessness’ characterise those suffering from 
employment-related or other kinds of insecurity, undermining their accommodation 
into welfare society? The answer seems to be positive. Yet the two groups of the young 
struggling with either un- or under-employment fall short of accommodation in two 
very different ways. Similarly as with the compliance/discontent-diagonal, they fall apart 
in terms of the acceptance/solitude-diagonal. In particular, solitude and isolation have 
increased among those on fixed term contracts54 in a remarkably consistent way. In 
contrast, the unemployed55 have experienced more sympathy despite deprivation in all the 
other contexts except in Luxemburg and Sweden.  
 
The picture of those permanently employed is notably different56. When looking at all 
the employed, both the pre-crisis situation and the crisis-effect appear to be restricted to 
the marginalisation–accommodation axis, which is perpendicular to the 
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acceptance/solitude-axis separating the un- and the underemployed groups. In most 
cases the effect is towards marginalisation but in Romania and Lithuania as well as in 
Germany, Austria and Denmark, the employed appear to be better accommodated after 
the crisis, furthering the divide between the standard and the insecure.  
 
It is also noteworthy that the young employed in France stand at the corner characterised 
by marginalisation together with the Bulgarians and the Greeks. Indeed, in an earlier 
study it appeared that the negative effects of employment along with insecurity in social 
networks were the strongest in France (Paugam and Russell, 2000: 263). Moreover, the 
unemployed young there were also characterised by marginalisation still in 2007, but the 
crisis seems to have brought change to this as the young have received more sympathy. 
Generally, therefore, it is crucial that marginalisation is a phenomenon that is not 
restricted to unemployed people or the so-called NEETs, but in many contexts (e.g., 
Portugal, Cyprus, Greece, Sweden) also those who work have become more 
marginalised. In contrast, Germany is characterised by marked social isolation among 
the unemployed (ibid., 264), even if this occurs in the form of deprivation rather than 
disdain. Germany is one of the leading qualitative crisis -countries and despite the fact 
the number of the unemployed is lower there, those who do fall outside the labour 
market experience the depths of poverty.  
 
However, considering why the employed are also affected, part of this effect can be 
explained by the fact that people adopt new jobs with a lower status or qualification 
even if they continue to work. Indeed, most occupational groups have moved towards 
acceptance except for the managers or those in ‘other occupations’57 so it seems likely 
that the marginalising tendency reflects shifts in the occupational structures. It is the 
qualitative deficit in the set of available job opportunities that results in marginalisation 
apart from the unemployment-crisis.  
 
By contrast, the level of education does not interact with the crisis-effect, even though it 
seems that especially in the Nordic and Continental countries the highly educated 
young adults have been less likely of suffering from deprivation: this is exaggerated for 
example in Finland where the highly trained young adults prosper at the expense of 
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those with only primary education. Both groups, however, show higher sympathy as a 
result of the crisis. Only for the German and Luxemburgian young the crisis appears to 
have resulted in elevated disdain regardless of education; the low-skilled then are 
effectively marginalised.  
 
Looking at context-level differences, the countries with high old age dependency ratio 
seem to react in more accepting ways towards the deprived. In contrast, in countries 
with no prolonged recession, but also where the fiscal crisis is high, the tendency is towards 
marginalisation. This supports my claim that the quality of growth tends to be 
undermined during the crisis. High GINI, by contrast, is associated with disdain, but 
not necessarily with deprivation. Therefore, the most accommodating countries still are 
the Nordic welfare states, where the ‘fellow-feelings’ are high and life is generally found 
the most affordable—at least when it comes to necessities of life. The situation is 
contrary for example in Spain where people are sympathetic but now overtly deprived. 
Yet, even in the North, the trend appears to be towards marginalisation. 
 
In conclusion, the question of sympathy further supports my claim that the unemployed 
and the ‘underemployed’ young appear to be straying further. In the previous chapter I 
discussed why it appears that the prevalence of the unemployment crisis has not affected 
satisfaction and happiness among the unemployed. It is now possible to hypothesise an 
answer to this question: it appears that social support and recognition (sympathy and 
sufficiency) indeed increase as a function of the unemployment-crisis, but they still do 
not help to mitigate the effects of economic deprivation, which is more directly linked 
to happiness and satisfaction. Furthermore, it is quite intriguing that within-group 
effects of the crisis take place largely on the acceptance/solitude-diagonal, whereas the 
marginalisation-diagonal instead depicts aggregate changes that can in part be explained 
by the reversal of the ‘status attainment’ process: people fall into lower occupation 
groups even if they are not outright unemployed. This also supports a tendency that I 
will discuss more thoroughly in the next chapter: that in countries with high general 
level of education also the low-skilled tend to struggle as the highly skilled take jobs 
from lower occupation groups.  
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From	Crisis	to	Conflict?	
Let me now look into more specific socialisation effects. In particular, I ask whether the 
crisis is framed or recognised as inhering a social conflict. Starting again by comparing 
the un- and the underemployed young, those working on fixed term contracts seem to 
be increasingly likely to express indifference towards social problems, stress and tensions. 
They withdraw from the social conflict and political engagement, thus mirroring their 
feelings of solitude and discontent.  
 
In contrast, the unemployed, who previously externalised their difficulties to a great 
extent, are now increasingly likely to internalise their problems. This is so even if the 
crisis provided a communal framework that enables people to better articulate their 
difficulties, also reflecting higher sympathy experienced by this group. This parallels 
with what was encountered earlier—that the crisis has made health issues (often mental 
or psychosomatic) particularly common among the unemployed young (.555*)—and 
suggests that the imprint of the crisis on self-development could prove lasting. 
 
These effects, however, are not similarly consistent across the contexts. For example, 
among the young on fixed term contracts, there is a great variation in terms of 
recognition. But apart from Bulgaria, externalisation and indifference are still the norm 
everywhere else58. As a peculiar outlier, the Finnish young on fixed term contracts are 
much less internalising, possibly reflecting the specific government initiatives that have 
contributed to the proliferation of such jobs in the public sector. By contrast, the 
unemployed are similarly diffuse in terms of recognition, but internalising. The 
internalising tendencies are, however, reverted in the Netherlands, Denmark, Romania 
and the Czech Republic59.  
 
In the general population, the effects are even more diffuse60. This happens quite 
interestingly also in contexts dominated by the quantitative crisis. The young in Spain 
and Greece tend to externalise, whereas the Portuguese young have become more 
recognising or affirmative. So have the Swedes, unlike most Nordic and German 
people, and the Swedish crisis could reflect generational tendencies as I will discuss in 
more depth in the next chapter. These socialisation-effects are not reducible to 
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differences in economic affects (the young in Cyprus, Greece and the UK tend to 
marginalise, whereas in Greece and Latvia they become depressed), but for example the 
different pathways of the Greek and Portuguese youth are noteworthy.  
 
In relation to educational groupings, those with tertiary education have shifted towards 
indifference, and are thus more likely to express externalising attitudes; they also ignore 
the relevance of skilled jobs at the heart of the crisis. Those with primary education, by 
contrast, adopt a more inner-directed orientation, but neither one of these two groups 
appear to be forming a generational awareness about the crisis.  
 
However, the socialisation effects can be all the stronger, as the awareness of the actual 
causes of trouble is absent. One peculiar phenomenon that catches the eye is the fact 
that in the Eastern regime, and to some extent also in the Nordic countries, there is a 
great contrast between younger and older respondents—the latter are much more inner-
oriented. What is even more remarkable, however, is the orientation of the crisis-effect: 
among older adults, the effect largely rests on the affirmation/indifference-diagonal, 
whereas changes in young adults’ attitudes emerge in the direction of inner-/other-
directed orientations (e.g., in Greece, Spain, the Netherlands, Finland). As I mentioned 
above, precisely because changes on this diagonal are specific to youth, it has to do with 
the socialisation effects of the crisis (Jahoda, 1992, 1998) but also with the difficulties 
specific to labour market entry (De Vreyer et al., 2000).  
 
If this is the case, it is also eminent that among the employed there are few if any effects 
in the direction of the orientation characteristics61; it is perhaps more common for 
respondents to become affirmative, whereas Greece, Spain, Denmark, Luxemburg, 
Germany and Austria all illustrate a shift to indifference in respect to social conflict 
instead. Managers and service workers behave quite similarly, exhibiting withdrawal and 
externalisation, whereas elementary workers illustrate an internalising tendency. 
However, the deeper, long-lasting socialisation effects are more likely to affect the un- 
and the underemployed young. Unlike in the case of economic accommodation, the 
psycho-social effects are often also similar in the two groups, even if the direction 
depends on the context.  
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In terms of education, in countries with the most staggering crisis (particularly in EAS 
and SAS) those with tertiary education tend to externalise. The opposite effect 
characterises the highly trained young mainly in some Protestant countries (and 
France). Finally, in the group of those who still study the socialisation effects are 
dispersed.  
 
Is there any way then to explain the vast differences in these socialisation effects? The 
next chapter applies multilevel analysis to answer this question. However, by looking at 
the MCA-plots directly, both social democratic policy and changes in that direction 
contributes to other-directedness, thus mitigating the otherwise internalising 
tendencies. A similar, other-oriented effect seems to follow from higher GINI-
coefficients. Multilevel analysis (see the next chapter) confirms both effects, except that 
the shift to leftist policy follows from other-directed orientations rather than explains it. 
Regarding the extent and the length of recession, it is notable that in both extremes (deep 
or no recession) externalisation is more likely, as is the case also where the GDP growth 
is high.  
 
Finally, I asked about what role the active labour market policies could play in economic 
socialisation and adaptation processes. Generally, a higher emphasis on ALMPs is 
associated with lower deprivation but also with less sympathy and higher solitude; often 
temporary work due to public job creation could further this effect. At the same time, 
integrative approaches to ALMPs predict a slight shift towards more recognising 
attitudes. In contrast, in market-oriented countries the shift towards indifference is 
particularly high; this is the case also in recessing economies, where the effects of 
incentives based policies are not similarly positive. Given that such policies focus on the 
individual and do not address the labour market structurally (which would instead 
contribute to recognition), they also make respondents more compliant about declining 
incomes.  
 
But there is also something peculiar about the crisis that the data cannot answer. 
Indeed, I compared the MCA-analysis with the epistemological representation in the 
context of the Eurobarometer-data62. The comparison then indicates where the main 
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analysis falls short: it is, on the one hand, the representations about the contingency of 
the crisis-outcomes—a question that has to do with rhetoric and crisis-policy that lack 
in the quality of life data—and about the question of moral representations on the other, 
that is, about possible debt-relief or the obligation to repay. The latter axis in particular 
is independent of crisis-awareness, however. Therefore, it does not undermine the 
representation of the crisis considered in this chapter, even if the question of debt 
obviously needs further investigation—an issue that takes us back to Max Weber’s thesis 
about the cultural contexts of the economy. But we also need to investigate who 
particularly are paying the price for the moral obligations (whether or not they are to be 
responsible) and, henceforth, what are the contexts that the crisis has made particularly 
indebted.   
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Figure 29. Countries where the unemployment rates have increased more for those with 
tertiary education degrees (goo.gl/Ml8GZO). 
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Chapter	9	
Post-Fordist	Crisis	of	Welfare	
 
 
If Thomas Piketty (2014a) and Göran Therborn (2013) are right in that inequality 
tends to rise, at least in the present, it seems right to say that people are increasingly 
divided. Yet it is not always clear how exactly they are divided; what is the proper way to 
draw and visualise new distinctions? Many scholars now convincingly argue that ‘class’ is 
coming back—if it ever went away in the first place! But especially if ‘class’ is a mobile 
phenomenon (e.g., Egerton and Savage 2000; Skeggs 2004), there is the problem of 
constructing it as part of empirical research: do we refer by ‘class’ to a group consisting 
of any number of people? Or does it, instead, refer to the principle according to which 
they are being classified? Similarly, it is often intriguing to associate age-related 
differences with a certain ‘generationalist’ point of view, exaggerating the prospects of 
shared, age-dependent consciousness instead of truly understanding what unifies and 
divides youth as a cohort (Wohl 1979, 5; Hazlett, 1998: 8–9; Purhonen, 2006). 
 
The question of classification and divides could also be used to target contexts, not only 
groups of individuals. Indeed, even if there is a dominant belief that austerity and cuts 
to welfare are inevitable and necessary results of economic deprivation, it is remarkable 
that even in those economies that grow, negative affects like discontent and 
marginalisation are now more common than before. Therefore, like the previous chapter 
concluded, in growing economies polarisation and tensions tend to occur, whereas in 
the more deprived countries sympathy emerges instead. Economic subjectivities are thus 
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reconstructed in and through the crisis, possibly furthering the vicious circles of 
economic depression.  
 
The most important question from the multilevel perspective, then, is how the divisions 
based on groups and contexts interact. In particular, it is crucial to contrast context 
dependent differences with the so-called ‘two-tiered’ labour market structure as pursued 
by contemporary employment research. It particularly characterises the experiences of 
youth, as the growing group of ‘losers’ are marginalised, while the ‘winners’ 
simultaneously take advantage of the more flexible, creative project society (Jones 2002; 
Reister and Craig, 2003; see also Boltanski and Chiapello, 2005), and are otherwise 
accommodated in a world where the ‘atypical’ itself is the norm (discussed already by 
Evans and Furlong, 1997: 17–18). In the previous analysis the marginalisation–
accommodation-axis is then pivotal for understanding how the so-called ‘youth divide’ 
plays out. Yet, contextual differences are vast: economic growth appears to be associated 
with marginalisation and polarisation, whereas welfare and social expenditure contribute 
to the accommodation of broader groups.  
 
In the context-level, however, the question of marginalisation only characterises 
differences among the employed (or the unemployed in the Nordic and Continental 
contexts). Instead, the crisis induced a peculiar, context-independent differentiation 
between two groups of young adults who are in more inferior positions: the unemployed 
are deprived but they are still more compliant about the declining income; they also feel 
more accepted, symphatised and are less externalising. In contrast, the employees on fixed 
term contracts feel discontent despite the crisis-induced increase in perceived affordability; 
they are more likely to experience solitude and are increasingly ignorant.  
 
The un- and the underemployed then form two different faces of Robert Castel’s (2003: 
430) ‘supernumeraries’ or Hannah Arendt’s (2013 [1958]) ‘useless of the world’. Both of 
them suffer from the ‘deficit of occupiable places’, but in contrary ways. They provide 
their own answers to the question of the ‘serious men’ who, in the midst of the crisis, 
‘ha[ve] no resource’ in themselves but whose ‘coagulate[d]’ or ‘dismissed’ rendition of 
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‘human reality’ carries the weight of the crisis, if not ‘the world’, on their ‘shoulders’63 
(Sartre, 2003: 580; ref. Bourdieu 1990: 42).   
 
Of course, not all young adults on fixed term contracts perceive the ‘flexicurisation’ in a 
similarly negative way (cf. Bradley and van Hoof, 2005; Plug and du Bois-Reymond, 
2005). As Anthony Giddens (1991) anticipated, self-development, ‘self-actualisation’ 
and contemporary challenges are sometimes positively perceived (cf. Harsløf 2003). 
However, the results are clear on the aggregate level. At the same time, the historical 
importance of these differences stems from the fact that flexible employment 
characterises the situation of an increasingly large share of young adults (Gash, 2008; 
O’Higgins, 2012; Schömann et al. 1998, 139), in part because of the public policy 
recommendations by the EC (Heyes, 2011). The effects are also the most exaggerated 
among the youth64.  
 
Two crucial implications can then be drawn from this discrepancy between the two 
groups of ‘losers’. First, neither group as such appears to be characterised either by 
marginalisation or accommodation, as suggested by Gilles Jones original discussion of 
the so-called ‘youth divide’. Instead, the sympathy-related acceptance–solitude axis but 
also the more economically laden compliance–discontent-axis are crucial in 
distinguishing between those who find their positions more vulnerable: these differences 
tend to cancel out when looking at the younger age-cohort as a whole.  
 
Second, the way in which the negatively affected acknowledge their own struggle 
appears to little indicate a shared, common understanding—the young bear no 
‘consciousness’ of their own existential ‘freedom’ and capacity to oppose. Rather, there 
might not be shared ethics implied by the crisis: those who can afford living costs are 
still likely to feel insecure and thus deficient, while those who do not are anyway more 
sympathetic even if they are at the same time deprived. If work itself is framed as a form 
of existential obligation or ‘debt’, as I previously suggested, there is not necessarily any 
common way in which its allegedly ‘burdensome and imprisoning’ characteristics are 
experienced (Peebles, 2010). Yet it is clear that work in contemporary society appears as 
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the ‘great creditor’ (Lazzarato, 2012)—not that much as the ‘great integrator’ as it did in 
the past during nearly full employment (cf. Barel, 1990).  
 
Combining	Bourdieu’s	MCA	with	Multilevel	Methods	
The discrepancy between the two, ‘losing’ groups of youth that I identified at the end of 
the previous chapter is perhaps the most apparent and illustrative result of how MCA 
can be used in visualising social change, that is, as a way to describe the ‘dynamics of the 
field’ and particularly from the ‘transnational’, comparative perspective. Yet, the visual 
interpretation of the groupings alone does not allow us to distinguish between 
compositional effects and more endemic properties of such groups.  
 
To address this problem, I instead combined multilevel methods with MCA-axes that 
as such are theoretical, abstract constructs and only retrospectively interpreted by 
utilising various, indirect techniques (including semiotic analysis). Extending Bourdieu’s 
use of MCA, I thus modelled the different diagonals of wellbeing with the same 
multilevel predictors I used in the main analysis. In other words, the MCA-constructs 
themselves are studied as the outcomes of regression analysis to identify these latent 
aspects in association with group compositions. The MCA-constructs used as outcomes 
in these models sum variables with relatively high Cronbach’s alpha-coefficients, 
making the analyses more reliable than in the case of individual crisis-outcomes65.  
 
Affects	and	the	Three	Crises	of	Welfare	
There are two important questions that we can now address by analysing the MCA-
model by multilevel methods: (1) what particular factors have catalysed the effects of the 
financial crisis so as to prolong economic deprivation and (2) what implications can be 
drawn regarding the effects of economic policy on different ‘affects’ of the crisis? Multilevel 
methods can thus be combined with the MCA-paradigm in order to identify more 
specific and systematic connections between the various groupings and the affects of the 
crisis, invisible in the previous visual analyses.  
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After controlling for economic, financial and policy-related predictors, deprivation still 
appears to have increased (.175*) and so has depression, both generally (.530***) and 
among the unemployed (.390*). These effects are interesting to contrast with the 
welfare typology and, ultimately, with the three crises of welfare as I discussed in the 
first part of my thesis. There are, indeed, few statistically significant differences between 
welfare regimes, and especially in the Eastern regime people are more compliant and 
there is less discontent despite the falling income; depression in contrast characterises 
those inhabiting SAS or the Nordic and Continental regimes.  
 
Apart from the Eastern regime, in all the other regimes non-economic affects have not 
been altered significantly in the general population but only among the unemployed 
(sympathy .310*, affirmation .407*, other-directedness -.573*). As regards welfare 
regimes, the sympathy-affect among the unemployed is reverted in SAS (-.372**), 
suggesting that the unemployed young in the Southern and Anglo-Saxon regimes are 
subject to marginalisation, unlike their Eastern, Nordic and Continental peers. At the 
same time, the unemployed in SAS are, however, more affirmative (.310*), and other-
directed as a result of the crisis (1.467***); they are also more compliant about the 
declining level of income.  
 
By contrast, in EAS affirmativity (.200***) and other-directedness (.288***) characterise 
the general population, not just the unemployed. At the same time, they are relatively 
less deprived and depressed—and the employed are less discontent—than what would 
be expected on the ground of financial and economic predictors. Furthermore, the post-
Soviet transition overshadows the experiences of older adults, but even the younger ones 
are now closer to the EU averages in terms of economic socialisation.  
 
Also the multilevel analysis on the MCA-constructs confirms my interpretation of the 
bifurcation of the experiences of the un- and the underemployed young: those in fixed 
term contracts are increasingly discontent (.179***) especially among the young (.062*); 
they are also less sympathetic (-.104**, further -.168** for young), less affirmative (-
.174*** though less so among young .098*) and more other-directed (.073*, further 
.151** for young). Also, in contrast to the unemployed young, who more often 
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internalise the crisis, those on fixed term contracts are less likely to experience health-
related limitations but tend to externalise social conflicts instead.  
 
It is thus inevitable that the economic crisis overshadows all welfare regimes, even if 
people in the Eastern regime still bear slightly more hope or they are at least a little 
more compliant. In contrast in those countries, where the level of social protection used 
to be extremely high, the unemployed now encounter more staggering effects of 
economic depression, while generally people have become much more discontent. In 
SAS, affirmation prevails in some groups of the unemployed (.310*) but less so with 
young adults (-.315), indifference is further exaggerated in Orthodox countries in the 
Southern regime, especially Cyprus and Greece (-.594**). In these countries, the 
discrepancy between the younger and older cohorts is notable. However, in addition to 
being more discontent, respondents in these countries also reflect a higher likelihood of 
externalisation: the conflict is not subject to age-specific representations or recognition.  
 
Furthermore, the internalising tendencies among the young unemployed, but also the 
outbursts of externalisation in specific contexts, suggest that the crisis affects processes 
of economic socialisation. In EAS the young are actually approaching the EU-averages, 
whereas in SAS the young are moving in the opposite direction. Given that people in 
this cohort are living through ’emerging adulthood’ (Tanner and Arnett, 2009) and 
undergo processes related to ‘secondary socialisation’ (e.g., Mortimer and Simmons, 
1978)—their ‘most impressionable’ phase of life (Elias, 2000: 377), configuring their 
images of social order and of future trajectories (Evans and Furlong 1997, 17)—it is 
significant that the crisis makes only the young more internalising, but not the older 
adults. This is reflected both by the vast increase in the number of unemployed young 
adults with health limitations. Several epidemiological studies also confirm the 
emergence of crisis-related depression, eating disorders, etc. (e.g., Economou et al., 
2013; Frangos, 2012).   
 
Education,	Support	and	Other	Group-Specific	Predictors	of	Socialisation	
Given the socialisation effects of the crisis, which make its effects more long lasting and 
possibly also support generational experiences, it is relevant to discuss a few group-
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specific moderators of these affects as well. Indeed, those with only primary education 
can in many ways be viewed as being in the eye of the storm. Both the employed and 
particularly the unemployed in this group have indeed become more deprived at least as 
they themselves view their situations, even if they are at the same time more compliant. 
Even if experiencing some of the most exaggerated consequences of the crisis, this 
group also appears to reflect little resistance or empowerment either in economic or 
societal terms. Their experiences of the crisis thus appear to illustrate certain 
rootlessness and historical unawareness. Even in education-intensive economies and 
especially in them, this group is the most vulnerable and they need to increasingly 
compete with the people who have tertiary educational qualifications.  
 
Another relevant theme is accommodation and social support. Home loans have made 
the young more affirmative about the economic struggle, bringing them closer to the 
general population (this group of young used to be quite ignorant). This crisis-
awareness brought about by mortgage debt is associated with higher depression, even if 
the unemployed mortgage holders seem to have become more compliant, making them 
particularly prone to finding the less more sufficient, that is, of being able to cope with 
lower standards (thus even furthering a similar general effect on the unemployed). 
However, those mortgage holders who are 30 to 35 year-olds—the age in which people 
usually enter the housing market—are more likely to experience depression and 
discontent. Generally the compliance related to home loans is likely to characterise the 
respondents who have either already paid back a substantial part of their loans or who 
are in a privileged enough position to buy a home early in life. In contrast, those paying 
rent are now less deprived, probably because of the composition effect: the tenants 
struggling most have often moved away.  
 
At the same time, the respondents who live with at least one parent have become more 
depressed—especially in low-income households where parents inevitably lack economic 
resources to support their offspring. This could also be explained in part by the 
composition effect, of course, as the more depressed young are more likely to look for 
support from their parents. However, it is notable that this form of social support still 
does not seem to mitigate the negative effects of the crisis. The reasons for seeking 
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support could thus be ‘social’: the young living with their parents have experienced more 
sympathy or feeling of togetherness (.451***), even if they are equally deprived. Yet even 
sympathy does not characterise the young sheltered by their parents (-.645***). The 
unemployed young need to look for sympathy elsewhere. 
 
To consider other groupings, the unemployed young ‘internalise’ the crisis more often in 
health-related ways. They are also more likely to experience sympathetic affects, despite 
scoring possibly higher in economic depression, and similar experiences characterise the 
young with children. By contrast, reflecting certain ambivalences associated with 
prolonged transition periods, disdain and the lack of sympathy are the most prevalent 
among the young living with their parents who also have tertiary education degrees. This 
is so possibly because of contradicting expectations and norms related to economic and 
domestic socialisation. 
Expenditure,	Equality	and	Growth:	In	Addition	to	the	‘Financial’	
Based on the associations between education, social support and wellbeing, there are 
reasons to believe that welfare regimes do shape or are associated with the way in which 
the crisis affects long-term economic socialisation processes. Besides welfare, it is, 
however, interesting to see whether there are other ways to distinguish the contexts 
where the effects of the crisis are most emphatic. In particular, we are interested in the 
structure of the economy—both national policy but also demographics—in evoking 
different affects associated with the crisis.  
 
First, multilevel models applied on MCA-outcomes confirm a tendency that I 
previously identified in relation to specific crisis-outcomes. Namely, higher social 
expenditure is associated with a mitigated level of deprivation (-.215*) and depression (-
.197*) among the unemployed, but even more importantly, it is associated with lower 
general discontent in society at large (-.293*). Such measures are also being applied 
particularly there where the affirmation of economic struggle is higher (.084***).  
 
Again, the results cannot be explained just by the general, stimulative effect of state 
expenditure. This is because in countries where the emphasis is put increasingly on non-
social expenditure the associations are the contrary: the experiences among the 
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unemployed are less sympathetic (-.108*) or affirmative (general -.037***; unemployed -
.105**). Non-social fiscal stimulation also seems prone to making the unemployed more 
deprived (.271***) even if, at the same time, it makes them less subject to discontent (-
.450***). Because both kinds of expenditure contribute to aggregate demand, their 
contrary outcomes should be associated with the (opposite) dynamical effects, instead. 
Non-social expenditure then appears to serve only a symbolic function, justifying public 
policy in the eyes of the employed even if the actual policy-effects are contrary to those 
expected. The case is contrary to social expenditure, which contributes to employment 
and wellbeing despite the general discontent towards social policy.  
 
In result, the quality of growth—where it exists—has been anti-social: a claim that I drew 
by looking at individual crisis-outcomes but which is now confirmed by less contingent 
multilevel models based on MCA-affects.  Indeed, higher growth during the crisis 
predicts lower sympathy both before the crisis (-.227***) particularly among the young (-
.278***), and even more so after the crisis (-.165**, -.164**). Decreased sympathy is also 
visible among the unemployed (-.159***), where the economy grows. Furthermore, high 
growth is associated with less other-directed (-.138***, further with youth: -.067*) and 
thus more internalising or inner-directed tendencies, not to mention the associated 
increase in deprivation among the general population, both before (.217***, further with 
youth: 170**) and especially after the crisis (.177***, further with youth: .282***).  
 
These associations support the idea that qualitative changes and crises prevail even in 
the contexts which have been growing or where unemployment has remained limited. 
In contrast, countries characterised by the quantitative crisis—often also associated with 
the ‘financial’ aspects and high bond yields—reflect higher deprivation generally 
(.242***) and particularly among the youth (.359**) though only among the employed 
young. Therefore, unlike in qualitative crisis-contexts, the financial crisis itself has not 
furthered deprivation among those short of work (except by increasing their number).  
 
The burden of national refinancing costs is then at least not the only source of struggle, 
even if it has inevitably affected the dynamics of economic engagement of those who 
stay in work. At the same time, the higher level of national debt as such does not seem 
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to be a problem, at least at the present, but still it seems to have mitigated the effects of 
the crisis in terms of deprivation (-.219***) and depression (-.172*) by allowing a higher 
level of protection and by contributing to aggregate demand. Yet, the national debt still 
predicts possibly higher unemployment (.137 and .065) and it is prone to creating 
discontent (.267) and indifference (-.081***, unemployed -.210**). 
 
There are a few other country-level variables predicting economic deprivation. What 
explains economic struggle among the unemployed (not so much the employed) is the 
old age dependency ratio (.217**), which also undermines how much sympathy those 
lacking work experience (-.334**). This predictor is, however, associated with lower 
discontent (-.427**), suggesting that the burden of aging at the same time justifies 
economic struggle among the general population even despite the lack of fellow-
feelings. In contrast, high economic inequality (GINI) increases sympathy among the 
unemployed and makes them more affirmative but also more discontent—thus opposite 
to the effects of old age dependency ratio.  
 
Alternative	Interpretation:	A	Crisis	of	Higher	Education	
Above, I identified various ways to frame the negative affects incurred by the crisis, 
sourcing them not only to ‘financial’ variables like bond yields but also to the underlying 
structure of the economy: GDP growth, equality and the old age dependency ratio. 
Neither one of these context-predictors were invariable in terms of crisis-outcomes 
when looked at from the point of view of multiple affects and particularly when 
compared between the employed and unemployed respondents. Rather, they appear to 
indicate how economic struggle or the ‘financial’ crisis is being distributed and canalised 
in qualitatively different ways.  
 
However, there is indeed one predictor that reflects a more invariable, negative effect on 
almost all the affects: the share of 30 to 34 year-olds with tertiary education. It is associated 
for example with solitude, indifference and internalisation. Furthermore, all these effects 
apply not only to the general population but especially to the unemployed, and they are all 
further exaggerated among the young66. The prevalence of higher education thus gives us a 
much more coherent picture of crisis-related differences than what for example the 
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financial indicators (bond yields, national debt) can do. It reflects tendencies that are 
independent of the employment status but particularly important to youth (and 
economic socialisation).  
 
Figure 30. ‘Post-Fordist’ countries with a high share of 30–34 year-olds with tertiary 
education degrees (goo.gl/WPdtZO).  
Yet the effect of the prevalence of higher education is not reducible to non-economic 
affects. Instead, the structural struggle of such economies is visible in terms of 
deprivation especially among the young (.088*, furthered afterwards by .052* after), 
deprivation of the unemployed generally (.119*, furthered by .128*) and further among 
the young (.077, furthered again by .111*); depression in general (.020, furthered 
afterwards by .094***) and further among the young (.138**, again furthered by .121***); 
and depression specifically in the group of the unemployed generally (.088 furthered by 
.156**) and further among the young (.021, furthered again by .140**). The only 
economic affect that appears generally unaffected by the education-indicator is 
discontent—except again for the unemployed, among whom the prevalence of 
education predicts compliance (lower discontent). The multilevel analysis on the MCA-
model also confirms the finding that happiness scores are lowered particularly where 
highly skilled work is common.  
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Figure 31. The effect of the crisis on a combination of negative affects (deprivation, disdain, 
insufficiency, goo.gl/RJdt3Q). 
 
I visualised these findings by making a sum variable of aforementioned affects 
(deprivation, disdain, insufficiency): the resulting distribution (Figure 31) is notably 
similar to the one describing the share of those with tertiary education degrees (Figure 
30). Only in France the subjective effects have been less exaggerated despite high level 
of education, whereas the situation in Germany, Austria and the Czech Republic is the 
contrary. Also, the people in the Baltic countries have experience less subjective effect of 
the crisis mainly because they were more deprived to begin with. 
 
There are several points to be drawn from this finding. First, the uniformity of the 
effects but also their peculiar relevance to youth confirms how the crisis seems to be 
functioning as an engine of social and economic change, and in a way that is not 
explained by the ‘financial’ predictors alone. The interpretation is also quite different 
from the view conventionally held that the reason for economic depression in developed 
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countries should follow the outsourcing of low-skilled jobs (to countries like China) 
rather than reflect the disinvestment of skilled work, instead. Figure 29 at the beginning 
of this chapter supports this interpretation. It indicates that in more educated countries 
unemployment rates have increased relatively more among those with tertiary education 
degrees. In particular, the data is at odds with the epochal prophecies praising the 
importance of the so-called ‘information’ or ‘knowledge-based’ work (Castells, 1996) or 
of the importance of ‘cognitive labour’. The deflated value of cognitive work could as 
well be the source of the current stagnation in the EU.  
 
The crisis could thus be alternatively framed as one undermining the dynamics of the 
highly skilled, ‘cognitive’ work—possibly due to public sector cuts, the welfare crisis and 
other tendencies that undermine the prospects of education-intensive, or what we have 
called the ‘post-Fordist’ societies (Burrows and Loader, 1994). Post-Fordism is 
generally used as a term referring to a variety of themes overshadowing social and 
economic change over the past few decades. In particular, the relevance of the industrial 
or ‘Fordist’ standardisation of work has gradually ceded over the past few decades. 
Stuart Hall defines post-Fordism as  
 
a shift to the new 'information technologies'; more flexible, decentralised forms of 
labour process and work organisation; decline of the old manufacturing base and the 
growth of the 'sunrise' computer-based industries; the hiving-off or contracting-out of 
functions and services, a greater emphasis on choice and product differentiation, on 
marketing packaging and design... (Boldening by the author.) 
 
 
While many of these themes have been discussed through this study, in this chapter the 
term ‘post-Fordism’ is operationalised more straightforwardly, referring particularly to 
those economies where the share of the 30 to 34 year-olds with tertiary education is the 
highest. Contrary to Hall’s assumptions, Chapter 6 actually demonstrates that 
flexicurisation now increasingly characterises also manual and elementary work, and that 
manual work is actually not disappearing but rather re-emerges in new ways.  
 
In comparison to the education-related, ‘post-Fordist’ predictors, it is worth noting that 
the effects of the crisis are much less uniform in respect to other material conditions like 
the level of unemployment, which combines both positive and negative effects. At the 
 275 
same time, it is important that the crisis of post-Fordist societies is associated with 
psycho-social effects in particular (at least currently)—there is no similar effect on 
objective indicators like growth rates or the level of unemployment.  
 
Second, it appears that the depth of the crisis incurred by the ‘post-Fordist’ organisation 
of work and education is itself education independent, that is, all education groups suffer 
where the prevalence of tertiary education is high. Indeed, when looking specifically at 
those holding tertiary education degrees in different contexts (Figure 29), the highly 
educated have lost jobs particularly in Eastern Europe, with the highest ratios in 
Romania, Slovakia, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Hungary. In contrast, countries 
favouring people with tertiary education in terms of employment include Lithuania, 
Sweden, Denmark, Latvia, Luxemburg, Italy, France, Ireland, Portugal and Greece. 
Again, it is interesting that the Baltic countries, together with Slovenia, differ 
significantly from the rest of the Eastern regime. Therefore, also those with lower 
educational degrees suffer because of the dynamics associated with the high-skilled 
employees.  
 
There are several tentative possibilities to explain this. First, it could reflect the fact that 
the high-skilled employees then compete for the same jobs with the low-skilled ones, 
also reducing the prospects of those who have not acquired any higher education. 
Second, in the sixth chapter I identified that elementary public work is undermined in 
countries characterised by fiscal problems, the welfare cost hike and non-social 
expenditure—many of these characterise education-intensive economies in particular. 
Therefore, it is possible that the effect of post-Fordist economies on wellbeing is 
mediated in part by the lessening of public work opportunities—this could then also 
undermine the prospects of elementary occupations in the public sectors. Elementary 
work might not necessarily be the cause of the employment crisis in education-intensive 
economies, but the associated fiscal difficulties and welfare costs could well prove 
consequential to the economic prospects of elementary work as well as to the 
representations of public work in general. The third possibility is that those economies 
relying on skilled work would have been even more prone to outsourcing low-skilled 
work, either because of the lack of similar worker rights movement or the higher overall 
 276 
cost of labour. However, at least the latter interpretation is unlikely the main cause 
because this effect should then be mediated by the GDP-predictor instead.  
 
Whatever way we interpret the finding, in the light of empirical data, those with tertiary 
education degrees are themselves more indifferent about the crisis. Particularly they do 
not illustrate any more specific awareness than those with only primary education. 
Therefore, in micro-level experiences education-groups do not score differently in non-
economic affects even if the macro-economic causes of the crisis reflect the overall 
prevalence of education. However, indicating the results of actual economic affects or 
struggle, the highly trained respondents are associated with increased depression 
generally (.077*) and for the young (.083*); the increase is particularly visible among the 
unemployed (.232*). In contrast, if discontent is the only negative affect that is not 
specific to education-intensive contexts, this in turn affects the highly educated 
specifically on the individual level (.094**), especially when not unemployed. Therefore, 
we can say that higher education is related to all the crisis-affects included in our model, 
even if it depends on the specific affect whether it overshadows particular education-
groups or the overall dynamics of the economy.  
 
Against this background, it then appears that the high level of education could explain 
the prolongation and the pervasiveness of the employment crisis in the peculiar 
contexts—perhaps much better than the ‘financial’ crisis which may or may not have 
triggered the process, but which fails to explain why some contexts appear to be more 
thoroughly affected than others. Also, in contrast to either the growing economies or 
those laden by the most exaggerated financial struggle, in the case of education-
intensive economies the loss of sympathy is specific to the young and does not 
characterise the older population. This suggests that the question of education does 
indeed depict something crucial about the crisis. The post-Fordist organisation of work 
and welfare could function as an engine of social change—particularly among the 
young—even if at this point it appears implausible to believe that such changes should 
become attached to the crisis-representations or consciousness of those holding tertiary 
education degrees or generally among young adults.  
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The	Question	of	Youth	Then:	Only	on	Paper?	
Based on the findings above, among the youth there is no general crisis-awareness about 
difficulties encountered in ‘post-Fordist’, education-intensive economies. In fact, in 
Chapter 7 it turned out that those living in education-intensive economies are generally 
more trusting. However, to see whether group-specific affects of the crisis can be 
associated with other contextual or group-level phenomena and thus claimed to 
represent them, I further modelled the group of young adults separately to be able to 
compare the groups of young across contexts properly, and to avoid the mistake of 
interpreting the lack of youth-specific effects as a sign that certain effects should be 
irrelevant to youth. For example, in countries with high national debt and less emphasis 
on social protection young adults more often tend to have also mortgage-debt. The 
effect is stronger in SAS and in education-intensive countries, whereas in EAS the 
amount of mortgages among the young has collapsed (–1.956***).  
 
It then appears that—taking economic, financial and equality-predicts into 
consideration—youth unemployment increased mainly in the Nordic and Continental 
countries (.700*) but less so in EAS (-.333) and not at all in SAS (-.598***). A notable 
effect is also visible in the decrease of the number of fixed term contracts (-1.135***), 
which also mainly applies to the Nordic and Protestant countries and less intensely in 
SAS (.515***). Therefore, ‘flexicurising’ tendencies best describe crisis-experiences in the 
emerging welfare regimes, whereas in the old, saturating welfare regimes desecurisation 
has now materialised, resulting in a loss of many fixed-term jobs in addition to the 
relatively exaggerated youth-unemployment problems. Among the young we also see 
that fixed term contracts now characterise elementary and low-skilled jobs like any 
other, while previously such contracts were more typical of those working in services, 
sales and support.  
 
Tertiary education by contrast, predicts an increase in deprivation index (.215*) and was 
confirmed by the lowered ability to make ends meet (-.495***). This suggests that even 
if in the general population the crisis of higher education manifests itself in all 
education-groups, among the young the consequences bear relevance particularly to 
those who have acquired such degrees. However, like in the general population, also the 
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prevalence of higher education at the macro-level is associated with GDP-independent 
increase in the social exclusion index (.147***) and deprivation (.114*), but also in the 
amount of mortgages (.383**). Also, as in the case of older adults, more education-
intensive economies indicate lower abilities of the young to make ends meet (-.246***), 
while the negative feelings at the same time increase (.265**). Positive feelings, by 
contrast, decline only in high GDP countries (-.244***) but not generally (.120*).  
 
If it is right to say then that the crisis undermines the prospects of the so-called post-
Fordist societies (Burrows and Loader, 1994), the question that follows is that of 
consciousness (e.g., Mannheim, 1952 [1927]; also Wohl, 1979). What would be needed 
so that post-Fordism as a general engine of the crisis, unemployment and 
desecurisiation particularly in the Nordic and Continental countries would become an 
inherent part of young adults’ own representations?  
 
It turns out that despite the clear and material effects of the post-Fordist crisis of work 
on economic affects and representations of individual wellbeing, it currently appears 
that crisis-awareness, which can generally be construed similarly as I did in Chapter 3, 
indicates little youth-specific awareness in NC and generally any associations with 
crisis-consciousness and education-intensive, ’post-Fordist’ work are absent. The only 
exceptions, indicating age-related differences in the epistemological representations of 
the current crisis, are in Sweden and the Netherlands.  
 
In the crisis-context, we can now repeat Bourdieu’s (1993: 94) famous allegation that 
there is no essence to ‘youth’, that is, youth is ‘just a word’. This does not mean to 
deconstruct age as a biological category but rather to say that ‘youth’ is not backed up by 
such shared experiences that are often assumed when discussing for example the crisis of 
youth in particular: it has no coherent ‘subject’, and the experiences of young adults are 
reasonably heterogeneous; the average experiences should then be treated similarly as 
what can be regarded as a ‘class on paper’ as analysed by Bourdieu (1985: 735; 1987; 
1990: 177–118). Indeed, to be ‘born in the same period’ is not a sufficient condition for 
a cohort to bear any shared, ‘generational’ experiences (cf. Ryder, 1965).  
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Even so, we must not forget the experiences of the more minor, ‘deviant’ groups of 
youth as opposed to ’society as a whole’ (Bennett, 1957: 721). Social crises are periods, 
when precisely such deviations occur, imposing a lasting imprint on some members of a 
given cohort (Elder, 1971). Shared ’tragedies’ could unite at least parts of age cohorts, 
giving rise to generational experiences among some of them at least, even if not all 
(Edmunds and Turner, 2002). Thus I have considered specific cohorts throughout my 
analyses in order to see whether we can trace a shared tragedy at least among part of 
them, but who would then represent that cohort more generally as being ‘in transition’ 
(Wyn and Woodman, 2006).  
 
But I wanted to represent cohort-specific differences also at a very broad level (Figure 
32). Age, then, appears to make particular difference in respect to solitude, discontent and 
other-directed diagonals, but not marginalisation or depression. The cohorts scoring 
highest on these axes are the 30 to 49 year-olds—not the younger ones who instead 
come closer to the 50 to 59 year-olds. The only notable gender-difference, however, 
relates to sufficiency-axis: women in all age groups represent their income as being more 
sufficient, even if they simultaneously score lower on affordability. Yet the effects of the 
crisis in respect to deprivation, sympathy or sufficiency show no gender-specific 
interactions with age or context. However, what the multilevel analysis indicates is that 
there are notable within group differences that are invisible on the level of general 
aggregates. 
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Figure 32. Economic affects by age and gender (MCA-axes 1 × 2, 1 × 3 and 4 × 5). 
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The picture also shows that gender-related interactions are modest on all the axes other 
than the sufficiency-axis, young women’s slightly higher affirmativity, or older women’s 
slightly more internalising tendencies. Based on multilevel analysis, young women also 
seem to seek support more often than men. Unemployment, by contrast, has not 
increased similarly among young female adults (-.341**) but only after controlling for 
level 1 variables (.245). This suggests that the support sought has not similarly defended 
against unemployment, but in general the unemployment crisis is also more prevalent 
among men, who also become more deprived as a result of joblessness. 
 
However, despite the generally lower unemployment-effect, young women are more 
polarised and at the risk of marginalisation when lacking family-related social support.  
This is visible particularly among those with only primary education: in this group the 
social exclusion and deprivation indices and the number of fixed term contracts have 
decreased, whereas for the less educated young women all these three figures have 
notoriously increased (.194*, .438*** and 1.096t).  
 
Tertiary education, on the other hand, appears to defend young women (.523*) against 
unemployment in comparison to men (-.914*), which suggests that the post-Fordist 
crisis is possibly less relevant to women. This, in turn, indicates that the post-Fordist 
crisis relates not only to public sector work (more often occupied by women) but also to 
the transformations of cognitive capitalism itself. However, in Catholic countries at 
least the crisis is associated with higher rates in both positive and negative affectivity 
among young women, suggesting a higher emotional involvement by young women 
where the crisis is more materially related to finance and more quantitative in nature.  
Crisis	Policy	and	the	Two	Measures	of	Tension	
Therefore, regardless of the clear signs of the association between post-Fordism and 
negative socialisation effects and affect-representations, when measured in terms of 
social and age-specific tensions, there is still no indication that the effects related to 
higher education—either individually or contextually—should result in common 
acknowledgment or awareness. Awareness of young women is associated with the quest 
for social support, but these associations fail to attest context-level differences related to 
the general level of education. Also, at the individual level differences in education and 
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occupation do not indicate generational awareness that would be shared by the majority 
of the age cohort. One notable exception is the difficulties of young women in Catholic 
countries. They result in more affirmative and generally more affective reactions.  
 
Continuing with the models specific to youth, it is then interesting to see if there are 
other, economic or policy-related contexts that could indicate some level of age-related 
awareness induced by the crisis. Cabinet composition is one such a predictor: social 
democratic representation in the government increases positive affectivity, even if it is 
unable to reduce negative affectivity. It is also associated with lower social exclusion (-
.210**) and lower deprivation indices (-.084*) but only the latter effect is strengthened if 
the leftist cabinet has emerged in response to political change (-.071), whereas newly 
formed social democratic change has emerged as a result of higher exclusion of youth 
(.116*). Confirming my identification of the MCA-axes, such political reactions are also 
associated with a notable increase in the awareness of social tensions (.182***), but not 
with age-specific tensions.  
 
These effects add to the widespread effects of social expenditure and a higher tax base, 
whereas non-social expenditure again benefits only specific groups of young adults. 
Indeed, high social expenditure is associated with much lower unemployment among 
the youth (-.478**) and lower social exclusion (-.163*) in addition to higher employment 
(.205*). In addition, negative effects specifically among the youth also result from cuts 
to unemployment benefits. In effect, securing the public economy but also the broader 
accommodation of different groups greatly benefits young adults in terms of economic 
engagement by reducing youth unemployment (-.293***), social exclusion (-.106***) and 
insecurity due to fixed term contracts (-.348***) while simultaneously increasing 
employment among the young (.358***). On top of the relevance of the type of public 
expenditure on the overall economy, social expenditure has proved to be an extremely 
crucial tool in helping governments tackle the long-term consequences of averted 
socialisation processes and hysteresis, which could be all the more empathic among the 
youth without this policy.  
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Investment in social infrastructure is also more beneficial than direct job creation—the 
second main component of the ALMPs. Increase in incentives and rehabilitation is 
associated with lower youth unemployment (-.456***), whereas public job creation has 
poor results (.514***) particularly in high GDP countries (.768***). Yet even incentives 
are not positive in other respects: they undermine the ability to make ends meet among 
the young (-.500**) and contribute to negative affectivity despite the slightly abating 
effect on youth unemployment. Also, the market-oriented ALMPs contribute to 
employment only where the economies are anyway growing. Incentives are also of little 
help when the unemployment crisis is otherwise forceful. Regarding the awareness of 
conflict, incentives are associated with higher age-specific tensions (.182*) but less with 
general social tensions (-.125*), and the data suggests that this connection could be 
causal.  
 
Benefits of social expenditure for the youth, on the other hand, are not restricted to 
economic effects, but they are further visible on the level of subjective assessments 
including trust and tensions. Social expenditure indeed has a particularly strong effect 
on young adults’ ability to make ends meet (.613***), lowers tensions (-.205***) and 
negative affectivity (-.671**), even if to some extent it also appears to undermine 
opportunity seeking and positive affectivity (-.520**), which is precisely what economists 
often fear: that benefits make receivers non-innovative and indolent. At least according 
to the current data, however, this fear is unwarranted because the current economic 
conditions do not appear to resonate with the level on which positive affects are being 
abated.  
 
Table 9. The affective experiences of the crisis based on the most important national predictors. 
Non-social 
expenditure  
Social 
expenditure  GDP growth  
Post-Fordist 
economies 
Solitude  Affordability  Solitude  Deprivation Ignorance  Prosperity  Deprivation  Depression Deprivation  Complicance    Solitude Compliance  Affirmation    Indifference 
      Internalisation  
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Given these rather invariable results related to the positive effects of social expenditure 
—especially among the young—there are two possible interpretations. Either the 
disinvestment of the public economic project itself stands behind the dynamics that 
undermines economic prospects particularly in high-skilled economies. Crisis could 
then catalyse this effect precisely by inducing austerity both in the public sector but, like 
I have summarised in Table 9, also more broadly in the context of ‘post-Fordist’, 
cognitively demanding work. Alternatively, investment in public and social expenditure 
could help mitigate the effects of austerity without altering the dynamics related to the 
cognitive work itself.  
 
Whatever the case, long-term social conditions like inequality-measures have much less 
predictive power than the education-related predictors. Inequality-indicators are mixed 
indicators: life expectancy (cf. Therborn, 2013), for example, is not only an equality 
measure but it is also correlated with old age dependency ratio, health related costs, and 
many other economically important variables. As the latter might reduce unemployment 
rates (-.415***), life expectancy itself appears to be associated with contrary negative 
effects. There is then not necessarily a direct link between inequality and economic 
prospects, but such correlations identified by scholars like Piketty (2014a) could be 
dissolved into other mechanisms more directly related to demographic and economic 
structures such as the level of education or the age-dependency ratios. As a result of 
these mixed effects, life expectancy rate (equality measure) actually has an effect in the 
same direction as the GINI-index: both are associated with lower affectivity as a result 
of the crisis (both negative and positive). However, they affect crisis-awareness in the 
opposite directions, as the GINI is associated with lower recognition of social tensions 
whereas life expectancy with higher.  
 
Therefore, as a general conclusion about the effects of equality, it appears that the 
recognition of social tensions is a sign of higher equality, even if this is not directly 
linked to economic growth. Some level of equality thus seems to be a prerequisite for 
differences to be constructed and represented as social tensions or ‘inequalities’ (cf. 
Therborn, 2013). This only applies to the general measure of social inequality, however: 
lower ‘inter-generational equity’ (Quadagno, 1989), as measured by the recognition of 
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age-related tensions, follows from the life expectancy gap that is an inequality-measure, 
instead.  
 
If we look at age-related awareness specifically, it is clear that fixed term contracts have 
one of the clearest effects on inter-generational conflict (PCA13: .183***; e.g., Spain, the 
UK, Bulgaria, Cyprus and Portugal), especially because no similar effect overshadows 
social tensions. Given that the ‘underemployed’ young have at the same time become 
more discontent, we can say that disdain and the lack of sympathy are then connected 
with inter-generational representations. In contrast, sympathy and compliance that 
characterise the unemployed resonate with social but not age-related tensions.  
 
At the structural level, also high welfare costs (PAF2: -.275***) and social inclusion 
measures (-.134***) mitigate age-related tensions. By contrast, given how young women 
more often use health services than young men, countries associated with (health-
related) welfare cost hikes illustrate higher recognition of age-specific tensions among 
women (.161*). Age-tensions (-.237***) also outweigh general social tensions (-.101*) 
where (gender) economic participation is low, again emphasising the female-dominance 
of generational awareness.  
 
Gendered	Inter-Generational	Conflict?	
The recognition of age-related tensions is one of the most visible signs of inter-
generational conflict. Yet it is often not clear whether such awareness results in an 
adequate acknowledgment of the true mechanisms and causes that undermine the 
prospects of youth in contemporary, education-intensive economies in particular. Young 
adults appear to pay a double price for the crisis both because of welfare cuts and because 
of the lack of adequate jobs. At the same time, several factors including non-social 
public expenditure at the expense of social investment prove particularly consequential 
among the youth. Welfare cuts specifically increase the prevalence of long-term 
unemployment among the young, and despite the short-term effects on economic growth 
it is obvious that youth-specific effects are the most crucial ones when evaluating the 
effects of policy on long-term economic development.  
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One way to approach this question of consciousness is by looking at gender-specific 
differences, which appear to illustrate a certain level of fragmentation. For example, as a 
result of cuts to unemployment benefits, it is specifically the females who are more 
affirmative of social tensions (-.065***, -.064***). At the same time, they are less likely to 
‘act out’ which is illustrated by reduced affectivity. Previously, we also discovered that 
young women are more prone to seeking social support than men, even if they are at the 
same time possibly more internalising.  
 
In addition, there are two other relevant gender-specific interactions: social inclusion 
measures are associated with a much lower employment rate among young women (-
.374***). On the other hand, the higher gender pay gap has made young women’s 
unemployment rates decline (-.211***) suggesting that they can benefit from income 
elasticity in the supply side of the job market at the expense of young men (.082). 
Young women thus benefit both from a higher wag-gap but possibly also from certain 
inclusion measures that appear to better address marginalisation among women than 
men. Employment-related deprivation and unemployment are in this sense 
complementary conditions when compared at the group-level. There is then no 
inevitable reason why young women and men should experience the crisis in the same 
way, even if the differences on MCA-axes other than sufficiency proved out to be 
gender-independent.  
 
Another theme relevant to the possibility of inter-generational conflict from the gender-
perspective relates to the distinction between the pervasive crisis of work and the more 
urgent increase in unemployment rates, which appears to have catalysed and furthered 
distinctions stemming from the former. The PCA-model on youth unemployment now 
indicates that the pre-crisis level of unemployment (pervasive crisis) and the post-crisis 
effect (catalyst) retain opposite gender-interactions: the increase in the unemployment 
rates among young women is associated with the pervasive crisis, whereas young men 
are more affected where the unemployment-crisis has emerged more abruptly. 
Therefore, even if the general, crisis-induced increase of the youth-unemployment rates 
is unaffected by the pre-crisis rates, those rates appear to have a significant effect on the 
distribution of the current crisis of work between genders. This also illustrates why the 
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pervasive crisis -axis is associated with positive affectivity among women but not men: 
women can then view themselves more positively if they continue to stay in work in 
occupations where female youth-unemployment is more common (e.g., in Slovakia, 
Poland, Germany, Portugal and Belgium). 
 
This is not to say that women should be more affected by the pre-crisis rates more than 
men, but instead gender reflects the extent to which the current crisis catalyses the 
pervasive crisis of work or whether difficulties are more condensed. Given the 
associations of inter-generational recognition with gender (female) it seems then 
plausible to say that age-related tensions are more likely to occur where employment 
insecurity has materialised and the long-term changes in the employment process—
more often among young women than men—are in play.  
 
A	Generation	Experienced	as	a	‘Gap’	
When the ‘post-Fordist’ welfare states were still emerging in the 1990’s, an English 
electronic dance music group Prodigy coined the term ‘jilted generation’ to summarise 
the peer experiences of this particular age-cohort, which they believed to be defined 
through divisions rather than unity. The age of austerity made this term recently 
reappear (Howker and Malik, 2010), now mirroring the experiences of a group of young 
adults, who are sometimes referred to as the generation ‘gap’: young adults, living at a 
time when they are apt to encountering the widening divides and difficulties of 
fulfilment.  
 
But what precisely is this gap? How exactly are they divided? Are they divided between 
the ‘winners’ and the ‘losers’, like scholars used to argue (Jones, 2002), or between the 
unemployed and the underemployed young?  
 
It is obvious that such divisions, despite their exact nature, pose a challenge to the 
emergence of shared, ‘generational’ experiences that would help young adults reify their 
historically peculiar situation. On the other hand, acknowledging those very divides 
could help them specify a ‘common location in the social and historical process […] 
predisposing them for a certain characteristic mode of thought and experience, and a 
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characteristic type of historically relevant action', like Mannheim (1952: 291) argues in 
Problem of Youth in Modern Society.  
 
There are now many kinds of experiences of insecurity, and crisis-awareness itself is 
heterogeneous; often they occur in gender-specific ways. The experiences of youth 
across Europe are divided according to the prevalence of higher education, but it is 
likely that the post-Fordist organisation of labour and the cognitive work induce ‘gaps’ 
among the youth instead of resulting with their acknowledgment. Precisely by being 
‘gapped’ as a generation, the young today do not necessarily experience a 'co-operative 
process of group life in which everyone unfolds their knowledge within a framework of a 
common fate, a common activity, and the overcoming of common difficulties' 
(Mannheim, 1936, 26). Instead, the post-Fordist crisis of work appears to contribute to 
the difficulties of the young in constructing and reconstructing themselves and society 
(Bauman, 1991).  
 
The question of shared generational experiences is then quite ambiguous. On the one 
hand, it appears implausible to assume that such ‘gapped’ experiences of the young 
should result in experiences of ‘common fate’ or historical ‘location’. However, because 
the lack of recognition and rootlessness characterise the experiences of specific groups of 
young adults, the ‘gap’ itself may induce shared experiences that may compete to 
represent ‘generational’ experiences in the restricted groups at least (cf. Edmunds and 
Turner, 2002). If the ‘generation gap’ used to define youth in a way deprived from the 
resources similar to older adults (cf. Feuer, 1969; Mead and Taylor, 1970), it is now 
possible that the experiences internal to specific age-cohorts are themselves ‘gapped’.  
 
On the other hand, in order to avoid ‘generationalism’ (Wohl, 1979, 5; Hazlett, 1998: 
8–9) that treats a given age-group as a generation without verifying whether their 
members truly share a common consciousness and stand out as an ‘interactive class’ 
(Hacking, 2000; Martínez, 2009) rather than only as a ‘class on paper’, we should ensure 
that the group bears a common ‘will to power’ (Bourdieu, 1985: 735, follows 
Schopenhauer’s definition of ‘class as will and representation’). It is thus open whether 
the ‘gapped’ experiences could induce such will and who could best represent it. In fact, 
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it follows from Bourdieu’s own theory of ‘habitus’ that generations never exist in a way 
that would invariably represent the will of all the members of a specific group. Instead, 
those representations are complex processes and subpopulations compete to represent 
such will from their own perspectives.  
 
At the same time, the question of generations relates to that of ‘generativity’: the 
formation of will and representation always requires a certain level of ‘regulated 
improvisation’ (Bourdieu, 1977: 78) because the conditions of possibility of any group 
(what it needs to provide, what it may demand) are subject to change. In the context of 
welfare, youth is generally required to improvise in response to the conflicting situations 
overshadowed by welfare cuts and lack of work. They need to provide by paying taxes at 
the same time as their opportunities to work are undermined by regulatory change 
(flexicurisation) among other things. Therefore, the ‘gap’ between the experiences of the 
un- and the underemployed young demand ‘generative’ engagement regardless of 
whether they recognise themselves as a generation. 
Deviations,	Dispositions	and	the	Symbolic	
But should the youth emerge as an interactive, willing, and generative group, at least in 
specific contexts, its ‘common fate’ cannot be accessed or articulated by looking at 
individual representations alone. This is because a range of other variables, which have 
little to do with the generational question in particular, are anyway connected with 
generational outcomes. Therefore, even if the individual level predictors of age-related 
tensions cannot as such demonstrate the existence of generational experiences, certain 
(context-specific) representations of ‘common will’ can still be distilled out by the means 
of contextual comparisons.  
 
I am particularly interested in how countries—and particularly the youth there—deviate 
from what would be expected based on multilevel models (particularly the economic and 
social predictors) and thus reflect more ‘symbolic’ representations of the crisis. In fact, 
the question of such ‘symbolic’ phenomena is pivotal to Bourdieu’s own theory of 
‘habitus’, and in this sense the task is now to compare how youth is being inhabited in a 
way that the ‘objectivating’ dynamics of the field—as represented by the multilevel 
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analysis—fails to recognise. The question of ‘habitus’ or ‘generations’ then emerges in a 
nationally embodied way.  
 
To this end, I compared how a set of national averages differ and are thus ‘decentered’ 
or ‘disposited’ from what would be expected by multilevel models alone67. The 
deviations were first calculated for 18 different models/outcomes. After aggregating the 
data, I applied principal component analysis to reduce the dimension and to group the 
‘dispositions’ so as to present them in the most accessible way.  
 
Six factors resulted: those related to unemployment, employment, deprivation, 
employment insecurity (health limitations and the prevalence of fixed term contracts), 
social tensions and age tensions. Youth-specific deviations (positive/negative affectivity) 
were left out, but it appears that positive dispositions are independent of the above six 
factors68, whereas abnormalities in negative affectivity are reducible to dispositions 
related to deprivation and social tensions. Note that the national dispositions related to 
employment and unemployment are independent. However, the most important 
deviations relate to subjectively perceived deprivation and insecurity (Figure 33) as well 
as on age tensions and social tensions (Figure 34).  
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Figure 33. National deviations from multilevel models by deprivation and insecurity 
(goo.gl/hOlTKl). 
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In terms of economic dispositions, it is notable that there are two trajectories in terms of 
deprivation and employment insecurity: insecurity has been realised to a greater extent in 
Sweden, Austria, Luxemburg and Portugal, whereas the countries overshadowed by 
deprivation include Portugal and Greece but also Slovakia and Denmark (in comparison 
to expectations). Given the low expectations and the benefits of welfare states illustrate 
deprivation less than expected (Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Hungary).  
 
From the generational perspective, however, the lines of flight related to social and age-
related tensions is the most interesting question. Even if Greece and Portugal score 
close to each other in terms of insecurity and deprivation, they are far apart in other 
respects, particularly in relation to age. Indeed, Portugal is disposited towards age-
related tensions whereas Greece scores the lowest. The Netherlands and Sweden are 
also disposited towards inter-generational conflict. Figure 34 now illustrates that it 
might not be accidental that Sweden and Portugal have rapidly moved in the direction 
of employment insecurity, while the Netherlands was situated there already in 2007.   
 
Young adults in Sweden and Portugal are also the most affirmative about the crisis, and 
this now appears to be connected to age-related representations there. In the opposite 
direction, the Greek youth are extremely non-exaggerated about age-related tensions, 
and they also reflected an externalising and more ignorant attitude in the MCA-
analysis. Therefore, it is questionable whether generational grass root consciousness 
should be emerging in Greece, despite the apparent political mobilisation illustrated by 
Syriza. As a result, even if progressive left coalitions like Syriza in Greece then demand 
a profound reorganisation of welfare, they still refer to it from an extra-national and 
thus in some sense an externalising point of view instead of being able to rearticulates 
welfare in terms of how to even out internal dissimilarities and make the welfare state 
sustainable. Also in Spain, Bulgaria, Denmark and the UK the recognition of age-
related tensions is lower than expected, resulting in a possibly similar tendency towards 
‘externalisation’.  
 
By contrast, deprivation does not similarly result in having any consistent effect on 
either social or age-specific tensions: for example Latvia and Hungary are similarly 
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disposited towards lower deprivation, but social conflict in Latvia is notoriously high 
and opposite to Hungary, where the recognition of social tensions appears to be limited.  
 
In order to see whether these deviations reflect particular groups of youth, the variables 
were similarly modelled specifically among the young unemployed and among the 
young employees on fixed term contracts. Among the unemployed, it appears that social 
tensions are instead strengthened in Estonia, Germany and to some extent in Finland, 
the Netherlands and the Czech Republic. Inter-generational awareness in contrast is 
not unexpectedly high in any contexts among the unemployed despite a slight 
exaggeration in Sweden, the Netherlands, Cyprus, Germany and Ireland. 
 
Those on fixed term contracts, in turn, are more divided in their ‘dispositions’. 
Discontent (shortage of positive feeling, high social tensions) is the most exaggerated 
among young temporary employees in Bulgaria, Ireland, Cyprus, Latvia and Spain. 
Deprivation (high negative feeling, low affordability) instead characterises insecure, 
young workers in Estonia, Cyprus, Austria, Slovakia and Hungary. Therefore, similarly 
as the young are divided in respect to their experiences of unemployment and 
underemployment, it also appears that national contexts behave in quite diffuse ways. It 
then seems that even if generational ‘will’ is supported more by insecurity than by 
deprivation, such effects are context-specific and it would be premature to talk about a 
single generation of the ‘precarious’, underemployed young on the level of the EU as a 
whole. The most promising contexts for such ‘will and representation’ to emerge are 
Portugal and Sweden: two different extremes representing both the quantitative and 
qualitative crises of employment. 
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Figure 34. National deviations from model-expectations by social and age-specific tensions 
(goo.gl/dCO6RV). 
 295 
  
 296 
 
 
 
 
	
	
	
	
Discussion	
 
 
 	
 297 
	
	
	
Summary	of	Findings	
 
The current economic crisis in Europe is standardly articulated as a more or less direct 
consequence of the global financial crisis, which in turn followed the collapse of Bear 
Sterns and Lehman Brothers. It is argued that the distrust in the banking sector lead to 
economic ‘frictions’ resulting in the global production slump (Hall, 2010). This, indeed, 
seems to have been the case but only till March 2009, when the global economy started 
to recover.  
 
No similar recovery occurred in Europe, however, suggesting that the prevailing causal 
narrative is only half of the story. Indeed, ‘real economic’ factors like higher 
unemployment rates before the financial crisis explain why the crisis turned into a 
sovereign-debt crisis in some countries but not others. As an alternative to the standard 
‘financial’ narrative, my thesis has sought to locate the crisis from the point of view of 
these national and group-level differences. Based on this comparison I concluded that 
fiscal measures like austerity, which is conventionally viewed as a way to counter act the 
sovereign-debt crisis, could in fact contribute to it (particularly the cuts to social 
expenditure).  
 
Based on the quality of life data, my study has attempted to locate the crisis also interms 
of the subjective experiences and perceptions of the economy. Based on this data there is 
another ‘qualitative’ crisis narrative that is equally relevant to the youth. It relates 
particularly to the so-called ‘flexicurisation’ process, whereby fixed term contracts 
increasingly dominate the job market. I demonstrated that the associated effects of 
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insecurity are particularly visible in the so-called ‘post-Fordist’ economies, where the 
level of education is high, although in such economies, ‘flexicurisation’ characterises 
elementary work increasingly as well. 
 
Reflecting the relevance of these two narratives to the current economic crisis, the level 
of institutional crisis awareness is high in both groups of countries, the ones 
overshadowed by either quantitative (e.g. unemployment) or qualitative (e.g. 
flexicurisation) tendencies. Crisis awareness is divided also at the individual level: 
between the unemployed and otherwise insecure youth. Those lacking a job believe in 
change, but they are at the same time more compliant and sympathetic, thus unable to 
articulate the position of the youth specifically. Those in insecure jobs, by contrast, tend 
to be more aware of age-related tensions, but they have little faith in the possibility of 
political change, reporting solitude and disdain. These divisions question the possibility 
of either a general or ‘generational’ understanding of the crisis.  
 
The general misrecognition of the crisis also means that the national crisis policies have 
been far from optimal. Most policies address only the ‘quantitative’ crisis (e.g. 
unemployment), resulting in measures like non-social fiscal stimulation which could 
actually further the spreading of insecurity, contributing to or even ‘performing’ the 
qualitative aspects of the crisis. At the same time, deprivation, depression, discontent 
and ignorance have followed the cuts to social compensations, especially among the 
youth, even if the analysis showed that in purely economic terms such cuts are pointless: 
social expenditure hardly explains the expansion of total government expenditure, 
which, instead, reflects changes in non-social expenditure. 
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Chapter	10	
The	End	that	Never	Ends—A	Critique	of	the	Neoclassical	Public	
Economy	
 
As of writing these concluding paragraphs, it was not the first or the second but the 
third time that Europe was calling for the end of the crisis—a resolution for Greeks’ 
never ending debt trap and a new direction for European economic governance to 
unfold in. Crisis-media like the famous Euro crisis live blog by the Guardian was once 
again at the centre of attention: the Finnish government was about to ‘collapse over 
Greek bailout’, while Angela Merkel mentally ‘waterboardered’ Alexis Tsipras, the 
Greece prime minister through the night of July 13. ‘Enough is enough’, Italy then told 
Merkel, as the country was irritated by German domination. The Eurozone was about 
to break up, all until Donald Tusk theatrically interrupted Merkel and Tsipras as they 
were about to walk out the negotiation: ‘sorry’, he said, ‘but there is no way you are 
leaving this room’.  
 
This episode reminds me of what Félix Guattari wrote in the 1980’s: that Greece is the 
black sheep of Europe, and that Europe needs such a black sheep to defend itself from 
Franco-German domination. Yet after July 2015 we must ask whether Greece still 
serves in this old role. Fearing the collapse of the Greek banking system, Tsipras 
capitulated: he is even said to have undergone a panic attack in the night following the 
‘Oxi’ vote, when the Greek people decided to refuse the bailout deal. Yet he gained the 
support of his own cabinet (votes 4–2) against Varoufakis’ alternative plan to honour the 
spirit of that vote—planning to use Greece’s tax account system as a new banking 
network to serve the most immediate duties of the government.  
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Tsipras then agreed to an unforeseen 50 billion worth privatisation program in an 
economically miserable situation overshadowed by depressed property prices. Tsipras 
believed that Germans wanted Greece out of the Eurozone so badly that the only way 
to maintain (his) integrity was to stay in at any cost. Yet the German Federal Minister 
of Finance Wolfgang Schäuble later commented on—and this is where he actually 
appears to agree with Varoufakis—that the conditions of the third bailout program are 
so devastating for Greece that the bail-out program itself is the surest way for the 
country to fall outside the Eurozone. Seeking to appeal to even the most ‘moralist’ 
regions of Europe, the program, which was actually written with the help of François 
Hollande, the French socialist Prime Minister, is more sporadic than anyone expected, 
even though it was still barely sufficient in reassuring countries like Germany, Finland 
and Slovakia. Only time will tell what it is worth of.  
 
We never know what would have happened had Tusk remained silent at that epochal 
moment at around 4 am, when the Eurozone was about to come apart. Yet such 
historical moments come and pass: only two months later, when the Syriza-based 
coalition was re-elected, few Europeans were paying attention to Greece any more. The 
political momentum had disappeared. The market shifted its focus wholly on China and 
the falling oil prices. And despite all the fears about the proposed Grexit, Goldman 
Sachs had actually suggested much earlier in June that the turbulence in the market was 
to have followed the distress over the sovereign-bond buying programs by the ECB 
rather than the situation of Greece. Some even suggested that trying to force Greece out 
was a way to motivate the continuation of the newly adopted quantitative easing 
programs by the ECB but which soon found motivation elsewhere, from global 
markets.  
 
Whatever the case, the ‘will’ of the Greek people—as represented by their elected 
Syriza-led cabinet—turned out to be more populist and conservative than many had 
believed. Yet even in the September re-elections, the Greek people had virtually no 
other choice but to maintain their support for Syriza, even if it could only bring about a 
third round of austerity.  
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Ends	of	Austerity	
The roots of this study date back to 2010. My original research question focused on the 
technical aspects of the crisis like the creation of the Basel III bank regulation standards, 
reflecting the prevailing contention that the global recession was driven by the failure of 
the financial market to absorb the American subprime mortgage crisis. But as the 
European crisis never passed over, I became increasingly sceptical of the exact links 
between real economic struggles and the financial turbulence.  
 
My study has sought to provide an alternative narrative to the common position. In 
comparison to the US, the initial actions in the EU were slow and uncoordinated, and 
the ECB in particular lacked in its capacity to ‘monetise’ losses. This extended the 
unemployment crisis in Europe when the US was already returning to growth 
(Appelbaum, 2011). Public discourse was at the same time fulfilled with crisis rhetoric, 
the banking crisis being taken as a generic cause that could ‘necessitate’ all sorts of 
austerity.  
 
Given these questions, I decided to look at the crisis from a very different point of 
view—as something rooted in the ‘real economic’ process, ignoring the generic, financial 
narrative. It became an empirical question to ask why the crisis is sustained in some 
countries rather than others. The comparative approach demonstrated that the global 
banking crisis does not play a similar role in all the EU-countries. Latvia and Portugal, 
for instance, faced serious unemployment crises due to the withdrawal of global capital, 
but their banking sectors are very different. What is more common to both countries is 
that their policies have been driven by austerity. The comparative account has shown 
that national policy processes do make a difference, even if the effects of the ‘financial’ 
crisis are often articulated as inevitable or unavoidable.  
 
If the third bailout package of Greece is supposed to put an end to this never ending 
crisis of Europe—engendering hopes similarly as the two earlier packages in 2010 and 
2012—let me briefly discuss the ends aimed by these ‘crisis-resolution’ packages. Of 
course, immediately during the crisis the only end for Syriza’s populist leftist coalition 
might have been just to avoid the collapse of the banking system, or of ‘capitalist 
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realism’ like Mark Fischer (2009) says, as the end of capitalism is now unimaginable 
even to the left, who also believe that it is in the unambiguous interest of (all) the people 
that the monetary system is saved at whatever cost. Quite pertinently, Fredric Jameson 
(2005, 199) summarises the current condition of political rhetoric by saying that ’it is 
easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of capitalism’69. 
 
At the same time, national economies have become increasingly dependent on and 
dominated by the financial system—at least when it comes to political rhetoric and 
beliefs about the consequences of monetary default. The actual outcomes are of course 
unknown, but the proposed scenarios have a genuine effect on policy (cf. Uprichard, 
2010), as the risk of ‘debt-bondage’ looms over entire nation-states. Hence the crisis is 
not only about the sustainability of contemporary banking; it is also about political will.  
 
Much remains to be said about the year-long intergovernmental process that led to the 
third rout of Greece, but it entrenches the fact that the problems of the Greek 
‘economy’ are as much political as they are economical70. For example, the ECB grounds 
its decision on the changed solvency situation of the Greek banks. Yet nothing material 
besides the political conflict had changed after Greece announced the upcoming 
referendum. The ECB thus publicly confirmed that it would shape its actions according 
to political processes, and therefore gave up its political (or should I say metapolitical) 
independence even if in a way backed up by the Maastricht Treaty.  
 
Taking us back to the theme that we put aside in the first chapter—the discourse on the 
economic rather than that ‘of the economy’—it is not only the qualitative and quantitative 
crises of the ‘economy’ that divide Europe but also the two opposite schools as to what 
is exactly the most ‘economical’ response to the crisis. One of them is represented by the 
macro-economic visions like those expressed by Varoufakis, now a professor of 
economic theory, who recognises the detrimental consequences of austerity. The other 
side is promoted by such German politicians and thinkers like Wolfgang Schäuble, the 
sitting finance minister, or Hans-Werner Sinn, who is a professor in public economy 
and also serves as the President of the Ifo Institute for Economic Research as well as as 
a member of the German Economy Ministry’s advisory council.  
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The latter view opposes further Eurozone integration based on his negative views about 
the integration process internal to Germany, which Sinn argues to have been 
detrimental to the German economy over the past two decades. This might sound 
arrogant given how the German economy has actually grown at much faster pace than 
the rest of Europe during that time, but the benefits of integration could be indirect and 
are not affirmed by Sinn71, who lists only explicit statistics and speculates on the level of 
growth in these two areas as if they could be studied as separate, independent economies 
(it is like asking what is the IQ of only the right side of a human brain). Agent-based 
accounts on the migration patterns after the collapse of the Berlin Wall give quite a 
different story which Sinn’s simplistic economising, rationalistic account on individual 
behaviour obviously misses (cf. Heiland, 2003).    
 
Of course, such speculations are necessarily counter-factual, as the two Germanies are 
now fundamentally connected not only economically but also politically and 
demographically. The nominally higher growth in the West part could reflect for 
example the relocation of businesses and capital from the other side or other exchanges 
misspecified by Sinn’s micro-economic account, which is rather like the one of an 
accountant. Therefore, even when dominated by one part, we should consider the 
dynamics and growth rate of the economic region as a whole instead of simplistically 
comparing the nominal rates on these two parts. Varoufakis, by contrast, takes the 
‘economic’ itself as a starting point as he promotes a more democratic view over Europe, 
while emphasising the role of aggregate demand and other macro-economic indicators.  
 
Therefore, one of the pivotal political conflicts in contemporary Europe emerges from 
the discontent overshadowing Germany’s own integration process. At the same time, 
the conflict between micro- and macro-economic approaches to the public economy has 
become increasingly imminent.  
 
Culture,	Institutions	and	Networks	
Sinn’s view on German growth makes no reference to culture and the social benefits of 
the integration process that, according to Varoufakis, should be widespread. But also in 
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relation to economic growth itself the role of culture and institutions is now broadly 
debated in the field of economics. In Why Nations Fail?, Acemogly and Robinson 
(2012) pick on Max Weber’s (2001) argument on the Protestant Ethic by seeking to 
demonstrate that the institutional framework of market policy should play a major role 
leaving no room for cultural differences. Yet to Weber’s defence, he analysed economic 
change at a vastly different time-scale. Also, the question of ‘institutions’ is very 
differently framed in economic sociology than in economics (e.g., Nee and Swedberg, 
2008). To the latter, institutions mainly refer to the organisation of production and 
industry along with labour market regulation, tax-policy and the structure of 
investment, instead of acknowledging how the market is both culturally and politically 
embedded (cf., Fligstein, 1996).  
 
My work has contrasted these two perspectives even if the institutional differences 
considered relate to welfare and the allocation of public expenditure rather than on 
conventional economic indicators. Considering these in the context of the two 
temporalities—the crisis as an abrupt change and as a catalyst of long-term change—it 
is quite intriguing that religion appears to engender differences of the latter kind in 
particular: culture has expedited the crisis by bringing forth latent differences. However, 
it is the abrupt, pan-European crisis that manifests the peculiar importance of European 
institutions, thus contributing to the immediacy and abruptness of the crisis. 
 
Of course, European culture and cultural differences are in part mirrored in the diffuse 
institutional framework of European government (Théret, 1999). They can play a 
crucial role also in the prolongation of the abrupt, pan-European crisis and it is thus not 
possible to separate culture and institutions like Acemogly and Robinson attempt to do. 
Instead, there is an entire ‘network’ of institutional, cultural but also individual reasons 
that make the crisis in Europe contingent.  
 
Among the EU-institutions, the ECB plays an interesting role as it walks the tightrope  
seeking to keep the Eurozone together. This is difficult under the rules of the 
Maastricht Treaty, which, however, seem to loosen year after another. For example, 
after stepping into the office Mario Draghi, the current President of the ECB, was 
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quite open about how direct sovereign-bond purchases would be ’against the Treaty’. 
Yet it is precisely such quantitative easing policies that the ECB now executes following 
its fear over the destabilisation of society at large (cf. Judt 2010; Engelen, et al 2011). 
Greece just plays one part in the justification-process over the controversial policies as 
the German government and the Bundesbank have resisted such loose monetary policy 
since the birth of the common currency.  
 
On the other hand, Goldman itself organised the accounting tricks to enable Greece to 
enter the currency zone. This happened at the same time as Mario Draghi was directing 
the Goldman Sachs International. It is as if Goldman sent its former vice-chairman to 
clean up its own mess (he and Henry Paulson left Goldman the same year, and the 
latter took over the U.S. Treasury). Furthermore, Draghi’s PhD in economics was 
supervised by Franco Modigliani and Robert Solow, whereas Lucas Papademos served 
as a top research assistant to Modigliani, and he was the Vice President of the European 
Central Bank in 2002 to 2010. If nothing else, Draghi and Papademos, both working in 
powerful positions pivotal to Greece’s euro-entry, came from the very same circles. 
When it comes to the current economic policy in Europe, it thus appears that personal 
networks and connections could have a prominent influence in addition to the cultural 
and institutional peculiarities of Europe.  
 
Utilities	of	State	Expenditure:	A	Neoclassical	Perspective	
Based on the complex, often personal networks operating in the EU, the conflict 
between micro- and macro-economic perspectives that the crisis has escalated—or 
should I say the agency-structure to which sociologists are more accustomed—is 
irreducible to culture and institutions. However, mainstream economics continues to be 
dominated by the so-called neo-classical synthesis that emerged as a combination of 
neoclassical micro-economic theory (based on rational actors with measurable price 
elasticity and convex use-value functions) with certain macro-economic components 
stemming from Keynes’ theory, which sought to answer how to increase aggregate 
demand (through state interventions) in order to put labour power into service.  
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In the light of the crisis, neither one of these two, micro- or macro-economic schools of 
thought as such seem to be able to frame the ‘public’ itself as an economic agent. In 
these discourses, the public is constructed as an actor embodied by the production of 
‘public’ goods and services, of course, but while all the other agents are assumed to be 
more or less rational, the ‘public’ economic actors are not. They are reduced into a 
reactive role, as if public deliberation itself did not actively and rationally shape the 
market.  
 
Taxes and public services are then viewed as the necessary evil rather than contributing 
and productive agents. And even if some international comparisons have established 
that public spending might be inefficient from the point of view of aggregate growth, 
the studies focus largely on the developing economies: nothing guarantees that the 
private sector should turn any more prosperous at least in the current context. 
Furthermore, nothing suggests that the reduction of public spending (independent of its 
type) should have the opposite effect, making the national economy more ‘efficient’.  
 
At the same time, state spending is not a one-dimensional phenomenon but, as I have 
illustrated, the decision between ‘social’ and ‘non-social’ expenditure appears to predict 
radically different outcomes. Indeed, as discussed before, during the current crisis social 
expenditure appears to have resulted in lower unemployment among the young, lower 
social exclusion index and higher employment (not to mention its effects on the ability 
to make ends meet, the lowering of social tensions and of negative affectivity among the 
youth in particular). Precisely because social expenditure tends to increase as a function 
of the unemployment crisis that then mitigates its gains, the actual benefits could be 
even higher. Similar influence was in part also illustrated by effects related to tax on 
income and wealth: unlike what economists generally believe, higher tax rates were 
associated with more accommodating economies. In contrast, the effects of non-social 
expenditure were identified as being opposite: higher social exclusion, deprivation and 
various negative effects on psycho-social affects.  
 
Therefore, even if the macro-economic benefits of social expenditure are not 
conventionally accepted72, there is supporting evidence that their benefits could 
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outweigh the effects of either non-social expenditure or tax-reductions, both of which 
attempt to contribute to material production with less emphasis either on equality or 
security—the contents of the qualitative crisis narrative. Social policy research has 
rightly recognised that the European social models need ‘more of the social’ (Rubery, 
2011)—not just to defend individuals but to allow the economy itself to grow. Yet it is 
unlikely that over the next few years politics should evolve in this direction to 
accommodate people more efficiently. It has been argued that the state may ‘maintain 
its protections [only] by continuous activity’—this applies not only in warfare but also 
welfare states can survive only through continuous investment in ‘the social’. What is at 
risk is no less than the ‘social bond’ itself (cf. Castel, 2003: 376).  
 
From the point of view of Sinn’s and Varoufakis’ debate, then, the former’s 
desubstantialising point of view articulates the state neither as a proper financial nor an 
economic actor (in the micro-economic sense), for he argues that investment decisions 
can only be efficient when made by private investors: unlike the state, Sinn claims, 
private actors alone bear actual financial risks. This is a weird statement: as if the Greek 
government, for example, did not suffer from the realisation of financial risk par 
excellence. But Sinn still believes the contrary. States and governments, he claims, are at 
no risk and thus their decisions are not just uninformed (as are any single actor’s 
decisions) but based on entirely different principles. This view is overtly arrogant, of 
course, as if demographic governments would never recognise the actual risks borne by 
the people. It is a view that is actually critical about state expenditure only to conceal 
infinite state-centeredness: as if states were entirely free of economic and political 
contingency. Sinn never answers why the state should not similarly seek to maximise its 
utilities as any other actor does.  
 
It is one thing to ask what these ‘utilities’ of the state are—economic, political, or 
governmental—and whether the public or the private economies can best serve these 
utilities. By separating both the public and private economic actors as well as the 
national product attributed separately to East and West Germany, Sinn defines such 
utilities again from a micro-economic perspective. What is missing is the actual link 
between the spatially distributed, micro-economic product and national growth, which 
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is an aggregate figure: the distributional question is again dissociated from the question 
of macro-level prospects (cf. Piketty, 2014a). Even if the Eastern part has continued to 
stagnate despite all the efforts, we should not ignore the benefits of the elevated 
absorption of the domestic product and of the diffusion of ideas resulting from the 
reunification of Germany. Yet somehow Sinn believes in the right to use this process as 
an analogue justifying his opposition towards any direct transfer of funds from Northern 
to Southern Europe, as if these transfers (rather than their absence) were the true cause 
of stagnation.  
 
The anxieties over the German reunification process could then be one of the actual 
reasons why there is no political resolution in sight, as the German government plays a 
major part in the context of the crisis-resolution. Needless to say, the Germans’ not only 
oppose more inter-European social policy and solidarity, but since the beginning they 
have resisted the implementation of quantitative easing policies like those adopted in 
the UK and the US. In result of this rather ‘Protestant’ view on the economy, Wolfgang 
Schäuble personally drafted the three ‘draconian’ austerity packages for Greece (2010, 
2012, 2015).  
 
And the Germans have played their cards right: the rest of Europe but also the IMF 
now follow their lead. Whenever we discuss governmentality in the current context—
the ‘way of explaining the establishment and exercise of political power’ by definition 
(Mitchell, 2006)—the peculiar position of Germany must not be overlooked (any more 
than the pre-institutional networks of power traversing between the public and private, 
i.e., Draghi and Paulson). I will next consider an alternative perspective that views the 
‘public’ as an active agent that can both make investments and be subject to them.  
 
The	Public	Economy:	A	Structure	and	an	Agent		
As discussed above, I argue that the neoclassical distinction between the public and 
private spheres is possibly erroneous. It is readily assumed that ‘public’ economic actors 
are not governed by the same, rational norms of agency that, by definition, cover all the 
other actors. Public actors are defined rather as being what private agency is not: 
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contingent and irrational. Resistance towards the public economy (e.g., taxation) at the 
same time is constitutive to private economic action.  
 
Social investment and expenditure is just one example. Even if our data indicates that it 
has been wise to invest in people, many governments have opted to invest in material, 
non-social targets instead. Social expenditure at the same time is viewed as a cost or 
liability. I would then like to make a little thought-trial. How to think about social 
investment in terms of rationality and as governed by the laws of the market?  
 
Social investment is seldom viewed from such a point of view, that is, as a measure 
permitting the state to reduce its own contingencies. I do not like to call it public 
investment, because the public economy consists of a variety of goods that might have 
nothing to do with the state, welfare or the ‘social’. Whatever the case, it is possible to 
argue that the state is separate from the public or ‘the people’: social and non-social 
expenditure differ in respect to whether the allocation of resources is orchestrated by the 
public (spending welfare-money or services) or the state (central coordination of 
spending).  
 
Non-social expenditure thus coordinates the transformation of money into purchasing 
power through central planning—a mechanism whose economic efficiency became 
widely criticised after the 1950’s. By contrast, social expenditure (including transfers but 
also the public services available when the subject chooses them voluntarily) coordinates 
or rearticulates the public flow of consumption very differently: as if already part of the 
personal, private economy. In both forms of social expenditure (transfers and services) 
this rearticulation of money as purchases refers to the public allocation of needs as 
opposed to non-social, state-centred allocation. 
 
There are two things to learn from this analogue. First, the form of the argument is 
similar to what is generally exercised in economic theory, even if it now applies to the 
allocation of needs rather than supply (from the market perspective there should not be 
any substantial difference between the supply and demand sides). Second, this line of 
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argument acknowledges the relevance of absorption and expenditure in propagating 
economic growth: something theorised by social scientists like Bataille (1985).  
 
In effect, social expenditure serves very different functions and structures aggregate-
demand very differently from non-social expenditure. Empirical evidence in turn 
supports the idea that the allocation of resources in the case of social expenditure could 
be more efficient, that is, they could better serve towards such ends as economic growth 
but also wellbeing and social inclusion—all of which are central from the point of view 
of welfare. The social allocation of expenditure also helps mitigate the peculiar, negative 
effects on youth. It then contributes to long-term prospects by maintaining the existing 
patterns of economic socialisation.   
 
Yet the actual emphasis most governments put on non-social fiscal stimulation 
illustrates how economic governance is driven by ideas stemming only from the 
production-side of the economy. This results in an unwarranted hierarchy not only 
between the public and private agencies but also between production and absorption—
two sides of the market that pure market theory conceives as structurally symmetric. I 
do not claim that this symmetry should hold sway but rather that we should not 
overlook the relevance of economic absorption for agency and growth altogether. 
Instead, it should be an empirical object of investigation to answer what particular 
functions the two kinds of agencies serve for national growth and wellbeing. Indeed, 
even if it would be wrong to conclude that social expenditure should result in the most 
efficient allocation of supply and demand in all markets, it would be equally wrong to 
unequivocally associate social expenditure with ‘inefficiency’ and unproductive macro-
economy, while praising tax reductions and the downsizing of the public economy 
instead.  
 
In this respect, the ideas and interests that currently drive economic change in the EU 
seem to be overshadowed by somewhat unempirical arguments: social security and 
welfare are seldom understood as efficient ways of allocating demand but as wasted 
resources, instead. The welfare state in turn is never viewed as a ‘technology’ that could, 
in the best case, ‘perform’ agency and growth. Security in particular is not viewed as an 
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engine of efficiency but rather the contrary. This is because in mainstream theory the 
question of efficiency concerns production and skills, not the allocation of absorption 
and need. It is true that insecurity could contribute to more efficient allocation of 
production and labour power (although the data indicates that incentives-based policies 
could have an opposite effect), but at the same time it undermines other aspects of the 
economy that are equally pertinent.  
 
Finally, in order to understand in which historical contexts the benefits of social 
expenditure have been the most emphatic, we cannot ignore the fact that the public 
sector is still by far the biggest contributor to the ‘service economy’. Insofar as we assume 
the post-industrial societies to be driven by the production (and absorption) of services 
rather than only material technology and innovation, social expenditure can broaden the 
publics that can access services and partake in the allocation of public resources (through 
transfers) in order to allocate purchasing power into service-production in the most 
efficient way.  
 
Therefore, if the state-economies are increasingly blamed for too narrow, centrally 
organised structure of supply and the benefits of fiscal stimulation are thus rightly 
criticised, the same does not need to apply to social expenditure. At least, in the current 
context there are indications that the public is by far more efficient in allocating demand 
and absorbing various kinds of services than private economic agents (e.g., through 
insurance policies). On the other hand, this phenomenon is at least not wholly new. 
Instead, it has been long recognised in economic anthropology that public spending and 
consumption of resources is an important feature of ceremonies and other social events 
(Durkheim, 2001) including potlatch73 as one of the most extreme forms (e.g., Mauss, 
2002).  
 
Publicly	Embedded	Debt-Crisis	
I started this thesis with the question of how best to frame the crisis beyond the most 
economistic, financial and technically laden interpretations of either its causes or 
consequences. Was it truly triggered by the collapse of Lehman Brothers, I asked, or 
was this financial meltdown itself caused by something more imminent and profound 
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like the reinforcement of global inequality (Lysandrou, 2011) or the changes in the 
prevailing employment process (Castel, 2003). Is the crisis itself essentially a financial 
one? Not necessarily, I argue, at least from the point of view of global derivatives 
markets, which are now larger than ever as if the crisis never happened. Well, someone 
could say that it was such a crisis, but that its financial aspects were rapidly overcome as 
a result of the policies favourable to financial markets. Had states decided to exercise 
‘sovereignty’ differently, contemporary banking could look very different.  
 
Another question that I asked concerns the reason why the crisis is particularly 
prolonged in Europe. Of course, we should compare Europe with other economic 
regions in order to understand the specificity of the continent as a whole. However, we 
can also identify patterns internal to Europe that regulate the variation of outcomes 
across contexts, even if the crisis overall appears to overshadow them. Most importantly, 
the crisis is differently sustained in countries characterised either by ‘quantitative’ or 
‘qualitative’ crises of wellbeing in addition to the group-specific differences in affect.  
 
But what is common to the crisis, besides its various socio-cultural embeddings (Castells 
et al., 2012), is that it has questioned the sustainability of public economies. If the crisis as 
a whole should be brought down to a single question of judgment, besides employment, 
‘social citizenship’ and welfare, it is about the ‘public’ above all. The ‘public’ (economy) 
is framed as a liability rather than an asset; it is embodied as debt and much less as 
wealth.  
 
At the same time, given how debt is a moral affair that more or less directly affects 
economic agency as understood broadly, the study has come to support the conclusion I 
already hypothesised in the first chapter: the question of wellbeing is about politics and 
rhetoric, not just about ‘the economy’. If sovereign-debt is one of the most visible 
illustrations of this process whereby the ‘public’ increasingly ‘destroys’ its ‘own creativity’ 
(given for example the shift to manual labour in the public sector) and becomes liable to 
austerity and implosion, the very notion of ‘sovereignty’ here is oxymorous: the debt-
relationship precisely undermines the sovereignty of the state. At the same time, it is 
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public defaults—which used to be much more common in the past (Reinhart and 
Rogoff, 2009)—that are some of the most discrete indications of ‘sovereignty’.  
 
This is not to say that such expressions of sovereignty—national defaults—should make 
public economies prosper. The arrears of Greece to the IMF in July 2015 did not 
necessarily bring any good to the Greek people. However, the combination of ever 
higher value of public obligations and the fact that the possibility of defaulting is 
unspeakable or considered entirely ‘unrealistic’ to most economies suggests that the 
‘sovereigns’ are increasingly dependent on the ever turbulent financial markets—at least 
when it comes to rhetoric: it is unimaginable what the failure of the monetary system 
would bring about and it is due to this fear that the nation-states are increasingly 
limited in what they are free to decide on. The question of welfare and public debt are 
indisputably closely intertwined. However, the question of how debt, the symbol of 
‘responsibility’, becomes reframed might be even more intrinsic to contemporary Europe 
than the question of welfare, which is (just) one, pivotal but now increasingly contested 
way to articulate public responsibility.  
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Appendix	1	
Description	of	Data	
 
The country-level indicators represent the years 2007 and 2012 and I collected those 
entries individually from sources like Eurostat and the UN. The individual level data is 
based on three surveys, each of which is collected in all EU-countries and with roughly 
similar sample sizes, 1000 respondents per country.  
 
The European Quality of Life Survey (EQLS) is a cross-sectional study conducted every 
four years by Eurofound. The European Working Conditions Surveys (EWCS) is similarly 
collected by Eurofound, focusing on the employees and the self-employed across 
Europe. Both of these sets cover randomly selected individuals aged 18 and higher in all 
EU-countries. Most often the data was collected from 1000 individuals on each 
occasion, but additional interviews were conducted in some of the most populous 
countries (Germany, France, Italy, Poland, Turkey, the United Kingdom). Both sets are 
available for non-commercial research purposes (hosted by the UK Data Service in 
Essex, http://discover.ukdataservice.ac.uk/). 
 
Given the pre-testing and other quality assurance measures, all sets of data provided by 
Eurofound are relatively reliable although, like in every survey, it is not possible to 
entirely close out the possibility of systematically missing data (refusal to respond on a 
systematic basis). The data is also weighted in order to account for the most immediate 
demographic biases following missing responses. Furthermore, many aggregate variables 
like the overall unemployment rates cohere with other sources of data (e.g., Eurostat). 
This suggests that at least the most obvious, systematic effects of missing data are 
reasonably safe to ignore.  
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The two sets of data used in the multilevel analysis were also equipped with various 
country-level indicators, which were collected from Eurostat, the World Bank, the 
United Nations, and from a few other reliable sources. Given the form in which the 
data is accessible online, I had to enter the country-level data to SPSS by hand (with 
nearly 2000 entries). It was then aggregated as part of the other sets of data by using 
SPSS AGGREGATE. In the third chapter I also use two Eurobarometer –surveys 
(76.1., 2011, and 78.1, 2012). They are public opinion surveys collected by the Public 
Opinion Analysis sector of the European Commission, and with sample size 
comparable to Eurofound’s surveys.  
	 	
 318 
	
 
	
Appendix	2	
Variables	Used	in	Multilevel	Models	
 
 
All numeric variables were normalised and standardised (linear scaling resulting in mean 
= 0 and variance = 1). All level 1 variables (EQLS) used in my multilevel analyses were 
recoded in order to make them compatible between different waves (2007 and 2011). 
Unfortunately, many interesting variables such as the origin of birth were not collected 
similarly in the two occasions and they had to be ignored.  
 
Most of the recoded variables are dichotomic, but there are several variables that 
resulted as sum-variables from the PCA. They are regarded as normally distributed and 
therefore I standardised them. Even so, multilevel models were specified with robust 
test estimates, which reduces the likelihood of false results due to the violations of 
model assumptions.  
 
 
Individual)level)variables)
Crisis%%
Wave 
Demographic%
Female 
Youth (18 to 29 year-olds) 
30 to 35 year-olds 
36 to 64 year-olds (reference) 
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Socio%economic)
Low-income 
Lower middle-income (reference) 
Higher middle-income (third quartile) 
High-income (top quartile) 
Primary education (at most) 
Missing income information 
Secondary education (reference) 
Tertiary education 
Missing education information 
 
Social)support)
Lives with partner 
Lives with at least one parent 
Lives alone 
 
Accommodation)
Holds a mortgage 
Responsible to paying mortgage or rent 
 
Occupation)(latest))
Services, sales or clerical support staff 
Elementary, other or missing 
Professional, managerial, skilled (reference) 
 
Temporary contract (when applicable) 
Second job (when applicable) 
Unemployed (when applicable) 
Never had a paid job (when applicable) 
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Other&
Health related problems 
Number of children 
 
Country(level,variables,
Financial&and&fiscal&situation&& &
  GDP growth 2007–2012, % 
  Change to tax on income and wealth, 2007–2012, percentage points 
  National debt 2012, % of GDP 
  Long-term bond rates used in calculating the EMU convergence criteria 
   
Economic&structure& & &
  GDP per capita, PPP, euros 
  Openness: the sum of exports and imports as % of GDP 
Old age dependency ratio (the share of 65 year-olds and older population 
of all residents over 18) 
  The portion of 30–34 year old with acquired tertiary education degree 
   
Policy&and&equality& & &
  Increase in non-social expenditure, % 
  The level of social expenditure (excl. health and pensions), % of GDP 
  Cabinet composition, see below 
  Change to cabinet composition, see below 
  GINI (economic inequality index, between 0 and 0.5) 
  Life expectancy, years 
  Life expectancy gap, years 
   
Welfare& & &
  Southern and Anglosaxon (SAS) 
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  Nordic and Continental (ref., NC) 
Religion( ( (
  Catholic  
  Orthodox or other 
  Protestant (ref.) 
 
Interactions+
Individual(level(interactions(
Young * Female, Social support, Mortgage, Pay rent or mortgage, Health 
limitations (* Wave) 
Female * Lives alone (* Wave) 
Lives with parent * Low income, Tertiary education (* Wave)  
Lives alone * Low income, Mortgage (* Wave) 
Mortgage * Female, 30–35 year old (* Wave) 
Number of children * Young, Female (* Wave) 
 
Country(level(interactions(
GDP capita * Bond rate 
GDP capita * Economic openness (* Wave) 
Welfare * Life expectancy  
Welfare * Change to tax on income and wealth (* Wave) 
Pensions, Pensions * GDP capita, * National debt, * Welfare 
Social expenditure not pensions * GDP capita, National debt 
 
Cross(level(interactions((
Lives alone * Welfare (* Wave) 
Religion * Female (* Wave) 
Religion * Mortgage (* Wave) 
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Excluded	Interactions	(Based	on	Unemployment-Models)	
 
	
Alternative	Models		
Alternative models were developed based on the following sets of predictors.  
Individual level interactions excluded from the model (not statistically significant) but that 
were tested in the case of unemployment:  
- Demographic * Demographic, Income, Education, Social support, Mortgage, Health 
limitations (* Wave) 
- Income * Social support, * Mortgage, * Pay rent or mortgage (* Wave) 
- Education * Social support, * Mortgage, * Occupation (* Wave) 
 
Country-level interactions excluded from the model (not statistically significant) but that 
were tested in the case of unemployment:  
 
- GDP capita, GDP growth * Openness, * Tax, * Bond rate, * National debt, * Pensions  
- Welfare * GDP growth, * Growth of non-social expenditure, * Equality (GINI, life 
expectancy gap), * Pensions, * Social expenditure other than pensions or health care 
- Religion * GDP growth, * Bond rate 2012, * National debt 2012, Growth of non-
social expenditure, * Equality (GINI, life expectancy, life expectancy gap) 
 
Cross-level interactions excluded from the model (not statistically significant in the 
unemployment-context) but that were tested:  
- Demographic * Welfare (* Wave) 
- Mortgage * GDP per capita, * GDP growth, * Welfare (* Wave) 
- Social support * Welfare * Young (* Wave),  
- Social support * GDP per capita, * GDP growth (* Wave) 
- Young * Social Support * GPD capita (* Wave), * GDP growth (* Wave), * Pensions 
(* Wave) 
- Number of children * GDP per capita, * GDP growth (* Wave) 
- Number of children * Welfare (* Wave) 
- Number of children * Religion (* Wave) 
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ALMP	
 
PCA	
	
PAF	
 
Total amount spent on ALMPs in 2012, % of GDP 
ALMP factor 2: high incentives and rehabilitation, low job creation 
Change in incentives and rehabilitation 2007–2012, % of GDP 
Change in job creation 2007–2012, % of GDP 
Unemployment crisis (component 1) 
Pre-crisis social protection (component 2) 
Pre-crisis unemployment (component 3) 
Welfare cost hike (component 4) 
Gender economic participation (component 5) 
Increase in non-social expenditure (component 6) 
Government contribution in social protection (component 7) 
Inclusion during crisis (component 8) 
Gender pay gap (component 9) 
Cuts to unemployment benefits (component 10) 
Share of private contributions (component 11) 
Male crisis (component 12) 
Cuts to flexicurised workforce (component 13) 
Economic safetynetwork (component 14) 
Public finance crisis (factor 1) 
Fiscal crisis (factor 2) 
Welfare crisis (factor 3) 
Welfare cost expansion (factor 4) 
Participation (factor 5) 
Youth crisis (factor 6) 
Anti-poverty policy (factor 7) 
Young women's crisis (factor 8) 
Gender pay gap (factor 9)
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Appendix	3	
Definition	of	Some	Contextual	Variables	
 
Cabinet	Composition,	Schmidt	Index	
(1) Hegemony of right-wing (and centre) parties (no seats in left and social democratic 
parties), (2) dominance of right-wing (and centre) parties (under 1/3 of seats), (3) 
balance of power between left and right (between 1/3 and 2/3 of seats), (4) dominance 
of social-democratic and other left par- ties (at least 2/3 of seats), (5) hegemony of 
social-democratic and other left parties (100 % of seats). Based at the University of 
Berne, the data is collected by Klaus Armingeon, Christian Isler, Laura Knöpfel, David 
Weisstanner, Sarah Engler who run he Comparative Political Data Set service 
(http://www.cpds-data.org), currently covering yearly averages of government 
composition till 2013.  
 
Change in cabinet composition between 2007 and 2012 measures the difference of the 
two figures calculated as above.  
 
Welfare	State	Classification	
Countries are coded according to the following table: in specific correlation tests, the 
variable is used as an ordinal variable (Spearman). In the multilevel analysis, the 
categories 1 and 2 as well as 3 and 4 were recoded as two single categories.  
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Table 2. The classification of welfare regimes following the one suggested by the European 
Social Survey foundation. 
 
Economic	Participation	and	Opportunity	Factor	of	the	Gender	Gap	Index	(GEP)	
While most gender inequality indices are developed from the point of view of global 
inequality, the gender economic participation –indicator measures gender equality from 
the point of view of empowerment and existential equality, making it particularly 
relevant to welfare states. As the UNDP just discontinued calculating the previously 
publicised gender empowerment index, I look at the particular factor (Economic 
participation and opportunity) in the Gender Gap Index calculated by the World Social 
Forum.  
 
Gender	pay	gap,	in	unadjusted	form 
Difference between average the gross hourly earnings of male paid employees and of 
female paid employees as a percentage of the average gross hourly earnings of male paid 
employees (Eurostat).  
 
 
 
1"Nordic" 2"Continental" 3"Anglo3Saxon" 4"Southern" 5"Eastern"
!! !! !! !! !!
Sweden! Switzerland! Ireland! Spain! Estonia!
!
! !! !! !!
Denmark! Belgium! The!United!Kingdom! Italy! The!Czech!Republic!
!! !! !! !! !!
Sweden! Austria! !! Greece! Poland!
!! !! !! !! !!
Finland! France! !! Portugal! Croatia!
!! !! !! !! !!
The!Neatherlands!! Germany! !! !Malta! Hungary!
!
!! !! !! !!
!! Luxemburg! !! !Cyprus! Latvia!
!! !! !! !! !!
!! !! !! !!
Lithuania!
!
Romania!
!! !! !! !! !!
!! !! !! !! Slovenia!
!! !! !! !! !!
!! !! !! !! Slovakia!
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At	risk	of	social	exclusion	or	poverty 
According to Eurostat, the measure of those at risk of social exclusion or poverty 
‘corresponds to the sum of persons who are: at risk of poverty or severely materially 
deprived or living in households with very low work intensity. Persons are only counted 
once even if they are present in several sub-indicators. At risk-of-poverty are persons 
with an equivalised disposable income below the risk-of-poverty threshold, which is set 
at 60 % of the national median equivalised disposable income (after social transfers). 
Material deprivation covers indicators relating to economic strain and durables.’ 
Furthermore, ‘[p]eople living in households with very low work intensity are those aged 
0-59 living in households where the adults (aged 18-59) work less than 20 % of their 
total work potential during the past year.  
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Appendix	4	
Explorative	Principal	Component	Analysis	of	27	EU-countries	
 
 
The explorative PCA with 13 components discussed in Chapter 3 is expressed in the 
following table.  
 
 
  
 328 
Table 3 (part 1 of 3). PCA of several crisis-indicators, 13 axes explain 92 % of the variation. 
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Table 11 (part 2 of 3). PCA of several crisis-indicators, 13 axes explain 92 % of variation. 
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–
+
–
–––
Increase(of(w
om
en's(portion(of(the(unem
ployed(2007–2012,(
%
––
–
+
–
––
W
om
en,(%
(of(all(unem
ployed,(2007
+
+
––
+
+
W
om
en,(%
(of(all(unem
ployed,(2012
–
––
+
–
W
om
en,(%
(of(the(youth(unem
ployed,(2007
+
+
–
++
W
om
en,(%
(of(the(youth(unem
ployed,(2012
––
––
––
–
Contributions*in*social*protection
Goverm
ent(contributions,(%
(of(all(social(expenditure
++++
Em
ployer(contributions,(%
(of(all(social(expenditure
–––
–
–
–
Private(contributions,(%
(of(all(social(expenditure
–
+++
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Table 11 (part 3 of 3). PCA of several crisis-indicators, 13 axes explain 92 % of variation. 
 
 
  
Unem
ploy
m
ent*crisis
Pre–crisis(
level(of(
w
elfare
Pre–crisis*
unem
ploym
ent
W
elfare(
cost(hike
Gender*
econom
ic*
participation
Increase(in(
non–social(
expenditure((eg.(
stim
ulation)
Governm
ent**
protection
Inclusion*
during*crisis
Gender(pay(
gap
Cuts*to*
unem
ploym
ent*
benefits
Share*of*
private*
contributions
M
ale(crisis
Cuts(to(
flexicurized(
w
orkforce
Increase(in(social(protection(on(housing(2007–2012.(%
(of(GDP
–
+
––
+
Increase(in(social(protection(of(all(unem
ployed
+
–
–––
–
Cuts(to(protection(per(unem
ployed,(2007–2012
++
+++
Increase(in(social(protection(on(old(age(2007–2012.(%
(of(GDP
–––
–
Increase(in(social(protection(on(health(2007–2012.(%
(of(GDP
–
+++
Increase(of(protection(against(social(exclusion,(per(claim
++++
Increase(in(total(governm
ent(expenditure,(%
(of(GDP
+++
++
Education
Tertiary(education(attainm
ent,(%
(of(30–34(year(old,(2012
+
–
++
+
–
Unem
ploym
ent(rate(of(people(w
ith(low
er(education,(2012
++
–
+
+
+
Unem
ploym
ent(rate(of(people(w
ith(seconary(education,(2012
++++
Unem
ploym
ent(rate(of(people(w
ith(tertiary(education,(2012
++++
Unem
ploym
ent(rate(of(people(w
ith(low
er(education,(2007
–
+++
++
Unem
ploym
ent(rate(of(people(w
ith(seconary(education,(2007
+
+++
–
Unem
ploym
ent(rate(of(people(w
ith(tertiary(education,(2007
++
+
++
+
Unem
ploym
ent(change(ratio:(teritary/low
er(educational(
groups
–––
+
–
 331 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix	5	
Multiple	Correspondence	Analysis	on	the	Quality	of	Life	Survey	
 
The multiple-correspondence analysis that I constructed in Chapter 8, and which 
consists of all respondents 18–64 year-olds from both 2007 and 2011 waves, is based on 
all categorical variables modelled as crisis-outcomes in separate multilevel analyses. A 
complete list is available online (goo.gl/FFUh0f). The resulting five dimensions have 
the following inertia.  
 
 
 	
Affordability: .194 
Sympathy: .109 
Sufficiency: .092 
Withdrawal: .081 
Externalisation: .080 
Total inertia explained: .555. 
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Appendix	6	
Constructions	of	the	Crisis	as	an	Object	of	Knowledge	
 
Table 4. Model summary of the MCA on the current economic crisis, (Eurobarometer 76.1, 
2011). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 35. Semiotic square illustrating two epistemological dimensions related to crisis-
representations (MCA-axes 1 and 3, Eurobarometer 76.1).   
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Figure 36. Semiotic square illustrating two epistemological dimensions related to crisis-
representations (MCA-axes 2 and 4, Eurobarometer 76.1). 
	
 
Table 5. Model summary of the MCA on the current economic crisis (Eurobarometer 78.1, 
PCA2012). 
 
	
 
 
Table 6. Model summary of the MCA on the effects of the crisis on national and European 
economies (Eurobarometer 78.1). 
 
 
 
 
  Favour Eurobonds 
   Assertiveness    Solidarity 
 
 Disapproval                Acknowledgment 
 
   Moral obligation   Uncertainty  
  Ignorance 
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Table 7. Model summary of the MCA on personal situation (Eurobarometer 78.1). 
 
 
	
 
Table 8. Model summary of the MCA on EU-perceptions (Eurobarometer 78.1). 
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Appendix	7	
Multilevel	Modelling	in	Practice—The	Case	of	SPSS	21	
 
 
GENLINMIXED package was introduced to IBM SPSS in version 19. I use the 
version 21 that the school has made available to students. There is now an accessible 
introduction to the use of multilevel methods in SPSS for categorical data (Heck, 
Thomas and Lynn, 2013). SPSS only covers GLMMs and GEEs, but this is suitable to 
our research purposes.   
 
Even if many multilevel approaches were developed already in the 1980’s, still today 
most mixed method paradigms require other statistical tools like STATA that, however, 
are usually not freely available. In particular, it would have been interesting to apply 
multilevel factorial techniques in an explanatory setting. Even if this field of 
methodology is rapidly developing (Bingham et al., 2008), there are few usable 
implementations. There are some technical limitations related to SPSS however: it has 
not, for example, implemented multi-threading on GENLINMIXED, which is why I 
used virtualisation and ran several parallel installations of SPSS simultaneously.   
 
I shall now briefly explain how to use SPSS for mixed methods and on multiple-
correspondence analysis. The first issue relates to the structure of data. The context-
level data was entered in a separate file and then merged with the level 1 –data by using 
SPSS MERGE. The resulting form of data is called the ‘long form’, which means that 
each context-level entry is separately entered for all individual respondents. Entering 
data on a separate country-level table first, however, allowed the data to be merged 
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similarly with both EQLS and EWCS data sets; it also permitted the separate analysis 
of country-level correlations and factorial analyses.  
 
The model development in SPSS is based on a graphical interface, even if I then 
manipulated the core syntax directly, when developing more complex models. The first 
thing GENLINMIXED asks is the specific multilevel-structure of data—particularly 
whether the lowest level canvas consists of repeated measurements (longitudinal data) or 
individual subjects (cross-sectional data). In the former case, three level models would 
be more suitable (considering the occasions as level 1 and individuals as level 2), while in 
my case the two-level structure is sufficient. 
 
In the ‘Field and Effects’ tab the dependent variable (outcome) is chosen first and then 
whether to use multinomial, binary or other estimation methods. Next the variables 
deemed as fixed effects are singled out, that is, the ones with no interclass variance 
component. Random effects are then added in blocks. Multiple blocks are applied 
particularly if there are more than two levels, but using a single block was sufficient for 
my purposes. In my case, the intercept and the wave-effect are both always used as 
random effects to test whether their variations are statistically significant and to see how 
different blocks of predictors affect them. Similarly, the question of youth-effect is so 
important that in all applicable models the effect corresponding to the group of 18 to 29 
year-olds is defined as random. 
 
The random effects covariance type must be specified, but for reasons mentioned in 
Chapter 4, the matrix is assumed to be diagonal, that is, all the covariances between 
random effects vanish. Under 'Build Options’ it is also possible to alter the required 
level of significance, to choose whether to use the residual maximum likelihood method 
which is the standard assumption, or the Satterthwaite approximation (used for 
parameters with lower boundary constraint), and whether the (usually exponential) 
model assumptions are correct or whether to use robust estimates instead. Finally, the 
weight-variables are entered and it is chosen whether the predicted values should be 
saved—this is pivotal when aggregating the country-level deviations of the actual 
situations from the model-predictions.  
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Different models were then produced by manipulating the original code. Organising the 
code systematically was pivotal because IBM SPSS is not very stable: analyses taking 
weeks to calculate were often disrupted by errors. All the analyses described in .sps-files 
were thus saved in similarly named .spv-files allowing me to continue from where the 
analysis was the last saved. I tried to save the output-file at least once a day but some 
models (among the nearly thousand I built) took up to four days to produce.  
 
Also, there were some memory allocation issues in the result of which SPSS sometimes 
froze, resulting in the loss of all unsaved analyses. In fact, having experienced the 
multilevel modelling capacities of IBM SPSS on the OSX version and on both 32- and 
64-bit versions on Windows, it is the latter one which is the least vulnerable to failure.  
IBM SPSS 21 also introduced a new ‘graphical’ model viewer for GLMM analyses. 
Luckily, however, it is possible to bypass it and use ordinary reporting tools that were 
much easier to use. But every time the program halted the setting had to be made again.  
 
After the analyses finally succeeded, it took weeks to enter all the values on the tables by 
using Microsoft Excel. As illustrated the Table 17 below illustrates in the case of 
employment-related outcomes, there were over 10 000 values to enter.  
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Table 9 (part 1 of 3). Multilevel analysis on employment-related variables, all 18–64 year-
olds, EQLS 2007–2012 (t: p < .10, *: p < .05, ** p < .01; *** p < .001, goo.gl/hkKmGy).   
Table	A.	M
ultilevel	analysis	on	em
ploym
ent-related	variables,	all	18–64	year-old	respondents,	EQ
LS	2007-2012	(t:	p	<	.10,	*:	p	<	.05,	**	p	<	.01;	***	p	<	.001).	
Dependent	variable
Respondents
18–64	year	old
Logit
Logit
Logit
Logit
Logit
Inform
ation	criterion
302919.287
N	=	48486
236794.884
N	=	48486
347506.397
N	=	48486
349003.839
N	=	49600
148471.949
N	=	29984
Num
ber	of	effects
fixed
random
fixed
random
fixed
random
fixed
random
fixed
random
505
4
446
2
453
4
258
4
480
4
Variance	com
ponents
intercept
w
ave
young
fem
ale
w
ave
young
fem
ale
intercept
w
ave
young
fem
ale
intercept
w
ave
young
fem
ale
intercept
w
ave
fem
ale
fem
ale
M
odel:
dem
ographic
.227*
.057
.060**
.055**
.016**
.059***
.045***
.251
.143**
.109**
.095**
.154
.062*
.445**
.032*
.192*
.057**
.075**
.028*
socio-econom
ic
.196*
.068*
.062**
.056**
.027**
.039***
.051***
.179
.170**
.112**
.095**
.087
.060*
.429**
.036*
.175*
.057**
.073**
.028
social	support,	accom
m
odation
.161*
.090*
.054**
.055**
.028***
.038***
.054***
.144
.197**
.096*
.105**
.151*
.054**
.086**
.032*
level	1	(health,	children,	em
ploym
ent)
.133
.116**
.056**
.043**
.029***
.044***
.056***
.129
.188**
.100*
.108**
.081
.060*
.452***
.039*
.158*
.061**
.089**
.038*
fincial	and	fiscal	situation
.121
.121*
.073*
.051*
.109
.147*
.103*
.108**
.068*
.407***
.037*
.052
.063**
.088**
.038*
econom
ic	structure
.157
.087
.069*
.049*
.015*
.047**
.060**
.117
.103*
.102*
.109**
.065*
.444***
.037*
.043
.054*
.083**
.037**
policy	and	equality
.116
.133
.060**
.046**
.024*
.061***
.128
.114
.104*
.111**
.084
.410***
.036*
.029
.035
.083**
.038*
only	w
elfare
.101
.068
.041*
.043**
.027
.048**
.125
.174
.043
.113**
.059
.203***
.036*
.016
.052
.055*
.038*
only	religion
.203
.081
.052*
.043**
.019
.057***
.212
.135
.091*
.114**
.036
.212**
.037*
.021
.035
.085**
.038*
w
elfare	+	religion
.028
.083
.043*
.041*
.025
.049***
.079
.012
.085**
.038*
cross	level	interactions
.027
.083
.042*
.041*
.055
.126
.049
.125*
.050
.184**
.033*
.080
.017
.055*
.043*
socio-econom
ic	+	ALM
Ps
.103
.163*
.056**
.044**
.032
.041***
.061
.274*
.100*
.111*
.054
.066*
.448***
.039*
.213*
.071*
.072**
.029*
+	fincials		+	econom
ic	structure
.154
.024
.058**
.044**
.101
.151
.102*
.116*
.073
.443***
.038*
.042
.019
.070**
.029*
socio-econom
ic	+	PCA
.088
.038
.039
.044**
.015
.043**
.058***
.103
.098
.035
.116*
.047
.400***
.037*
.032
.023
.071
.029*
socio-econom
ic	+	PAF
.158*
.021
.057*
.043*
.018*
.039**
.051***
.177
.046
.105*
.106**
.081*
.384***
.037
.089
.065*
.071**
.029*
M
ain	effects
intercept	
w
ave
young
w
*fem
ale
intercept	
w
ave
young
fem
ale
intercept	
w
ave
young
w
*young
intercept	
w
ave
young
fem
ale
intercept	
w
ave
young
w
*young
M
odel:
dem
ographic
-2.955***
.811***
.410**
.118
1.139***
-.222***
-.727***
-.766***
-3.649***
.752**
-.127
.014
-4.787***
-.102
-.3289***
-1.735***
-1.201***
-.008
-.540***
.025
dem
ographic,	socio-econom
ic
-3.071***
.926***
.516**
.168
1.001***
-.248**
-.873***
-.767***
-3.861***
.983***
.009
.112
-5.036***
-.173
-.3489***
-1.702***
-1.259***
-.107
-.565***
.046
social	support,	accom
m
odation
-2.889***
.878***
.375*
-.356**
.813***
-.225**
-.445***
-.731***
-3.704***
.909***
-.095
.366	(t)
-1.000***
.182
-.150
-.172	(t)
level	1	(health,	children,	em
ploym
ent)
-2.965***
.856**
.491*
-.399**
.859***
-.118
-.088
-.758***
-3.625***
.924***
.173
.495*
-5.053***
-.193
-2.369***
-1.615***
-1.285***
-.017
-.206	
-.073
fincial	and	fiscal	situation
-2.945***
.838**
.495*
-.399***
-3.638***
.933***
.171
.499*
-5.063***
-.195
-2.374***
-1.617***
-1.283***
-.011
-.206
-.072
structure	of	the	econom
y
-3.032***
.856**
.491*
-.393***
.843***
-.126*
-.091
-.758***
-3.781***
1.018***
.178
.484*
-5.036***
-.173
-2.379***
-1.618***
-1.009***
-.034
-.209
-.093
policy	and	equality
-3.361***
.914**
.491*
-.397***
.879***
-.113
-.110
-.807***
-3.415***
.936**
.169
.489*
-5.167***
-.141
-2.386***
-1.620***
-1.316***
-.173
-.212
-.091
only	w
elfare
-3.129***
.495
.493*
-.397***
1.066***
-.308
-.161
-.811***
-2.611***
.294
.165
.492*
-6.459***
-.811**
-2.383***
-1.620***
-.637***
.102
-.572**
.092
only	religion
-4.671***
.524
.176
-.088
.909***
-.134
-.179
-.811***
-3.539***
1.242**
-.038
.355
-6.510***
.143
-2.487**
-1.731***
-1.746***
-.663**
.088
-.189
w
elfare	+	religion
-3.431***
.560
.491*
-.398***
1.145***
-.210
-.187
-.811***
-1.087***
.423*
-.212
-.091
cross-level	interactions
-3.327***
.481
.394*
-.294	(t)
-2.573***
-.216
-.026
.805***
-6.161***
-.725**
-2.346***
-1.437***
-.226
.603**
-.189
-.125
socio-econom
ic	+	ALM
Ps
-2.766***
.746*
.493*
-.398***
-3.396***
.864**
.168
.496*
-4.966***
-.206
-1.885***
-1.660***
-1.088***
-.178
-.563***
.043
ALM
Ps	+	fincial	+	econom
ic	structure
-2.719***
.955**
.497*
-.398***
-3.315***
.742*
.163
.497*
-5.225***
-.825***
-1.891***
-1.631***
-.827***
-.081
-.580***
.039
socio-econom
ic	+	PCA
-2.964***
.844**
.476*
-.392***
1.006***
-.256***
-.876***
-.768***
-3.664***
.941***
.224
.633*
-4.635***
-.008
-1.896***
-1.635***
-1.261***
-.104
-.585***
.062
socio-econom
ic	+	PAF
-2.964***
.858**
.499*
-.393***
1.005***
-.254***
-.875***
-.768***
-3.668***
.975***
.168
.496*
-4.613***
.010
-1.879***
-1.626***
-1.258***
-.104
-.564***
.043
fixed	effects
effect
*	w
ave
*	young
interact.
effect
*	w
ave
*	young
interact.
effect
*	w
ave
*	young
interact.
effect
*	w
ave
*	young
interact.
effect
*	w
ave
*	young
interact.
Individual	level
intercept	/	
-3.327***
.481
1.145***
-.210
-2.573***
-.216
-6.161***
-.725**
-.226
.603**
18–29	year	old
.394*
.370*
-.187
-.150
-.026
.805**
-2.346***
.380	(t)
-.189
-.125
30–35	year	old
.361**
-.233	(t)
.608***
-.101
-.052
.187
-.285*
-.112
-.243*
-.048
fem
ale
-.096
-.294
.078
-.811***
.241***
.332*
-.534*
.062
-1.437***
.238
.704***
.112
-.150	(t)
-.185
low
	incom
e
.957***
-.085
-.396	(t)
-.673***
-.234**
-.216
1.240***
-.458*
.040
-1.016***
.158
.528**
-.278
-.275*
-.009
-.146
.186
low
er	m
iddle	incom
e	(reference)
higher	m
iddle	incom
e
-.354**
-.357*
.498***
.068
-.383*
-.914***
.208
.527***
-.204
.057
.190*
high	incom
e
-1.084
-.221
.262
.725***
.150*
.305***
-.731**
-.105
.722***
.194
-.022
-.011
.223*
.031
incom
e	not	reported
-.127
-.062
.077
.020
-.009
-.418***
.100
-.195*
.046
prim
ary	education
.050
.070
.694***
-.476*
-.674***
-.248*
.358*
.215
.115
.248
.582*
-.586*
-.631***
-.341	(t)
.014
.418
-.172
-.142
-.049
.027
secondary	education	(reference)
tertiary	education
-.506*
.399**
-.243
.640***
-.137*
.135
-.764**
.425*
-.535*
1.512***
-.194
-.697***
-.080
.083
-.086
education	not	reported
.198
-.483**
-.479***
.636***	??
.397	
-.415
-.170
-.075
-.100
-.210
lives	w
ith	partner
-.186
-.217
.365***
-.161
-.208	(t)
-.183
.285***
-.288***
lives	w
ith	parent
.360*
-.163
-.092
.129
.287***
-.316*
-1.006
-.109
.384*
.021
-.965	(t)
-.546
-.110
.074
-.089
.065
lives	alone
.396**
-.095
-.498*
.183
.066
-.264	(t)
.103
.157
.558**
-.051
-.546
.386
.642***
-.352	(t)
.055
-.510**
.121
.156
Unem
ployed
W
orking	on	a	fixed	term
	contract
Unem
ployed	for	over	12	m
onths
Never	had	a	paid	job
W
orks
.055***
 339 
Table 17 (part 2 of 3). Multilevel analysis on employment-related variables, all 18–64 year-
olds, EQLS 2007-2012 (t: p < .10, *: p < .05, ** p < .01; *** p < .001, goo.gl/hkKmGy).  
lives	alone
.396**
-.095
-.498*
.183
.066
-.264	(t)
.103
.157
.558**
-.051
-.546
.386
.642***
-.352	(t)
.055
-.510**
.121
.156
services,	sales	and	clerical	support
-.202*
.337***
.643***
-.221***
-.459***
.419***
.445***
-.214***
elem
entary	or	other	non-skilled	w
ork
.266*
.138
.482***
-.349**
.125
.136
-1.322***
1.078***
m
agerial,	professiol	and	high	skilled	(ref.)
occupation	not	reported
.738
-.397
-.334**
lives	in	a	m
ortgaged	hom
e
-.716**
.116
-.371	(t)
.767**
.954***
.014
-.570***
-.073
-1.127***
.253
-1.310***
1.888***
.370**
-.072
.009
.117
pays	rent	or	m
ortgage
.537***
.075
-.318	(t)
-.255
.205*
-.298***
-.104
.277*
.520***
.056
-.455*
-.443
-.380***
.191
.087
.059
Num
ber	of	children
-.202***
.184**
.261**
.184	(t)
.114***
-.117**
.452***
-.064
-.203**
.197*
.524***
.140
.286**
-.162	(t)
.659***
.085
-.061
.103
.204**
-.199
health	lim
itations
.136
-.282*
.046
.570	(t)
-1.261***
.169*
1.244***
-.675***
.242	(t)
-.305*
.027
.576
-.188*
-.157
.225
-.199
-.157*
.106
.133
-.225
has	tw
o	jobs
-.123
-.269*
fixed	term
	contract
Contry	level	effects	
effect
*	w
ave
*	GDP
3-w
ay
effect
*	w
ave
*	GDP
3-w
ay
effect
*	w
ave
*	GDP
3-w
ay
effect
*	w
ave
*	GDP
3-w
ay
effect
*	w
ave
*	GDP
3-w
ay
Fincial	and	fiscal	situationGDP	grow
th	2007–2012
.217*
-.403**
-.155*
.130*
.507***
-.029
.342*
.443*
-1.045***
.421	(t)
-.846***
.295
.303*
-.230***
Change	to	tax	on	incom
e	and	w
ealth
.090
-.167
-..059
.142**	
.411***
-.069
-.084
-.018
.036
-.202***
national	debt,	%
	of	GDP
1.227***
-.125
.258
-.357**
.268
.100
.594	(t)
-.334*
Bond	rate
-.216
-.008
-.232
.130*
-.037
.670***
.063
2.119***
.081
-.785***
.384*
-1.715***
1.567*
-.436**
-.049
Econom
ic	structure
GDP	per	capita,	PPP
-.507*
.251
-.389***
.067
.616**
-.092
-1.266***
.733*
.439*
-.280
Openness
.086
.032
-.738***
-.456	(t)
.036
.011
-.013
.069
.314*
-.386	(t)
.186
-.470***
-.333	(t)
-.100
.013
-.063
Old	age	dependency	ratio
.073
-.261*
-.212***
.066
-.416***
-.011
-.079
-.123
-.366***
.009
.196*
.227***
Portion	of	30–34	year	old	w
ith	tertiary	edu..392***
-.021
-.168*
-.211
-.001
-.047
.414***
-.151
-.145
.308**
-.470***
.539***
.225*
-.058
Policy	and	equality
increase	in	non-social	expenditure
.278***
.092
-.027
-.012
-.421***
.233*
.103
-.142
.143	(t)
-.078*
soc.	expenditure	(excl.	health	and	pensions)
-.084
-.112
-.225	(t)
.008
-.151
.844***
-.933**
.380
1.389***
-1.192***
Cabinet	com
position
-.112
.077
de
-.089
-.375***
-.067
-.702*
531***
Change	to	cabinet	com
position
-.132
.058
.123*
-.070
-1.346***
.321
.334*
-.242	(t)
.333
-.111
GINI.205*
.345**
-.702***
-.397**
-.144	(t)
-.066
-.289***
-.050
-.551***
.628***
-.702***
.054
.099
-.670***
-.198
-.536***
.190
-.224
.672***
-.222*
life	expectancy
.170
.073
-.065
-.481	(t)
.021
-.074
-.350*
.039
-.082
.376
-.158
-.027
-.571***
.062
.230
-.587***
life	expectancy	gap
-.494*
-.279
-.010
-.006
.130
.000
-.568**
.533**
1.039***
-.598***
fem
ale	*	life	expectancy	gap
.129
	
.130
.182
.080
.187*
-.278***
.078
-.050
W
elfare
*	young
3-w
ay
*	young
3-w
ay
*	young
3-w
ay
young
3-w
ay
*	young
3-w
ay
Southern	and	anglosaxon
-1.220**
-.024
.416*
-.002
-.378*
.131
.326*
-.297**
-2.176***
1.345*
.990***
-.059
-2.298***
.659	(t)
1.025**
-.568*
1.376*
-1.128***
.894***
-.431**
Eastern
1.059
.594
-0,127
.393*
-.651*
.228
-.165
-.146
-1.048*
2.159***
.350	(t)
.416	(t)
-2.347***
1.087*
-1.013**
.025
3.425**
-2.920***
.497*
-.546**
Nordic	and	Continental	(ref.)
Religion
Catholic	-.289
.393
.190
-.059
-.085
.048
.118
.002
-.623
1.050***
.200
.127
-1.322***
.214
.049
-.219
-1.455***
1.395***
-.269
.280*
Orthodox
.374
.351
.368*
-.175
-.242
-.275*
.065
.141
-.189
-.255
.451*
.308
-1.418*
-.523
-.112
-.035
.206
.572
-.277
.479*
Protestant	(ref.)
Interactions
effect
*	w
ave
effect
*	w
ave
*	young
3-w
ay
effect
*	w
ave
*	young
3-w
ay
effect
*	w
ave
*	young
3-w
ay
effect
*	w
ave
*	young
3-w
ay
Level	1
fem
ale	*	lives	alone
-.453*
.253
.153
.216
-.632**
.408
fem
ale	*	m
ortgage
.182*
-.141
.355*
-.070
fem
ale	*	num
ber	of	children
.122
-.199**
-.324***
.120***
.121
-.193*
-.007
30–35	year	old	*	m
ortgage
-.192
.027
-.558***
.140
-1.157*
.602
-.086
.502**
lives	alone	*	m
ortgage
-.636
.571
.580***
-.384*
-.274
.003
.203
.026
low
	incom
e	*	lives	w
ith	parent
-.171
.064
-.066
-.437*
-.704*
.547
-.304
.377
low
	incom
e	*	lives	alone
.475***
-1.165***
.467**
-.335
high	incom
e	*	lives	alone
-.527	(t)
.564***
-.556
.068
tertiary	education	*	lives	w
ith	parent
.809*
-.572*
-.104
.298
.892*
-1.262***
.258
-.251
pays	rent	or	m
ortgage	*	lives	w
ith	parent
.048
.015
.023
-.118
.323
-.182
-.142
222
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Table 17 (part 3 of 3). Multilevel analysis on employment-related variables, all 18–64 year-
olds, EQLS 2007-2012 (t: p < .10, *: p < .05, ** p < .01; *** p < .001, goo.gl/hkKmGy). 
Cross	level	interactions
fem
ale	*	catholic	/	SAS
.349*
-.118
(*	catholic)
-.399**
.142
-.119
-.180
(*	southern	and	angl.)
-.369*
.077
(*	southern	and	angl.)
-.150
.188	(t)
(*	catholic)
fem
ale	*	orthodox	/	EAS
.198
-.239
(*	orthodox)
-.411	(t)
.267
.103
.078
(*	eastern)
-.102
-.144
(*	eastern)
.058
-.024
(*	orthodox)
m
ortgage	*	GDP	grow
th
-.077
-.019
-.028
-.166***
m
ortgage	*	SAS
.209
-.015
-.108
.041
.387
.024
(*	southern	and	angl.)
-.256*
.076
m
ortgage	*	EAS
.262
-.177
.225
-.262
.635
-.470
(*	eastern)
-.166*
-.046
lives	alone	*	SAS
-.408**
.215
-.050
.153
-.571*
.132
.403
.120
-.298*
.326	(t)
lives	alone	*	EAS
-.490**
-.219
-.421*
-.008
-.608*
-0,326
-0,215
-.333	(t)
-.142
.273	(t)
ALT	1:	ALM
Ps
effect
*	w
ave
effect
*	w
ave
effect
*	w
ave
effect
*	w
ave
effect
*	w
ave
Total	ALM
Ps	(com
p	1)
.218
.651***
-.092
.190*
.341
1.022***
-.203
.111
-.324
.472***
M
arket-orientation	vs.	integration	(com
p	2)-.082
-.066
.031
-.072
-.259
-.399
.171
-.116
.441***
-.573***
Increase	of	m
arket-oriented	policies
-.292**
-.006
.066
-.005
-.088
-.358
.232	(t)
-.130
.204*
-.117	(t)
Increase	of	integration-oriented	policies
-.019
.330***
-.124*
.084
.272
.618*
-.463	(t)
.078
-.306*
.350***
GDP	capita	*	total	ALM
Ps
-.787*
.347
-.205
-.120
-.553
1.002*
-.782*
.703*
.225
.380*
GDP	capita	*	high	m
arket,	low
	integration
.309
-.181
.088
.118
-.028
.400
.241
-.395	(t)
-.487***
.210*
GDP	capita	*	increase	in	m
arket-orientation
.796*
-.621***
.140
-.200*
-.194
-.184
-.151
.36
-.488***
.044
GDP	capita	*	increase	in	integration-orientation
-.085
.951***
-.096
.191**
.366
1.388***
-.534
-.011
-.425*
.649***
GDP	grow
th	*	total	ALM
Ps
.413**
-.073
.095*
-.136*
-.111
.424**
.399***
-.336***
ALT2:	Principal	com
ponents
effect
*	w
ave
*	young
3-w
ay
effect
*	w
ave
*	young
3-w
ay
effect
*	w
ave
*	young
3-w
ay
effect
*	w
ave
*	young
3-w
ay
effect
*	w
ave
*	young
3-w
ay
PCA1
Unem
ploym
ent	crisis
.062	(t)
.432***
.088	(t)
-.109*
.012
-.149***
-.075
.510***
.259**
-.186*
-.192***
-.072
-.340***
.112***
.156**
-.126*
2
W
elfare	crisis	(pre-crisis	prot.).056
-.030
.100	(t)
-.263**
.034
.042
.072
-.015
.054
-.344*
.038
-.001
-.034
-.114**
-.053
.088	(t)
3
Unem
ploym
ent	prior	to	crisis
.233***
-.083
.033
-.140*
-.079**
.094***
.406***
-.188*
-.015
-.048
-.105	(t)
.036
.072
-.023
-.022
-.122**
4
W
elfare	cost	hike
-.065*
.095	(t)
.065
-.107	(t)
-.030
.002
.017
.077
.123	(t)
-.142
-.132***
.107*
-.201***
.091***
.074
-.029
5
Participation
.260***
-.039
-.347***
.067
.015
-.020
.214*
-.018
-.418***
.074
.298***
.014
.339***
.038
-.100*
-.079
6
increase	in	non-social	expenditure
-.084**
.082	(t)
-.013
-.073
-.009
.042
-.237***
.182*
-.005
-.092
.084	(t)
.075
.189***
-.069
-.181***
.140**
7
Governm
ent	contributions
-.109**
.057
.155***
-.140*
.006
-.026
-.250**
.068
.129
.008
.029
.035
-.020
.014
-.057
.024
8
Social	inclusion	m
easures
.033
.111*
.038
-.126*
.056***
-.066**
-.012
.181**
.106**
-.236***
.122***
-.042	(t)
-.022
.137***
.101**
-.130***
9
Gender	gap
-.025
.139**
.045
-.167*
.100***
-.052*
-.002
.159**
-.069
-.090
.326***
-.194***
.063
-.160***
.146***
-.021
10
Cuts	to	unem
ploym
ent	benefits
.038
-.139***
-.141**
.187***
-.015
-.022
.051
-.148***
-.266***
.323**
-.020
-.010
.029
-.062*
.024
-.089	(t)
11
Share	of	private	contributions
.023
.000
-.078	(t)
.009
-.010
.042
.146*
-.148*
-.057
.009
-.104
.092	(t)
.040
-.051
-.116
.089
12
M
ale	crisis
-.077	(t)
.111*
.085	(t)
-.111*
.013
-.045
-.073
.132*
.308**
-.287	(t)
.047
-.107*
-.060
.047
.048
-.035
13
Red.	of	revenue	/	flexic.	w
orkforce
.230***
-.072
.008
.049
-.001
-.048*
.196**
-.025
.117
-.048
.007
-.066
-.174***
.089
.075
.038
14
Safety	netw
orks
.047
.024
-.008
-.045
.022
-.059***
.015
.053
-.111
.004
.034
-.158***
-.233***
.126**
.020
.100
ALT	3:	Principal	axis	factoring
effect
*	w
ave
*	young
3-w
ay
effect
*	w
ave
*	young
3-w
ay
effect
*	w
ave
*	young
3-w
ay
effect
*	w
ave
*	young
3-w
ay
effect
*	w
ave
*	young
3-w
ay
PAF1
Public	financing	crisis
-.212
.408***
-.015
-.095	(t)
-.241*
.462***
-.322*
.033
-.082
.019
2
Fiscal	crisis
.082
.081
.056
.080
-.002
-.100
-.152*
.011
3
W
elfare	crisis
-.006
-.140**
-.009
.080*
.039
-.165*
-.192*
.012
-.141*
-.091
4
W
elfare	cost	expansion
-.067
-.102	(t)
5
Participation
.089
-.147*
.020
.035
-.095
-.094
.238*
.083
.291**
-.104	(t)
6
Youth	crisis
-.239**
-.017
-.127***
.078	(t)
.286	(t)
-.239**
-.179*
.048
.134
-.075
7
Anti-poverty	policy
.057**
-.052
8
Em
ploym
ent	insecurity	(young	w
om
en)-.333*
.278
-.021
.077
-.213*
-.020
.012
.005*
.062
-.036
9
Gender	pay	gap
.097***
-.003
increase	in	non-social	expenditure
-.040
.035
-.474**
.405**
-.195
.104
.046
-.051
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Appendix	8	
Formal	Definition	of	Generalised	Linear	Mixed	Models	
 
Let me now shortly review how the Generalised Linear Mixed Models (GLMM) are 
mathematically constructed. Let us start with a variance component model of, say, two 
explanatory variables on the individual level (X1ij,, X2ij) indexed in respect to both 
individuals (i) and contexts (j) in addition to one contextual variable (Zj). The model 
looks like the following.  
 
 
 
Unlike in one-level regression, there are two residual components (eij) and (u0j) that 
separate within and between contexts variance.  
 
What the variance component model (1) cannot specify, however, is how the regression 
coefficients, and thus also the effects of individual variables (X1ij,, X2ij), vary across 
contexts. They are regarded as if they were fixed across contexts. The random coefficient 
model instead supposes that also the coefficients β0, β1 and β2 vary across contexts. The 
model is decomposed as   
 
 
 
In effect, the covariance structure itself becomes rather complex always with only two 
subject-specific and one contextual effects: 
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The model now writes as  
 
 
 
where the residual component reflects also the interceptions of individual predictors.  
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Appendix	9	
Brief	Introduction	to	Multiple	Correspondence	Analysis	
 
Correspondence analysis is a method otherwise similar to the PCA but on categorical 
data. This is then particularly useful in social scientific research, not the least because 
the analysis may thus also incorporate blank response categories (e.g., Bourdieu, 1984). 
The method was first introduced in the 1930’s to be again rediscovered in France in the 
1960’s. Two distinct methodological schools evolved, but the resulting analyses appear 
quite similar (Di Franco, 2015).  
 
Consider the traditional cross-tabulation of two variables. For each row the mass refers 
to the sum of respondents in that row. The inertia of a row in turn refers to the extent 
to which the distribution differs from the average: it is calculated according to !2-metrics. The product of inertia and mass then measures the extent to which a single 
response category (row or column) skews the picture.  
 
Mathematically, for a given contingency table C—either the cross-tabulation in the case 
of two variables or otherwise the Burt table—the weights are calculated as the vectors  
.  
Dividing C by the sum of C results with the so-called stochastic matrix S. Based on 
matrix theory there is a decomposition  
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for suitable matrices U, E, and V. For each row item the resulting frequency scores are 
Frow = Wrow UE (defined similarly for columns). The MCA-axes reflect the different 
dimensions of this vector. The first few of them usually account to most variation.  
Multi-dimensional correspondence analysis (MCA) applies similar methods but to the 
so-called Burt table aggregating more than two variables. Each row (respectively 
column) represents a single response category of a single variable. The cells then 
represent either the number of respondents in a single response category (e.g., young ×
young) or a pair of categories (e.g., young × not unemployed). 
 
The MCA is accessed under Analyze > Dimension Reduction > Optimal Scaling in SPSS. 
For each variable, the blank responses were encoded as response categories of their own. 
What is most crucial to sociological applications is visualising the data using group- and 
context-averages (of vectors F above), however. The graphs related to construction 
variables were produced automatically. Nevertheless, because of the memory allocation 
issues of SPSS that made it crash when on too much memory load, for each plot I had 
to first choose two out of the five dimensions before resizing the figure. In addition, the 
context-dependent plots were constructed by first aggregating the MCA-data using 
SPSS AGGREGATE command. This enabled colour coding of national contexts, 
which helped drawing vectors between occasions (using Photoshop)—quite an onerous 
task and took roughly an hour for each one of the nearly 40 different plots. 
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Appendix	10	
Making	Maps	with	R	
 
R is a free statistical software with a wealth of packages for visualising data. To draw the 
geographic maps of Europe, I used the R packages maptools, ggplot2 and ggmap. The 
shape-data was first downloaded from Eurostat under the ‘Administrative and 
Statistical Units’ website (http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/gisco/geodata/reference-
data/administrative-units-statistical-units/nuts, NUTS_2010_60M_SH.zip), and it 
could be used to map out any geographical data based on NUTS-units. Shape-data was 
imported by the readShapePoly-command and then suitably transformed by fortify, after 
which the maps were drawn by using ggplot, geom_path, geom_polygon and theme-
commands (the source code is exemplified in goo.gl/q5hRuD).  
	 	
 346 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	
Notes		
                                               
 
 
1 Published by the Basel Committee on Bank Supervision in late 2011, Basel III –standards were created 
in a collaborative process including hundreds of private and central banks throughout the world in order 
to tackle certain regulatory issues related to bank supervision at the global scale. 
2 Even if the combined public debt of all EU-countries increased from 66 % to 87 % between 2007 and 
2011, this is not an alarming figure when compared with Japan, where the public debt is at a level 
comparable to Greece. 
3 The former Finance Minister and an acknowledged macro-economist Yanis Varoufakis argues that the 
ECB intentionally reinitiated the discussion about bank solvency in Greece in order to evoke financial 
fears and political pressure against Syriza. 
4 In particular, the analysis responds to Jones' (2002: 3) request for more 'holistic' perspectives to the 
changing patterns of employment and 'youth transitions'. 
5 In a recent Eurobarometer (75.3, 2011) survey it appears that only 5.2 % of respondents are concerned 
about private debt whereas the national debt is addressed by 11.3 % of the respondents. However, even in 
Greece, Ireland, Latvia and Spain government debt concerned only 8.3–16.2 % of respondents whereas 
the unemployment concerned 52.0–76.5 % of the respondents. This suggests that monetary debt, even at 
the national level, is not similarly adjacent to people’s life-experiences as the unemployment crisis is. Also, 
relative to others, Protestant Latvians are concerned about their level of debt even if it is relatively low. 
6 Rather, such knowledges themselves are embedded and embodied and thus subject to socio-cultural 
differences as I illustrate in the third chapter. 
7 In 2012, nine countries paid over 5 % interest rates, while Denmark, Sweden and the UK (non-Euro 
countries), and Germany, Luxemburg, Finland and the Netherlands benefited from the crisis by paying 
less than 2 % annual rates. In the case of Greece, we can of course ask whether the 22.5 % figure is 
comparable to other Euro-countries given the default of some of its debt. The yield-figure is, however, 
significantly higher than the second highest rate of Portugal (10.55 % in 2012), and the ‘hair-cut’ basically 
addressed only these excess interest payments. The other countries paying rates significantly higher than 
prior to the Euro-crisis are Hungary (7.55 %), Cyprus (7.00 %), Romania (6.68 %), Ireland (6.17 %), 
Spain (5.85 %), Slovenia (5.81 %), and Italy (5.49 %). However, what is crucial to the fiscal situation in 
the corresponding countries is not only the absolute rate but also the level of debt relative to GDP, for it 
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is the product of the two which determines the overall cost of public financing. In 2012, the national 
economy in Greece was 156.9 % of GDP. A large share of its revenue then went to foreign speculators—
much higher than in, say, Romania and Slovenia, where national debt is only 37.3 % or 53.4 % of GDP 
respectively. In results, the interest rates encode ‘political’ and other kind of risks, not just economic 
sustainability. Market rates are also inherently ‘speculative’ in a sense that investors base their views on 
how they believe others to grade economic, political or moral risks rather than of how they themselves 
perceive them. For example, despite its extreme level of public debt (121.7 % in 2012) and large deficit 
(8.2 %), Ireland pays only 6.17 % interest on long-term bonds in 2012. Portugal runs the same level of 
debt but lower deficit (5.5 %), yet it pays 10.55 % interest on long-term bonds. 
8 In 2012 there were 27 EU-countries (excluding Croatia, which joined the EU in July 2013) and ten of 
them had their own currencies (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Latvia until 2014, 
Lithuania until 2015, Poland, Romania, Sweden and the UK). These countries are then not directly 
involved in the Euro-crisis even if the combination of the global financial crisis and the Eurozone 
recession have become consequential to virtually all the EU-countries 
9 Similar views have been expressed in the non-equilibrium economics based on Thorstein Veblen’s 
(1898) ‘principle of circular and cumulative causation’ and further developed, for example, by the Swedish 
Nobel Prize economist Karl Gunnar Myrdal (1898–1987). There is a revival of interest in this forgotten 
branch of economics since the financial crisis (Berger ed., 2009). 
10 Basel III -standards seek to raise capital reserves but also introduce counter-cyclical capital buffers 
based on the so-called Hodrick–Prescott-filter. This approach is as such peculiar as it is at odds with the 
conventionally assumed efficient market -hypothesis.  
11 I could have phrased the public finance crisis alternatively as the ‘sovereing-debt crisis’. However, I have 
referred to the crisis as public finance crisis first because public finance problems extend to sub-sovereign 
bonds (e.g. municipal bonds), secondly because also the public economies that have not encountered a full 
scale bond crisis are otherwise affected by financial pressures, and thirdly because I want to emphasise the 
role of public policy, that is, the fact that the public finance crisis is also a crisis of the ‘public’. 
12 However, I compared the correlations with similar tests on weighted cases. At least the ranking order 
(between low and large correlations) remained intact with most pairs of variables; the correlations 
themselves were usually also higher in the weighted case, supporting the decision to consider unweighted 
contexts, which generally give more conservative results.  
13 It is the sum of the difference between the yearly GDP and GDP in 2007 for each year between 2008 
and 2012. 
14 Starting with the compounded growth of national income, it is strongly correlated (r = –0.78) with the 
number of months the country was in recession between 2007 and 2012. Similarly the GDP growth rate 
in 2012 correlates with the length of recession (–.755). The bond rates do reflect these economic factors: 
the length of recession (.62), the compounded real growth 2007–2012 (-.61) and the GDP growth in 
2012 (-.56) correlate with bond rates much more than the credit ratings, whose correlations with the 
variables above are all less than 0.4.  
15 Only the compounded real growth (2007-2012), but not so much the current rate, the longer period 
correlates with GINI-coefficient (–.33), which could also reflect longer trends than the few-year period 
eclipsed by the crisis. 
16 High government bond rates are associated with decrease in unemployment benefits per claimant (r = -
.39) and with high levels of national debt (r = –.46). 
17 The ‘crisis’ is constructed ‘phenomenologically’ as a latent explanan—the totality of all effects that have 
occurred over the past years—and it is impossible to say whether for example the ‘real economic’ crisis 
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preceded or followed the ‘financial’ crisis (these already refer to what explains the crisis but are not being 
explained). 
18 The ‘basic law’ adopted in Hungary in 2011 adds several measures like the ceiling for the level of public 
debt, new taxation principles, and it restricts judicial control over public finance. 
19 Their correlation is negative in the Continental and the Eastern regimes, and yet slightly positive in 
both the Nordic and the Southern regimes. Therefore, in the Continental regime the more traditional 
division of labour could contribute to economic safety, unlike in the other regimes. 
20 Technically PAF is a thype of structural equation modeling and often referred to as confirmatory 
factorial analysis.  
21 Sir William Beveridge is known for the Beveridge Report on Social Insurance and Allied Services published 
in 1942. This work has been regarded as pivotal to the birth of the welfare state in the UK.  
22 This led to such a controversial idea that even material particles like ‘quarks’ could eventually be framed 
as social constructions (Pickering, 1984).  
23 This independence of ‘ethnical’ and ‘epistemic’ orientations towards the crisis also confirms Weber and 
Durkheim’s classical post-Kantian interpretation of the independence of ‘validity’ and ‘value’-claims (cf. 
Rose, 1985). 
24 This axis is distinct from another diagonal, which combines expectations about the prolongation of the 
crisis-resolution but also of positive attitudes towards them.  
25 Questions about the crisis include: the role of the ECB; the benefits of the Eurobonds and of financial 
market policies adopted in the EU (bank taxes, rules over the credit rating agencies); and a long-term 
vision about the EU (modernise the labour market, help the poor and socially excluded).   
26 In addition to GLMM, there are alternative approaches to multilevel logistic regression, which can 
better handle violations of model assumptions and, in some cases, of missing data. The GEE used more 
standardly in epidemiological research is only semi-parametric, which means that estimating equations do 
not result but after the complete specification of the joint distribution of observed variables (Liang and 
Zeger, 1986). The GEE is particularly suitable for longitudinal data, however, as it does not assume the 
independence of responses.  
27 In generalised linear models, the independent responses y form an exponential family 
 
 
The regression factor, 훽, then minimises the function 
  
 
that in turn results in the maximum likelihood model.  
28 The number of positive values divided by the number of those who score 0. In a sample where, say, 20 
% of the respondents are unemployed, the odds of being unemployed is 20 % / 80 % = 1 / 4. 
29 For a large set of data with hundreds of predictors, any denser time-series data would be unfeasible. 
Also, the comparison between two years of response allows the crisis to be represented as a historical 
event—the ‘totality’ of its effects—without yet specifying whether the changes have been abrupt or 
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whether they should be reflected as more perpetual processes. A process-based view in contrast would 
require us to restrict to only one of the two levels.  
30 In particular, a 3-level model would not resonate with change: for example, we would only be able to 
treat cabinet composition as a variable relative to the year of response, but not political reactions or 
changes in cabinet composition themselves as meaningful predictors. Such models would then 
‘economise’ the picture by ‘explaining away’ the crisis: changes in the outcomes would be viewed only as 
results from the changes in predictors instead of interpreting the changes themselves. 
31 This ‘totality’ of the crisis as a phenomenon also means that it should not be explained away by 
referring to specific ’logic’ or events like the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Instead, the crisis is a historical 
period encompassing virtually all possible processes that may not always be linked to Lehman Brothers, 
unemployment or other faces of the crisis (except rhetorically). Much about the crisis remains contingent 
to our knowledge. 
32 Policy and equality -variables were left out for the simple reason that it is itself interesting to 
understand the ALMPs as ‘political’ regulators of the crisis and as I wanted to avoid overlapping between 
variables. 
33 The modelled employment-related variables include the following binary variables: unemployed, long-
term unemployed, at work, never had a paid job, fixed term contract, work simultaneously in two jobs. In 
terms of the economic situation, the structured outcomes included the deprivation index and the social 
exclusion index (integers) and a binary variable identifying those with no household income during the 
past year; unstructured likert-scale outcomes, recoded into binary outcomes, were ‘able to make ends 
meet’ and whether the household can afford a ‘meal with meat, chicken, fish every second day if you 
wanted it’. 
34 To exemplify, mathematically the pre-crisis difference in the odds for the referenc-group and the young 
follows from the fact that e.394 = 1.48. The post-crisis rates further multiply this difference by e.370 = 1.45. 
In multilevel models, when we specify the group-effects the coefficients are additive, which means that 
the combined post-crisis difference is therefore e(.394 + .370) = e.394 ×e.370 = 2.16.  
35 Deprivation: .760***; social exclusion:.408***; ends meet: -1.334***; cannot afford proper meals: 
1.212***. 
36 As the PCA- and PAF-models directly incorporate the increase in unemployment rates as part of the 
sum variables, it is understandable that these models much better explain interclass variance of the wave-
effect, explaining about 80 % of the variation of unemployment rates, and 50–75 % of the variation in 
long-term rates. 
37 These effects then reflect the life expectancy gap as an ’existential’ inequality-measure; as a measure of 
vital inequality –measure it would be assumed to result with male-related difficulties.  
38 The interpretation does not apply to food deprivation, which was lower and has become lower further 
in the countries where the political landscape has shifted from the right to the left.  
39 More specifically, this means that the additive structure in combining variables fails. For example, for 
Southern, Catholic countries we could not calculate the effects by adding the two coefficients. 
40 In the long-term refinancing operations (LTRO) in 2011–2012 the ECB provided liquidity to nearly 
1000 banks in the amount of over €1000 billion, and the operations have been continued further since. In 
2015 the ECB started direct purchases of sovereign-bonds worth €60 billion every month, being now 
extended to municipal and public liabilities. 
41 While it is difficult to know whether the reasons to leave occupation unreported are the same before 
and after the crisis, at least it is clear that because many of those who do not report occupation are un- or 
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underemployed, there is no conflict between the unemployed- and no-occupation figures. The 
unemployed and those who reported no occupation status also scored similarly in respect to trust in 
government, generational tension and ethnic tension. 
42 ‘Institutional trust’ and ’social tensions’ refer to two sum variables. The former is based on trust in ’the 
national parliament’, ‘the legal system’, ‘the press’, ‘the police’ and ‘the government’. The latter 
encompasses tensions between the rich and poor, management and workers, men and women, old and 
young, racial and ethnic, and between religious groups.  
43 In fact, ethnic tensions is one of the few variables where the bond yield ×unemployed –interaction is 
significant. 
44 Bulgaria, Slovakia and the Czech Republic illustrate more recognising patterns, whereas in Hungary, 
Slovenia and the Baltics more projective and externalising attitudes prevail. 
45 Interestingly, however, Marx’s own central works were written in reaction to the previous meta-cycle, 
which culminated short after the manifest and was followed by the Victorian growth of the 1860’s and the 
1870’s. 
46 The linear level 2 variables were recoded into two, three or four response categories. 
47 The plots are accessible in the author’s personal Dropbox-folder (goo.gl/wGVew1). They are 
constructed in generally and then in the following specific settings:  
— country by age and wave among 18 to 64 year-olds 
— country by age and wave among the unemployed 
— level 1 variables by wave 
— level 2 variables recoded into categorical variables by wave (separated into two groups) 
— factorial (PAF) and ALMPs variables, each recoded into three categories, by wave.  
48 MCA-construction, axes 1 and 3 (goo.gl/FGB3g9).  
49 MCA-construction, axes 1 and 2 (goo.gl/xpkfpN).  
50 MCA-construction, axes 4 and 5 (goo.gl/vg0Jz6).  
51 All respondents, MCA-axes 1 and 3 (goo.gl/Z7RMRj). 
 
52 Fixed term, MCA-axes 1 and 3 (goo.gl/s4fySu).  
53 Unemployed, MCA-axes 1 and 3 (goo.gl/VXVgxI).  
54 Fixed term, MCA-axes 1 and 2 (goo.gl/74UOmG).  
55 Unemployed, MCA-axes 1 and 2 (goo.gl/u5t2ax).  
56 Employed, MCA-axes 1 and 2 (goo.gl/QcvSoF).  
57 Level 1 groups, MCA-axes 1 and 2 (goo.gl/6AYy09). 
58 Fixed term, MCA-axes 4 and 5 (goo.gl/6D44xD).  
59 Unemployed, MCA-axes 4 and 5 (goo.gl/QZTltN).   
60 All respondents, MCA-axes 4 and 5 (goo.gl/qpOyL7). 
61 Employed, MCA-axes 4 and 5 (goo.gl/hs4aoF).  
62 This was done by aggregating the results within countries and based on several demographic, socio-
economic and occupation categories. For the resulting 1600 groups of respondents, MCA-axes were then 
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correlated, and they were also compared with several variables that were similarly aggregated from the 
EQLS. 
63 And Sartre continues: ‘hiding from [them]selves the consciousness of [their] own freedom’. 
64 In some countries like Lithuania and Finland the crisis appears to have exaggerated the effects among 
the young, whereas in countries like Denmark the shift in attitude is more likely to concern older adults 
(see goo.gl/RXrXOY).  
65 Reliability reflected by the high Cronbach’s alpha-coefficients (ranging from .4 to .8) is also visible from 
the low interclass variances (between .005 and .035 for the wave-effect in working age population) 
suggesting that level 2 predictors can give a reasonable insight into how the geographies of wellbeing are 
affected (the alternative PAF and PCA models were omitted). Because of limited resources and given 
that the considered affects are anyway abstract constructs, I only developed the models for welfare- and 
religion-related predictor sets but did not calculate the entire genealogy of the relevant interclass 
variances. 
66 Solitude -.047 and -.225*** unemp.; indifference -.048*** and -.112*** unemp; inner directedness -.041 
and -.284*** unemp. Among the young: solitude -.061** and -.199** unemp.; indifference -.078*** and -
.008 unemp.; inner directedness -.176*** and -.176* unemp.  
67 I first recorded the expected values or probabilities of several outcomes as modelled against the PCA- 
and PAF-models. The set of predictors were chosen so as to minimise the interclass variances in order to 
make the representation of the ‘field’ of youth maximally reliable. 
68 Deviations in positive affectivity distinguish particularly the overtly positive Danes and the least positive 
Swedes in aftermath of the crisis. However, it is notable that the Greek young are no longer as extremely 
non-positive as they were in 2007. 
69 This quote can originally be traced back to Jameson although it became more famous after being 
associated with the 'Žižek cult'—for example Mark Fischer (2009) misplaces the quote to Slavoj Žižek.  
70 Yanis Varoufakis for example has been quite open about how their proposals were refused one after 
another instead of allowing them proper consideration. 
71 Published by Ifo, Sinn recently criticised the German economies for being unable to reclaim the 
promises about the benefits of economic convergence even after two decades after the unification. 
Sociologically it is crucial, however, to what extent the social and cultural effects are associated with this 
process and how they, in turn, benefit West German growth. See http://www.cesifo-
group.de/de/ifoHome/policy/Staff-Comments-in-the-Media/Press-articles-by-staff/Archive/Eigene-
Artikel-2015/medienecho_ifostimme-voxeu-01-11-2015.html (accessed 18 April 2016). 
72 It is possible that many of the results in empirical economics are skewed by the fact that they often 
ground on the dynamics of developing economies. 
73 Potlatch refers to the way in which an individual sacrifices her entire fortune in order to gain social 
recognition. The resources are subsequently spent together. Such activity was practiced by indigenous 
peoples of the Pacific Northwest Coast of Canada and the United States. In 1884 it was prohibited, 
however, given its ‘wasteful’ and ‘unproductive’ functions to society.   
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